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Questo articolo cerca di esplorare il rapporto tra parrēsia ed exemplum negli ultimi Corsi al Collège de France di Michel Foucault. A partire da L’ermeneutica del soggetto , viene analizzato il campo semantico e pratico relativo alla direzione di coscienza stoica ed epicurea, in cui Foucault oppone la parrēsia all’adulazione e alla retorica per collocarla invece all’interno di un’importante serie di concetti: la paradosis (la trasmissione dei discorsi di verità), il kairos (il momento giusto, la circostanza opportuna) e l’ (...) class='Hi'>exemplum definito come «il cuore della parrēsia » poiché esso assicura l’ adæquatio tra il soggetto di enunciazione e il soggetto di comportamento che si conforma alla verità espressa dal primo. Successivamente, viene posta l’attenzione sul legame tra parrēsia ed exemplum nell’ultimo Corso, Il coraggio della verità , per mettere in evidenza un’importante riconfigurazione all’interno della parrēsia cinica, in cui l’esempio appare come una categoria etica basata sulla permanenza e sull’identità a sé. Pertanto, esso si rivela inadeguato per questo regime aleturgico della parrēsia cinica, che invece consiste in un atteggiamento etico sperimentale, una mise à l’épreuve cui sottomettere la vita per arrivare a una trasformazione politica del mondo attraverso una continua e scandalosa provocazione degli altri, in grado di mettere in discussione la percezione di norme culturali e di abitudini consolidate. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the mythological exemplum in Vergil’s “Eclogues”, examining those passages where certain legendary characters are used as significant mythological exempla (i. e. Ecl. 2.19-27, 4.31-36, 4.53-59, 6.27-30 and 8.69-71). These exempla whose subject is mostly related to music and song, are used to serve Vergil’s literary goals in the passages where they are found (i. e. literary function); but, most significantly they are closely associated with poetry and poetics, symbolising either the epic or pastoral genre (...) or neoteric poetry (i. e. meta-literary function). (shrink)

The former consensus stipulating the singularity and incomprehensibility of Nazism and the "Final Solution" has been challenged in recent years from two perspectives. Microhistorical works and studies of poststructuralist orientation have emphasized the normal and ordinary aspects that link Nazism and the Holocaust to the postwar period. Both approaches differ in their understanding of the concept of historical truth, but together they stress the need for close-range, contextualist methods for studying the emergence of the "Final Solution" and the development of (...) its representation and memorialization since 1945. This paradigmatic change in the perception of Nazism from an exceptional to an exemplary event apparent in recent scholarship in the United States follows similar developments in Germany. In both countries the rejection of the concept of singularity and the use of contextualist methods developed as a result of a more general generational transformation. Younger scholars born after World War II seek to integrate Nazism within its wider historical context and use knowledge about Nazism and the "Final Solution" as a key to better understanding of the modern era and contemporary societies, a project hitherto discouraged by the notion of Nazism's exceptionality. (shrink)

El relato mitológico de Níobe es un motivo constante en la literatura antigua que se remonta a la Ilíada de Homero. Así, esta primera referencia textual sobre Níobe ha sido reutilizada, remodelada e incluso reinterpretada a lo largo de los siglos hasta la literatura latina de época imperial. No solo nos referimos aquí al relato mítico, en términos de forma o contenido, sino también a la conexión entre el uso y función del propio episodio. Todo ello indica el dinamismo de (...) los textos, es decir, que ni estos ni su interpretación eran fijos, sino que podían cambiar dependiendo de la necesidad del autor en su obra. (shrink)

La obra de Valerio Máximo se inscribe en las transformaciones políticas, socioculturales y simbólicas propias de la instauración del principado. En este artículo se estudian las características y funciones de la dubitatio, una de las figuras retóricas más idiosincrásicas del estilo de este autor, como marca textual que permite recuperar el comportamiento del enunciador como agente del discurso ejemplar y de la memoria, temas centrales del texto y de un contexto en que la elite se ve obligada a redefinir su (...) identidad y su papel en la escena política. The work of Valerius Maximus enrolls in the political, socio-cultural and symbolic transformations of the advent of the Principate. We study the features and functions of dubitatio, one of the most idiosyncratic rhetorical figures of this author's style, as a textual markings which allows recover the position of the speaker as an agent of the exemplary discourse and memory, main focus of the text and of a context in which the elite is forced to redefine their identity and their role in the political scene. (shrink)

This book explores the contradictory images of the Spartan polis presented in the work of Isocrates. Countering the belief that presentation is always subordinate to rhetorical persuasion, the author shows that Isocrates actually presented different types of argumentation. Isocrates distanced himself from many arguments, calling for a discourse based on morality. His work is a critical commentary on the rhetorical practices of his times.

“She is the second St. Clare.” These words were inscribed by poet Jehan Le Fèvre as a tribute to his neighbor and living contemporary, the fourteenth-century Minorite sister Jehanne de Neuville , abbess of Longchamp from 1375-87. By invoking the example of Clare, the first Franciscan woman religious, to adorn his thirty-five-line portrait of Jehanne, Le Fèvre produced a conventional and orthodox encomium to both women. The context, however, is decidedly secular and even surprising for this type of material.This essay (...) will begin with a translation and discussion of Le Fèvre’s tribute to Jehanne de Neuville and two other nuns of her abbey, in relation to their literary and .. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to show how Thomas More's use of a seemingly obscure episode from Livy's Ab Urbe Condita in his Apology provides important insights into the major themes of the polemical project that was to consume his final years. More's adaptation of the episode situates him among other Renaissance luminaries who saw in it a means to explore how group dynamics affect individual judgement and shape common opinion. The adaptation also serves to provide thematic cohesion in a (...) polemic long considered excessively excursive and without merit, literary or otherwise. This exploration will further shed light upon the ways in which Renaissance authors appropriated classical histories to address contemporary concerns. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Philologus Jahrgang: 160 Heft: 2 Seiten: 372-378.

The comparison between Prop. 2, 34, 91-92 and Virg. ecl. 10, 18 allows to argue that Gallus treated Adonis in his love elegy and that he used this character as an exemplum, in the same way of his future followers, in particular Propertius and Ovid. It is possible that he imitated Euphor. fr. 43 Pow., and for this reason we can try to reconstruct his relationship with the models and his freedom in in adapting them to the new elegiac (...) poetry. (shrink)

This article addresses the topic of excerpts by focusing on modern excerpting practices used in the analysis of Greek myth. It examines the mythological exemplum about Melanion and Timon from Aristophanes’ Lysistrata within the context of Greek myth’s flexibility and potential for innovation. After discussing the innovative details of the exempla, I turn to the use of the Melanion excerpt by two prominent classicists, P. Vidal-Naquet and M. Detienne. This leads to some general remarks on the transmission of knowledge (...) regarding mythological lore, as well as on our modern scholarly practices of excerpting passages out of their original context. (shrink)

Christian parables have retained their force well beyond the sphere of religion; indeed, they share with much of modern literature their status as a form of address: "Who hath ears to hear, let him hear." There is no message without there first being--or, more subtly, without there also being in the message itself--an address to a capacity or an aptitude for listening. This is not an exhortation of the kind "Pay attention!" Rather, it is a warning: if you do not (...) understand, the message will go away.The scene in the Gospel of John in which the newly risen Christ enjoins the Magdalene, "Noli me tangere," a key moment in the general parable made up of his life, is a particularly good example of this sudden appearance in which a vanishing plays itself out. Resurrected, he speaks, makes an appeal, and leaves."Do not touch me." Beyond the Christ story, this everyday phrase says something important about touching in general. It points to the place where touching must not touch in order to carry out its touch (its art, its tact, its grace). The title essay of this volume is both a contribution to Nancy's project of a "deconstruction of Christianity" and an exemplum of his remarkable writings on art, in analyses of "Noli me tangere" paintings by such painters as Rembrandt, Dürer, Titian, Pontormo, Bronzino, and Correggio. It is also in tacit dialogue with Jacques Derrida's monumental tribute to Nancy's work in Le toucher--Jean-Luc Nancy.For the English-language edition, Nancy has added an unpublished essay on the Magdalene and the English translation of "In Heaven and on the Earth," a remarkable lecture he gave in a series designed to address children between six and twelve years of age. Closely aligned with his entire project of "the deconstruction of Christianity,'" this lecture may give the most accesible account of his ideas about God. (shrink)

Das Phänomen des Angst- oder Alptraums fügt sich, wie Freud selbst betonte, nur schlecht zu bestimmten Grund­annahmen seiner Traumtheorie. Umso erstaunlicher ist es, dass er dem Theoriekapitel der Traumdeutung einen Text voranstellte, der sich, entgegen seiner Absicht, auch als Alptraum lesen lässt: den sog. »Traum vom brennenden Kind«. In diesem Text sind Traum und Erzählung so untrennbar verbunden, dass er sich narrativen Genres wie dem Märchen und dem Exemplum annähert. Tatsächlich weist er, was bisher nicht gesehen wurde, starke Bezüge (...) zu dem Grimm’schen Märchen vom »Totenhemdchen« auf. Der vorliegende Beitrag unternimmt eine vergleichende Lektüre des atypischen Traums und des atypischen Märchens. Sie erlaubt, psychologische Fragen zu adressieren, die sowohl traum- als auch literaturtheoretisch relevant sind: die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Wunscherfüllung und Angstausdruck und die Frage nach elementaren symbolischen Verfahren, die einem traumatischen Verlust an »Traumhaftigkeit« entgegenarbeiten. (shrink)

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Renaissance Crisis of ExemplarityFrançois Rigolot“Every example is lame” (Tout exemple cloche), acknowledged Montaigne in the last chapter of his Essais. 1 Was this the moaning of a lone, disillusioned skeptic or the idiosyncratic formulation of a widely shared attitude of mistrust at the end of the sixteenth century? To answer this question one must first examine the epistemological status of examples at the end of the period we (...) still conventionally call the “Renaissance”; and this is the purpose of this group of papers. 2In his work on the notion of exemplum in early modern France and Italy John D. Lyons helped restore the concept of exemplarity to its central place in the history of rhetoric. 3 From Aristotle’s paradeigmata—simple case stories at the orator’s disposal (Rhetoric 1.2. 1356b)—to Montaigne’s “lame” exemples—contingent instances unfit for demonstrative purposes (Essais III, 13, 1070)—the rhetorical impulse has followed strangely circuitous ways. Part of the confusion is probably due to the transformation of technical language under the pressure of common usage. Throughout the early modern period, while the Latin word exemplum continued to refer to rhetorical practice (an illustrative anecdote with a moral point), its vernacular derivatives (esempio, ejemplo, exemple, etc.) generally had a broader, looser, and less didactic meaning, as the emphasis was displaced to the “narrative” aspect of instances, regardless of their intentionality. In other words, although examples were often used to illustrate a didactic point, they differed from exempla inasmuch as they were not always meant to serve a demonstrative purpose.Of course, to the extent that choosing an example necessarily involves some form of selective process from a larger quantity of material, every instance is [End Page 557] bound to entertain a metonymic relation with a greater whole. But, etymologically, an example (essample, in Old French spelling) is a sample, one thing merely alleged to resemble another one, not a demonstrative tool. Yet in his Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London, 1611), Randle Cotgrave gave polysemous English equivalents for exemple and exemplaire:Exemple: 1) An example, sample, patterne, or president [sic] to follow; 2) a copie, or counterpane of a writing; 3) one thing alledged to prove, or inforce another that resembles it.Exemplaire: 1) A patterne, sample, or sampler; 2) an example, president [sic] or precedent, for others to follow, or to take heed by; 3) also, the copie, or counterpane of a writing. 4There is an odd mixture of demonstrative and non-demonstrative connotations. The two seemingly interchangeable words receive tripartite definitions, with the three meanings of exemple corresponding to the three of exemplaire.In Renaissance humanistic oratory the evocation of examples was often a simple matter of style. For better elocutory purposes public speakers were encouraged to use graphic case stories to make their speeches more appealing and enjoyable, but orators also used what they called exemplars (Latin exemplaria) to provide their audience with models of conduct to imitate. Worthiness was the ultimate criterion for exemplarity. Cato and Socrates were living symbols of moral determination and courage. They became powerful exemplars of ancient “virtue,” or moral fortitude (Latin virtus; Italian virtù). In the selective process of arguments (inventio), they were chosen because they exemplified a specific attitude or line of conduct: they were, by definition, exemplary examples. 5In the Renaissance the uplifting reading of ancient exemplars was closely related to the doctrine of imitatio, the sacrosanct recourse to inherited cultural models. At the same time the appeal of mimesis, characterized by the actual experience of the real world in reaction to scholastic insularity, greatly problematized the reception of ancient models. Whereas a long-held reverence for the imitative power of traditional exempla offered compelling patterns of moral conduct, the new attractiveness of a more “natural” mimetic discourse [End Page 558] tended to turn the study of models away from duplication. 6 In the face of the inexhaustible diversity and unpredictability of human actions, how can we choose a proper model after which to pattern our own behavior? This is one of the many questions raised by the humanist’s disenchantment with imitative symbols of moral conduct.In recent years the concept... (shrink)

The attention Seneca attracted in his lifetime and succeeding generations not only preserves information about his biography: it also merits interpretation as a cultural phenomenon on its own terms. This paper argues that the life of Seneca achieved exemplary status because it enabled Romans to think through issues critical to the preservation of social order. As a new man who rose to power as the republican noble families were dying out, Seneca posed the question of imperial succession in an acute (...) form. As a member of an imperial elite that was increasingly inclusive in its recruitment strategies, Seneca validated reliance on education and key cultural competencies as markers of elite status and legitimacy. His renown articulates a shift in emphasis within Roman culture from gloria-the old republican ideal based on zero-sum competition for honor-to claritas, or claritudo-distinction for special achievement or characteristics that grants entrée to a collective elite. The specific cultural competencies demonstrated by Seneca and noted by those who spread his renown alert us to practices the Romans especially valued, namely theatricality, the use of writing to display a persona, the mastery of general discourse, and the interpretation of politics in ethical terms. As an exemplum Seneca could be-and was-the target of both praise and blame. The story of his close relationship with Nero and subsequent tragic death placed him among the sacrificial victims Romans seemed to regard as legitimizing a social order based on domination by a well-defined elite. In addition to various of Seneca's writings, this essay considers in particular the Tacitean narrative of his relationship with Nero, Quintilian's analysis of his achievement and influence, and his depiction in Octavia. (shrink)

Cases—be they real or fictional—are commonplace both in the medical ethics literature and in the public media. Cases take on a variety of forms: from streamlined to book length narratives. They also serve a variety of different purposes, from illustration, to decision making, and from debunking to heuristics. Drawing on the rhetorical analysis of « exemplum », I shall describe what cases are, and what their role is in the practice of clinical ethics. I identify two basic ways in (...) which cases can be brought to bear on ethical thinking and practice: a « tamed » and a « wild » way, and show how « wild cases » can serve a useful heuristic function despite their appeal to emotions and their unusual and striking character. In conclusion, I will argue that cases, both in their wild and their tamed form, are not only useful pedagogical tools, but can serve as a legitimate empirical basis for medical ethics. (shrink)

The classic Arabic bibliographies ascribe to al-Farabi a treatise entitled Fi mahiyyat al-nafs (“On the Essence of the Soul”), of which no Arabic manuscript is known to exist. There is however a Hebrew text, translated from the Arabic by Zera[hudot]iah ben She'altiel [Hudot]en of Rome in 1284, which is ascribed to al-Farabi in all the manuscripts and which carries the title Ma'amar be-mahut ha-nefesh (“Treatise on the Essence of the Soul”). Since Steinschneider, this text is taken to be the translation (...) of al-Farabi's treatise lost in the original. In this paper I argue that the Ma'amar be-mahut ha-nefesh is not by al-Farabi: it is in vain that one looks in it for ideas characteristic to the Second Master, while the ideas expressed therein are incompatible with those of al-Farabi. I offer a study of Ma'amar be-mahut ha-nefesh, followed by an annotated translation into French. This is a “popular” Neoplatonic text, whose ideas are mostly very ordinary, but in part uncommon. It notably explains the emergence of forms in matter by positing the existence of a pneuma that by circulating around the body “brings forth” the vegetative and animal souls. The author also draws on an unusual notion called hemshel in Hebrew (a term probably translating the Arabic mithal, rendered as exemplum in Latin): the exemplum is said to become visible as a result of the pneuma's circular motion. The paper is followed by a short Note by Rémi Brague looking into the sources of the treatise. Brague concludes that the text cannot be assigned to any specific tradition. (shrink)

Dido's Epicureanism is as complex and problematic as Aeneas' much-discussed Stoicism. This paper argues that Virgil's allusions to Lucretius form a consistent pattern: Dido embodies the ironies inherent in Epicureanism as practiced by Virgil's contemporaries, mouthing apparently Lucretian sentiments even as she comes to personify a Lucretian exemplum malum. Yet her fall is largely due to the pervasive supernatural machinery of the Aeneid-divine intervention which Lucretius declares impossible. In Book 1, Virgil employs Lucretian allusions in distinctly un-Lucretian contexts to (...) suggest in Dido a disjunction between words and actions. There is a Lucretian flavor in the description of her initial equanimity, in her injunction to the Trojans to put away fear and cares, and in the scientific rationalism of the song of Iopas. These passages contrast with the sensualism evident in her lavish court and her growing passion for Aeneas-excesses of luxury and love described in words that Lucretius used to condemn them. In Book 4, Virgil more directly refutes Lucretian doctrine about the mortality of the soul and the indifference of the gods. The sarcastic questions of Anna and Iarbas are implicitly answered in such a way as to refute the Epicurean stance. Dido points to the gods' indifference a few seconds before she invokes their aid, and her final submission to Fate occurs in words that Lucretius used to deny its existence. Finally, the departure of Dido's soul recalls Lucretius' atoms of "heat and wind," in ironic contrast to the immortality of her Shade. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Three Moments in the Crisis of Exemplarity: Boccaccio-Petrarch, Montaigne, and CervantesKarlheinz StierleIn his recent book History as Topic Peter von Moos denies that there was any crisis for the exemplum in the Renaissance. 1 He strongly argues against my essay on “History as exemplum,” where I pointed out that in Montaigne, as earlier in Boccaccio, the pragmatic form of exemplum is put into question. 2 My (...) main interest in this essay, however, was not to mark a break between Middle Ages and Renaissance but to understand the way in which the correlation between sententia and exemplum was transformed into a more complex relation between moral reflection and particular case. Undoubtedly, since Valerius Maximus and his Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri, there has always been, as in John of Salisbury’s Policratius, the possibility of questioning the exemplary truth of the exemplum by opposing it to a never-ending wealth of counter-examples. This, however, never puts into question the idea of exemplarity itself. The validity of the exemplum as a rhetorical form of narration that tends towards its own conceptual or ideological structure has an anthropological basis. It presupposes that over time, there is more analogy in human experience than diversity, or that in all situations of civil and political life the pole of equality is stronger than that of difference.Boccaccio’s novella is precisely the narrative form that puts this anthropological basis into question. Each novella in the Decameron is essentially a [End Page 581] particular variant of a more general conceptual scheme. The stress of narration, however, is not on the scheme itself but on the autonomy of the variant. Basically the novella is a form of rewriting in the mode of retelling, thus bringing an elementary narration to higher complexity. 3 Each of the “vari casi,” mostly of love-affairs, is a confrontation of exemplarity and contingency. It is the power of contingency or fortuna that brings forth the specific particularity of each novella. The art of the writer Boccaccio, whose primary fiction is oral story-telling, consists in giving aesthetic evidence to this particularity. Reading, not listening, is the form of reception that corresponds to this structure. That Boccaccio adds the other title “Il Prencipe Galeotto” to the Decameron is an allusion to Dante’s Divine Commedy where in the famous episode of Paolo and Francesca (Inf. V), Galeotto becomes the personification of the allegory of reading and its seduction.Contingency, or, in Boccaccio’s own medieval terms, fortuna, is the real poet of the novella. That is why the most important scenes of the novellas are those where the power of contingency comes to light: at the sea and in the city. The particular shape of novella, which results from a balance between contingency and significant configuration, emerges from contingency itself. Its configuration is a particular case of contingency, one that by its immanent structural elegance is aesthetically gratifying. It nevertheless leaves open the question whether there might not be a power of a superior kind behind contingency. Because there is an ambiguity between contingency and sense, the exemplary status of each story is, ironically, placed in question. Contingency overcomes exemplarity; however, it never triumphs definitely. The impact on the exemplum by contingency not only gives to each narrative case its difference or even autonomy, it also opens up a new temporal dimension. The exemplum seems to move in an essential time where all time-aspects are controlled and functionalized by a dominating conceptual structure. In the novella time becomes a primary structure. “Or avviene che” is the narrative formula for this new quality of narrative time, becoming a time of disruption and instability where things and situations may change in a moment for the better or for the worse.I would like to illustrate the structure of the Boccaccian novella by at least one exemplary case. Almost in the middle of the book—which means in the middle of its temporal space of ten days—we find the novella of Federigo degli Alberighi, considered to be one of Boccaccio’s finest (V, 9). Federigo, in a world of merchants and trade, is the perfect nobleman who ruins himself by his... (shrink)

Considers the paradox of demonstrative retreat from public life, as illustrated by scenes like Sen. Ep. 78.20f. and Epict. 3.22.23 with ailing philosophers almost scurrilously eager to display their heroism. Why would a philosopher want to withdraw and, at the same time, make a show of his withdrawal? How can this kind of exemplarity fulfill its therapeutic function? And how is this kind of communication, with one’s back turned to the audience, as it were, supposed to work? Tacitus’ narrative of (...) Thrasea Paetus’ end in the Annales (16.22ff.) is analyzed as illustrating this form of communication and compared with a similar communication strategy of Seneca’s Epistulae morales as a document of exemplary withdrawal. Concentric circles of audiences and interactors are layered around the role model, and he reader is pulled into the center of the circle, into direct contact with the exemplum. The way in which this happens determines the reader’s role in the story and thus the import the role model. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el marco de las concepciones compensatorias de la naturaleza humana, la negatividad asignada a lo humano se «dialectiza». A partir de dicha constatación, señalaremos las dificultades que ello implica en el abordaje de las cuestiones actuales en torno al hombre. Evidenciaremos la importancia de renovar la noción de «ausencia de naturaleza» que circula en cierta línea alemana de problematización de lo humano, de la cual la noción de «pobreza» postulada por Heidegger constituirá el exemplum. Valiéndome de la (...) interpretación de la «pobreza» realizada por M. Blanchot, indicaré la posibilidad de leer la ausencia de naturaleza no en tanto pura negatividad sino como pasividad no dialectizable que afecta al hombre.PALABRAS CLAVE POBREZA, PASIVIDAD, BLANCHOT, HEIDEGGER, ESPOSITOABSTRACT Human negativity is “dialectized” within the framework of the compensatory conceptions of Human Nature. After analysing this point, we will call attention to the difficulties it implies when approaching the contemporary questions around the Human Being. We will demonstrate the importance of renewing the notion of ‘absence of nature’ that circulates in a certain German line of research on the human, of which the notion of ‘poverty’ postulated by Heidegger will constitute the exemplum. Making use of the interpretation of “poverty” made by M. Blanchot, we will indicate the possibility of reading the absence of nature not as pure negativity but as nondialectizable passivity that affects Man.KEYWORDS POVERTY, PASSIVITY, BLANCHOT, HEIDEGGER, ESPOSITO. (shrink)

This article examines Macrina’s ascetic identity and Gregory of Nyssa’s intentions in writing the Life of his sister. Macrina’s highly complicated profile is constructed on the basis of two identities: a public one that displays the conservative life of an obedient daughter and/or a grieving wife, and a secret one that allowed her to lead the life of a virgin, who challenged and revised the traditional role of women in late antique family. This secrecy, though not attributed to Macrina alone, (...) but almost to every character in the Life, is one of Gregory’s key patterns. As argued, this was his way to create an exemplum of asceticism, parallel to that developed in the Life of Anthony, but which instead would be accessible to laymen and would not contradict directly the ideals and norms of the Greco-Roman city. (shrink)

L’édition critique des œuvres de Moïse ben Sabbataï, philosophe juif actif (à Rome?) vers 1340, avait signalé, parmi d’autres sources latines lues dans les traductions en hébreu de son contemporain Juda de Rome, un exemplum présentant le sage athénien Solon sur son lit de mort en champion de la doctrine de l’élévation intellectuelle en vue de la vie éternelle. Cette note identifie comme sa source un chapitre d’Albert le Grand, De natura et origine animae II, 13, dont la traduction (...) en hébreu se trouve dans un ouvrage inédit de Juda de Rome, son Commentaire du Qaddīš et de la Qeduššāh. La traduction du chapitre est éditée, l’histoire de l’ exemplum reconstituée et son emploi par les trois auteurs, remis en contexte et interprété. (shrink)

This article traces Hobbes’s account of ‘exemplarity’ from his early writings to Leviathan. It argues that, by tracking Hobbes’s changing views on exemplarity, we get a better grasp on how he construed the effective conditions of an enduring peace in 1651. While these conditions are compatible with the formal structure of sovereignty, they remain distinct from it. I start by inserting Hobbes’s early engagement with historiography in the context of the ‘crisis of exemplarity’ of the late Renaissance. Whereas prior engagement (...) with antiquity had relied on a notion of exemplarity as historical particulars embodying general norms to be imitated in a contemporary setting, a dissatisfaction with this model, characteristic of a revived interest in Tacitus, appears in the sixteenth century. Initially adhering to this ‘Tacitean’ scheme of political theory, Hobbes ended up abandoning exemplarity as the foundational model of politics in Elements of Law and De cive. However, Leviathan reintroduced the scheme of exemplarity as a strategy of effective government. This strategy is based on a retrieval of the sovereign’s appearance as a moral exemplum to be imitated by the subjects. Lastly, I suggest that this change stems from the altered conditions of government at the end of the 1640s. (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of two meditative lectures (poetic songs) about God’s love which appeared in Kasper Twardowski’s poem entitled Pochodnia miłości Bożej z piącią strzał ognistych, the shorter First Song delivered by Mary Mother of God and the longer Fifth Song presented by Mary Magdalene. In both of these poetic lectures, the poet showed the power of God’s love to human beings and man’s pursuit of the mystic union with The Creator. Twardowski’s poem, which was classified as meditative (...) literature, so popular in Baroque, was based on the art of meditation and the ideas of Ignatius of Loyola. The poem is regarded as autobiographical and written with didactic objectives. The author probably thought that his personal internal history deserved propagating and his spiritual conversion will offer readers a specific exemplum which will encourage imitating virtue. (shrink)

The Monologion (Latin: Monologium, "Monologue"), originally entitled A Monologue on the Reason for Faith (Monoloquium de Ratione Fidei) and sometimes also known as An Example of Meditation on the Reason for Faith (Exemplum Meditandi de Ratione Fidei), was written in 1075 and 1076.The Proslogion (Latin: Proslogium, "Discourse"), originally entitled Faith Seeking Understanding (Fides Quaerens Intellectum) and then An Address on God's Existence (Alloquium de Dei Existentia), was written over the next two years (1077-1078).

This article attempts to answer the question: What makes the Roman constitution "by far the best," as Cicero claims in De republica? Following Polybius, Cicero analyses the Roman constitution as a mixed constitution, which both regard as the best type of constitution. Cicero, however, does not merely impute the best type of constitution to the Romans. He elevates the Roman constitution above all other mixed constitutions as the single best constitution. In rivalry with Plato, he constructs a model of the (...) Roman constitution as an exemplum that can unite the Romans in a common purpose. The constitution is distinguished by two main features: a fair system of cooperation among the whole citizen body and wise guidance by individual leaders. The moral unity of this constitution sets it apart from all other mixed constitutions. (shrink)

In the tenth book of Ovid’s Metamorphoses there is a moving story which explores the relationship between the artist and his work of art. It is the myth of the sculptor Pygmalion. The story of the Cypriot artist for whom the ivory statue of his ideal woman came to life knew a very widespread transmission. The myth inspired authors and artists to reflect about love, idolatry, lifeless matter, the artist vis-à-vis the one Creator, and so on. The secondary literature which (...) has been published on the reception of this metamorphosis is proportionately plentiful. However, it mainly takes Pygmalion as its starting point. Scant attention has been paid to the other figure: the woman, who is silent in Ovid’s tale, but increasingly became the mouthpiece for a Western vision of the image of women. The Middle Ages ascribed to Pygmalion all the vices they could come up with. Already in the early Christian period there was mention of a Cypriot artist who had intercourse with a statue of Aphrodite. He was adduced as an exemplum warning of the madness of idolatry in Antiquity. With the development of humanism these Christian interpretations are swept away and the simple love-story comes into its own again. Pontormo paints the female figure as a woman of flesh and blood who gazes, not towards the kneeling Pygmalion, but towards the viewer and the painter. For various reasons this painting fits into the so-called paragone, which was in full swing at this time: the struggle for rank between the arts of sculpture and painting. For the art of painting can do what the art of sculpture cannot: paint skin, suggest movement, paint the art of sculpture itself, etc. The influence of the Pygmalion myth reaches a peak in the eighteenth century. Rousseau gives the female figure what Voltaire, in his poem of love for an actress, had not: a name. She is Galathea, after the nymph, the image of perfect inner and outer beauty. The beloved thus acquires an identity? Well, she does speak, in any case. Rousseau’s musical play – in the eighteenth century the arts of the stage recognize new challenges in the Pygmalion theme – endswith the words of the beloved: “c’est moi” , “ce n’est pas moi” , “aussi moi” . This points to a complete amalgamation of the beloved with her creator. Diderot subscribes to the same body of ideas, and again relates them to the paragone. But for him it is sculpture, and not painting, which provides the ultimate access to Nature, and thus to the Divine. For the third dimension is the most direct emanation of the internal image of the artist, his muse, in reality. For him, Falconet’s Pygmalion et Galathée is the sculpted group which on all fronts revives the supremacy of the discipline. He even claims that Falconet is the eighteenth-century Pygmalion. In the nineteenth century we see the first signs of change. Galathea begins to reject Pygmalion. In literature she is portrayed a the cold and unattainable woman. From the point of view of gender we see indeed that women’s self-image had come to a crisis. She could not mirror herself in the past. The woman of the nineteenth century had to put an end to a male ideal image. Christina Rossetti’s poems express this impasse. Galathea – who had in the meantime herself become a “metaphor” for the plastic arts – becomes the fitting cue to mark the beginning of the new, “modern” art. Rodin has her looking away from Pygmalion in disgust. Goya portrays himself as the sculptor who, as it were, rapes Galathea. This moribund Galathea was intended to express criticism of the academic “dictatorship” of mimesis, but also the social responsibility of the artist in a society wracked by civil war. Paul Delvaux reads another subjection into his Pygmalion . The domination of the artist by his mother, who segregates him from the female sex. He puts himself in Galathea’s place as a helpless torso; his mother embraces him. Here we pick up the trail of the psycho-analytical archetypes in the myth. They are not so clearly established as in the case of Narcissus, for example, but they relate to the feminine attributes which the beloved has personified throughout the ages: from lust-object to frigidity. Ever since her awakening, the story of her tranmission has been fed on the evolving images of woman herself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 39.3 (2005) 44-57 [Access article in PDF] Literary Biography: The Cinderella of Literary Studies Michael Benton There are no prizes for guessing who are the two ugly sisters: Criticism, the elder one, dominated literary studies for the first half of the twentieth century; theory, her younger sister, flounced to the fore in the second half. Meanwhile, 'Cinders,' who had been doing the chores for (...) centuries, has been magically transformed in recent times, decked out in new clothes by Richard Holmes, Claire Tomalin, Juliet Barker, Peter Ackroyd et al., and, as the millennium approached, celebrated and admired on all sides. At the start of the new century, literary biography remains in vogue. The bibliography that carries it forward is rolling, and there is no sign of it turning into a pumpkin. Why is Cinderella so popular?One obvious if superficial answer might be that literary biography is where literary people go who find the contemporary preoccupation with theory to be personally undernourishing and critically unenlightening; they would rather stay with the literary works themselves and with the lives, the minds, and the times that produced them. Yet it is not only literary biography that is thriving; life writing in general is the fastest-growing area of mainstream publishing, evidence for which can be seen in Waterstone's flagship store in London's Piccadilly, which devotes its prime ground-floor site to thousands of biographies. This commercial high profile is responding to an evident, if unfocused, need to look at other lives and understand them. Individual reasons for the popularity of biography range from prurient interest and hero worship to a, perhaps unrecognized, search for coherence and purpose in an age that is often disinclined either to accept institutional values or to respect traditional authority. The motives for this search usually include the desire for recognizable success, to which end the invention of a convincing identity is essential. Biographies offer models of how others live, face challenges, and cope with change; they are prime sites for studying ourselves. Curiously, this justification for biography as providing [End Page 44] a model for living was felt most strongly when this literary genre first emerged in the eighteenth century. The difference today is that the model has changed: Biography as a moral exemplum based upon Christian principles has been replaced in today's celebrity culture by the demand for models of success provided by public personalities. Nonetheless, whatever the range of satisfactions readers seek in biography, life writing offers, in one form or another, detailed pictures of widely different ways of living and amid these, perhaps, some clues to how an individual sense of identity might be shaped.Literary biographies (i.e., biographies of writers, not biographies with a particular literary quality) are a significant and, in some respects, a unique subgenre since they purport to offer access to the creative imagination. They have a long and distinguished history from Johnson and Boswell to the present day; they are sometimes written by other novelists (Elizabeth Gaskell on Charlotte Bronte, Peter Ackroyd on Dickens); and autobiographical writing may take the form of poetry (Wordsworth) or fiction (Joyce).1 Furthermore recent writing in this field has increasingly introduced elements of metabiography in books by Adam Sisman2 and Lucasta Miller.3 It is evident, therefore, that literary biography offers a rich and varied area of study that raises issues about the relationships among biography, history, fiction, and poetry that are fundamental to aesthetic education.Yet despite this promise, it has become a truism to declare that biography has failed to establish any theoretical foundations upon which to build. Backscheider quotes Ira Nadel's remark on the absence of "a sustained theoretical discussion of biography incorporating some of the more probing and original speculations about language, structure, and discourse that have dominated post-structuralist thought."4 She goes on to lament the poverty of criticism; the absence of a cultivated readership; the failure to engage even with the practical questions of selection, organization, or presentation; and indicates that readers of biography are too easily... (shrink)

This paper aims to provide an analysis of the metatextual function of one of the most well-known elements of Martial's Epigrams, the ‘lion and hare’ cycle from Book 1. This cycle, in which a hare is held precariously but safely in the jaws of a lion, has historically been read as representing the relationship between Domitian and poet. This paper aims to expand on this reading of the cycle while considering a largely unexplored point of view: the metatexual function of (...) this cycle within Martial's larger epigrammatic project. I identify three major ways in which the cycle supports Martial's larger interests in exploring poetic anxieties and defending the genre of epigrammatic poetry. First of all, by figuring the lion and the hare as, respectively, the emperor and the poet, Martial presents and performs an exemplum modelling clemency in the reception of lascivious poetry. Second, as a sexual metaphor that points to the anxiety and insecurity of both predator and prey, the cycle anticipates a broader concern of the Epigrams: the instability of Roman hierarchical relations and the difficulty of maintaining balance within such relationships. Third, Martial's continued use of hare imagery in the later books of the Epigrams, both in culinary and in hunting contexts, suggests the continued consumption and enjoyment of the genre of epigram, particularly outside of the imperial city. (shrink)

La figura de Medea, mujer y extranjera, es el hilo conductor que trata de ofrecer un análisis sobre la pasión de la ira desde la tradición clásica, que la rechaza como pasión destructiva, hasta la apropiación realizada por el feminismo negro norteamericano de Lorde. Ambas iras tendrán algo en común: Audre Lorde hablará de la rabia por la misoginia, homofobia y racismo sufrido y en Medea habrá ira por la misoginia y xenofobia de la época. Para ello en primer lugar (...) el artículo analiza el vocabulario relacionado con la cólera y la ira tanto en griego y en latín. A partir de ahí desarrollan dos hilos. En el primero se ofrece la lectura tradicional del mito de la Medea infanticida que es la que se encuentra en la tragedia de Séneca y que se relacionada con su tratado filosófico _Sobre la ira_. De ese modo se convierte a Medea en _exemplum e contrario_ y contraimagen del sabio estoico. En el segundo se recupera la otra tradición del mito según la cual Medea no fue la que mató a sus hijos sino los corintios. Este segundo hilo del enfoque clásico de la ira para mostrar su validez como herramienta de cambio. (shrink)

The second part of “Ars, Natura, Historia” focuses on the narrative techniques used by Pliny’s art history found in the Naturalis Historia. The narratological analysis of the artist anecdotes draws our attention to how Pliny’s diction is essentially rooted within rhetoric. The artist anecdotes of Naturalis Historia fulfill the role of exemplum, and as such, they become the vehicle for conveying the sets of values expounded in the encyclopedia.

This article examines the 4th-century CE interpretation of the story of Rahab the Harlot by Severian of Gabala, in his homily, De paenitentia et compunctione (CPG 4186). In this article, a close and critical reading of Severian’s references to the story of Rahab in De paenitentia et compunctione (with some comparative reference to other works of Severian, and also of John Chrysostom and Pseudo-Chrysostom) is provided. It is asked, ‘how and why could a treacherous harlot, a prostitute, who was considered (...) to be the epitome of vice in early Christian moral deliberations, function as an exemplum for Severian?’ The article firstly asks how Severian deals with the problematic and paradoxical aspects of Rahab, namely, the fact that she was a prostitute and also a liar. Then, it illustrates how Severian transforms Rahab into a Christian heroine and how he deploys these qualities of the transformed Rahab in a potent anti-Judaistic rhetoric. This study is finally concluded with a somewhat broader delineation of the importance of Rahab in the development of a curious Christian cultural and moral trope, namely, the penitent prostitute. Such a study of Rahab is significant not only in that it expands our understanding of the history of women and gender dynamics in early Christianity, but it also elucidates the complex and strategic discursive moves employed by male Christian authors to deal with the seemingly ‘bad girls’ of scripture. Contribution: This article investigates the historical reception of the story of Rahab (Jos 2) in a little-known homily by Severian of Gabala. The focus is how Severian interprets the story and the paradoxical figure that is Rahab, with reference to its use as an anti-Judaistic trope, and its role in the shaping of the cultural phenomenon that is the penitent prostitute in early Christian thought. (shrink)