Negli scorsi decenni abbiamo assistito ad un processo di accelerazione centrifuga rispetto alla molarità statuale. Da un lato, tale accelerazione ha generato un interessante polimorfismo di valori, visioni del mondo e forme di vita, liberando quelle energie sociali e politiche che hanno contribuito e contribuiscono alla ridiscussione radicale dei più profondi presupposti del vivere comune. Dall’altro, tale carica liberogena si lega, come è ovvio, –insieme come causa e risultato– ad una crescente incertezza individuale e collettiva. Viviamo insomma in un’epoca panica, (...) che per molti aspetti ricorda proprio quella stagione barocca, che fece da crogiolo alla nascita degli Stati moderni e all’equilibrio Westfaliano. Il rischio è che di fronte al contemporaneo vuoto di risposte, resti la valorizzazione economica offerta dalla logica governamentale l’unica sponda di senso disponibile, con tutto il suo precipitato di sfruttamento e alienazione. È forse possibile ritrovare nella tensione metastorica fra barocco e classico una possibile linea di equilibrio fra dinamismo Istituente e stabilità dell’Istituito? (shrink)

Che cosa sono il pensiero critico e l’ingiustizia epistemica? E cosa hanno a che vedere con l’educazione e la riduzione delle disuguaglianze? Secondo una concezione molto diffusa il pensiero critico è un pensiero ragionevole finalizzato a decidere cosa credere e come agire. Tuttavia, come intendere questa ragionevolezza? Affrontare questa questione, nell’ottica del nostro convegno, richiede la considerazione di un altro aspetto noto come ‘ingiustizia epistemica’. L’ingiustizia epistemica è un fenomeno che genera oppressione relativamente a questioni legate alla conoscenza. Ciò accade (...) quando non si ascolta una persona e non si presta attenzione al suo pensiero o al suo giudizio, poiché ritenuti irrilevanti o ingiustamente non competenti, a causa di un pregiudizio. Questi pregiudizi possono essere l’appartenenza del parlante a una diversa classe sociale, a una determinata etnia, o genere o gruppo sociale. Tuttavia, esistono varie forme di ingiustizia epistemica. La conoscenza, infatti, comporta l’interscambio e la partecipazione al dialogo, alla discussione ai gruppi di ricerca. La partecipazione ad un dibattito non richiede solo uno scambio di informazioni, bensì anche la presentazione di domande e la considerazione di possibilità alternative. In questo caso l’ingiustizia epistemica avviene perché la partecipazione di un parlante, sebbene accreditato come competente, non viene presa in considerazione come un valido contributo al dibattito. L’idea di fondo di questo convegno è dunque che la filosofia per ragazzi, attraverso la discussione, nonché la trasmissione di contenuti e problematiche può contribuire all’abbattimento delle barriere che generano le disuguaglianze, favorendo lo sviluppo di una sensibilità critica e al tempo stesso etica. La sensibilità critica risulta funzionale a una forma di resistenza, vale a dire a un uso delle nostre risorse epistemiche e abilità che depotenziano e cambiano le strutture normative oppressive, quale tratto caratteristico della democrazia. Ciò significa concepire la democrazia come un processo dinamico di auto-correzione e apprendimento continui. (shrink)

Una specie di favola, ispirata al Dialogus di Abelardo, per riflettere sul ruolo del cristianesimo nello sviluppo del pensiero filsofico medievale. La filosofia medievale è complessa e articolata come quella di ogni altro periodo storico e spesso, anziché porsi al servizio della teologia, si appoggia sui contenuti della fede per dare stabilità alle proprie ricerche. A sort of tale, inspired by the Abaelard's Dialogus, to consider the role of christianity in the development of the medieval philosophical thought. The medieval (...) philosophy is complex and articulated as that of any other historical period and often, instead of being at the service of theology, is founded on the contents of faith to give stability to its own research. (shrink)

La ricerca sulla quale si basa il volume ha coinvolto cinque istituti superiori di Udine e si è svolta attraverso interviste agli studenti e ai loro docenti del triennio. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto se la filosofia insegnata a scuola riuscisse a stimolare un processo di mutamento, o perlomeno di chiarificazione, della visione del mondo e, soprattutto, se avesse un impatto sulle relazioni con gli altri. Si è inteso così operare un rivolgimento della filosofia su se stessa e sul suo (...) modo di avvicinare il mondo degli adolescenti. Attraverso la prospettiva fenomenologica, applicata alle riflessioni di studenti e docenti, è divenuto perciò possibile comprendere le ragioni per cui la disciplina ha effetti più o meno incisivi sull’esistenza dei ragazzi. (shrink)

Il gruppo riveste una grande importanza nella crescita del singolo. I valori sociali si strutturano e consolidano attraverso i processi di socializzazione, la formazione di un legame emozionale tra individuo e società, e l’interiorizzazione delle norme, processi e legami questi che si danno nel gruppo. L’articolo offre un’analisi delle fasi, le dinamiche e i percorsi che si danno nello sviluppo del gruppo di animazione, con lo scopo di offrire agli educatori uno strumento valido per l’educazione dei ragazzi. A questo (...) riguardo, in un primo momento, viene analizzata la ricerca fatta dall’individuo per essere accettato all’interno del gruppo quale motivazione primaria per la formazione del gruppo. In seguito, l’articolo si propone di studiare la nascita del gruppo come insieme teso al fare. Infine, verrà preso in considerazione il come si determina la creazione di legami interpersonali da dove sorgono i valori sociali. (shrink)

Ne Le possible et le rèel Bergson dice che due sono i problemi ango­scianti della metafisica: il primo ha generato le teorie dell’essere, il secondo le teorie della conoscenza. Entrambi i problemi hanno però la medesima forma: chiedono perché qualcosa invece del nulla. Prendendo ad esempio alcuni mo­menti capitali della storia della metafisica occidentale (e una favola scritta da Gianni Rodari) si vuole mostrare che la contingenza dell’ente, lungi dall’essere una evidenza intuitiva, è in realtà il frutto di una (...) inferenza ed è il risultato di uno specifico addestramento. Grazie a questa “pedagogia” si genera infatti un soggetto “adulto” e si fuoriesce da quella “infanzia mistica”, che invece, per il Bergson delle Deux Sources, costitutiva il modello della nuova filosofia. Parole-chiave: Henri Bergson. Metafisica. Nada. (shrink)

Nonostante Don Chisciotte e Madame Bovary si siano rovinati (letteralmente) la vita a forza di leggere romanzi, è opinione condivisa che le opere letterarie possano essere molto importanti, se non addirittura fondamentali, quale fonte di conoscenza. Non è quindi per caso che si comincino a leggere le storie ai bambini piccoli, che se ne richieda la lettura ai ragazzi a scuola e si cerchi di sensibilizzare il più possibile al mondo dei libri, perché, come diceva Umberto Eco, «[…] la (...) nostra ric... (shrink)

This is the first definitive monograph on the concept of obligations erga omnes---international obligations owed to the international community as a whole and binding irrespective of consent---an increasingly important concept in contemporary international law. Ragazzi adopts a pragmatic approach that identifies five common elements among the examples of obligations erga omnes given by the International Court. These five common elements are then discussed in the light of other candidates of obligations erga omnes which have emerged in State practice and (...) international literature. (shrink)

Large-scale public datasets are vital for driving the progress of abstractive summarization, especially in law, where documents have highly specialized jargon. However, the available resources are English-centered, limiting research advancements in other languages. This paper introducesLAWSUIT, a collection of 14K Italian legal verdicts with expert-authored abstractive maxims drawn from the Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic.LAWSUITpresents an arduous task with lengthy source texts and evenly distributed salient content. We offer extensive experiments with sequence-to-sequence and segmentation-based approaches, revealing that the latter (...) achieve better results in full and few-shot settings. We openly releaseLAWSUITto foster the development and automation of real-world legal applications. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. This introduction to the 5th issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts reviews the latest literature and key topics surrounding the relationship between philosophy, cartography (...) and mapmaking. (shrink)

What kind of entities are works of art from an ontological point of view? This question has become canonical in the framework of analytic philosophy. One way of answering the puzzle seemed to be conclusive. It is the hypothesis that all, or the majority of artworks can be identified with types embedded into tokens. To begin with, I will survey how the type-token distinction transitioned from semiotics to ontology. Secondly, I will consider how some contemporary art forms contributed to questioning (...) this approach to the ontology of artworks. Lastly, I will suggest how the nature of types and tokens should be reassessed in order to properly describe artworks in their historical and socially construed nature. (shrink)

Analyzing and evaluating legal case reports are labor-intensive tasks for judges and lawyers, who usually base their decisions on report abstracts, legal principles, and commonsense reasoning. Thus, summarizing legal documents is time-consuming and requires excellent human expertise. Moreover, public legal corpora of specific languages are almost unavailable. This paper proposes a transfer learning approach with extractive and abstractive techniques to cope with the lack of labeled legal summarization datasets, namely a low-resource scenario. In particular, we conducted extensive multi- and cross-language (...) experiments. The proposed work outperforms the state-of-the-art results of extractive summarization on the Australian Legal Case Reports dataset and sets a new baseline for abstractive summarization. Finally, syntactic and semantic metrics assessments have been carried out to evaluate the accuracy and the factual consistency of the machine-generated legal summaries. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. Following what has been termed “the cartographic turn in social sciences”, The Art of Mapping Between Land and Mind delves into two intertwining issues. On one side, it examines how the (...) aesthetic properties of maps convey cognitive, cultural, and political meanings. On the other, it explores the role of visual arts in reflecting on cartographic thought, shaping both its methods and motivations. The volume is divided into four sections. Embracing the point of view of both the philosopher and the geographer, the first one sheds light on the relationship between epistemology and cartography (Kukla; Costantini; Tanney). The second addresses mapmaking as an art form (Tanca; Haugdal) or, conversely, considers maps from the perspective of their aesthetic properties (Török; Ogundiwin; Elhaik). The third focuses on the digital condition of today’s cartography (Tschochohei; Quaranta; Keller). Finally, the last section includes two contributions that represent attempts to guide cartography toward its future (Bosca; Ianniello). Opening this issue, a special essay by Elizabeth Povinelli offers a generous précis of her upcoming book. (shrink)

In this paper, we support a continuistic reading of Joseph Margolis' philosophy, defending the claim that in the 1970s, Margolis tackled the issues suggested by the analytic philosophy of art from an original theoretical perspective and through conceptual tools exceeding the analytical framework. Later that perspective turned out to be a radically pragmatist one, in which explicitly tolerant realistic claims and non-reductive naturalism converged with radical historicism and contextualism. We will endorse this thesis by focusing on two important concepts appearing (...) in Margolis' aesthetics essays from the late 1950s to the 1970s: the type-token pair and the notion of cultural emergence. On the one hand, we will emphasise Margolis' indebtedness to Peirce's first formulation of the type-token distinction, involving a strong interdependence between the two elements of the pair, as well as an anti-essentialistic, historicised, and contextualised notion of type. On the other hand, we will delve into Margolis' exploration of the concept of emergence and cultural emergence, involving a genuinely pluralistic view of ontology, as well as a non-reductive, continuistic form of naturalism. Finally, we will connect the criticism of the so-called closure of the physical world with Margolis' anti-autonomistic stance in defining artworks. (shrink)

It has been argued, by Penrose and others, that Gödel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem shows that human mathematics cannot be captured by a formal system F: the Gödel sentence G(F) of F can be proved by a (human) mathematician but is not provable in F. To this argment it has been objected that the mathematician can prove G(F) only if (s)he can prove that F is consistent, which is unlikely if F is complicated. Penrose has invented a new (...) argument intended to avoid this objection. In the paper I try to show that Penrose's new argument is inconclusive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 43-56 [Access article in PDF] Jack London's Medusa of Truth Per Serritslev Petersen FROM THE VERY START of his literary career, Jack London believed that a good fiction writer must also be a good thinker—that fictional authenticity and integrity must somehow be imbedded in philosophical authenticity and integrity. In his early essay "On the Writer's Philosophy of Life," and in his early letters to (...) Cloudsley Johns, his intellectually "slovenly" friend (who also happened to share his literary ambitions and interests), London insists, again and again, on the proper philosophical foundation of the successful writer. This is how poor Cloudsley, who had previously been told to "get in and systematically ground [himself] in history, economics, biology and the kindred branches" 1 gets browbeaten by his self-appointed mentor and master, a veritable Jack of all trades, in a letter dated March 15, 1900: "To be well fitted for the tragedy of existence (intellectual existence), one must have a working philosophy, a synthesis of things. Have you a synthesis of things? Do you write, and talk, and build upon a foundation which you know is securely laid? Or do you not rather build with a hazy idea of 'to hell with the foundation.'" London then proceeds to catechize his friend on scientific principles such as the indestructibility of Matter, the persistence of Force, and the overall "dynamic principle, true of the metamorphosis of the universe"—principles that Cloudsley is urged to study "carefully and painstakingly" before he can ever claim to have "a firm foundation for [his] philosophy of life" (Letters, pp. 170-71).In London's admittedly heavy-handed ad hominem argument, one recognizes the philosophical sledgehammer of Ernest Everhard, the revolutionary hero of The Iron Heel and one of the fictional exponents of "that cold forbidding philosophy, materialistic monism," 2 which also [End Page 43] served as the scientific foundation of London's own philosophy of life. There are, however, not one, but two components to London's philosophy, which, as I shall argue in this essay, together constitute an essentially dialectical construction, a dynamic juxtaposition of and negotiation with, on the one hand, the "cold forbidding" Medusa of Truth and, on the other hand, the life-enhancing Aphrodite of Romance, the second of which is one of several versions of the vital Maia-Lie (Maia being the Buddhist term for the power that creates or re-creates the world as cosmic illusion).Two points need to be stressed from the outset. First, London's work is implicitly aligned with literary naturalism—the "Zolaistic Movement" of modern American fiction that the genteel writer and editor Thomas Bailey Aldrich famously condemned for its "miasmatic breath" 3 —even though London himself would always qualify his own naturalism by insisting that, artistically, he was "an emotional materialist" (Letters, p. 329), and that his realism was, in the words of Martin Eden, one of his fictional alter egos, "an impassioned realism, shot through with human aspiration and faith." 4 Second, London's work is explicitly aligned with philosophical naturalism (as distinct from supernaturalism)—that is, naturalism as the philosophical or epistemological view that, to quote The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995), "everything is natural, i.e. that everything there is belongs to the world of nature, and so can be studied by the methods appropriate for studying that world." In philosophical practice, naturalism and materialism have tended to coalesce, materialism being basically understood as the view that everything is made of matter, which can be studied by the methods of natural science. Like London's philosophical alter ego Ernest Everhard (and also like fictional protagonists such as Wolf Larsen and Martin Eden), London declared himself "a materialistic monist," although, as he admitted to Cloudsley Johns, "there is dam little satisfaction in it." Rhetorically impersonating, as it were, Wolf Larsen, London, in the same letter, asks himself and his correspondent, "what squirming anywhere, damned or otherwise, means anything? That's the question I am always prone to put: What's this chemical ferment called life about? Small wonder that small men... (shrink)

This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version (...) of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not. (shrink)

The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment. It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas-Penrose arguments and even Penrose's 'new argument' in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose's new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241-250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19-42] and elsewhere of this question.

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive (...) analogues cannot perform the interpersonal and social functions of reactive attitudes, it does not follow that the losses of abandoning them outweigh the gains of retaining them. The force of the challenge rests on a mistake, identified by John Stuart Mill among others, that is common when evaluating entrenched social practices. (shrink)

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a neurodegenerative disease exhibiting amyloid beta (Aβ) peptide accumulation as a key characteristic. Autophagy, which is dysregulated in AD, participates in the metabolism of Aβ. Unexpectedly, we recently found that autophagy, in addition to its degradative function, also mediates the secretion of Aβ. This finding adds Aβ to an increasing number of biomolecules, the secretion of which is mediated by autophagy. We also showed that inhibition of Aβ secretion through genetic deletion of autophagy leads to intracellular (...) Aβ accumulation, which enhanced neurodegeneration induced by autophagy deficiency. Hence, autophagy may play a central role in two pathological hallmarks of AD: Aβ amyloidosis and neurodegeneration. Herein, we summarize the role of autophagy in AD with focus on Aβ metabolism in light of the recently established role of autophagy in protein secretion. We discuss potential routes for autophagy‐mediated Aβ secretion and suggest experimental approaches to further elucidate its mechanisms. (shrink)

In risk management, de minimis risk is the idea that risks that are sufficiently small, in terms of probabilities, ought to be disregarded. In the context of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, this paper examines one suggested way of determining how small risks ought to be disregarded, specifically, the natural-occurrence view of de minimis, which has been proposed by Alvin M. Weinberg, among others. It is based on the idea that “natural” background levels of risk should (...) be used as benchmarks and de minimis levels should be derived from those levels. This approach fails even if the doubtful distinction between what is natural and what is not can be upheld. (shrink)

Rules of thumb are simple instructions, used to guide actions toward a specific result, without need of advanced knowledge. Knowing adequate rules of thumb is a common form of technological knowledge. It differs both from science-based and intuitive (or tacit) technological knowledge, although it may have its origin in experience, scientific knowledge, trial and error, or a combination thereof. One of the major advantages of rules of thumb is the ease with which they can be learned. One of their major (...) disadvantages is that they cannot easily be adjusted to new situations or conditions. (shrink)

Introduction: The concept of ” work ability” is central for many sciences, especially for those related to working life and to rehabilitation. It is one of the important concepts in legislation regulating sickness insurance. How the concept is defined therefore has important normative implications. The concept is, however, often not sufficiently well defined. Aim and Method: The objective of this paper is to clarify, through conceptual analysis, what the concept can and should mean, and to propose a useful definition for (...) scientific and practical work. Results: Several of the defining characteristics found in the literature are critically scrutinized and discussed, namely health, basic standard competence, occupational competence, occupational virtues, and motivation. These characteristics are related to the work tasks and the work environment. One conclusion is that we need two definitions of work ability, one for specific jobs that require special training or education, and one for jobs that most people can manage given a short period of practice. Having work ability, in the first sense, means having the occupational competence, the health required for the competence, and the occupational virtues that are required for managing the work tasks, assuming that the tasks are reasonable and that the work environment is acceptable. In the second sense, having work ability is having the health, the basic standard competence and the relevant occupational virtues required for managing some kind of job, assuming that the work tasks are reasonable and that the work environment is acceptable. Conclusion: These definitions give us tools for understanding and discussing the complex, holistic and dynamic aspects of work ability, and they can lay the foundations for the creation of instruments for evaluating work ability, as well as help formulate strategies for rehabilitation. (shrink)

The book under review offers a novel approach to politicizing the "animal issue." Drawing on liberal citizenship theory, the authors argue that key concepts of international justice such as "citizen," "denizen," and "sovereignty" may be mapped onto human-animal relations in order to protect individual animal rights as well as ecosystem integrity. The ambition is also to overcome some well-known problems of traditional animal rights theory in relation to ecological concerns. Yet the argument that ecosystems, like human states, ought to be (...) seen as sovereign communities entails problematic concept-stretching that may undermine the individual rights it was meant to protect. (shrink)

The concept of the mahant- ātman-, or “vast self”, found in some of the Early and Middle Upaniṣads, has, at least since the days of Hermann Oldenberg, been explored by a number of scholars, most notably by van Buitenen :103–114, 1964). These studies have usually emphasized the cosmic implications of this concept; the vast ātman- being the non-individualized spirit that brings forth and pervades the universe, then enters the bodies of all created beings as their animating principle. As such it (...) precedes the mahān, or mahat, of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The present paper argues that the concept of a mahant- puruṣa- or “vast person”, appearing parallel to the vast ātman in these texts, is in fact older, being traceable to Middle Vedic texts; the emergence of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine has eventually led to its replacement by the mahān ātmā. Originally, it is argued, the adjective mahant- stressed the difference between this “vast” puruṣa, who is said to dwell in the sun, and the minute puruṣa within man, who is seen as the tiny “person” in one’s pupil, or resides in the heart, having the size of a thumb. In contradistinction to the ātman, the puruṣa is a thoroughly anthropomorphic soul-concept, a “person” within the person. The ultimate identity between this tiny soul-person and the puruṣa in the sun is a recurring, but little studied, motif in the micro-macrocosmic speculations of the Brāhmaṇa texts. This “vast”, solar puruṣa is sometimes identified with the Puruṣa or primeval man of Ṛgveda 10.90, from whose body the universe was formed, and much of the imagery surrounding the vast puruṣa of Middle and Late Vedic literature seems to derive from this hymn. (shrink)

Within child and adolescent psychiatry, there are a number of potential dilemmas pertaining to diagnosis, treatment, the protection of the child, as well as the child's own developing intelligence and moral judgement. Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry is the first in the IPPP series to explore this highly complex topic.

When we forgive, we do so for reasons. One challenge for forgiveness theorists is to explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not. This paper argues that we forgive in response to a perceived change of heart on the part of the offender. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I show that we forgive for reasons. Second, I argue that forgiveness requires the right kind of reason. Third, I show that these two points explain a common (...) distinction between forgiving and letting go and, in doing so, solve a problem facing many accounts of forgiveness. Finally, I consider candidate reasons to forgive and argue that all of them are either the wrong kind of reason or are instances of a more general reason of the right kind, namely, a perceived change of heart. (shrink)

Since Varian (Econometrica 50:945–973, 1982; Review of Economic Studies 50:90–110, 1983) made checking for consistency with revealed preference conditions more accessible to empirical researchers; researchers have often used revealed preference procedures to test their maintained hypotheses and narrow the scope of their demand studies. The tests developed by Varian are for the direct utility function, while researchers estimating demand systems often find it convenient to model consumer behavior with an indirect utility function. Unfortunately structure revealed in the direct utility function (...) does not necessarily follow for the indirect utility function. To remedy this problem, we set forth conditions for checking consumer data for consistency with revealed preference conditions for minimization and weak separability of the indirect utility function. (shrink)