ABSTRACT In this brief note we explore a couple of features of the semantics for indicative conditionals provided by Field. Those features strikingly resemble some controversial principles in connexive logic. We will show that although Field’s semantics has the technical means to stand to the mentioned features, more work is needed to make some of its outcomes less unintuitive.

In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets (...) of higher-order values. This method is based on the concept of a multilattice. If the method is applied to the set of truth values of Belnap's “useful four-valued logic”, one obtains a trilattice, and, more generally, structures here called Belnap-trilattices. As in Priest's case, it is shown that the generalized truth values motivated by hyper-contradictions have no effect on the logic. Whereas Priest's construction in terms of designated truth values always results in his Logic of Paradox, the present construction in terms of truth and falsity orderings always results in First Degree Entailment. However, it is observed that applying the multilattice-approach to Priest's initial set of truth values leads to an interesting algebraic structure of a “bi-and-a-half” lattice which determines seven-valued logics different from Priest's Logic of Paradox. (shrink)

Ordinal functions may be iterated transfinitely in a natural way by taking pointwise limits at limit stages. However, this has disadvantages, especially when working in the class of normal functions, as pointwise limits do not preserve normality. To this end we present an alternative method to assign to each normal function f a family of normal functions Hyp[f]=〈fξ〉ξ∈OnHyp[f]=〈fξ〉ξ∈On, called its hyperation, in such a way that f0=idf0=id, f1=ff1=f and fα+β=fα∘fβfα+β=fα∘fβ for all α, β.Hyperations are a refinement of the Veblen hierarchy (...) of f. Moreover, if f is normal and has a well-behaved left-inverse g called a left adjoint, then g can be assigned a cohyperationcoH[g]=〈gξ〉ξ∈OncoH[g]=〈gξ〉ξ∈On, which is a family of initial functions such that gξgξ is a left adjoint to fξfξ for all ξ. (shrink)

I provide a characterization of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions---that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of acyclic relations---in terms of hyper-relations satisfying certain properties. For those hyper-relations Nehring calls extended preference relations, the central characterizing condition is weaker than (hyper-relation) transitivity but stronger than (hyper-relation) acyclicity. Furthermore, the relevant type of hyper-relation can be represented as the intersection of a certain class of its extensions. These results generalize known, analogous results for path independent choice (...) functions. (shrink)

In the global world, momentous migratory tides have produced hyper-pluralism on the domestic scale, bringing citizens with radically different conceptions of life, justice and the good to coexist side by side. Conjectural arguments about the acceptance of pluralism, the next best to public reason when shared premises are too thin, may not succeed in convincing all constituencies. What resources, then, can liberal democracy mobilize? The multivariate democratic polity is the original answer to this question, based on an interpretation of (...) Rawls which revisits Political Liberalism in the light of The Law of Peoples . The unscrutinized assumption is highlighted, often read into Rawls’s Political Liberalism , that a polity moves homogeneously and all of a piece from religious conflict to modus vivendi, constitutional consensus and finally to overlapping consensus. Drawing on The Law of Peoples , a different picture can be obtained. (shrink)

Hyper tableau reasoning is a version of clausal form tableau reasoning where all negative literals in a clause are resolved away in a single inference step. Constrained hyper tableaux are a generalization of hyper tableaux, where branch closing substitutions, from the point of view of model generation, give rise to constraints on satisfying assignments for the branch. These variable constraints eliminate the need for the awkward ‘purifying substitutions’ of hyper tableaux. The paper presents a non-destructive and (...) proof confluent calculus for constrained hyper tableaux, together with a soundness and completeness proof, with completeness based on a new way to generate models from open tableaux. It is pointed out that the variable constraint approach applies to free variable tableau reasoning in general. (shrink)

We discuss the relationship between various weak distributive laws and games in Boolean algebras. In the first part we give some game characterizations for certain forms of Prikry’s “hyper-weak distributive laws”, and in the second part we construct Suslin algebras in which neither player wins a certain hyper-weak distributivity game. We conclude that in the constructible universe L, all the distributivity games considered in this paper may be undetermined.

In this paper we define the hyper operations ⊗, ∨ and ∧ on a hyper MV -algebra and we obtain some related results. After that by considering the notions ofhyper MV -ideals and weak hyper MV -ideals, we prove some theorems. Then we determine relationships between hyper MV -ideals in a hyper MV -algebra and hyper K -ideals in a hyper K -algebra . Finally we give a characterization of hyper MV -algebras (...) of order 3 or 4 based on the hyper MV -ideals. (shrink)

Drawing upon the thought of Giorgio Agamben, this essay focuses upon the potential of a single act to change a political order. Agamben’s writings retain the possibility for a paradigmatic gesture that opens a space for a politics not founded on a form of belonging grounded in a particular property, such as national identity. To illustrate this event this essay turns to Agamben’s construction of whatever-being, which is constructed hyper-hermeneutically. This term is chosen deliberately. Whatever-being retains a hermeneutic structure, (...) but is constructed through singular paradigmatic examples. These examples are evidence for whatever-being’s existence as a pure singularity, unable to be reduced to a particular quality. Such examples are gestures that allow future modes of belonging to separate themselves from oppressive foundations and dominating constructions of political existence, through revealing the possibility of a new way of being that does not require a revolutionary “zero hour” to be brought about. (shrink)

In this paper, we study indiscernibility relations and complementarity relations in hyper arrow structures. A first-order characterization of indiscernibility and complementarity is obtained through a duality result between hyper arrow structures and certain structures of relational type characterized by first-order conditions. A modal analysis of indiscernibility and complementarity is performed through a modal logic which modalities correspond to indiscernibility relations and complementarity relations in hyper arrow structures.

A Heyting algebra is supplemented if each element a has a dual pseudo-complement \, and a Heyting algebra is centrally supplement if it is supplemented and each supplement is central. We show that each Heyting algebra has a centrally supplemented extension in the same variety of Heyting algebras as the original. We use this tool to investigate a new type of completion of Heyting algebras arising in the context of algebraic proof theory, the so-called hyper-MacNeille completion. We show that (...) the hyper-MacNeille completion of a Heyting algebra is the MacNeille completion of its centrally supplemented extension. This provides an algebraic description of the hyper-MacNeille completion of a Heyting algebra, allows development of further properties of the hyper-MacNeille completion, and provides new examples of varieties of Heyting algebras that are closed under hyper-MacNeille completions. In particular, connections between the centrally supplemented extension and Boolean products allow us to show that any finitely generated variety of Heyting algebras is closed under hyper-MacNeille completions. (shrink)

Predicates are "hyper-evaluative" when they depend on more than just the semantic values (be they intensional or more fine-grained) of their individual arguments, but also on the way those arguments are "coordinated" or "wired." I examine motivations and semantic implementations for such predicates, drawing from linguistics and computer science.

This article seeks to grasp the meaning of Michel Henry's use of the term "transcendental" to understand its specific nature as pure experience that owes nothing to the constituted or the a posteriori. It then considers the methodological consequences and difficulties resulting from such a conception of the transcendental. According to my hypothesis, in order to maintain the "major division" between the empirical and the transcendental, material phenomenology is caught in a form of double bind. One cannot say much about (...) the transcendental without risking contamination by the empirical. As far as the constituted is concerned, it is certainly possible to refer to it, but actually there is nothing to say. This paper tests this interpretative hypothesis against a specific example, namely, the phenomenological description of feeling offered by Henry. The analysis concludes by considering whether material phenomenology does not lapse into what Rudolf Bernet calls a form of "hyper-transcendentalism" in the sense that the totality of empirical reality ends by being "transcendentalized". No basis can be provided for intentionality, as Henry sometimes claims: it becomes a superfluous concept. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to tackle the sociosemiotic strategies through which the relation between power and visibility is articulated in today’s metropolitan São Paulo. Drawing on the theoretical-methodological framework of Greimasian and post-Greimasian semiotics, the following hypotheses are put forth: (1) contemporary São Paulo is characterized by a true visual hypertrophy, which manifests itself, all at once, in both its architectural and mediatic landscapes; (2) in São Paulo, power is hypervisible and apparently transparent; (3) the excess of images, (...) gazes, and perspectives produces, in São Paulo, dense and wide areas of topological, mediatic, and social invisibility; (4) the predominant visibility in São Paulo can be qualified as a “populist” visibility. Based on these assumptions, this article intends to contribute to the consolidation of a critical debate on the visual matrices of power and on social processes of exclusion and inclusion currently in place in global metropolises. Likewise, it is intended to contribute to the elaboration of a theoretical-methodological framework capable of understanding and addressing the complexity of the phenomena that characterize such debate. (shrink)

The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that (...) the former are formulated in the semantic meta-language of mathematical theories without the use of the iota-operator or the lambda-operator as the abstractor, whereas the latter require for their expression at least one of these non-standard term-operators. Hyper-slingshots implement simpler language tools in comparison with those used in conventional slingshots. (shrink)

Women view hypersexuality on their part as being about not subordinating their sexuality to their prospective wifely and motherly duties. Thus, women see hyper-sexuality on their part as a form of rebelling.

In this paper we present a contribution to a classical result of E. Ellentuck in the theory of regressive isols. E. Ellentuck introduced the concept of a hyper-torre isol, established their existence for regressive isols, and then proved that associated with these isols a special kind of semi-ring of isols is a model of the true universal-recursive statements of arithmetic. This result took on an added significance when it was later shown that for regressive isols, the property of being (...) hyper-torre is equivalent to being hereditarily odd-even. In this paper we present a simplification to the original proof for establishing that equivalence. (shrink)

During the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the Executive Office of the President became dominated by West Wing advisers who specialized in campaign politics, media management, and nonstop public communications. With record numbers of presidential appointees requiring no congressional approval, the Bush White House pursued partisan control of cabinet agencies. Even obscure federal bureaus were required to remain “on message.” The constitutional derangement about which The Rhetorical Presidency had warned has occurred. No matter who occupies the Oval Office (...) in the future, the hyper‐rhetorical presidency is here to stay. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hyper-Abjects:Finitude, “Sustainability,” and the Maternal Body in the AnthropoceneBethany DoaneThe concept of the Anthropocene prioritizes a new paradigmatic scale that seems to outweigh that of “the political”: imagining deep time or the death of the human species as a result of climate change tends to negate the (relatively speaking) smaller-scale concerns of race, class, gender, or capitalism. While feminist critique is often circumscribed by this political scale, and (...) thus may seem to be dwarfed or rendered obsolete by the geological, deep-time scale of the Anthropocene, examining issues of feminist concern from this geological perspective has profound implications for thinking not only of gender politics but also of how to construct something like the political at all in this new era. Suggesting a new and normative global politics is, of course, beyond the scope of this article, but perhaps we might begin to conceive of a political schema that would function more appropriately in light of this grander scale. At the very least we may begin to think the borders or limits of the species as it has existed in the modern era in a way that neither environmentalism nor posthumanism has yet been able to sufficiently tackle.The Anthropocene marks the epoch in which human activities have caused global environmental changes that will leave their mark in the geological strata of the earth itself.1 While the specific moments of its onset are contested, its beginnings are generally associated with the industrial age; Crutzen and Stoermer mark its onset at roughly 1800 with the beginnings [End Page 251] of the industrial revolution. (Timothy Morton pinpoints it more specifically with the invention of the steam engine in 1794.) The changes made in this era of geological, technological, and climate convergence have accelerated in the last seventy years or so in what scientists call the Great Acceleration, which began around 1940 and quickened anthropogenic impact with events like the testing/dropping of atomic bombs, the homogenization of biodiversity, mass extinctions as a result of human activity, and various types of drilling and mining.2 In the era broadly conceived as modernity, the steady march of “progress” that has so shaped the paradigm of the period has been made possible only through its own abjections: those phenomena that mark the era as limited, limiting, and unsustainable. In other words, the “birth of the modern world” was made possible only through devastating acts of violence: institutionalized inequalities like slavery, oppression, colonization, and war. These acts of violence translate as cannibalization at the global scale: the exploitation of most members of the species and the consumption of their resources for the benefit and luxury of the few. While these forms of violence have been criticized and confronted by political and theoretical movements since at least the middle of the twentieth century, thinking of them in terms of the Anthropocene and deep time allows us to consider their consequences in a new light. Our present awareness of the Anthropocene makes visible phenomena like climate, global warming, earth, and the “anthropos” that present us with the very real eventuality of species finitude. Species finitude calls into question not just the practices of modernity that have brought about the Anthropocene (the exploitation of the many for the benefit of the few), but the entire paradigm of global thinking that is invested in progress, growth, and even in any environmentalism that calls for stewardship of the earth. The notion of care for an entity like “nature” or “the environment” only reinforces the separation between the human and its milieu, a separation that is impossible to maintain in light of the absolute inextricability that the Anthropocene brings to light.At the heart of this essay are two theoretical concepts: Julia Kristeva’s abjection, and Timothy Morton’s hyperobjects, both of which stand for a sort of insufficiency or impossibility of discourse (politics, the Symbolic, etc.) in managing some Real object or phenomenon. Kristeva’s abject is generally thought of as functioning at two levels or scales: the personal, in which an individual must cast off the abject of the maternal body in order to become a proper subject; and the social or... (shrink)

Choice is a sine qua non of contemporary life. From childhood until death, we are faced with an unending series of choices through which we cultivate a sense of self, govern conduct, and shape the future. Nowadays, individuals increasingly experience and enact consumer choice online through web-based platforms such as Yelp.com, TripAdvisor.com and Amazon.com. These platforms not only provide a sprawling array of goods and services to choose from, but also reviews, ratings and ranking devices and systems of classification to (...) navigate this landscape of choice. This paper suggests a radical reconsideration of platform architectures and design features to consider how they reconfigure and respecify choice, ‘choosers’, and choice-making practices. Platforms are not simply cameras that present choice and enable comparisons between different options, but are more akin to engines that govern, drive and expand choice, configuring users within particular discourses, practices and subjectivities. In making sense of the entangled trajectories of consumer choice, platform architectures and Big Data, I suggest that ‘hyper-choice’ emerges as a condition of the contemporary platform-driven web. I examine hyper-choice not only in terms of the relationship between platforms and a growing abundance of choice, but more importantly how platforms reconfigure choice in ways that go beyond and fundamentally challenge existing understandings of what choice is, who and what is involved in producing knowledge about choice, and what it means to be a ‘chooser’. (shrink)

In this article I present HYPER-REF, a model to determine the referent of any given expression in First-Order Logic. I also explain how this model can be used to determine the referent of a first-order theory such as First-Order Arithmetic. By reference or referent I mean the non-empty set of objects that the syntactical terms of a well-formed formula pick out given a particular interpretation of the language. To do so, I will first draw on previous work to make (...) explicit the notion of reference and its hyperintensional features. Then I present HYPER-REF and offer a heuristic method for determining the reference of any formula. Then I discuss some of the benefits and most salient features of HYPER-REF, including some remarks on the nature of self-reference in formal languages. (shrink)

Generalizations of Boolean elements of a BL-algebra L are studied. By utilizing the MV-center MV(L) of L, it is reproved that an element x L is Boolean iff x x * = 1. L is called semi-Boolean if for all x L, x * is Boolean. An MV-algebra L is semi-Boolean iff L is a Boolean algebra. A BL-algebra L is semi-Boolean iff L is an SBL-algebra. A BL-algebra L is called hyper-Archimedean if for all x L, xn is (...) Boolean for some finite n 1. It is proved that hyper-Archimedean BL-algebras are MV-algebras. The study has application in mathematical fuzzy logics whose Lindenbaum algebras are MV-algebras or BL-algebras. (© 2007 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the “dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory, (...) that is, the thesis that the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. Lately, several philosophers have argued against this idea. In this paper I want to push this line of reasoning further by exploiting the hyper-Russellian scenario against the A-theory of time. (shrink)

The article retraces three important steps along the path of Derrida’s Heidegger interpretation in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II. Readings of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Introduction to Metaphysics, and “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” complement and further develop Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger, which revolves around the term “Walten” and its role in the world-formation that makes community possible. The analysis of what Derrida calls the hyper-sovereignty of Walten reveals an ethico-political ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts. On the (...) one hand, this hyper-sovereignty registers as a super-sovereign violence that founds theological-political world-constructs through the exclusion of those deemed other. On the other hand, like différance it serves as the condition of impossibility of a common world. Following Derrida’s provocation, I develop this second sense to argue that the dissolution of the common world entails an ethical imperative to carry the other with whom one has nothing in common. (shrink)

The notions of a hyper MV-deductive system, a -hyper MV-deductive system, a - hyper MV-deductive system, a -hyper MV-deductive system, a -hyper MV-deductive system and a -hyper MV-deductive system are introduced, and then their relations are investigated.

This paper introduces the concept of ‘hyper-ambition’ in academia as a contributing factor to what has been termed a ‘replication crisis’ across some sciences. The replication crisis is an umbrella term that covers a range of ‘questionable research practices’, from sloppy reporting to fraud. There are already many proposals to address questionable research practices, some of which focus on the values, norms, and motivations of researchers and institutes, and suggest measures to promote research integrity. Yet it is not easy (...) to promote integrity in hyper-competitive academic environments that value high levels of ambition. I argue that in such contexts, it is as likely that a kind of hyper-ambition is fostered that (inadvertently or otherwise) prioritises individual success above all, including to the detriment of scientific quality. In addition, efforts to promote values like integrity falter because they rely on sufficient uniformity in motivations or tendencies. Codes and guidance promoting integrity are, however, likely to influence those for whom such values are not optional, while others simply find ways around them. To demonstrate this I offer a thought experiment in which we consider the imaginary working situations of two ordinary academics. I conclude that tackling questionable research practices in the light of the replication crisis requires robust ‘top down’ measures that expect and accommodate a broader range of academic values, motivations, and tendencies, while challenging those that help to promote hyper-ambition. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

If T is an isol let D(T) be the least set of isols which contains T and is closed under predecessors and the application of almost recursive combinatorial functions. We find an infinite regressive isol T such that the universal theory (with respect to recursive relations and almost recursive combinatorial functions) of D(T) is the same as that of the nonnegative integers.

Over the past ten years, the community researching connexive logics is rapidly growing and a number of papers have been published. However, when it comes to the terminology used in connexive logic, it seems to be not without problems. In this introduction, we aim at making a contribution towards both unifying and reducing the terminology. We hope that this can help making it easier to survey and access the field from outside the community of connexive logicians. Along the way, we (...) will make clear the context to which the papers in this special issue on Frontiers of Connexive Logic belong and contribute. (shrink)

In this paper we study the category of hyper MV-algebras and we prove that it has a terminal object and a coequalizer. We show that Jia's construction can be modified to provide a free hyper MV-algebra by a set. We use this to show that in the category of hyper MV-algebras the monomorphisms are exactly the one-to-one homomorphisms.

A central frustration of recent political discourse is the consistent reduction of politically relevant factual and critical speech to mere expression of partisan commitment. Partisans of “the other side”—members of the other tribe—are viewed as de facto wrong, because partisans, even when their speech invokes mere facts or purportedly shared political principles. Ideally, democratic political discourse operates along at least two central dimensions: a dimension of shared factual, historical, and political assumptions, and a more contested dimension of interpretation, prioritization, and (...) evaluation that results in diverse and often competing understandings of what is good, and so of what is best to collectively pursue. Debates among advocates of competing conceptions of the good and partisans of diverse world views identifiable in terms of the second dimension are, on this picture, constrained and grounded by the shared factual and political commitments of the first, thus ensuring a meaningful basis for ongoing political engagement. While there is little reason to think this ideal has ever been perfectly realized, in recent political discourse statements that events have occurred, drugs are effective, or transparency is important in political conduct cannot seem to get uptake except as mere expressions of political partisanship any more than an actor on stage trying to convince her audience of the danger of a real fire that has broken out in the theater can get uptake for this claim except as an expression in a theatrical performance. In both cases, the real content and discursive intent of speech is undermined by the context in which it occurs. In the case of the actor on stage, the appropriate rules for uptake and interpretation are being followed, just to unfortunate effect. However, in the case of political discourse something seems to be wrong with the rules for uptake and interpretation that have come to dominate in many quarters. This essay relies on recent discussions of silencing and epistemic injustice to introduce the ideas of partisan silencing and hyper-partisan silencing in an attempt to say more precisely what has gone wrong with the rules for uptake and interpretation in political discourse. It then relies on Hannah Arendt’s analyses of truth and lies in politics to connect these phenomena to underlying features of political action and speech. Conditions of partisan and hyperpartisan silencing turn out to be a natural, if not inevitable, consequence of the relationship of truth-telling and deception to political action itself as Arendt understands this. Finally, the essay elaborates on two suggestive passages from Arendt’s 1967 essay “Truth and Politics” to propose potential strategies for resisting conditions of hyperpartisan silencing. Because hyper-partisan silencing itself imposes a certain discursive logic, there are kinds of political speech and action that might succeed in being understood as sincere and so in being persuasive—even in the face of hyper-partisan silencing—precisely because they challenge the assumptions that underpin this discursive logic itself. (shrink)

I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.

Much work on mystical experience has taken for granted a certain view about the relation between experience and its interpretation. This ‘traditional view’ has received perhaps its most explicit statement in Stace's Mysticism and Philosophy . It is a view which is attractive to proponents of the doctrine of unanimity, the doctrine that at the phenomenological level all mystical experiences are basically similar. Recently, however, in a growing body of literature, the traditional view has come under heavy fire. Its critics (...) adopt a Kantian, indeed a hyper–Kantian, picture of experience. And they see the traditional view, accordingly, as ‘naïve’ and ‘simplistic’. In addition, hyper–Kantians typically reject the doctrine of unanimity. (shrink)

In section III of Pryor 2006a, I argued against the view that the mere fact that a thought- type is hyper-reliable directly gives one justification to believe a thought of that type. A close alternative says that our merely appreciating that the thought-type is hyper-reliable directly gives us that justification.

In this article, we explore how digital marketers think about marketing in the age of Big Data surveillance, automatic computational analyses, and algorithmic shaping of choice contexts. Our starting point is a contradiction at the heart of digital marketing namely that digital marketing brings about unprecedented levels of consumer empowerment and autonomy and total control over and manipulation of consumer decision-making. We argue that this contradiction of digital marketing is resolved via the notion of relevance, which represents what Fredric Jameson (...) calls a symbolic act. The notion of the symbolic act lets us see the centering of relevance as a creative act of digital marketers who undertake to symbolically resolve a contradiction that cannot otherwise be resolved. Specifically, we suggest that relevance allows marketers to believe that in the age of surveillance capitalism, the manipulation of choice contexts and decision-making is the same as consumer empowerment. Put differently, relevance is the moment when marketing manipulation disappears and all that is left is the empowered consumer. To create relevant manipulations that are experienced as empowering by the consumer requires always-on surveillance, massive analyses of consumer data and hyper-targeted responses, in short, a persistent marketing presence. The vision of digital marketing is therefore a fascinating one: marketing disappears at precisely the moment when it extends throughout the life without limit. (shrink)

According to hyper-Humeanism, the world of “fact” is utterly distinct from the realm of “value”-that is, the realm of morality and religion.This is a well-known philosophical position, and it more or less follows from some well-known philosophical doctrines (e.g., logical positivism, and neo-Wittgensteinianism), but its appeal is not limited to philosophers. Indeed, an acceptance of hyper-Humeanism seems to be at the root of Stephen Jay Gould’s recent defense of the thesis that science and religion are utterly distinct. Gould’s (...) stated aim in defending this thesis is to settle, or perhaps reveal as illusory, various conflicts between science and religion. However, I arguenot only that Gould’s version of this thesis is defective, but also that hyper-Humeanism itself is false. If I am right, then “facts” and “values”-science and religion in particular-can overlap in philosophically interesting ways. (shrink)