Historically nurses have lacked significant input in end-of-life decision-making, despite being an integral part of care. Nurses experience negative feelings and moral conflict when forced to aggressively deliver care to patients at the EOL. As a result, nurses participate in slow codes, described as a limited resuscitation effort with no intended benefit of patient survival. The purpose of this study was to explore and understand the process nurses followed when making decisions about participation in limited resuscitation. (...) Five core categories emerged that describe this theory: (1) recognition of patient and family values at the EOL; (2) stretching time and reluctance in decision-making; (3) harm and suffering caused by the physical components of CPR; (4) nurse’s emotional and moral response to delivering aggressive care, and; (5) choosing limited resuscitation with or without a physician order. Several factors in end-of-life disputes contribute to negative feelings and moral distress driving some nurses to perform slow codes in order to preserve their own moral conflict, while other nurses refrain unless specifically ordered by physicians to provide limited care through tailored orders. (shrink)

Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation is the default response for persons who suffer cardiac or pulmonary arrest, except in cases in which there exists a do-not-resuscitate order. This default mindset is based on the rule of rescue and the ethical principle of beneficence. However, due to the lack of efficacy and the high risk of potential harm inherent in CPR, this procedure should not be the default intervention for cardiac or pulmonary arrest. Although CPR is a lifesaving medical intervention, it has (...) class='Hi'>limited positive results and the potential for multiple harmful consequences. Given the limited potential of CPR as a medical procedure, clinicians and patients must be educated regarding its limited potential, and procedures must be developed to help determine when it is appropriate as a medical intervention. (shrink)

Decisions about cardiopulmonary resuscitation may be based on medical prognosis, quality of life and patients' choices. Low survival rates indicate its overuse. Although the concept of medical futility has limitations, several strong predictors of non-survival have been identified and prognostic indices developed. Early results indicate that consideration of resuscitation in the elderly should be very selective, and support "opt-in" policies. In this minority of patients, quality of life is the principal issue. This is subjective and best assessed by (...) the individual in question. Patients' attitudes cannot be predicted reliably and surrogate decision-making is inadequate. Lay knowledge is poor. However, patients can use prognostic information to make rational choices. The majority welcome discussion of resuscitation and prefer this to be initiated by their doctors; many wish to decide for themselves. There is little evidence that this causes distress. The views of such patients, if competent, should be sought actively. (shrink)

Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance (...) had different guidance for first responders.The situation regarding resuscitation led the CEG to consider ethical aspects of health care professionals’ responses to the need for resuscitation during COVID-19. Members agreed that professionals should, ideally, have the level of PPE required for an aerosol generating procedure. However, there was no consensus regarding professionals’ duty to care when this is not available. On the one hand, it was agreed that the casualty/patient’s interests regarding resuscitation should be prioritised due to professionals’ contract with the public and professional privilege. On the other hand, risk thresholds were considered relevant to individual decision-making and professionals’ duty to care. All agreed that decision-making should not be influenced by rewards or reprimands. It was agreed also that decisions to resuscitate should not be considered as moral heroism or supererogatory - regardless of PPE availability - but rather as ‘minimally decent’. We agreed that it may be acceptable for professionals, with good reasons, to opt out of resuscitation attempts and these should be reflected on and discussed before the event. (shrink)

A Do Not Resuscitate order reflects a considered judgment that a physician can no longer stave off death. Why, then, have a patient consent to such an order? The primary point is that physicians should share with patients their judgment about what medicine can and cannot do. Because we cannot make death go away, we must make decisions about when to withhold or limit resuscitation openly, in honest and trusting conversation between doctor and patient.

BackgroundDeciding whether to resuscitate extremely preterm infants (EPIs) is clinically and ethically problematic. The aim of the study was to understand neonatologists’ clinical–ethical decision-making for resuscitation of EPIs.MethodsWe conducted a qualitative study in Belgium, following a constructivist account of the Grounded Theory. We conducted 20 in-depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with neonatologists. Data analysis followed the qualitative analysis guide of Leuven.ResultsThe main principles guiding participants’ decision-making were EPIs’ best interest and respect for parents’ autonomy. Participants agreed that justice as resource (...) allocation should not be considered in resuscitation decision-making. The main ethical challenge for participants was dealing with the conflict between EPIs’ best interest and respect for parents’ autonomy. This conflict was most prominent when parents and clinicians disagreed about births within the gray zone (24–25 weeks). Participants’ coping strategies included setting limits on extent of EPI care provided and rigidly following established guidelines. However, these strategies were not always feasible or successful. Although rare, these situations often led to long-lasting moral distress.ConclusionsParticipants’ clinical–ethical reasoning for resuscitation of EPIs can be mainly characterized as an attempt to balance EPIs’ best interest and respect for parents’ autonomy. This approach could explain why neonatologists considered conflicts between these principles as their main ethical challenge and why lack of resolution increases the risk of moral distress. Therefore, more research is needed to better understand moral distress in EPI resuscitation decisions.Clinical Trial Registration: The study received ethical approval from the ethics committee of UZ/ku Leuven (S62867). Confidentiality of personal information and anonymity was guaranteed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation of 25 May 2018. (shrink)

This article looks at the history of the stem cell as an experimental life-form and situates it within the context of biological theories of cellular ageing which emerged in the 1960s, under the banner of ‘biogerontology’. The field of biogerontology, I argue, is crucially concerned not only with the internal limits to a cell's lifespan, but also with the possibility of overcoming limits. Hence, the sense of ‘revolution’ that has surrounded the isolation of human embryonic stem cells. The article goes (...) on to situate the problematic of cellular ageing within the larger historical transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production – a transition whose effects on the life sciences have been insufficiently theorized – and points to resonances between the concerns of biogerontology and an emerging political rhetoric on the crisis of ageing and limits to growth. Having surfaced in parallel with the neo-liberal euphoria of the 1990s, the field of regenerative medicine presents itself as a biomedical solution to the problem of limits to growth. What is at stake in the contemporary biosciences, I suggest, is not so much the mass commodification of life itself as its transformation into a source of speculative surplus value. (shrink)

Despite its prevalence today, the practice of purely performative resuscitation (PPR)—paradigmatically, the ‘slow code’—has attracted more critics in bioethics than defenders. The most common criticism of the slow code is that it’s fundamentally deceptive or harmful, while the most common justification offered is that it may benefit the patient’s loved ones, by symbolically honoring the patient or the care team’s relationship with the family. I argue that critics and defenders of the slow code each have a point. Advocates of (...) the slow code are right that not all PPR is wrongly deceptive or harmful to the patient or his family, and that the symbolic aspect of medicine is itself morally significant. But the critics are also correct: slow codes are prima facie wrong. I argue that pursuing a slow code amounts to treating the patient as a tool for others’ benefit—hence, treating him as an object—and that this instrumentalizing quality constitutes one core prima facie wrong of the practice. I also build a case for the idea that the slow code may not always be all-things-considered wrong, specifying certain limited conditions under which acts of PPR might ultimately be permissible. Thus, the symbolic dimension of medical treatment is indeed morally important, both in morally favorable and in morally problematic respects—namely, in its symbolic denial of the patient’s humanity. (shrink)

Whether to allow the presence of family members during cardiopulmonary resuscitation has been a highly contentious topic in recent years. Even though a great deal of evidence and professional guidelines support the option of family presence during resuscitation , many healthcare professionals still oppose it. One of the main arguments espoused by the latter is that family members should not be allowed for the sake of the patient's best interests, whether it is to increase his chances of survival, (...) respect his privacy or leave his family with a last positive impression of him. In this paper, we examine the issue of FPDR from the patient's point of view. Since the patient requires CPR, he is invariably unconscious and therefore incompetent. We discuss the Autonomy Principle and the Three-Tiered process for surrogate decision making, as well as the Beneficence Principle and show that these are limited in providing us with an adequate tool for decision making in this particular case. Rather, we rely on a novel principle and a novel integrated model for surrogate decision making. We show that this model is more satisfactory in taking the patient's true wishes under consideration and encourages a joint decision making process by all parties involved. (shrink)

Background: Certain factors may facilitate or inhibit the formation of moral sensitivity in nurses performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The identification of these factors in the context can help develop strategies to promote nurses’ moral sensitivity and offer new insights into the consequences of their moral decisions. Objective: Taking into account the possibly multi-factorial nature of moral sensitivity, this study aimed to identify the factors affecting the formation of nurses’ moral sensitivity in CPR settings. Research design and methods: This study (...) performed a conventional qualitative content analysis. Twenty-one participants were selected via purposive and theoretical sampling. The data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews and simultaneously analyzed via content analysis. Participants and research context: In total, twenty-one participants (fourteen clinical care nurses, three head nurses, two educational supervisors, and two faculty members) from different cities of Iran were interviewed. Ethical considerations: The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of Urmia University of Medical Sciences in Iran (IR.UMSU.REC.1399.337). Findings: Four categories (underlying factors, professional factors, organizational inhibitors of ethics, and professional limitations) and 13 sub-categories were extracted. Discussion: The formation of moral sensitivity requires a range of ethical standards and their maintenance, not only at the individual level but also at the profession, organization, and community levels. So eliminating inhibitors of ethics in these contexts can improve nurse’s ethical performance in CPR settings. Conclusion: Any measures taken or decisions made by nurses in CPR are driven by numerous ethical issues to which nurses must be morally sensitive. Some factors facilitate and some inhibit the formation of moral sensitivity in nurses. (shrink)

Some health care organizations allow physicians to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from a patient, despite patient or surrogate requests that it be provided, when they believe it will be more harmful than beneficial. Such cases usually involve patients with terminal diagnoses whose medical teams argue that aggressive treatments are medically inappropriate or likely to be harmful. Although there is state-to-state variability and a considerable judicial gray area about the conditions and mechanisms for refusals to perform CPR, medical teams typically follow (...) a set of clearly defined procedures for these decisions. The procedures are based on the principle of nonmaleficence and typically include consultation with hospital ethics committees, reflecting the guidelines of relevant professional associations. Ethical debates about when CPR can and should be limited tend to rely more on discussions of theory, principles, and case studies than systematic empirical study of the situations in which such limitations are applied. Sociologists of bioethics call for empirical study, arguing that what ethicists and health professionals believe they are doing when they draft policies or invoke principles does not always mirror what is happening on the ground. In this article, we begin the task of modeling the empirical analyses sociologists call for, focusing on a cohort at Massachusetts General Hospital. We inductively analyzed ethics committee notes and medical records of nineteen patients whose surrogates did not accept the decision to withhold CPR. (shrink)

In clinical ethics, there remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of attempting cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for certain patients. Although the issue continues to receive ample attention and various frameworks have been proposed for navigating such cases, most discussions draw heavily on the notion of harm as a central consideration. In the following, I use emerging philosophical literature on the notion of harm to argue that the ambiguities and disagreement about harm create important and oft-overlooked challenges for (...) the ethics of CPR. I begin by elucidating the standard account of harm, called the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). I then show that three challenges to the CCA—preemptive harms, the harm of death, and non-experiential harms—are particularly salient when assessing potential harms for candidates of CPR and likely impact-related decision-making and communication. I extend this argument to explore how the ambiguities of harm might extend to other realms of clinical decision-making, such as the use and limitations of life-sustaining treatments. To address these challenges, I propose two strategies for identifying and minimizing the impact of such uncertainty: first, clinicians and ethicists ought to promote pluralistic conversations that account for different understandings of harm; second, they ought to invoke harm-independent considerations when discussing the ethics of CPR in order to reflect the nuances of such conversations. These strategies, coupled with a richer philosophical understanding of harm, promise to help clinicians and ethicists navigate the prevalent and difficult cases involving patient resuscitation and many other harm-based decisions in the clinical setting. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine and the American Heart Association have issued a “call to action” to expand the performance of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in response to out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. Widespread advertising campaigns have been created to encourage more members of the lay public to undergo training in the technique of closed-chest compression-only CPR, based upon extolling the virtues of rapid initiation of resuscitation, untempered by information about the often distressing outcomes, and hailing the “improved” results when nonprofessional bystanders are (...) involved. We describe this misrepresentation of CPR as a highly effective treatment as the fetishization of this valuable, but often inappropriately used, therapy. We propose that the medical profession has an ethical duty to inform the public through education campaigns about the procedure's limitations in the out-of-hospital setting and the narrow clinical indications for which it has been demonstrated to have a reasonable probability of producing favorable outcomes. (shrink)

Critical care society guidelines recommend that ethics committees mediate intractable conflict over potentially inappropriate treatment, including Do Not Resuscitate status. There are, however, limited data on cases and circumstances in which ethics consultants recommend not offering cardiopulmonary resuscitation despite patient or surrogate requests and whether physicians follow these recommendations. This was a retrospective cohort of all adult patients at a large academic medical center for whom an ethics consult was requested for disagreement over DNR status. Patient demographic predictors (...) of ethics consult outcomes were analyzed. In 42 of the 116 cases, the patient or surrogate agreed to the clinician recommended DNR order following ethics consultation. In 72 of 74 of the remaining cases, ethics consultants recommended not offering CPR. Physicians went on to write a DNR order without patient/surrogate consent in 57 of those cases. There were no significant differences in age, race/ethnicity, country of origin, or functional status between patients where a DNR order was and was not placed without consent. Physicians were more likely to place a DNR order for patients believed to be imminently dying. The median time from DNR order to death was 4 days with a 90-day mortality of 88.2%. In this single-center cohort study, there was no evidence that patient demographic factors affected ethics consultants’ recommendation to withhold CPR despite patient/surrogate requests. Physicians were most likely to place a DNR order without consent for imminently dying patients. (shrink)

Advance directives allow people to accept or decline medical interventions and to appoint surrogate decision makers if they become incapacitated. Living wills are written in ambiguous terms and require interpretation by clinical providers. Living wills cannot cover all conceivable end-of-life decisions. There is too much variability in clinical decision making to make an all-encompassing living will possible. While there are many limitations of advance directives, this article reviews some of the most troublesome ethical dilemmas with regard to advance directives.

We argue that Aged Residential Care (ARC) facilities should be allowed to create and adopt an informed “No Chest Compression” (NCC) policy. Potential residents are informed before admission that staff will not provide chest compressions to a pulseless resident. All residents would receive standard choking care, and a fully discussed advance directive would be utilized to determine if the resident wanted a one-minute trial of rescue breaths (to clear their airway) or utilization of the automatic defibrillator in case of arrest. (...) The benefits of chest compressions for residents in ARC are dubious, and the burdens are high. For frail elderly people without a pulse, chest compressions are arguably unethical because the chance of benefit is minuscule, the procedure is violent, painful, and challenging to perform correctly, and procedures detract from a peaceful end of life. These burdens fall on residents, their families, ARC facilities providers, and society. We further argue that limitations on universal invasive resuscitation, such as advance directives, need to be more consistently sought and applied. The goals of an informed NCC policy are twofold: removing added suffering from a person’s end-of-life experience and increasing ARC residents’ understanding of the burdens of ineffective treatments for pulselessness. (shrink)

This paper examines several decision-making models that have been proposed to limit the use of CPR for COVID-19 patients. My main concern will be to assess proposals for the implementation of unilateral DNRs — i.e., orders to withhold CPR without the agreement of patients or their surrogates.

BackgroundThe acceptance or practical application of the do-not-resuscitate order is substantially dependent on internal or personal factors; in a way that decision-making about this issue can be specific to each person. Moreover, most nurses feel morally and emotionally stressed and confused during the process decision-making regarding DNR order. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to evaluate nurses’ attitudes towards DNR order in a systematic review.MethodsThis critical survey was conducted using a systematic review protocol. To this end, the most (...) relevant articles published in domestic and foreign databases with no time limits until October 2018 were searched. The inclusion and exclusion criteria were articles on DNR order, studies about nurses’ attitudes, descriptive and analytical research papers, as well as those with download links and full texts. The given articles were also assessed in terms of their quality and their main results were extracted.ResultsOf the total number of 1663 articles searched in the process of systematic review to investigate nurses’ attitudes towards DNR order, 88 articles were included in the full-text review step and finally 10 articles, meeting the inclusion criteria, were found. Assessing the quality of articles included in this review showed that 8 articles, in general, were of good quality and 2 studies were characterized with moderate quality. The main factors associated with nurses’ attitudes towards DNR order were grouped into three categories of (1) nurses’ attitudes towards DNR order, (2) guidelines for DNR order, and (3) decision-making by patients and their families about DNR order. In most of the studies examined, nurses’ attitudes towards DNR order were reported positive.ConclusionIt seemed that nurses were willing to get involved in DNR order and each hospital was recommended to develop a written DNR policy directing individuals and avoiding their confusion in this respect. (shrink)

We describe the case of an eighty‐four‐year‐old man with disseminated lung cancer who had been receiving palliative care in the hospital and was found by nursing staff unresponsive, with clinically obvious signs of death, including rigor mortis. Because there was no documentation to the contrary, the nurses commenced cardiopulmonary resuscitation and called a code blue, resulting in resuscitative efforts that continued for around twenty minutes. In discussion with the hospital ethicist, senior nurses justified these actions, mainly citing disciplinary and (...) medicolegal concerns. We argue that moral harms arise from CPR performed on a corpse and that legal concerns about failing to perform it are unfounded. We contend that such efforts are an unintended consequence of managerialist policies mandating do‐not‐resuscitate orders and advance care plans and of defensive practices that can value the interests of institutions and practitioners over those of patients. Health management teaching should include managerialism and its pitfalls, while clinician training should prioritize ethical reasoning and legal knowledge over defensive practice. (shrink)

Differences in perception and potential disagreements between parents and professionals regarding the attitude for resuscitation at the limit of viability are common. This study evaluated in healthcare professionals whether the decision to resuscitate at the limit of viability are influenced by the way information on incurred risks is given or received. This is a prospective randomized controlled study. This study evaluated the attitude of healthcare professionals by testing the effect of information given through graphic fact sheets formulated either optimistically (...) or pessimistically. The written educational fact sheet included three graphical presentations of survival and complication/morbidity by gestational age. The questionnaire was submitted over a period of 4 months to 5 and 6-year medical students from the Geneva University as well as physicians and nurses of the neonatal unit at the University Hospitals of Geneva. Our sample included 102 healthcare professionals. Forty-nine responders were students, 32 paediatricians and 21 nurses in NICU. The received risk tended to be more severe in both groups compared to the graphically presented facts and current guidelines, although optimistic representation favoured the perception of “survival without disability” at 23 to 25 weeks. Therapeutic attitudes did not differ between groups, but healthcare professionals with children were more restrained and students more aggressive at very low gestational ages. Written information on mortality and morbidity given to healthcare professionals in graphic form encourages them to overestimate the risk. However, perception in healthcare staff may not be directly transferable to parental perception during counselling as the later are usually naïve to the data received. This parental information are always communicated in ways that subtly shape the decisions that follow. (shrink)

This paper examines the historical rise of both cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the do-not-resuscitate order and the wisdom of their continuing status in U.S. hospital practice and policy. The practice of universal presumed consent to CPR and the resulting DNR policy are the products of a particular time and were responses to particular problems. In order to keep the excesses of technology in check, the DNR policies emerged as a response to the in-hospital universal presumed consent to CPR. We live (...) with this historical concretion, which seems to perpetuate a false culture that the patient's wishes must be followed. The authors are critical of the current U.S. climate, where CPR and DNR are viewed as two among a panoply of patient choices, and point to UK practice as an alternative. They conclude that physicians in the United States should radically rethink approaches to CPR and DNR. (shrink)

Predictions of poor prognosis for critically ill patients may become self-fulfilling if life-sustaining treatment or resuscitation is subsequently withheld on the basis of that prediction. This paper outlines the epistemic and normative problems raised by self-fulfilling prophecies (SFPs) in intensive care. Where predictions affect outcome, it can be extremely difficult to ascertain the mortality rate for patients if all treatment were provided. SFPs may lead to an increase in mortality for cohorts of patients predicted to have poor prognosis, they (...) may lead doctors to feel causally responsible for the deaths of their patients, and they may compromise honest communication with patients and families about prognosis. However, I argue that the self-fulfilling prophecy is inevitable when life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn in the face of uncertainty. SFPs do not necessarily make treatment limitation decisions problematic. To minimize the effects of SFPs, it is essential to carefully collect and appraise evidence about prognosis. Doctors need to be honest with themselves and with patients and their families about uncertainty and the limits of knowledge. (shrink)

The ethical permissibility of the “slow code” sparks vigorous debate. However, definitions of the “slow code” that exist in the literature often leave room for interpretation. Thus, those assessing the ethical permissibility of the slow code may not be operating with shared definitions, and definitions may not align with clinicians' understanding and use of the term in clinical practice. To add clarity and nuance to discussions of the “slow code,” this manuscript highlights the salient medical and moral components that distinguish (...) resuscitative practices, resulting in a taxonomy that includes nine distinct entries: the Fake Code, Casual Code, Time‐Limited Code, Family Code, Contained Code, a la Carte Code, Preventive Code, Passive Code, and Accepted Code. We argue that cogent analyses of the ethical implications of the “slow code” must begin with clear, shared understandings of the practices under debate. (shrink)

Photo by Hannah Busing on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Religion has long provided guidance that has led to standards reflected in some aspects of medical practices and traditions. The recent bioethical literature addresses numerous new problems posed by advancing medical technology and demonstrates an erosion of standards rooted in religion and long widely accepted as almost axiomatic. In the deep soul-searching that pervades the publications on bioethics, several disturbing and dangerous trends neglect some basic lessons of philosophy, logic, and history. The bioethics (...) discourse on medical aid in dying emphasizes similarity over previously recognized important distinguishing features. For example, it overplays a likeness between assistance in dying and the withdrawal of life-saving technology. In many bioethics’ topics, arguments based on a logical continuum are used to question the lines demarcating important moral differences. l. The Line Between Ethical and Not: Logic Based on Continuum Careful case selection, often either end of a continuum, allows the tearing down or ridiculing of many rules and codes across most professions and fields of interest. This situation holds true for traffic laws as well as medical ethics guidelines. It is relatively simple for those who desire to attack a particular viewpoint by selecting a case that makes that position seem untenable. In the ethics realm, good and bad medicine exist at opposite ends of an ethical continuum, with many practices lying in between. For example, much of medical ethics exists between the Nazi criminal physicians and the most sainted nurse or physician. A gradual progression occurred over less than two decades from a utilitarian position that supported limited euthanasia for those with certain mental illnesses to genocide. German society embraced a utilitarian ethic in which the value of human life no longer was intrinsic but instrumental.[1] Many morally significant points on a continuum were then ignored as the misguided utilitarian policy rampantly continued. A point in the continuum to distinguish between ethically justifiable and that which is not can be difficult to identify compared to the two extremes. This continuum is not unique to ethics but can be applied to almost any other aspect of human life and endeavor. Between a severely ill schizophrenic person and a superbly well-adjusted individual, there is a continuum of mental and psychological function. The existence of a continuum should not paralyze thinking and prevent us from drawing lines and identifying moral differences based on objective criteria as well as moral philosophy. Yet, by focusing on a continuum, many bioethicists use logic to disregard dividing lines between an "ethical" and an "unethical" act. Unfortunately, sometimes bioethicists draw revolutionary conclusions that would change the scope of medical practices which is accepted as ethical. There are many examples of similar shifts on the continuum. Many authors argue for the ethical permissibility of abortion by pointing out that the human fetus is no different in various characteristics, one arguing it is as like an ape or chick as it is like a person,[2] and does not achieve unique human and individual characteristics until well into the first year of life.[3] While human fetuses arguably do not have certain distinctive qualities of personhood, most people shy away from the logical next conclusion: permitting infanticide. For example, Joshua Lederberg condemns infanticide, in the face of biological illogic, because of our emotional commitment to infants, to me, a relatively weak explanation. Sir Francis Crick suggests we might consider birth at two days of life in order to decide whether an infant is a "suitable" member of society.[4] Giublini and Minerva suggest that infanticide should be permissible since late pregnancy abortions are permissible, arguing there is no significant difference between a fetus just before birth and an infant just after birth.[5] Clearly the continuum approach would allow for subjective arguments in favor of later infanticide at other points many days post-birth. Years ago, with a cynical tone, I mentioned infanticide as a further step on the continuum beyond abortion, and I was rightly shouted down as being deliberately provocative to assert the logic would ever stretch so far. While it is not an accepted mainstream position, the movement in academic settings from widespread condemnation to limited possible acceptance of infanticide has taken place in an incredibly short time. Public opinion and medical opinion in these areas have shifted dramatically in a short time. In another area, from a biological and chemical point of view, there is a continuum from man down to a single carbon atom. Yet, it would not seem logical to ignore the emotional differences, the meaning of personhood, or the moral distinction between killing an insect and killing a person. ll. A False Continuum: Medical Aid in Dying I assert that there has been an erosion of ethical guidelines in recent years attributable to using continuums to camouflage important distinctions. James Rachels’ work on active and passive euthanasia, which contends that the two are ethically identical, exemplifies that logic.[6] He illustrates this thesis, using a continuum to compare different scenarios with like consequences as morally equivalent, by comparing the deliberate drowning of a child with a deliberate failure to rescue a drowning child when easily able to do so. The author's comparison proposes that since much of the medical profession has already made peace with withholding treatment in order to hasten death, consistency inexorably demands that we permit active euthanasia as well.[7] When permission for active euthanasia was first introduced, it was limited exclusively to patients suffering severely from an intractable, incurable, and irreversible disease. These guidelines have been continuously eroded. There is now a substantial serious consideration for permitting active euthanasia of healthy elderly individuals who feel that they have completed their lives and are "tired of living."[8] There are many moral and factual differences along the ethical continuum. In human life, there is a difference between a live baby and a fetus, between a viable fetus and one that is not, between a fetus and a zygote, and between a zygote and a sperm cell. Similarly, there is a difference between pulling a trigger to kill someone and not interfering in preventing his death, which is reprehensible though both may be. There is a difference between not resuscitating an 80-year-old man with cancer when his heart stops and injecting him with a fatal dose of potassium chloride. I argue that an overt act of taking life repels civilized human beings is to be commended and encouraged as the reverence for human life or even for just a moment of human life is one of the great contributions of our civilization. CONCLUSION As an orthodox Jew, I feel that divinely inspired guidelines that have stood the test of centuries shape my beliefs, and such guidelines contradict medical aid in dying. I cannot speak to the viewpoint of those who do not access religion in defining their moral stance, nor do I implicate them in the current bioethics' trends, as I am not aware of the personal role of religion in the lives of most such authors. While many nonreligious people have a firm philosophical grounding and oppose medical aid in dying, I suggest that in the absence of any religious or other absolute standards, developing logically defensible ethical guidelines may be challenging. At the least, religion may play a role in defining the points on the continuums that are ethically meaningful and refuting the trending beliefs that if the endpoint is the same, allowing different methods of arriving at that end are somehow ethically equal. The continuum of ways death may result does not negate analysis of whether death is brought about in ways that recognize the importance of life. The German philosopher Hans Jonas said, "It is a question whether without restoring the category of the sacred, the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment, we can have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers that we possess today and constantly increase and are compelled to use."[9] While countries vary on the role of religion in policy, with many emphasizing freedoms of religion, a recent position paper released by a group of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem leaders suggested the need for agreement on the unique sanctity of human life.[10] I would recommend that such a document serve as an example of consensus on critical foundational bioethical guidelines for democratic secular societies. - [1] Alexander L Medical science under dictatorship. New England Journal of Medicine, 241, p39-47 DOI10.1056/NEJM194907142410201 [2] Lederberg J. A geneticist looks at contraception and abortion, Annals of Internal Medicine 67, sup 2, 25-27. https:/doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-67-3-25 [3] Ibid. [4] Editorial, Sociology: Logic of biology. Nature 220, 429 https://www.nature.com/articles/220429b0 [5] Giublini A Minerva F After-birth abortion: why should the baby live. J Med Ethics 39, 261- [6] Rachels J Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 292, 78-80 [7] Ibid. [8] Cohen-Almagor R Euthanizing people who are "tired of life". in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide-Lessons from Belgium. Ch 11 of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Cambridge University Press pp173-187. 2017 and DOI; https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108182799.012 [9] Hans Jonas, Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics, 1972, found as Chapter IX, Philosophical Essays, 1980. https://inters.org/jonas-technology-responsability [10] A position paper of the Abrahamic Monotheistic religions on matters concerning the end-of-life. Vatican Press 28 October 2019 https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/10/28/191028f.html. (shrink)

BackgroundDecisions about limitations of life sustaining treatments are made for end-of-life patients in intensive care units. The aim of this research was to explore the professional and ethical attitudes and experiences of medical professionals on treatment of end-of-life patients in ICUs in the Republic of Croatia.MethodsA cross-sectional study was conducted among physicians and nurses working in surgical, medical, neurological, and multidisciplinary ICUs in the total of 9 hospitals throughout Croatia using a questionnaire with closed and open type questions. Exploratory factor (...) analysis was conducted to reduce data to a smaller set of summary variables. Mann–Whitney U test was used to analyse the differences between two groups and Kruskal–Wallis tests were used to analyse the differences between more than two groups.ResultsLess than third of participants stated they were included in the decision-making process, and physicians are much more included than nurses. Sixty two percent of participants stated that the decision-making process took place between physicians. Eighteen percent of participants stated that ‘do-not-attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitations’ orders were frequently made in their ICUs. A decision to withdraw inotropes and antibiotics was frequently made as stated by 22.4% and 19.9% of participants, respectively. Withholding/withdrawing of LST were ethically acceptable to 64.2% of participants. Thirty seven percent of participants thought there was a significant difference between withholding and withdrawing LST from an ethical standpoint. Seventy-nine percent of participants stated that a verbal or written decision made by a capable patient should be respected. Physicians were more inclined to respect patient’s wishes then nurses with high school education. Nurses were more included in the decision-making process in neurological than in surgical, medical, or multidisciplinary ICUs. Male participants in comparison to female, and physicians in comparison to nurses with high school and college education displayed more liberal attitudes about LST limitation.ConclusionsDNACPR orders are not commonly made in Croatian ICUs, even though limitations of LST were found ethically acceptable by most of the participants. Attitudes of paternalistic and conservative nature were expected considering Croatia’s geographical location in Southern Europe. (shrink)

Key ethical challenges for healthcare workers arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are identified: isolation and social distancing, duty of care and fair access to treatment. The paper argues for a relational approach to ethics which includes solidarity, relational autonomy, duty, equity, trust and reciprocity as core values. The needs of the poor and socially disadvantaged are highlighted. Relational autonomy and solidarity are explored in relation to isolation and social distancing. Reciprocity is discussed with reference to healthcare workers’ duty of care (...) and its limits. Priority setting and access to treatment raise ethical issues of utility and equity. Difficult ethical dilemmas around triage, do not resuscitate decisions, and withholding and withdrawing treatment are discussed in the light of recently published guidelines. The paper concludes with the hope for a wider discussion of relational ethics and a glimpse of a future after the pandemic has subsided. (shrink)

The current definition of death used for donation after cardiac death relies on a determination of the irreversible cessation of the cardiac function. Although this criterion can be compatible with transplantation of most organs, it is not compatible with heart transplantation since heart transplants by definition involve the resuscitation of the supposedly "irreversibly" stopped heart. Subsequently, the definition of "irreversible" has been altered so as to permit heart transplantation in some circumstances, but this is unsatisfactory. There are three available (...) strategies for solving this "irreversibility problem": altering the definition of death so as to rely on circulatory irreversibility, rather than cardiac; defining death strictly on the basis of brain death (either whole-brain or more pragmatically some higher brain criteria); or redefining death in traditional terms and simultaneously legalizing some limited instances of medical killing to procure viable hearts. The first two strategies are the most ethically justifiable and practical. (shrink)

BackgroundResuscitation and treatment of critically ill newborn infants is associated with relatively high mortality, morbidity and cost. Guidelines relating to resuscitation have traditionally focused on the best interests of infants. There are, however, limited resources available in the neonatal intensive care unit, meaning that difficult decisions sometimes need to be made. This study explores the intuitions of lay people regarding resource allocation decisions in the NICU.MethodsThe study design was a cross-sectional quantitative survey, consisting of 20 hypothetical rationing scenarios. (...) There were 119 respondents who entered the questionnaire, and 109 who completed it. The respondents were adult US and Indian participants of the online crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. Respondents were asked to decide which of two infants to treat in a situation of scarce resources. Demographic characteristics, personality traits and political views were recorded. Respondents were also asked to respond to a widely cited thought experiment involving rationing.ResultsThe majority of respondents, in all except one scenario, chose the utilitarian option of directing treatment to the infant with the higher chance of survival, higher life expectancy, less severe disability, and less expensive treatment. As discrepancy between outcomes decreased, however, there was a statistically significant increase in egalitarian responses and decrease in utilitarian responses in scenarios involving chance of survival, life expectancy, and cost of treatment. In the classic ‘lifeboat’ scenario, all but two respondents were utilitarian.ConclusionsThis survey suggests that in situations of scarcity and equal clinical need, non-health professionals support rationing of life-saving treatment based on probability of survival, duration of survival, cost of treatment or quality of life. However, where the difference in prognosis or cost is very small, non-health professionals preferred to give infants an equal chance of receiving treatment. (shrink)

Despite increased calls for hospital ethics committees to serve as default decision-makers about life-sustaining treatment for unrepresented patients who lack decision-making capacity or a surrogate decision-maker and whose wishes regarding medical care are not known, little is known about how committees currently function in these cases. This was a retrospective cohort study of all ethics committee consultations involving decision-making about LST for unrepresented patients at a large academic hospital from 2007 to 2013. There were 310 ethics committee consultations, twenty-five of (...) which involved unrepresented patients. In thirteen cases, the ethics consultants evaluated a possible substitute decision-maker identified by social workers and/or case managers. In the remaining cases, the ethics consultants worked with the medical team to contact previous healthcare professionals to provide substituted judgement, found prior advance care planning documents, or identified the patient’s best interest as the decision-making standard. In the majority of cases, the final decision was to limit or withdraw LST or to change code status to Do Not Resuscitate/Do Not Intubate. Substitute decision-makers who had been evaluated through the ethics consultation process and who made the final decision alone were more likely to continue LST than cases in which physicians made the final decision. In our centre, the primary role of ethics consultants in decision-making for unrepresented patients is to identify appropriate decision-making standards. In the absence of other data suggesting that ethics committees, as currently constituted, are ready to serve as substitute decision-makers for unrepresented patients, caution is necessary before designating these committees as default decision-makers. (shrink)

A recent commentary defends 1) the concept of 'brain arrest' to explain what brain death is, and 2) the concept that death occurs at 2–5 minutes after absent circulation. I suggest that both these claims are flawed. Brain arrest is said to threaten life, and lead to death by causing a secondary respiratory then cardiac arrest. It is further claimed that ventilation only interrupts this way that brain arrest leads to death. These statements imply that brain arrest is not death (...) itself. Brain death is a devastating state that leads to death when intensive care, which replaces some of the brain's vital functions such as breathing, is withdrawn and circulation stops resulting in irreversible loss of integration of the organism. Circulatory death is said to occur at 2–5 minutes after absent circulation because, in the context of DCD, the intent is to not attempt reversal of the absent circulation. No defense of this weak construal of irreversible loss of circulation is given. This means that paents in identical physiologic states are dead (in the DCD context) or alive (in the resuscitation context); the current state of death (at 2–5 minutes) is contingent on a future event (whether there will be resuscitation) suggesting backward causation; and the commonly used meaning of irreversible as 'not capable of being reversed' is abandoned. The literature supporting the claim that autoresuscitation does not occur in the context of no cardiopulmonary resuscitation is shown to be very limited. Several cases of autoresuscitation are summarized, suggesting that the claim that these cases are not applicable to the current debate may be premature. I suggest that brain dead and DCD donors are not dead; whether organs can be harvested before death from these patients whose prognosis is death should be debated urgently. (shrink)

In the second half of the 19th century, pre-Hispanic jade artifacts from Mexico—especially jade celts and votive axes—stood at the center of scholarly debates on the origins of American civilizations. The contradiction between the prevalence of carved jades, on the one hand, and the apparent absence of jade mineral deposits in the Americas, on the other, resuscitated centuries-old theories that placed the beginnings of pre-Hispanic civilizations in China. The increasing availability of Chinese and Mexican jades in the same spaces of (...) commercial exchange, collection, display, and study—following French imperialist interventions in China and Mexico in the 1860s, which resulted in the plunder of a massive number of antiquities; and in a broader context of interest in jade that brought together artifacts from the South Pacific and from Neolithic contexts in Europe—contributed material proof to these theories. The so-called “jade question” was mostly dismissed by the 20th century, but the debates surrounding jade's mineralogical identity and provenance provide insight into the kinds of epistemological configurations, material limitations, and geopolitical arrangements that bore upon the emergence of new disciplines, including mineralogy, archaeology, and prehistory, as well as the new sciences of the pre-Hispanic past. This essay explores these processes and reconstructs the dense networks of private and public institutions, scholars, collectors, dealers, and connoisseurs, that made jade artifacts from Mexico—and Central America—into a scientific, aesthetic, and commercial category. (shrink)

Empirical research pertaining to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), clinician behaviors related to do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders and substituted judgment suggests potential contributions to medical ethics. Research quantifying the likelihood of surviving CPR points to the need for further philosophical analysis of the limitations of the patient autonomy in decision making, the nature and definition of medical futility, and the relationship between futility and professional standards. Research on DNR orders has identified barriers to the goal of patient involvement in these life and (...) death discussions. The initial data on surrogate decision making also points to the need for a reexamination of the moral basis for substituted judgment, the moral authority of proxy decision making and the second-order status of the best interests standard. These examples of empirical research suggest that an interplay between empirical research, ethical analysis and policy development may represent a new form of interdisciplinary scholarship to improve clinical medicine. (shrink)

Essays and articles in the November‐December 2022 issue of the Hastings Center Report explore the complexities of medical decision‐making. A case‐study essay, for example, argues that the dismaying decision to perform resuscitation efforts on a patient who had obviously been dead for some time can be understood in the context of the harmful practice of defensive medicine. A narrative essay concerns whether an adolescent with locked‐in syndrome should be asked her wishes about life‐sustaining interventions, and the articles illuminate the (...) ethical value of the parental role in pediatric decision‐making, an array of ways in which patient decision‐making is interdependent, and the limitations of measures designed to evaluate the quality of a patient's decision and decision‐making process. (shrink)

Most elderly patients die with an order in place that they not be given cardiopulmonary resuscitation . Surveys have shown that many elderly in different parts of the world want to be resuscitated, but may lack knowledge about the specifics of cardiopulmonary resuscitation . Data from countries other than the US is limited, but differences in physician and patient opinions by nationality regarding CPR do exist. Physicians’ own preferences for CPR may predominate in the DNR decision making (...) process for their patients, and many physicians may not want the participation of the elderly or believe that it is necessary. More complete and earlier discussions of a wider range of options of care for patients at the end of life have been advocated. The process ought to include education for patients about the process and efficacy of CPR, and for physicians on how to consider the values and levels of knowledge of their patients, whose preferences may differ from their own. (shrink)

BackgroundThis research explores how the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the ways doctors make end-of-life decisions, particularly around Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR), treatment escalation and doctors’ views on the legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.MethodsThe research was conducted between May and August 2021, during which COVID-19 hospital cases were relatively low and pressures on NHS resources were near normal levels. Data were collected via online survey sent to doctors of all levels and specialties, who have worked in the (...) NHS during the pandemic.Results231 participants completed the survey. The research found that over half of participants reported making more patients DNACPR than prepandemic, and this was due, at least in part, to an increased focus on factors including patient age, Clinical Frailty Scores and resource limitations. In addition, a sizeable minority of participants reported that they now had a higher threshold for escalating patients to ITU and a lower threshold for palliating patients, with many attributing these changes to formative experiences gained during the pandemic. Finally, our study found that there has not been a statistically significant change in the views of clinicians on the legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide since the start of the pandemic.ConclusionThe COVID-19 pandemic appears to have altered several aspects of end-of-life decision making, and many of these changes have remained even as COVID-19 hospital cases have declined. (shrink)

Background: Decisions of patients, families, and health care providers about medical care at the end of life depend on many factors, including the societal culture. A pan-European study was conducted to determine the frequency and types of end of life practices in European intensive care units , including those in Israel. Several results of the Israeli subsample were different to those of the overall sample.Objective: The objective of this article was to explore these differences and provide a possible explanation based (...) on the impact of culture on end of life decision making.Method: All adult patients admitted consecutively to three Israeli ICUs who died or underwent any limitation of life saving interventions between 1 January 1999 and 30 June 2000 were studied prospectively . These patients were compared with a similar sample taken from the larger study carried out in 37 European ICUs. Patients were followed until discharge, death, or 2 months from the decision to limit therapy. End of life decisions were prospectively organised into one of five mutually exclusive categories: cardiopulmonary resuscitation , brain death, withholding treatment, withdrawing treatment, and active shortening of the dying process . The data also included patient characteristics , specific therapies limited, and the method of SDP.Results: The majority of patients had treatment withheld, none underwent SDP, 62 received CPR , 31 had brain death , and 18 underwent withdrawal of treatment . The primary reason given for limiting treatment was that the patient was unresponsive to therapy . End of life discussions were held with 132 families , the vast majority of which revolved around withholding treatment and the remainder concerned withdrawing treatment .There was a statistically significant association between the type of end of life decision and region—that is, the northern region of Europe, the central region, the southern region, and Israel.Conclusions: Regional culture plays an important part in end of life decision making. Differences relating to end of life decision making exist between regions and these differences can often be attributed to cultural factors. Such cultures not only affect patients and their families but also the health care workers who make and carry out such decisions. (shrink)

The current outbreak of Ebola virus infection in West Africa continues to spread. Several patients have now been treated in the United States and preparations are being made for more. Because of the strict isolation required for their care, questions have been raised about what diagnostic and therapeutic interventions should be available. I discuss the ethical challenges associated with caring for patients in strict isolation and personnel wearing bulky protective gear with reduced dexterity and flexibility, the limitations this may place (...) on available treatments and the permissibility of consequent departures from the standards of care. Restricting access to some interventions such as surgery requiring an operating room, advanced imaging, etc. is reasonable due to concern for protecting other patients, visitors and staff. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is a special case and the implications for withholding this intervention in situations where it may be desired is discussed, especially with respect to those patients who have suspected, but not proven, infection. These same restrictions are also considered under conditions where there are scarce resources and thus limited numbers of patients may receive care. While it is to be hoped that there is only limited and sporadic infection with Ebola virus in the US, careful thought must be given to the care of these patients under the unusual circumstances demanded by their isolation. I argue that an altered standard of care is reasonable and ethically acceptable under certain conditions. (shrink)

Two papers in this issue address the limits of surrogates’ authority when making life-and-death decisions for dying family members or friends. Using palliative sedation as an example, Jeffrey Berger offers a conceptual argument for bounding surrogate authority. Since freedom from pain is an essential interest, when imminently dying, cognitively incapacitated patients are in duress and their symptoms are not manageable in any other way, clinicians should be free to offer palliative sedation without surrogate consent, although assent should be sought and (...) every effort made to work with surrogates as harmoniously as possible. Ellen Robinson and her colleagues report on the implementation of a policy at Massachusetts General Hospital that supports do-not-resuscitate orders when cardiopulmonary resuscitation is likely to be ineffective or harmful, even if surrogates disagree. The “Doing No Harm” policy at MGH allows for what MGH calls a “medically indicated DNR” and what in some other places is called “a unilateral DNR”—the writing of an order not to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation, regardless of surrogate disapproval. These kinds of DNR policies have emerged in some hospitals across the country and for much the same reason that Berger provides in his argument regarding palliative sedation. I support the reasoning and the policies in both the Berger and Robinson papers. However, as the authors would most likely agree, the problems they aim to remedy are not simply about the scope of surrogate and professional authority. They are also symptoms of inattention to professional obligations and system failures. (shrink)

IntroductionClassifying the ethical issues in clinical ethics consultations is important to clinical practice and scholarship. We conducted a systematic review to characterize the typologies used to analyze clinical ethics consultations.MethodsWe identified empirical studies of clinical ethics consultation that reported types of ethical issues using PubMed. We screened these articles based on their titles and abstracts, and then by a review of their full text. We extracted study characteristics and typologies and coded the typologies.ResultsWe reviewed 428 articles; 30 of the articles (...) fulfilled our inclusion criteria. We identified 27 unique typologies. Each typology contained five to 47 categories (mean = 18). The most common categories were do-not-attempt-resuscitation orders (19 typologies, 70 percent), capacity (18 typologies, 67 percent), withholding (18 typologies, 67 percent), withdrawing (17 typologies, 63 percent), and surrogate or proxy (16 typologies, 59 percent). Only seven (26 percent) of the typologies contained all five of the most common categories. The typologies we used to characterize clinical ethics consultations exhibit significant heterogeneity and several conceptual limitations. A common typology is needed whose development may require multi-institutional collaboration and could be facilitated by professional organizations. (shrink)

Abstract. Over the last century and a half, discussions of Darwin in Arabic have involved a complex intertwining of sources of authority. This paper reads one of the earliest Muslim responses to modern evolution against those in more recent times to show how questions of epistemology and exegesis have been critically revisited. This involved, on the one hand, the resuscitation of long-standing debates over claims regarding the nature of evidence, certainty, and doubt, and on the other, arguments about the (...) use (and limits) of reason in relation to scripture. Categories of knowledge and belief, alongside methods of scriptural hermeneutics, were repositioned in the process, transforming the meaning and discursive reach of the former as much as the latter. Indeed, this paper argues that the long-run engagement with Darwin in Arabic led to the mutual transformation of both “science” and “religion,” whether as objects of knowledge (and belief) or as general discursive formations. (shrink)

Objectives: This study investigated Finnish physicians’ experiences of decisions concerning living wills and do not resuscitate orders and also their views on the role of patients and family members in these decisions.Design: A questionnaire was sent to 800 physicians representing the following specialties: general practice ; internal medicine ; neurology , and oncology .Results: The response rate was 56%. Most of the respondents had a positive attitude toward , and respect for living wills, and 72% reported situations in which such (...) a will would have been helpful, although experience with their use was limited. The physicians reported both benefits and problems with living wills. Thirteen per cent had completed a living will of their own. Half did not consider living wills to be reliable if they were several years old. Do not resuscitate orders were interpreted in two ways: resuscitation forbidden or only palliative care required . The respondents also documented DNR orders differently. Seventy two per cent discussed DNR decisions always or often with patients able to communicate, and even 76% discussed DNR orders with the family members of patients unable to communicate. Most respondents were able to approach a dying patient without difficulty. They also felt that education in general was needed.Conclusions: In general Finnish physicians accept living wills, but find they are accompanied by several problems. Many problems could be avoided if physicians and patients conducted progressive discussions about living wills. The differing interpretations of DNR orders are a matter of concern in that they may affect patient treatment. The promotion of patient autonomy with respect to treatment seems rather good, but the limitations of the study need to be kept in mind. (shrink)

Traditionally clinicians have determined their patients' resuscitation status without consultation. This has been condemned as morally indefensible in cases where not for resuscitation (NFR) orders are based on quality of life considerations and when the patient's true wishes are not known. Such instances would encompass most resuscitation decisions in elderly patients. Having previously involved patients in CPR decision-making, we chose formally to explore the reasons behind the choices made. Although the patients were not upset, and readily decided (...) at the time of initial consultation, on later analysing the decision-making we found poor understanding of the procedure, poor recall of information given and in some cases evidence of harm. This may be attributed to impaired decision-making capacity of elderly hospitalised patients as previously shown, or to the discomfort precipitated by having to contemplate the apparent immediacy of cardiac arrest by these patients. We propose that subscribing to autonomy as a general principle needs to be balanced against particular cases where distress may be caused by, or result in, diminished competence and limited autonomy. (shrink)

Newborn infants are among those most severely affected by humanitarian crises. Aid organisations increasingly recognise the necessity to provide for the medical needs of newborns, however, this may generate distinctive ethical questions for those providing humanitarian medical care. Medical ethical approaches to neonatal care familiar in other settings may not be appropriate given the diversity and volatility of humanitarian disasters, and the extreme resource limitations commonly faced by humanitarian aid missions.In this paper, we first systematically review existing guidelines relating to (...) the treatment and resuscitation of newborns in humanitarian crises, finding little substantive ethical guidance for those providing humanitarian healthcare. We next draw on paradigm cases and published literature to identify and describe some of the major ethical questions common to these settings. We divide these questions into quality of life considerations, allocation of limited resources, and conflicting cultural norms and values. We finally suggest some preliminary recommendations to guide ethical decision‐making around resuscitation of newborns and withdrawal of treatment in humanitarian settings. (shrink)

The most controversial issue in organ donation after the circulatory determination of death is whether the donor was truly dead at the moment death is declared. My colleagues and I further analyzed this issue by showing the relevance of the distinction between the “permanent” and the “irreversible” loss of circulatory functions. Permanent cessation means that circulatory function will not return because it will not be restored spontaneously and medical attempts to restore it will not be conducted. By contrast, irreversible cessation (...) means that circulatory function cannot be restored using currently available technology. In this issue of the Report, Kevin Munjal and colleagues criticize the unjustified application of the permanent‐irreversible distinction, which my colleagues and I developed for cDCDD, to their well‐designed and carefully conducted experimental protocol of uncontrolled DCDD (uDCDD) in New York City, for which our analysis was not targeted. They claimed that to determine a donor's death in uDCDD, it is unnecessary to show that permanence is a valid surrogate indicator of irreversibility because the unsuccessful attempt to resuscitate the patient comprises prima facie evidence of circulatory irreversibility. Ironically, that potent justification defending death determination in uDCDD yields limitations that are similar to those created when our permanent‐irreversible distinction is applied to death determination in cDCDD. (shrink)

This paper considers the issue of cryopreservation and the definition of death from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. A central conceptual focus throughout this discussion is the purportedly irreversible nature of death and the criteria by which a human body is considered to be informed by a rational soul. It concludes that a cryopreserved corpse fails to have “life potentially in it” sufficient to satisfy Aristotle’s definition of ensoulment. Therefore, if the possibility that such a corpse may be successfully preserved and resuscitated (...) comes to fruition, one would have to conclude that the person’s rational soul, which had separated from its body at death, has literally reanimated its resuscitated body. Obviously, this conclusion has theological implications that go beyond the scope of this discussion if we regard bodily resuscitation in this manner as a form of technologically induced resurrection. Another apparent implication of the paper’s argument is that, in a limited sense, death loses its irreversible nature. (shrink)

Purpose: To determine motives and attitudes towards life-sustaining treatments by clinical and preclinical medical students. Methods: This was a scenario-based questionnaire that presented patients with a limited life expectancy. The survey was distributed among 455 medical students in preclinical and clinical years. Students were asked to rate their willingness to perform LSTs and rank the motives for doing so. The effect of medical education was then investigated after adjustment for age, gender, religion, religiosity, country of origin, and marital status. (...) Results: Preclinical students had a significantly higher willingness to perform LSTs in all cases. This was observed in all treatments offered in cases of a metastatic oncologic patient and an otherwise healthy man after a traumatic brain injury. In the case of an elderly woman on long-term care, preclinical students had higher willingness to supply vasopressors but not perform an intubation, feed with a nasogastric tube, or treat with a continuous positive air-pressure ventilator. Both preclinical and clinical students had high willingness to perform resuscitation on a twelve-year-old boy with a TBI. Differences in motivation factors were also seen. Discussion: Preclinical students had a greater willingness to treat compared to clinical students in all cases and with most medical treatments offered. This is attributed mainly to changes along the medical curriculum. Changes in reasons for supplying LSTs were also documented. (shrink)

Objectives: This study investigated Finnish physicians’ experiences of decisions concerning living wills and do not resuscitate orders and also their views on the role of patients and family members in these decisions.Design: A questionnaire was sent to 800 physicians representing the following specialties: general practice ; internal medicine ; neurology , and oncology .Results: The response rate was 56%. Most of the respondents had a positive attitude toward , and respect for living wills, and 72% reported situations in which such (...) a will would have been helpful, although experience with their use was limited. The physicians reported both benefits and problems with living wills. Thirteen per cent had completed a living will of their own. Half did not consider living wills to be reliable if they were several years old. Do not resuscitate orders were interpreted in two ways: resuscitation forbidden or only palliative care required . The respondents also documented DNR orders differently. Seventy two per cent discussed DNR decisions always or often with patients able to communicate, and even 76% discussed DNR orders with the family members of patients unable to communicate. Most respondents were able to approach a dying patient without difficulty. They also felt that education in general was needed.Conclusions: In general Finnish physicians accept living wills, but find they are accompanied by several problems. Many problems could be avoided if physicians and patients conducted progressive discussions about living wills. The differing interpretations of DNR orders are a matter of concern in that they may affect patient treatment. The promotion of patient autonomy with respect to treatment seems rather good, but the limitations of the study need to be kept in mind. (shrink)

If one compares the development of modern medical ethics in Germany with those in the Netherlands, what stands out are the cultural and intellectual differences between the two countries. Dealing with the problems involved in limiting medical treatment, the authors show the differing and the common standards and values on which the discussion of this is based in both countries. Three examples, active termination of life, the do-not-resuscitate order and pain management, which are examined from an historical, legal, philosophical and (...) ethical perspective, put this in concrete terms. The authors belong to different generations as well as different political and philosophical camps. Vergleicht man die Entwicklung der modernen Medizinethik in Deutschland mit jener in den Niederlanden, fallen die kulturellen und intellektuellen Unterschiede zwischen beiden Landern deutlich auf. Anhand der Problematik der Begrenzung medizinischen Handelns zeigen die Autoren die verschiedenen bzw. gemeinsamen Normen und Werte, die der Diskussion daruber in beiden Landern zugrunde liegen. Drei Beispiele, die aktive Lebensbeendigung, die Nicht-Reanimierung und die Schmerzbekampfung, die aus historischem, juristischem, philosophischem und ethischem Blickwinkel betrachtet werden, konkretisieren die Darstellung. Die Autoren gehoren unterschiedlichen Generationen, politischen und lebensanschaulichen Lagern an. (shrink)

In current practice, decisions regarding whether or not to resuscitate infants born at the limits of viability are generally made with expectant parents during a prenatal consultation with a neonatologist. This article reviews the current practice of prenatal consultation and describes three areas in which current practice is ethically problematic: (1) risks to competence, (2) risks to information, and (3) risks to trust. It then reviews solutions that have been suggested in the literature, and the drawbacks to each. Finally, it (...) suggests that the model of prenatal consultation be altered in three ways: (1) that the prenatal consultation be viewed as a process over time, rather than a onetime event; (2) that decision making in the prenatal consultation be framed as a choice between nonresuscitation and a trial of neonatal intensive care, rather than a choice between “doing nothing” and “doing everything”; and (3) that the prenatal consultation process devote serious attention to both the transfer of information and the non-informational needs of families, rather than focus on the transfer of information alone. (shrink)