Improbable knowing is knowing something even though it is almost certain on one’s evidence at the time that one does not know that thing. Once probabilities on the agent’s evidence are introduced into epistemic logic in a very natural way, it is easy to construct models of improbable knowing, some of which have realistic interpretations, for instance concerning agents like us with limited powers of perceptual discrimination. Improbable knowing is an extreme case of failure of the KK principle, that is, (...) of a case of knowing something even though one does not know at the time that one knows that thing. A generalization of the argument yields cases of improbable rationality, in which it is rational for one to do something even though it is almost certain on one’s evidence at the time that it is not rational for one to do that thing. When the models are elaborated to represent appearances and beliefs as well as knowledge, they turn out to contain Gettier cases. Neglect of the possibility of improbable knowing may cause some sceptical claims and claims of the non-closure of knowledge under competent deduction to look more plausible than they deserve to. A formal appendix explores the closely related question of the conditions under which a reflection principle is violated. The principle says that the evidential probability of a proposition conditional on the evidential probability of that proposition’s being c is itself c. (shrink)

Si les publics improbables sont, fondamentalement, des publics faibles, ils nous surprennent aussi – et c’est leur principal cadeau, leur caractère exemplaire. Par un art de la transgression, ils rappellent combien la vie publique est une affaire commune, façonnée par les gens à certains moments, en certains lieux, animés par la lutte et l’imagination, et par la joie de se découvrir les uns les autres. Cet article identifie quatre figures d’agentivité sonique pratiquées par ces improbables publics : l’invisible, l’entendu par-dessus (...) l’épaule, l’itinérant et le faible. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...) motivated by independently plausible principles in the epistemology of perception, the epistemology of estimation, and concerning the connection between knowledge and justified belief. (shrink)

Voluntary, employment‐based insurance is afflicted by a variety of internal imbalances: inequities in the way health insurance is paid for, a conflict of interest in the selection of health insurance, the concentration of the healthy and the sick into separate plans, and free‐ridership. But while all these imbalances generate severe problems, those seeking to reform health insurance in the United States should concentrate on the last two.

Heterosexist ideology underpins education policy and practice almost universally. It has the effect of rendering invisible and disrespecting practitioners and students of other sexual and non-gender conforming identities. Much explicitly queer work has challenged this normalising and frequently oppressive higher education terrain. To maximise this queer potential this article proposes re-positioning queer within and through a practice and pedagogy of feminism. The broad-based identity politics of feminism and the anti-identitarian politic of queer may appear a slightly improbable alliance. The article (...) argues, however, that intersectional approaches which reinforce queer integrity, challenge oppressive social norms and simultaneously re-emphasise the importance of the political through an identity politics heavily influenced by feminism, are not just possible but necessary. In seeking to explore what unites feminism and queer educationally, the article makes three observations relating to history, pedagogy and activism. It references two particular LGTBQ Irish and European educational programmes, which it argues highlight this sense of the probable in terms of queer–feminist educational alliances. Such alliances can continue to challenge in material ways sustained educational constructions of heterosexuality as normal, natural and moral and in so doing provide a platform for empowerment and change. (shrink)

In the analytic Philosophy of Religion, much ink has been spilt on the existence of some sort of supernatural reality. Such work is usually done by theists; those that find classical theism to be probably true. It is my contention that theism is unjustly privileged by many in the field, even when supernaturalism has been – competently or incompetently – argued for. As such, I present a series of challenges for the theist, finding them to be insuperable at present. The (...) first such challenge concerns the challenge of polytheism. Polytheism is often very casually overlooked on the basis that monotheism is ‘simpler’. Recognising that such simplicity is not necessarily truth-conducive, I argue that polytheism, as a catch-all hypothesis, ought to be preferred. The second challenge proceeds from an assumption not only of supernaturalism, but also of monotheism. There are infinitely many monotheistic alternatives to theism, which can be conceived by simply tweaking the typical attributes of God. Again, simplicity is typically appealed to, and again found to be unhelpful. Furthermore, there are the deistic alternatives to consider also, many of which are seemingly more probable than theism. Finally, I consider the pantheistic god models, deciding that pantheisms are generally more robust and make fewer ad hoc assumptions about the world. As an aside, I concisely discuss the difficulties in moving from theism to Christian theism, which includes an argument against miracles, and a brief explanation of the increasing trend of questioning Jesus’ historical existence. (shrink)

It is argued that the \ cancellation model is a good proxy for discussions of finetuned cancellations in physical theories. XYCM is then analyzed from a statistical perspective, where it is argued that a finetuned point in the parameter space is not abnormal, with any such point being just as probable as any other point. However, landing inside a standardly defined finetuned region has a much lower probability than landing outside the region, and that probability is invariant under assumed ranges (...) of parameters. This proposition requires asserting also that the finetuned target region is a priori established. Therefore, it is surmised that a highly finetuned theory is generally expected to be highly improbable. An actionable implication of this moderate naturalness position is that the search for a non-finetuned explanation to supplant an apparently finetuned theory is likely to be a valid pursuit, but not guaranteed to be. A statistical characterization of this moderate position is presented, as well as those of the extreme pro-naturalness and anti-naturalness positions. (shrink)

Imams and ayatollahs oppress women in his name. Celibate popes and priests mess up people's sex lives in his name. Jewish shohets cut live animals' throats in his name. The achievements of religion in past history - bloody crusades, torturing inquisitions, mass-murdering..

Richard Dawkins has popularized an argument that he thinks sound for showing that there is almost certainly no God. It rests on the assumptions (1) that complex and statistically improbable things are more difficult to explain than those that are not and (2) that an explanatory mechanism must show how this complexity can be built up from simpler means. But what justifies claims about the designer’s own complexity? One comes to a different understanding of order and of simplicity when one (...) considers the psychological counterpart of information. In assessing his treatment of biological organisms as either self-programmed machines or algorithms, I show how self-generated organized complexity does not fit well with our knowledge of abduction and of information theory as applied to genetics. I also review some philosophical proposals for explaining how the complexity of the world could be externally controlled if one wanted to uphold a traditional understanding of divine simplicity. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v32-33-davies.

A growing number of powerful arguments have been formulated by philosophers and logicians in recent years demonstrating that the existence of God is improbable. These arguments assume that God's existence is possible but argue that the weight of the empirical evidence is against God's actual existence. This unique anthology collects most of the important arguments for the improbability of God that have been published since the mid-1900s. The editors make each argument clear and accessible by providing a helpful summary. (...) In addition, they arrange this diverse collection of arguments for the improbability of God into four thematic groups: Part 1 contains cosmological arguments based on the weight of the evidence relative to the origin of the universe; Part 2 presents teleological arguments based on the weight of the evidence relative to the order in the universe; Part 3 deals with inductive evil arguments based on the weight of the evidence relative to the widespread and horrendous evil in the world; and Part 4 contains nonbelief arguments based on the weight of the evidence relative to the widespread nonbelief or the reasonable nonbelief in the world. The list of distinguished authors includes William Rowe, Theodore Drange, Quentin Smith, Victor Stenger, J. L. Schellenberg, and Michael Martin, among others. With this new anthology as a companion to their earlier anthology, The Impossibility of God (2003), Martin and Monnier have created an indispensable resource in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not the (...) ability to do otherwise. (shrink)

We argue that creative ideas are potentially valuable improbable constructions. We arrive at this formulation of creativity after considering several problems that arise for the theories that suggest that creativity is novelty, originality, or usefulness. Our theory avoids these problems. But since we also derive our theory of creativity from the scientific commitments of a more general theory of cognitive development, a theory called rational constructivism, our theory is unique insofar as it explains creativity in both adults and children through (...) reference to a set of computational mechanisms that have been posited on the basis of independently plausible experimental research. (shrink)

E. P. Wigner 's argument that the probability of the existence of self-reproducing units, e.g., organisms, is zero according to standard quantum theory is stated and analyzed. Theorems are presented which indicate that Wigner 's mathematical result in fact should not be interpreted as asserting the improbability of self-reproducing units.

The publication in English of Karl R. Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery twenty-five years after the appearance of the German original, is an important event. At the time when many philosophers questioned the cognitive value of scientific hypotheses , Popper has shown how to reconcile the free use of bold explanatory hypotheses with an insistence on empirical testing. Many of Popper's views have now been accepted even by most of his earlier opponents, which is no small tribute to a (...) philosopher who had challenged an important current of opinion. But, though the basic aspects of Popper's theory have attracted considerable attention in recent years, some of his finer points have received insufficient discussion. It is hoped that the publication of this important book in English translation will now help to remedy this situation. (shrink)

L'improbable est souvent considéré comme un vain exercice d'hypothèses oiseuses ou comme un supplément d'incertitude dans la culture occidentale, qui préfère le prévisible à l'incertain. Et pourtant... Que ce soit dans la recherche scientifique fondamentale ou dans l'invention artistique, dans la discussion philosophique ou dans l'évolution du vivant, l'improbable est cette source de liberté d'où peuvent jaillir idées, solutions ou événements nouveaux et imprévus. Autour d'Alain Berthoz et de Carlo Ossola, une dizaine de chercheurs d'envergure internationale abordent dans une approche (...) multidisciplinaire les mystères et les ressorts de l'improbable, puissant facteur de créativité aux frontières du possible et de l'impossible. L'improbable au coeur de la création dans les sciences, les arts et dans la vie sociale! (shrink)

Written in the aftermath of the deaths of the French philosophers Jacques Derrida (19302004) and Paul Ricoeur (19132005), this book is an important and ...

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know (...) that P (we can’t strengthen ¬KKp to K¬Kp)! If we can construct such cases, we may be able to use them to understand some puzzling epistemic phenomena. (shrink)

The Selected Works of Arne Naess, ed. by Harold Glasser and Alan Drengson in cooperation with the author, Dordrecht: Springer 2005. 10 volumes. On January 12, 2009 Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess passed away at the age of 96. He was still actively involved in putting together the edition of the Selected Writings of Arne Naess . He worte an introduction to the writings which is printed at the beginning of each volume together with the extensive introduction by the editor Harold (...) Glasser. At first sight this seems strangely repetitive and superfluous but on closer scrutiny it certainly makes sense. In view of the large breadth of philosophical themes that are presented in the volumes it is quite likely that the readers interested in the writings will come from different areas. A number of these writings make high demands on the reader who is expected to be relatively versed in logical analysis and in the work and thought of Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Gandhi, Husserl, Carnap or even Sextus Empiricus. The reader who is interested in one of these heterogenous fields is encouraged by both introductory texts to reflect on a specific theme against the backdrop of the philosophers’s entire oeuvre – and that’s a good thing. (shrink)

Wondrous Truths answers two questions about the steep rise of theoretical discoveries around 1600: Why in the European West? And why so quickly? The history of science's awkward assortment of accident and luck, geography and personal idiosyncrasy, explains scientific progress alongside experimental method. J.D. Trout's blend of scientific realism and epistemic naturalism carries us through neuroscience, psychology, history, and policy, and explains how the corpuscular hunch of Boyle and Newton caught on.

Chronicles the emergence of yoga in Jazz Age New York, tracing the contributions of instructor Pierre Bernard, who trained with an Indian master before introducing patrons to modern yogic principles from his profitable Hudson River ashram.

[The following is from the Introduction to the collection that houses the chapter.] The final chapter, which is by Alexander Pawlak and Nicholas Joll, is about Hitchhiker’s as satire. Actually – and rather to the point, given the business of this book – the argument is that Hitchhiker’s is philosophical satire. In making that argument, we draw parallels between Hitchhiker’s, on the one hand, and famous satires by Swift and Voltaire, on the other. Another topic we discuss is the relation (...) between Hitchhiker’s and other, or more traditional, science fiction. The chapter contains material on the meaning of life as well. (shrink)

Cooperation and conversation in the public sphere may overcome historical and other barriers to rational argumentation. As an alternative to evidence-based medicine (EBM) and patient-centered care (PCC), the recent development of a modern version of person-centered medicine (PCM) signals an opportunity for a conversational pluralogue to replace parallel monologues between EBM and its critics, and the calls to EBM to debate its critics. This article draws upon elements of Habermas’s theory of communicative action in order to suggest the kind of (...) pluralogue that is required for stakeholders in modern medicine to benefit more from publicly conversing with each other than speaking alone or using debate to argue against each other. This reasoned perspective has lessons for all discourse when deep value-based and epistemological differences cannot be easily adjudicated. (shrink)

This article explores the case of informal car parkers in Mexico City, to whom drivers regularly entrust the keys to their vehicles. In contrast to literature on social trust that expects institutional trust and interpersonal trust to support one another, the article shows that interpersonal trust improbably arises in the context of corrupt and inefficient institutions. Coercive and market dynamics undergird the interactions among car parkers, police officers, and drivers, making possible the emergence of an informal market and noncontractual agreements. (...) The exchange between car parkers and drivers depends on the performance of class—a performance that becomes legible and formulaic enough to appear safe, precisely because it coalesces classist tropes that are clearly distinct and recognizable. Interpersonal trust becomes possible not only despite class cleavages and institutional shortcomings but, paradoxically, because of them. (shrink)

In this chapter, Logan Paul Gage examines the only real attempt to disprove God’s existence by a New Atheist: Richard Dawkins’s “Ultimate 747 Gambit.” Central to Dawkins’s argument is the claim that God is more complex than what he is invoked to explain. Gage evaluates this claim using the main extant notions of simplicity in the literature. Gage concludes that on no reading does this claim survive scrutiny. Along the way, Dawkins claims that there are no good positive arguments for (...) God’s existence. Gage attempts to show that Dawkins’s argument depends upon distinctively philosophical assumptions that do not appear to withstand scrutiny. (shrink)

El artículo expone la influencia de la teoría estética de Th. W. Adorno en la filosofía contemporánea o, más concretamente, en la obra del postestructuralista J. F. Lyotard. Se centra en una interpretación novedosa de cuatro conceptos fundamentales en ambos autores: el de crítica, la adhesión a una ética radical, la elección del panteón de los artistas preferidos por uno y otro y la defensa de ambos, frente a las estéticas sistemáticas y totales, de una estética micrológica. Palabras clave: Teoría (...) estética; Micrología; Crítica; Ética; Arte. (shrink)

Some risks have extremely high stakes. For example, a worldwide pandemic or asteroid impact could potentially kill more than a billion people. Comfortingly, scientific calculations often put very low probabilities on the occurrence of such catastrophes. In this paper, we argue that there are important new methodological problems which arise when assessing global catastrophic risks and we focus on a problem regarding probability estimation. When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they are really providing the (...) probability of the outcome occurring, given that their argument is watertight. However, their argument may fail for a number of reasons such as a flaw in the underlying theory, a flaw in the modeling of the problem, or a mistake in the calculations. If the probability estimate given by an argument is dwarfed by the chance that the argument itself is flawed, then the estimate is suspect. We develop this idea formally, explaining how it differs from the related distinctions of model and parameter uncertainty. Using the risk estimates from the Large Hadron Collider as a test case, we show how serious the problem can be when it comes to catastrophic risks and how best to address it. (shrink)

Autobiographical sketches by the philosopher and semioticist Ernst von Glasersfeld. The author writes: "Memories are a personal affair. They are what comes to mind when you think back, not what might in fact have happened at that earlier time in your life. You can no longer be certain of what seemed important then, because you are now looking at the past with today's eyes. The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico had that insight three hundred years ago: When we think of things (...) that lie in the past, we see them in terms of the concepts we have now." Ernst von Glasersfeld is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Georgia, Research Associate at the Scientific Reasoning Research Institute, and Adjunct Professor in the Dept. of Psychology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. A philosopher & cybernetician, he spent large parts of his life in Ireland, in Italy and since the mid-1960s in the USA. Elaborating upon authors as diverse as Vico and James Joyce, von Glasersfeld developed his own model of Radical Constructivism. (shrink)

La flânerie offre un pont qui relie les rives de la gestion et de la philosophie. Cet article clarifie d’abord le sens de la flânerie chez Taylor, sa distinction entre flâneries naturelle et systématique, et l’attention spécifique porté par Taylor à cette dernière, collective, organisée et sournoise, donc plus difficilement rationalisable. Il confronte ensuite Taylor aux réflexions de Benjamin s’attachant aux métamorphoses du flâneur dans le Paris du xix e siècle, pour interroger enfin l’ambiguïté de la flânerie et son potentiel (...) révolutionnaire : pour Taylor, la maîtrise du désir devient l’objet même du management ; pour Benjamin, la flânerie apparaît comme l’une des dernières possibilités de voir éclater l’espace-temps homogène de la Fin de l’Histoire. Le management contemporain clôt cette tension en intégrant les actions et les pensées des travailleurs dans de multiples boucles de rétroaction. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Richard Dawkins’ “argument from improbability” against the existence of God. This argument, which forms the core of Dawkins’ book The God Delusion, provides an interesting example of the use of scientific ideas in arguments about religion. Here I raise three objections: (1) The argument is inapplicable to philosophical conceptions of God that reduce most of God’s complexity to that of the physical universe. (2) The argument depends on a way of estimating probabilities that (...) fails for the probability of an entity that creates natural laws. (3) The argument supposes that complexity arises from past physical causes; however, some forms of complexity known to mathematics and logic do not arise in this way. After stating these three criticisms, I show that some of these same considerations undermine Dawkins’ critique of agnosticism. I close the paper with some remarks on Dawkins’ conception of God. (shrink)