Among children and adolescents, emotion understanding relates to academic achievement and higher well-being. This study investigates the role of general and emotion-specific language skills in children’s and adolescents’ emotion understanding, building on previous research highlighting the significance of domain-specific language skills in conceptual development. We employ a novel inventory (CEVVT) to assess emotion-specific vocabulary. The study involved 10–11-year-old children (N = 29) and 16–17-year-old adolescents (N = 28), examining their emotion recognition and knowledge of (...) class='Hi'>emotion regulation strategies. Results highlight the ongoing development of emotion-specific vocabulary across these age groups. Emotion recognition correlated with general vocabulary in the younger group. In the older age group, emotion recognition was related to emotion-specific vocabulary size, but this effect only became apparent when controlling for the depth of emotion-specific vocabulary. Against expectation, there were no significant contributions of general or emotion-specific vocabulary to knowledge of emotion regulation strategies in either age group. These findings enhance our comprehension of the nuanced interplay between language and emotion across developmental stages. (shrink)

The target article is well in accordance with recent theoretical advances considering the complex large-scale brain network organization underlying emotions. Given current limitations of the methods in brain science, however, research is faced with the difficult question as to how it will be possible to elucidate the complex nonlinear interactions, the neurotransmitters involved, and the excitatory or inhibitory nature of neural processes underlying human emotion in such networks. Moreover, while investigating the network properties of neural processes underlying emotions, it (...) is also important to keep in mind that specific brain structures, or specific brain networks, generate specific emotions. Thus, while aiming at elucidating complex large-scale brain networks of emotion, it is important to identify emotional specificity of, or within, these networks. (shrink)

The errors young children make when recognising others’ emotions may be systematic over-identification biases and may partially explain the challenges some have socially. These biases and associations may be differential by emotion. In a sample of 871 ethnically and racially diverse preschool-aged children (i.e. 33–68 months; 49% Hispanic/Latine, 52% Children of Colour), emotion recognition was assessed, and scores for accuracy and bias were calculated by emotion (i.e. anger, sad, happy, calm, and fear). Child and family characteristics and (...) teacher-reported social behaviour were also collected. Multilevel structural equation modelling revealed emotion-specific recognition accuracies varied between 36 and 65% whereas biases varied between 4 and 13%. Anger was the strongest bias followed by sad, happy, fear, and calm, in contrast to the pattern for accuracy – happy, sad, angry, fear, and calm. More variance was explained in emotion-specific recognition accuracies by child and family characteristics – 7–38% – than biases – 3–7%. Negatively-valanced emotion recognition biases associated with positively-valanced accuracies, and positively-valued emotion recognition biases associated with negatively-valued accuracies. Biases did not have meaningful associations with social behaviour. This study highlights that children’s emotion recognition errors may partially be systematic, but future studies are needed to understand the underlying cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

The present study examines the association between people’s interoceptive representation of physical sensations and the recognition of vocal and facial expressions of emotion. We used body maps to study the granularity of the interoceptive conceptualisation of 11 positive emotions (amusement, awe, compassion, contentment, desire, love, joy, interest, pride, relief, and triumph) and a new emotion recognition test (Emotion Expression Understanding Test) to assess the ability to recognise emotions from vocal and facial behaviour. Overall, we found evidence for (...) distinct interoceptive conceptualizations of 11 positive emotions across Asian American, European American, and Latino/a American cultures, as well as the reliable identification of emotion in facial and vocal expressions. Central to new theorising about emotion-related representation, the granularity of physical sensations did not covary with emotion recognition accuracy, suggesting that two kinds of emotion conceptualisation processes might be distinct. (shrink)

Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indicates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the perception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific aspects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emotion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception.

Most theories of affective influences on judgement and choice take a valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not specified if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is defined by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original (...) cognitive-appraisal dimensions of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisals—anger and fear—relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisal-tendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe examined the utility of a gaze cueing paradigm to examine sensitivity to differences among negatively valenced expressions. Participants judged target stimuli, the lo...

This research examined whether the non-conscious activation of an implicit appraisal concept could affect responses associated with the corresponding emotion as predicted by appraisal theories. Explicit and implicit emotional responses were examined. We focused on implicit unfairness and its effect on anger. The results show that subliminal activation of implicit unfairness affected implicit anger responses but not explicit anger feelings . The non-conscious effect of implicit unfairness was specific to anger, as no effect on sadness, fear, and guilt was (...) found. (shrink)

Past research has provided some evidence of positive relationships between leisure and cognitive functioning, but questions remain regarding their mechanisms. We argue that specific negative emotio...

The influence of emotion on episodic and autobiographical memory in schizophrenia was investigated. Using an experiential approach, the states of awareness accompanying recollection of pictures from the IAPS and of associated autobiographical memories was recorded. Results show that schizophrenia impairs episodic and autobiographical memories in their critical feature: autonoetic awareness, i.e., the type of awareness experienced when mentally reliving events from one’s past. Schizophrenia was also associated with a reduction of specific autobiographical memories. The impact of stimulus valence on (...) memory performance was moderated by clinical status. Patients with schizophrenia recognized more positive than negative pictures, and recalled more positive than negative autobiographical memories while controls displayed the opposite pattern. A hypothesis in terms of a fundamental executive deficit underlying these impairments is proposed. (shrink)

Expressive music, almost everyone agrees, evokes an emotional response of some kind in receptive listeners, at least some of the time, in at least some conditions of listening. But is such an emotional response distinctive of or unique to the music that evokes it? In other words, is there such a thing as music-specific emotion? This essay is devoted to an exploration of that question and others related to it. In the main part of the essay a sixpart component (...) model of a standard emotion is set out, and a case is made for the music-specificity of an emotional response to music of a mirroring sort, with respect to four of the six components of such emotion. In the latter part of the essay aspects of the phenomenology of the music-listening experience, and especially that of the inner sounding of music being heard, are explored further, and issues of the value, communicability, and degree of singularity of the emotional response to expressive music are addressed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this study was to examine the extent to which cognitive emotion regulation strategies were “common or transdiagnostic correlates” of symptoms of depression and anxiety and/or “specific correlates” distinguishing one problem category from the other. The sample comprised 582 13- to 16-year-old secondary school students. Symptoms of depression and anxiety were measured by the SCL-90, and cognitive emotion regulation strategies were measured by the CERQ, in a cross-sectional design. Multivariate regression analyses were performed. Before controlling for (...) comorbidity, the same cognitive emotion regulation strategies that were related to symptoms of depression were also related to symptoms of anxiety. However, after controlling for comorbid anxiety symptoms, rumination, self-blame, positive reappraisal, and positive refocusing were uniquely associated with depression symptoms; and after controlling for comorbid depression symptoms, ca... (shrink)

We review the jealousy literature and present our Dynamic Functional Model of Jealousy, which argues that jealousy evolved and has its own unique motivational state aimed at preventing others from usurping important relationships. It has a core form that exists in infants and nonhuman animals and an elaborated form in humans that emerges as cognitive sophistication develops. The DFMJ proposes that jealousy is an unfolding process with early and late phases that can be differentially impacted by relationship and personality factors. (...) It also notes the importance of looking at multiple concomitants of jealousy, including action tendencies. We discuss how jealousy fits with current emotion theories and suggest that theories of specific emotions need to be broadened. (shrink)

To date, emotion research has primarily focused on the experience and display of the emoter. However, of equal, if not more, importance is how such displays impact and guide the behavior of an observer. We incorporate a functionalist framework of emotion to examine the development of differential responding to discrete emotion, theorize on what may facilitate its development, and hypothesize the functions that may underlie such behavioral responses. Although our review is focused primarily on development, the theoretical (...) and methodological ideas laid out are relevant for researchers of emotion at all ages. (shrink)

Nowadays, the major depressive disorder is a common disease that negatively affects the life quality of many people around the world. As MDD symptoms are closely related with the changes in food and eating, the relation between patients’ emotional responses and food tastes could be used as criteria for diagnostic. Until now, studies on the emotional response to different food tastes for patients affected by MDD have been poorly described in literature. Therefore, the aim of this study was to evaluate (...) the emotional response of patients suffering from MDD to the imagined different food tastes and to compare the results with a control group. Emotional responses in tested participants were induced by using cards with words of basic food tastes such as “sweet,” “salty,” “bitter,” “sour,” and “neutral.” The assessment of emotional response was performed with FaceReader 6 software. The outcome of this study showed that participants with MDD expressed lower “happy” and “contempt” and higher “surprised” emotions, along with a higher negative valence mean, in comparison with controls for all tested basic tastes of food. When Likert scale was used, significant differences in response were only found for “sour” and “salty” imaginary tastes between healthy group and patients with MDD. The findings of this study provide the additional data on food–associated emotion analysis of MDD patients and could be useful for the further development of the contactless method for early diagnosis of MDD. (shrink)

To investigate the universality and cultural specificity of emotion processing in children from different ethnic groups (Han, Jingpo and Dai), we conducted three questionnaires, including emotional contagion scale, emotion regulation scale and the Chinese mood adjective check list (CMACL), among 1,362 ethnic Han, Dai and Jingpo participants (Mage = 13.78 years). We found emotion regulation (reappraisal and suppression) mediated the relations between emotional contagion and mood state, relation: (1) emotional contagion (positive and negative) increased positive mood (...) state and decreased negative mood state by reappraisal, and (2) Negative contagion finally increased negative mood state by weaken effect of reappraisal and enhance effect of suppression. Importantly, we found both universality and ethnic cultural specificity in the relations among emotional contagion, emotion regulation, and state mood. Firstly, the cultural specificity: (1) For Dai and Jingpo participants, negative contagion positively predicted reappraisal, while Han participants did not; (2) Jingpo participants demonstrated a weaker negative relation between reappraisal and negative mood state, and a stronger positive relation between negative contagion and suppression; and (3) Dai participants was the only ethnic group that showed a negative connection between negative contagion and positive mood state. Secondly, the emotion universality: Three ethnics both showed positive relations between negative contagion and negative mood, between suppression and negative mood; For all of them, positive contagion positively predicted positive mood state, mediated by reappraisal. In this paper, we discuss universal emotion processes and ethnic cultural differences in these emotion processes. (shrink)

This paper argues that emotional inferences about characters in a text are not as specific as previously assumed.

Emotion is central to human character, infiltrating our physiological functions and our mental constitution. In sport, athletes feel emotion in specific ways, from joy to anger and despair. This is the first book to examine emotion in sport from a philosophical perspective, building on concepts developed by ancient Greek and modern philosophers. For instance, how is Aristotle's concept of catharsis applied to the sports field? How about power as advanced by Nietzsche, or existentialism as discussed by Kierkegaard? (...) Emotion in Sports explores the philosophical framework for the expression of emotion and relates it to our psychological understanding, from the perspective of both athlete and spectator. A fascinating and useful read for students, researchers, scholars, and practitioners in the fields of sport sciences, philosophy, and psychology. (shrink)

Superior recognition of positive emotional facial expressions compared to negative expressions is well established. However, it is unclear whether this superiority effect differs between non-parents and parents, for whom emotion perception (EP) is an indispensable skill. Although EP has been shown to be modulated by the neuropeptide oxytocin, a central factor in the development of parental care, very little research has addressed the relationship between EP skills, the transition to parenthood, and plasma oxytocin levels. In the present study, we (...) assessed EP abilities with a test battery and measured plasma oxytocin in 77 non-parent and 79 parent couples and applied structural equation modelling to the data. The results showed increased happiness perception abilities in both parents and individuals with elevated oxytocin levels. Furthermore, non-parents showed superior abilities to recognise anger expressions. No significant associations were found regarding the perception of other basic emotion categories or with a general EP factor. The findings are consistent with previous research indicating that elevated oxytocin levels are associated with enhanced EP abilities. They also extend the existing literature by demonstrating that mothers and fathers, regardless of their oxytocin levels, exhibit increased EP superiority. (shrink)

It’s plausible that we only fully appreciate the value of something, say a painting or a blameworthy action, when we have a fitting emotional response to it, such as admiration or guilt. But exactly how and why do we grasp value through emotion? I propose, first, that a subject S phenomenally grasps property P only if what it is to be P is manifest in the phenomenal character of S’s experience. Second, following clues from the Stoics, I argue that (...) the phenomenal character of emotional experience is constitutively linked with its having directive content. More precisely, emotional experience directs us both to adopt a maxim for action – take certain characteristic kinds of action for an emotion-specific end – and to treat something about the object as a presumptively decisive reason to take such action for such end. If we assent to what the experience proposes (or rational control gets bypassed), we are motivated to take the relevant action and have a corresponding evaluative belief. This picture of emotional cognition yields a natural conception of the evaluative fittingness conditions of emotions without the problematic assumption that they have a presentational phenomenology. Instead, it is precisely in virtue of the directive and valenced phenomenology of emotion that values are only fully manifest in emotional experience, since values are essentially action- and attitude-guiding properties. (shrink)

Emotional information captures attention due to privileged processing. Consequently, performance in cognitive tasks declines. Therefore, shielding current goals fro...

This paper proposes a model for the analysis of emotions in which each emotion word in each language is made up of a universal component and a language-specific component; the universal component is drawn from a set of universal human emotions which underlie all emotion words in all languages, and the language-specific component involves a language-particular thought pattern which is expressed as part of the meanings of a variety of different words in the language. The meanings of a (...) variety of emotion words of Biblical Hebrew are discussed and compared with the meanings of English words with the same general meaning; it is shown that a number of the Biblical Hebrew words directly represent the biblical conception of God and the role of God combined with one or another of the proposed universal emotions. (shrink)

Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience (...) and correctness conditions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretation of purely-objectual emotional experiences which satisfies this weak view of propositional content. (shrink)

In this article, we advance the perspective that distinct emotions amplify different moral judgments, based on the emotion’s core appraisals. This theorizing yields four insights into the way emotions shape moral judgment. We submit that there are two kinds of specificity in the impact of emotion upon moral judgment: domain specificity and emotion specificity. We further contend that the unique embodied aspects of an emotion, such as nonverbal expressions and physiological responses, contribute to (...) an emotion’s impact on moral judgment. Finally, emotions play a key role in determining which issues acquire moral significance in a society over time, in a process known as moralization (Rozin, 1999). The implications of these four observations for future research on emotion and morality are discussed. (shrink)

In this work, on the one hand, we examined the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI) and empathy and, on the other, the relationship between emotional intelligence and nonverbal sensitivity, through two independent studies. The first study analyzed the relationship between dimensions of emotional intelligence and aspects of empathy, in a sample of 856 participants who completed two measures of EI, the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) and the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue), and a measure of empathy, The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (...) (IRI). The results showed a similar pattern of significant positive relations in all the EI domains with empathic Perspective-taking, and significant negative relationships with empathic Personal Distress, except for the EI domain of Attention, which had a positive relationship. Stepwise multiple regression analyses showed that the dimension that best predicted empathic Perspective-taking and Empathic Concern was the Emotionality Factor; whereas Attention best predicted empathic Fantasy; and the Self-Control Factor best predicted Personal Distress, although negatively. Gender emerged as a predictor of three empathic aspects, Fantasy, Empathic Concern, and Personal Distress, with women obtaining higher scores than men in all of them. Age was the only predictor of Fantasy, with a negative relationship. The second study involved 646 people who completed the same measures of EI as the participants of the first study and the Mini-Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (Mini-PONS). The results showed some significant relationships between EI dimensions and the channels and quadrants of the MiniPONS. Stepwise multiple regression analyses showed that very few EI dimensions predicted nonverbal sensitivity, with Attention obtaining the best result. Both gender and age emerged as predictors, some in unique cases, of channels, quadrants and of the total score of nonverbal sensitivity; age had a negative relationship, and women obtained higher scores than men. (shrink)

On the assumption that shame is a universal emotion, cross-cultural research on shame relies on translations assumed to be equivalent in meaning. Our studies here questioned that assumption. In three studies (Ns, 108, 120, 117),shamewas compared to its translations in Spanish (vergüenza) and in Malayalam (nanakedu). American English speakers usedshamefor the emotional reaction to moral failures and its use correlated positively withguilt, whereasvergüenzaandnanakeduwere used less for moral stories and their use correlated less with the guilt words. In comparison with (...) Spanish and Malayalam speakers’ ratings of their translations, American English speakers ratedshameandguiltto be more similar to each other. (shrink)

Modern appraisal theories inherited a problem from the Schachter theory: are emotions directed at intentional objects, and if so, why? On both theories the emotion is initiated by some sort of cognitive state, which according to Schachter produces a state of arousal, and according to appraisal theorists a cluster of emotion-specific states. If cognitions are components of the emotional state it may seem like we can explain why emotions inherit objects from those cognitions. In this article I focus (...) on appraisal theories, and argue that appraisals are emotional components because they are synchronized with other emotion subsystems. However, emotions do not inherit their intentional objects from appraisals, because the appraisals that are emotional components are generic, rather than object-directed. (shrink)

The auditory gaze cueing effect (auditory-GCE) is a faster response to auditory targets at an eye-gaze cue location than at a non-cue location. Previous research has found that auditory-GCE can be influenced by the integration of both gaze direction and emotion conveyed through facial expressions. However, it is unclear whether the emotional information of auditory targets can be cross-modally integrated with gaze direction to affect auditory-GCE. Here, we set neutral faces with different gaze directions as cues and three emotional (...) sounds (fearful, happy, and neutral) as targets to investigate how the emotion of sound target modulates the auditory-GCE. Moreover, we conducted a controlled experiment using arrow cues. The results show that the emotional content of sound targets influences the auditory-GCE but only for those induced by facial cues. Specifically, fearful sounds elicit a significantly larger auditory-GCE compared to happy and neutral sounds, indicating that the emotional content of auditory targets plays a modulating role in the auditory-GCE. Furthermore, this modulation appears to occur only at a higher level of social meaning, involving the integration of emotional information from a sound with social gaze direction, rather than at a lower level, which involves the integration of direction and auditory emotion. (shrink)

Affective aspects of a stimulus can be processed rapidly and before cognitive attribution, acting much earlier for verbal stimuli than previously considered. Aimed for specific mechanisms, event-related brain potentials (ERPs), expressed in facial expressions or word meaning and evoked by six basic emotions – anger, disgust, fear, happy, sad, and surprise – relative to emotionally neutral stimuli were analysed in a sample of 116 participants. Brain responses in the occipital and left temporal regions elicited by the sadness in facial expressions (...) or words were indistinguishable from responses evoked by neutral faces or words. Confirming previous findings, facial fear elicited an early and strong posterior negativity. Instead of expected parietal positivity, both the happy faces and words produced significantly more negative responses compared to neutral. Surprise in facial expressions and words elicited a strong early response in the left temporal cortex, which could be a signature of appraisal. The results of this study are consistent with the view that both types of affective stimuli, facial emotions and word meaning, set off rapid processing and responses occur very early in the processing stage. (shrink)

Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In (...) a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that “compassion” is a more adequate emotion than “sadness”. The emotion “sadness” is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion “compassion” is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. (shrink)

Emotions have long been of interest to philosophers and have deep historical roots going back to the Ancients. They have also become one of the most exciting areas of current research in philosophy, the cognitive sciences, and beyond. -/- This book explains the philosophy of the emotions, structuring the investigation around seven fundamental questions: What are emotions? Are emotions natural kinds? Do animals have emotions? Are emotions epistemically valuable? Are emotions the foundation for value and morality? Are emotions the basis (...) for responsibility? Do emotions make us better people? -/- In the course of exploring these questions, the book also discusses cutting-edge empirical research on emotion, feminist approaches to emotions and their value, and methodological questions on how to theorize about the emotions. The book also contains in-depth discussions of specific emotions like compassion, disgust, anxiety, and curiosity. It also highlights emerging trends in emotion research. (shrink)

This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.

This article reviews existing empirical research on the peak-and-end rule. This rule states that people's global evaluations of past affective episodes can be well predicted by the affect experienced during just two moments: the moment of peak affect intensity and the ending. One consequence of the peak-and-end rule is that the duration of affective episodes is largely neglected. Evidence supporting the peak-and-end rule is robust, but qualified. New directions for future work in this emerging area of study are outlined. In (...) particular, the personal meanings associated with specific moments and with specific emotions should be assessed. It is hypothesised that moments rich with self-relevant information will dominate people's global evaluations of past affective episodes. The article concludes with a discussion of ways to measure and optimise objective happiness. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to (...) think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries. (shrink)

A widespread perspective describes emotions as distinct categories bridged by fuzzy boundaries, indicating that emotions are distinct and dimensional at the same time. Theoretical and methodological approaches to this perspective still need further development. We conceptualize emotions as overlapping networks of causal relationships between emotion components—networks representing distinct emotions share components with and relate to each other. To investigate this conceptualization, we introduce network analysis to emotion research and apply it to the reanalysis of a data set on (...) multiple positive emotions. Specifically, we describe the estimation of networks from data, and the detection of overlapping communities of nodes in these networks. The network perspective has implications for the understanding of distinct emotions, their co-occurrence, and their measurement. (shrink)

I agree with the commentators that study of physical disease risk conferred by affective dispositions such as anger/hostility, anxiety, and sadness, should be more cognizant of developments in emotion theory. Emotions differ in their functional value depending on the person’s lifespan trajectory. Discrete emotions have different psychophysiological signatures; and emotional competence, including production, regulation, and knowledge, may be critical in determining whether specific negative affects, or general negative affectivity, are toxic for physical health. Emotion researchers, however, have mainly (...) focused on acute affective experiences and ignored the general effects of negative affectivity, which subsumes the discrete negative affects. Most diseases develop over years so more needs to be known about the biological signatures of chronic specific affects and negative affectivity. (shrink)