Parmi toutes les qualités que l’on peut reconnaître à l’œuvre de Jean Starobinski, l’une des plus importantes me semble être l’admirable travail de lecture dont elle témoigne. Je voudrais dégager ici quelques axes de sa méthode de lecture, en montrer la richesse et la subtilité, et en analyser les effets. Lecteur exemplaire, Starobinski ne cesse de nous apprendre à lire et à relire, l’un des plus beaux aboutissements de son œuvre étant de nous faire relire vraiment, et (...) donc redécouvrir, ce qu... (shrink)

It is doubtless appropriate to read The Interpretation of Dreams according to the image of the journey which Sigmund Freud describes in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess:The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. First comes the dark wood of the authorities , where there is no clear view and it is easy to go astray. Then there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my readers—my specimen dream with its peculiarities, its details, its indiscretions (...) and its bad jokes—and then, all at once, the high ground and the open prospect and the question: “Which way do you want to go?”1This walk has nothing of the nonchalant about it. Rather, it is strewn with tests and trials, as is usually the case in the “myth of the hero” or of the “conquistador,” which we know played a major role in Freud’s thought and in that of his disciples. The progress, in epic poetry, moves toward a discovery, the founding of a city, by means of difficult stages and combats. Every “discourse” capable of attaining a goal distant from its prolegomena finds its appropriate metaphor in the hero’s progress, or in the voyage of initiation. Discursivity then becomes the intellectual equivalent of the epic’s trajectory. At the time of its publication, Freud found his book insufficiently probing, and imperfect in its discursivity. He criticized himself for having failed to link properly his arguments . Doubt was momentarily cast on the achievement of the main goal…. But such severity was not to persist.But one can also read the work by discerning its framing devices. Several authors mentioned in the first chapter reappear at the work’s conclusion. Such a return is far from fortuitous; it is the result of an extremely well-calculated strategy. Another framing system which has been noticed by many readers is the one, shortly before the end of the book, which returns to a line from Virgil that Freud had placed as an epigraph on the title page: Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo. This line, because of its repetition at two crucial points in the book, traces its message in the form of an emblem. When it breaks in, it makes explicit that the dream mechanism is the return of the repressed:In waking life the suppressed material in the mind is prevented from finding expression and is cut off from internal perception owing to the fact that the contradictions present in it are eliminated—one side being disposed of in favor of the other; but during the night, under the sway of an impetus towards the construction of compromises, this suppressed material finds methods and means of forcing its way into consciousness.Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.2 1. Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 6 Aug. 1899, Freud, The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes, 1887-1902, ed. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris, trans. James Strachey , p. 290.2. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, ed. and trans. Strachey , p. 647; my emphasis. The Latin is translated in n. 1 on that page of Freud’s text: “If I cannot bend the High Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions.” All further references to this work, abbreviated I, will be included in the text. Another framing device is created by the theme of the prophetic dream, discussed at the outset of the first chapters and taken up again, with the ambivalence of denial and concession, in the final paragraph of the book. Jean Starobinski, professor emeritus at the University of Geneva, has devoted studies to Montaigne, Diderot, Rousseau, Saussure, and modern French poets. As an M.D., he is familiar with psychoanalysis and participates in the editorial board of La Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse . Some of his recent research deals with the history of melancholia; his most recent books are Montaigne in Motion and Rousseau . He was awarded the Balzan Prize in 1984. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the meaning and the implications of the comparative interpretation of Sartre’s and Ryle’s theses on imagination that Ricœur undertook in the still unpublished text of his Lectures on Imagination. These lectures were delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975. First, the article shows how Ricœur brings out a strong convergence , both in the method and in the presuppositions , of the Sartrean and Rylean conceptions of imagination : the choice of (...) a descriptive method leads the two philosophers to a common critique of the mental image . Secondly, the article analyses the properly critical side of the Ricœurian interpretation by showing how it eventually brings to light the common theoretical limitation of Sartre’s and Ryle’s theses on imagination. According to Ricœur, those theses lead to a conception of image as picture and fail to consider the image as fiction , and so they remain locked in a theory of reproductive imagination and of the primacy of perception. Résumé Cet article se propose d’analyser le sens et les enjeux de la lecture croisée des thèses de Sartre et Ryle sur l’imagination à laquelle se livre Ricœur dans le texte encore inédit des Lectures on imagination professées en 1975 à l’Université de Chicago. Dans un premier temps, il montre comment Ricœur met en relief une convergence forte , de méthode et de présupposés entre les conceptions sartrienne et rylienne de l’imagination : le choix d’une méthode descriptive conduisant les deux philosophes à une commune critique de l’image mentale . Puis, dans un second temps, il analyse le versant proprement critique de la lecture ricœurienne en montrant comment elle en vient à dénoncer une commune limitation théorique des thèses de Sartre et Ryle sur l’imagination. Selon Ricœur, ces thèses débouchent sur une conception de l’image comme tableau qui échoue à penser l’image comme fiction et elles restent de ce fait enfermées dans une théorie de l ’ imagination reproductrice et du primat de la perception. (shrink)

Le rapprochement des œuvres de Machiavel et de Bodin a déjà une longue histoire, à laquelle l’intention de cet article n’est pas d’ajouter un chapitre : il ne s’agit donc pas de proposer une lecture d’ensemble du rapport entre ces deux auteurs ou entre leurs doctrines générales, mais seulement de mettre en parallèle leurs conceptions d’une certaine méthode pour interpréter les histoires, conceptions qui se laissent lire d’une part dans l’épître dédicatoire et le proemio des Discorsi sopra la prima deca (...) di Tito Livio de Machiavel (ca. 1518) et d’autre part dans l’épître dédicatoire et le proemium de la Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem de Bodin (1566). À un demi-siècle d’écart, ces deux prologues mettent en effet en évidence le caractère indispensable d’un art de la lectio des histoires pour fonder les raisonnements de la science politique, mais ils le font, semble-t-il, en adoptant deux points de vue profondément différents : la nature exacte de cette différence est le véritable objet de cet article. (shrink)

Based on some interpretations about the Critique of Pure Reason, the author holds a real answer to the question about the possibility of Metaphysics remains in the uncertainty there. Without any proper Conclusion of the work, this question is displaced to the background and it is, in certain way, superseded by the question about God's existence and a future life. In II, The Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant points towards the Highest Good as a determining ground of the ultimate end (...) of pure reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MAINE DE BIRAN CRITIQUE DE HUME45· Essai de philosophie comparee A plusieurs reprises Maine de Biran s'en prend à Hume tantôt conjointement avec Malebranche, tantôt avec Condillac; parfois il est seul visé. Cette confrontation a un grand intér êt; elle a même une portée paradigmatique, car elle remet en question la méthode reflexive et l'interprétation à donner de la notion d'expérience immédiate, et elle nous éclaire en même temps (...) sur les visées de l'un et de l'autre. 2 Dans l'Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie Maine de Biran adopte la ligne dont il ne se départira pas par la suite. Il rejette â la fois les théories innéistes (ce qui le sépare des cartésiens), celles qui posent la causalité comme une forme a priori—autant dire â ses yeux une abstraction—et enfin celles qui prétendent la faire dériver de la succession habituelle, comme on le fait dans la tradition empiriste hérit ée de Bacon. C'est ici (et non, chose curieuse, à propos de l'identité personnelle) qu'il rencontre Hume. Celuici a bien aperçu le principe, mais il l'a rejeté tout de suite, faute d'en avoir compris la vraie nature: le fait primitif, en effet, n'est nullement justiciable de l'observation extérieure; prétendre le saisir par la vue, c'est le chercher où il n'est pas: "Enfin, regarder en soi, réfléchir, n'est pas reregarder au dehors ou se représenter des objets. En assimilant la valeur des données ou des lois de l'expérience avec celles de l'expérience intérieure, Hume renonce, des les premiers pas, à trouver ce qu'il cherche, ou plutôt il ne veut riene trouver et ferme exprès l'entrée à la lumière (Omnes aditus interclusi ut ad me adspicere non possis)."4 A partir de là, toutes les objections tombent. D'abord la 46. non prévisibilité de l'effet dans "l'énergie de la cause", puisque "il faut que l'énergie de la cause emporte avec elle sorte de pressentiment ou de prévoyance du succès; autrement il n'y aurait qu'un simple désir et point de vouloir". L'ignorance des moyens? —la question des moyens est envelopp ée dans la prise de conscience globale de la cause: "...car nous pouvons avoir le sentiment sans conna ître en aucune manière les moyens; mais bien sûrement nous ne songerions pas 3 en chercher les moyens, et il n'y aurait plus lieu â rien demander à" ce sujet si nous n'avions pas le sentiment. Ici le sceptique se prend dans ses propres filets." Objecter qu'il faudrait d'abord "connaître" le principe renferme un contresens sur la nature de la connaissance: c'est confondre la vue extérieure avec le sentiment intérieur: "Tout ce raisonnement porte à faux, en ce qu'il se fonde sur l'assimilation illusoire, précédemment établie, entre deux sortes de connaissance ou d'expérience: l'externe et l'interne....... Quelle espèce d'analogie y a-t-il entre la connaissance représentative de la position, du jeu et des fonctions de nos organes, tels que peut les connaître un anatomiste ou un physiologiste, et le sentiment intime de l'existence qui correspond à ces fonctions, comme aussi la connaissance interne des parties localisées dans le continu résistant dont nous parlions précédemment?"7 Que dire â quelqu'un qui nie l'évidence? Inlassablement Maine de Biran dénonce la confusion entre le visible et le senti. A qui a perdu ce sens, il faudrait lui en rendre l'usage, "...Ou si cela ne se peut pas, l'amener du moins S reconnaître que les propriétés essentielles,, qu'il nie, n'était point l'objet propre du sens auquel il voudrait les soumettre, il n'est point fondé a les rejeter par ce seul motif qu'il ne voit pas des choses non visibles par leur nature. "" Dans les Nouveaux Essais d'Anthropologie, Malebranche est de nouveau pris à partie... (shrink)

Vladimir Fock est un scientifique russo-soviétique connu pour diverses contributions à la physique moderne. Il en fut aussi un interprète, développant une position critique face à l’orthodoxie incarnée par Niels Bohr en mécanique quantique et Albert Einstein en relativité générale. Fock ayant adhéré au matérialisme dialectique, l’historiographie sur ses contributions aux débats d’interprétation met généralement l’accent sur sa défense d’une position réaliste, en faveur de l’objectivité du monde extérieur. Le présent article complète cette observation en s’appuyant sur un texte du (...) physicien soviétique jusqu’alors peu connu : « La signification fondamentale des méthodes d’approximation en physique théorique ». En effet, il révèle une forme d’antiréductionnisme essentielle à la compréhension du discours de Fock sur l’interprétation des théories de la physique moderne. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est désormais à tous égards un classique. Il a assurément, lors de sa première édition en 1939, suscité nombre de réactions critiques à la mesure de la nouveauté réelle d'un travail qui, délaissant les voies et les impasses de la méthode génétique, s'attachait, plutôt que de reconstituer dans sa systématicité prétendue la pensée du Stagirite, à dégager les cadres généraux ou les schèmes qui structurent effectivement une recherche se faisant. En se sens, il s'agissait bien d'étudier la méthode (...) d'Artistote, non pas tant celle qui est expressément thématisée dans l'Organon ou dans les excursus méthodologiques, mais celle qui se trouve concrètement mise en œuvre au vif des différents traités, et en particulier de la Physique. Déployant ce que l'auteur appelle lui-même une " sorte d'analyse structurale ", à travers une référence discrète mais significative, à Claude Lévi-Strauss et à Michel Foucault, l'ouvrage parvient à mettre en lumière un niveau originaire de la pensée aristotélicienne, lié aux schèmes du langage, de la fabrication, et surtout à l'expérience de la vie et du mouvement. Rien d'étonnant alors qu'une telle interprétation, attentive aux ambiguités ou aux apories de la recherche aristotélicienne, soit une des premières à avoir proposé une réinterprétation positive de la dialectique et des topiques. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging historical introduction to philosophical hermeneutics, Jean Grondin discusses the major figures from Philo to Habermas, analyzes conflicts between various interpretive schools, and provides a persuasive critique of Gadamer's view of hermeneutic history, though in other ways Gadamer's Truth and Method serves as a model for Grondin's approach. Grondin begins with brief overviews of the pre-nineteenth-century thinkers Philo, Origen, Augustine, Luther, Flacius, Dannhauer, Chladenius, Meier, Rambach, Ast, and Schlegel. Next he provides more extensive treatments of such major (...) nineteenth-century figures as Schleiermacher, Böckh, Droysen, and Dilthey. There are full chapters devoted to Heidegger and Gadamer as well as shorter discussions of Betti, Habermas, and Derrida. Because he is the first to pay close attention to pre-Romantic figures, Grondin is able to show that the history of hermeneutics cannot be viewed as a gradual, steady progression in the direction of complete universalization. His book makes it clear that even in the early period, hermeneutic thinkers acknowledged a universal aspect in interpretation--that long before Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was philosophical and not merely practical. In revising and correcting the standard account, Grondin's book is not merely introductory but revisionary, suitable for beginners as well as advanced students in the field. (shrink)

Le volume "Images de Platon et lectures de ses oeuvres" rassemble vingt et une contributions consacrees a diverses relectures qui ont ete faites de l'oeuvre ecrite de Platon entre le IIIe siecle (Diogene Laerce, Plotin) et le XXe sievle (K. Popper). Dans l'introduction, Ada Neschke met en lumiere le cheminement de ces relectures et souligne le fait que les lectures de Platon sont constamment alimentees par des preoccupations propres a ses lecteurs. Dans un premier temps, l'oeuvre de Platon est integree (...) dans une optique essentiellement theologique; apres l'avenement du kantisme, elle s'inscrit dans un cadre de pensee qui se veut critique et philosophique, c'est-a-dire emancipe de l'ancienne metaphysique. Ainsi, l'oeuvre de Platon represente, d'une part, pour les penseurs chretiens une source d'inspiration concernant les sujets les plus divers: la theologie chretienne (Clement d'Alexandrie, Ficin, les Platoniciens de Cambridge), la mytho-theologie neo-platonicienne (Plethon), l'iconographie de la trinite (Francisco di Hollanda), la politique catholique et le calviniste (Jean Bodin, Jean de Serres), le scepticisme face aux debats theologiques (Montaigne). D'autre part, Platon a la valeur d'une autorite pour les penseurs postkantiens, que ce soit pour construire une philosophie de la nature (Schelling), une ethique (Hegel), une epistemologie (les neo-kantiens Cohen et Natorp) ou encore une ontologie (Heidegger). Enfin, Platon sert de reference dans les debats politiques modernes et contemporains, en particulier dans les discussions sur le liberalisme (J. St. Mill) et le totalitarisme (Popper et ses successeurs). De l'antiquite jusqu'a nos jours, Platon reste donc un auteur qui interpelle son lecteur et lui lance meme souvent un defi. (shrink)

Using the Western tradition of metaphysical and political thought as a backdrop, Critique of Sovereignty (a work in 4 volumes) re-examines the concept of sovereignty in order to better understand why our ethical values and technical capacities often seem so divorced from our lived realities. On the one hand, ostensibly self-enclosed entities like the nation-state and the person are rhetorically bolstered as sites of technical agency and/or moral responsibility. On the other hand, these same entities appear fragile -- if not (...) purely fictional -- in relation to ever ongoing tidal processes such as the migration, diffusion, and conglomeration of bodies, capital, ideas, etc. While some of our institutions might work some of the time, they always seem to work differently than we like to think they do. Accordingly, the forging of more humane institutions might very well entail if not require ways of thinking that strive to undo the self-imagined binds, exceptions, and sureties of thought for the sake of embracing a continuity with all that withers, decays, and falls away. Book I, "Contemporary Theories of Sovereignty," compares the varied interpretations of sovereignty given by a range of 20th-century political theorists (Maritain, Foucault, Derrida, Schmitt, Agamben, Hardt, and Negri) with Jean Bodin's initial outline of the concept, rendered at the outset of modern political thought in the 16th century. The analytic framework of sovereignty encountered in these comparative readings provides an initial point of departure for unfolding a method of critique appropriate to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an ideal starting point for a critique of the deadlocks between thought and reality for a simple reason: it doesn't actually exist. When it serves as a guide to action, sovereignty may be regarded as a particularly captivating fantasy. The closer it appears, the further it recedes, and, too often, the more vigorously it is pursued. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dialectic as "Philosophical Embarrassment":Heidegger's Critique of Plato's MethodFrancisco Gonzalez (bio)Philosophie ist ein Ringen um die Methode.(GA58, 228)Hans-Georg Gadamer has expressed the following debt to the thought of Martin Heidegger: "The philosophical stimuli I received from Heidegger led me more and more into the realm of dialectic, Plato's as well as Hegel's."1 It is therefore surprising to discover that Heidegger himself did not see his thought as leading him into (...) the realm of dialectic. On the contrary, in Being and Time we find a curt and unexplained dismissal of dialectic, specifically Plato's, as a "genuine philosophical embarrassment" (Verlegenheit).2 This dismissal is repeated in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course of WS 1929/30 where Heidegger asserts that "all dialectic in philosophy," and thus that of Hegel as well as Plato, "is only the expression of an embarrassment."3 Only with the publication of Heidegger's earlier lecture courses from the 1920s, are we in a position to understand and evaluate this surprising dismissal. We are also in a better position to understand why even the later Heidegger failed to reassess his rejection of dialectic, despite the existence of strong incentives for doing so: incentives recognized not only by Heidegger's students but, as will be shown, by Heidegger himself. What will emerge are not only the oft-observed limitations of Heidegger as an interpreter of Plato, but also, and more importantly, their source in certain limitations of Heidegger's own thinking. [End Page 361]1. Heidegger's Critique of Dialectic in the 1920sHeidegger's most detailed account of Plato's dialectic, and thus the one that best explains his curt dismissal of dialectic in later works, is to be found in the Sophist lectures of 1924/25.4 This account begins with a description of the pervasiveness and potential obstructiveness of. Though ordinarily and most immediately pervades all forms of disclosing (GA19, 196), "[a]ccording to its original sense and original facticity, is not at all disclosing (aufdeckend), but is, if one may speak in an extreme way, precisely concealing (verdeckend)" (197).5 In other words, is initially and for the most part "idle talk" (Gerede), the kind of speech that is bandied about concerning anything whatsoever and that "has the facticity of not allowing the things themselves to be seen, but producing instead a self-satisfaction in resting content with what 'one says'" (197). Thus speech at first presents itself as self-sufficient and autonomous; one hangs onto what is said without being directed beyond it to the things themselves.This tendency of to conceal is a theme to which Heidegger returns repeatedly in the courses of the 1920s. In a course from WS 1923/24 he argues that deception has its origin in the very facticity of language.6 In the unpublished course from SS 1924 ("Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie"), the one that immediately preceded the Sophist lectures, Heidegger characterizes language as the proper domain of "Das Man" (18, 22) and describes the dominance of as leading to Gerede (7, 112).7 Heidegger therefore claims that because the Greeks lived in speech they were also imprisoned by it, with the result that a tremendous effort was needed for them to overcome their imprisonment and thus make science possible (41, 106 ).In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger assigns to dialectic an important role in this effort. Given both the pervasiveness and the concealing character of, philosophy, in its attempt to disclose the things themselves, must both begin with and break through it by means of a "speaking for and against" (Für- und Gegensprechen) that destroys the autonomy and self-sufficiency that has in Gerede and in this way "leads more and more to the matter under discussion and lets it be seen" (GA19, 197). What is needed, in short, is dia-lectic: a speaking that passes through speech.Already, however, one can see the tension that characterizes dialectic on Heidegger's account. Though dialectic is a, a speaking, it seeks to be more. Its aim is to disclose the things themselves of which it speaks, to see these things in a "pure seeing" uncontaminated by the... (shrink)

Toute situation de persécution a des effets sur les actions, les discours et les écrits de ceux qui en sont les victimes. Ce postulat conduit à une lecture critique de quelques - uns des traits saillants et des présupposés de « art d ' écrire entre les lignes », dont traite Leo Strauss dans son fameux essai Writing and Persecution. Le double constat de la pertinence de la méthode de lecture proposée et de son caractère problématique, inhérent à l ' (...) anthropologie élitiste qui sous - tend la démarche, conduit à revenir sur l ' histoire de la notion de persécution, pour en mettre en évidence la forte connotation religieuse, mais aussi l ' importance philosophique, à condition d ' assumer clairement le jugement éthique qui s ' y trouve engagé. Une étude de l ' écriture en régime de persécution devient alors possible, qui ne renie pas l ' inspiration straussienne, mais va plutôt chercher ses outils dans les sciences sociales contemporaines. Any persecution situation has effects on the actions, discourses and writings of its victims. Such a postulate leads to a critical reading of a few features and assumptions of an « art of writing in - between the Unes » Leo Strauss deals with in his famous essay Writing and Persecution. The twofold report of the relevant reading method and of its problematic character, inherent to the elitist anthropology underlying such an approach, leads to resume to the history of the concept of persecution such as to stress its strong religious connotation, but also its philosophical importance, provided one should fully acknowledge the ethical judgment thus implied. A study of writing in persecution regime thus becomes possible not denying the Straussian inspiration but rather trying to find new tools in contemporary social sciences. (shrink)

Cette parole d'Emmanuel Levinas touche le coeur d'une actualité, celle de notre rapport occidental à la mort, qui résume le contexte dans lequel la mort nous fait problème, C'est ce contexte qui permet aussi d'éclairer la difficile question des "fins de vie" sous nos latitudes. S'engage la bataille idéologique : puis-je ou non disposer de mon existence? Des deux côtés, on invoque la dignité humaine, que ce soit pour réclamer le droit de "mourir dans la dignité" ou pour justifier l'interdiction (...) de toute forme d'euthanasie au nom du "caractère sacré" de la vie humaine. La "dignité humaine" devrait-elle justifier tout et son contraire? Il importe plutôt d'en élucider la notion et le fondement, en commençant par faire le clair sur les interprétations concurrentes et leurs implications pratiques. L'approche pluridisciplinaire de l'ouvrage favorisera une lecture critique au sein de laquelle différents points de vue s'inscrivent dans des moments distincts : Moment d'attestation, celui des praticiens aux prises avec la réalité des hôpitaux et des unités de soins palliatifs. Ils expérimentent au jour le jour le drame et la tragédie des passages de la phase curative à la phase palliative puis à la phase terminale ; Moment d'information, d'analyse exégétique et critique, touchant notamment à l'état du droit ; Moment de problématisation. De quoi et vers quoi? Tout logiquement, en direction des fondements philosophiques, c'est-à-dire de ce qui justifie que l'on prenne telle ou telle décision importante concernant les soins, l'arrêt des soins, la fin de vie, voire l'arrêt de la vie. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, je propose une interprétation de la philosophie de Wilhelm Dilthey qui repose sur trois idées directrices. La première idée identifie l'objet de sa philosophie : la vie. La deuxième idée établit sa méthode, soit l'autoréflexion. La troisième idée clarifie ce qui est révélé par l'autoréflexion, à savoir l'universalité et la variabilité de la vie. Dans un premier temps, je défends que la lecture épistémologique de la philosophie de Dilthey doit être abandonnée. Dans un deuxième temps, je (...) présente mon interprétation de la philosophie de Dilthey. ABSTRACT In this paper, I suggest an interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy that rests on three guiding ideas. The first idea identifies the object of his philosophy: life. The second one establishes its method, namely self-reflection. The third one clarifies what is revealed by self-reflection, that is the universality and the variability of life. First, I show that the epistemological reading of Dilthey's philosophy must be abandoned. Second, I detail my interpretation of Dilthey's philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 415-431 [Access article in PDF] The Humanities at Home with Themselves Mark Bauerlein The Crafty Reader, by Robert Scholes; 272 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, $24.95. WHEN I STARTED GRADUATE SCHOOL in English in the early Eight ies, a typical thing happened. Those few students with a background in philosophy drifted together, shared influences, and developed a hierarchy of critical works. A (...) few pushed analytic philosophy and pragmatism, but overall Continental theory took first place, especially Derrida. "Structure, Sign, and Play" and "White Mythology," de Man's "Rhetoric of Temporality," Shoshana Felman's "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," and other weighty essays had the status of cutting-edge wisdom, and the hostility deconstruction drew from traditionalists and Marxists in the department only sharpened our commitment. Having no other professional standing, we savored the stigma, the roguishness. It complemented our poverty, and eased our transition from hot-shot undergraduates to first-year, prequalifying Ph.D aspirants. In the evenings, after instructing freshmen in comma splices, we gathered to trade Nietszchean epigrams and mock professors who looked befuddled at the mention of a priori and aporia.Other students found us insufferable, and doubtless we were, but not in a partisan way. We panned each other just as hard as we did the uninformed. This was UCLA, not Yale or Johns Hopkins, and personalities mattered less than arguments. If in discussion I backed a point with [End Page 415] "As Derrida says...," someone always answered, "So what?" We frowned on arguments from authority. Popularizations such as Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction earned our scorn. They were one step up from Cliff's Notes, packed with servile observations like "Jean Baudrillard wants to take us further, into a world where everything is so textualized that there is no space left for the real." We preferred to understand deconstruction through laborious readings of Being and Time and Beyond Good and Evil, not in watery effusions about textuality or the mechanical pairing of binary oppositions. The latter we placed among the scribes, those well-intentioned professionals canny enough to recognize the broad import of deconstruction, but not acute enough to discern the real meaning of différance or the radical disclosure of the ontic-ontological difference. The genius of philosophy, we thought, lay in plumbing the fundamental habits of cognition, like Hegel breaking down sense certainty and Heidegger questioning the determination of Being as substance. Exegesis of other texts was a lesser activity, though we acknowledged exceptions such as Starobinski's book on Rousseau and Kojève's lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit.Lower in our rankings were the quasi-Leftist attacks just emerging, such as Frank Lentricchia's Criticism and Social Change, which cast theorists as mandarin functionaries treating interpretation as an apolitical game. They filled the page with spiteful terms like "the mask of pure reason" and righteous declarations like "it is wrong to claim that you are above politics," spurning argument for the rhetoric of the reformer. We diagnosed them as puny reactions to the Reagan Revolution, carried out on the irrelevant ground of literary theory. Philosophically, Lentricchia was a hack, and we rejected the imputation that theory nullified activism and justified the status quo. Not that we thought theory bred activism. We just considered them separate activities, and saw no determinate connection between hermeneutical stance and party affiliation. However, we accepted the elitist charge. How could ambitious academics avoid elitism? It wasn't hard for graduate students struggling on $900 a month to see that populist attitudes didn't suit the tenured Ivy Leaguer. Professors were paid by exclusive institutions to teach poetry, to write letters for the best and brightest, to run recondite journals and jet to prestigious symposia. We wanted to join them, but not with phony expressions of social injustice that targeted theory as the problem.Allied with the political attacks on theory, and esteemed even lower, were critiques of the humanities as a bastion of high culture. Polemics [End Page 416] such as Andrew Ross's No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture treated... (shrink)

Il est question de montrer que l’une des clés de compréhension de l’idéal communautaire chez Jean-Luc Nancy, passe par sa mise en relation avec la critique littéraire de Maurice Blanchot. Autrement dit, l’idée de communauté recèle une essence poétique de l’absence-présence. Elle est le lieu de trame d’un évènement tragique qui neutralise l’essentielle possibilité du ‘vivre ensemble’. Cette conception de la communauté comme évènement tragique de la transvaluation, décrit comment le dernier homme à parler c’est-à-dire celui qui possède les (...) mots et l’écriture. Se détache de l’homme commun et ordinaire (le dernier homme nietzschéen). C’est une interprétation nihiliste littéraire qui aboutit sur une hypothèse qui consiste à dire que : La communauté désœuvrée est communauté d’une infinie résurrection de l’écrivain. Ce travail situe de ce fait, un instant de colloque, d’où le langage devient un acte pour la finitude. (shrink)

La distinction qu’Aristote propose de la connaissance pratique et de la connaissance théorique semble laisser le statut de la technique problématique : présentée comme une étape vers la science en Métaphysique A 1, la technique est rapprochée de la prudence en Éthique à Nicomaque VI 1, en ce qu’elles relèvent toutes deux de la même « raison délibérative ». Cette indétermination semble légitimer la critique célèbre adressée par Kant à la distinction aristotélicienne, ainsi que la conclusion radicale qu’il en tire (...) de rapatrier l’ensemble de la technique et des maximes de la prudence dans le domaine de la connaissance théorique. Le commentaire aristotélicien lui-même reste divisé sur cette question. Dans cet article, nous souhaitons proposer une interprétation nouvelle de la place qu’assigne Aristote à la technique dans le domaine du savoir, et notamment de son autonomie vis-à-vis des sciences théoriques. Cette interprétation se fonde sur l’analyse par Aristote de la délibération pratique comme d’une forme de recherche (ζήτησις), qui s’oppose fondamentalement à l’ἐπιστήμη comme savoir constitué et achevé dans sa présentation déductive. La technique apparaît alors comme le savoir positif qui permet de guider la délibération, et qui a donc trait aux méthodes. L’intérêt de cette lecture est de suggérer l’existence d’un lien profond entre la technique et la logique de l’ Organon, qui pointe vers notre concept moderne de « procédure », dont le rôle est central dans la théorie moderne de la calculabilité et en informatique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and PoliticsJean A. PerkinsGendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics, by Penny A. Weiss; xvii & 189 pp. New York: New York University Press, 1993, $40.00.As Penny Weiss puts it herself: “The main argument of this book is that Rousseau’s defense of sexual differentiation is based on the contribution he perceives it can make to the establishment of community” (p. 7). She accomplishes this by (...) dividing the work into two parts, the first devoted to an analysis of Rousseau’s Emile and Du Contrat social, the second consisting of two feminist essays inspired by her findings.After an introduction Weiss moves directly to an analysis of Emile, showing quite conclusively that the education given to Emile and Sophie does not differ in principle although it does differ in practice since the aim in both cases is to produce sex differences that will make each of them useful members of society. Chapter Three argues that, whereas Rousseau uses much of the rhetoric of innate and natural differences between the sexes, he really does not believe in this thesis. To Rousseau human nature, either male or female, is infinitely malleable. Chapter Four outlines the political benefits that Rousseau saw in the creation of a sex-roled affectionate family. The next chapter attempts to show the consistency of Rousseau’s thought, briefly described as nonliberal, anti-feminist, and communitarian. Up to this point Weiss has remained within the tradition of textual exegesis, but in Chapter Six she moves to a feminist critique of Rousseau’s thought. The argument put forward here is that sex-differentiated roles undermine community since it denies equality to the sexes. The eventual result of such a community would be the rampant spread of domination and the inevitable abuses of power this entails.This reviewer finds many problems with the book. An annoying trait is that the arguments are not given in logical order. For instance, human beings are described as asocial, indolent, and malleable before the author refers to the state of nature where Rousseau develops this idea. At no point does Weiss refer to the so-called Golden Age that intervenes in Rousseau’s scheme between the state of nature and civilization. In many ways this was Rousseau’s real ideal and his construct of an alternative society was only developed because it is impossible to go back to a previous developmental stage. Another, more grievous omission is the total lack of reference to La Nouvelle Héloïse. As William Ray has put it in a recent article, “I consider Julie and Emile as two stages of a single pedagogical project.” Perhaps Weiss, as a political scientist, does not believe that fictional works should be studied in the same way as treatises. Finally, there is an almost complete lack of references to critical works by literary critics (the exception is Jean Starobinski). Had Weiss been aware of Lester Crocker’s important works on Rousseau, she would not have been so surprised at his antifeminism or his recourse to manipulation in both education and society. The tutor or legislator need to arrange things so that individuals can perceive themselves to be free. [End Page 184]Chapters Two, Three, and Four offer the reader a careful look at Rousseau’s aims and methods. Chapter Five gives possible replies that Rousseau might have given in the face of certain criticisms. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight are interesting from a feminist perspective. Despite its limitations Weiss’s book contains much that is useful and thought-provoking.Jean A. PerkinsSwarthmore CollegeCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Ces recours à Fichte se placent sous le signe de l'approfondissement métaphysique de la liberté, à l'écart des modes philosophiques superficielles, et dans la confiance en la force de la réflexion rationnelle. Bergson et Nabert sont l'un et l'autre soucieux d'analyser l'expérience par la raison, sans recourir à rien qui lui soit extérieure. La lecture, l'interprétation et la critique de Fichte qu'ils proposent sont en cela représentatives de l'influence réflexive et non dogmatique du grand philosophe allemand dans la pensée française.

"Si le "jargon de l'authenticité" a sans doute rendu nombre de phénoménologies incapables de penser l'histoire et le politique, Merleau-Ponty a su le faire au coeur des textes étrangement les moins commentés, dans leur lien même, ceux des cours au Collège de France de 1954-1955: L'Institution et La Passivité. Des cours que cet ouvrage se propose enfin de relire, en discussion serrée avec l'ensemble de l'oeuvre merleau-pontienne, tant celle qui les précède que celle qui leur succède, pour la dévoiler autrement. (...) Cela, en trois temps, qui sont autant de "lectures de Merleau-Ponty", et de portes d'entrée dans son oeuvre la moins connue. Trois temps formant les parties de cet ouvrage qui suivent l'élaboration du concept merleau-pontien d'institution dans son rapport même à la passivité, sans chronologie fixe, et sans voeu de systématicité, mais en tentant d'être fidèle à la rédaction même de ces notes de cours d'une rare densité. Des cours qui foisonnent de références, tant à son oeuvre propre qu'aux nombreux auteurs avec lesquels Merleau-Ponty dialogue, tissant ainsi de nouveaux liens thématiques, et n'hésitant pas, par exemple, au coeur même d'un chapitre sur le vivant, à évoquer la question de la révolution marxiste. De Ruyer, Gesell, Lévi-Strauss, Alquié, Lachièze-Rey, à Sartre et Freud, etc., ce sont autant de dialogues qui éclairent en effet l'oeuvre et l'auto-critique de Merleau-Ponty, qui se confronte ici, mieux que nulle part ailleurs, à l'échec de son oeuvre passée, comme au contexte de l'époque. Plutôt qu'une exégèse ou qu'une interprétation orthodoxe, il s'agit au fond de continuer la pensée de Merleau-Ponty en questionnant ses dilemmes, ceux de la praxis mais aussi et en amont ceux de la méthode entre analogie et métaphore, en puisant à des essais qu'il aura en partie abandonnés, et qui nous semblent pourtant les plus prometteurs. D'où le pluriel, encore, de ces lectures."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique) and his (...) lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, I consider the place of Kant’s argument for moral theism both in the sections on moral theology that were part of his lectures on metaphysics (of those extant, only L1, K2, and Dohna contain small separate sections on moral theology) and in the more extensive separately held lectures on natural theology (Pölitz and Danziger), both of which were based on Part III of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, in the development of the various incarnations of (...) Kant’s ethico-theology in the published works—in its inchoate form in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Canon of Pure Reason, where Kant discusses the ideal of the highest good, and then in the section of the Dialectic of Practical Reason in the Critique of Practical Reason, where he presents the canonical proof of God’s existence as a practical postulate, and subsequently in the Doctrine of Method of the Teleological Power of Judgment in the Critique of Judgment (§§ 86–8), where the highest good is interpreted in terms of a moral teleology that first establishes a theology. Secondly, in the light of Eckart Förster’s (2000) claim (a) that there are at least four different versions of the practical postulate of God’s existence, three of which he maintains are abandoned by Kant by the time he publishes the Religion in 1793, and (b) that in the Opus postumum he presents an entirely new one (namely, the concept of God as necessary for practical Selbstsetzung, which supposedly eliminates God’s transcendence), I want to assess the systematic (“Critical”) consistency of Kant’s moral proof of God’s existence across the aforementioned works, and, importantly, to what extent this is also demonstrated by the account in the lectures. (shrink)

Après une agrégation de philosophie (1983), Marie-Dominique Couzinet s'est formée à la recherche en Italie, à l'Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence, et en France, au CNRS. Maître de conférences (1996) habilitée à diriger les recherches (2009), elle enseigne l'histoire de la philosophie de la Renaissance à l'Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UFR de philosophie ; Centre d'Histoire des Systèmes de Pensée Moderne : EA 1451). Ses travaux portent sur la philosophie de la Renaissance au XVIe siècle en France et en Italie, (...) l'histoire et la transmission des savoirs dans la culture humaniste européenne et l'historiographie consacrée à la Renaissance. Elle est l'auteur de Méthode et histoire à la Renaissance. Une lecture de la Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem de Jean Bodin (Paris, Vrin, 1996) ; Bibliographie des écrivains français : Jean Bodin, Paris- Rome (Éditions Memini, 2001), et Sub specie hominis. Études sur le savoir humain au XVIe siècle (Paris, Vrin, 2007). / This study analyzes the links between philosophy, humanism and scholarly culture according to Ramus, the great 16th-century pedagogue – a prime target of the so-called "critique of pedantry", which asserted that one had to choose between teaching and thinking. It offers new critical tools to approach his oeuvre. (shrink)

J. C. Dannhauer estimait nécessaire d'adjoindre une " nouvelle cité " à l'Organon aristotélicien, et J. Clauberg de donner un prolongement à la méthode cartésienne pour prendre en compte le caractère intersubjectif de notre accès à la connaissance. Admettre le fait que nous ne cheminons jamais seuls sur la voie qui nous y conduit ne contredit pourtant pas le geste plus classique de Descartes, ou de Malebranche par exemple, qui met l'accent sur la nécessité de se déprendre de ce que (...) l'" on " pense : il en est le pendant. Descartes s'adresse lui-même dans ses ouvrages à des lecteurs, et l'on sait que la lettre préface des Principes de la philosophie ne dédaigne pas leur indiquer précisément, quoique succinctement, la méthode correcte à laquelle doit obéir leur lecture pour en saisir le sens. À cet égard, et dans un contexte qui est également constitué par les débats théologiques de l'époque relatifs à l'interprétation de l'Écriture, l'apport de Dannhauer et de Clauberg tient au fait qu'ils ont élaboré cette partie de la logique visant à déterminer le sens des textes et plus largement des discours d'autrui, et qu'ils qualifient, avant Schleiermacher, d'herméneutique. À partir de contributions destinées à clarifier leur projet d'une herméneutique générale, cet ouvrage propose la première traduction de la remarquable troisième partie de la Logica de Clauberg consacrée à l'herméneutique qu'il appelle " analytique ". (shrink)

Contre l’herméneutique « philosophique », qui affirme le caractère contraignant de la structure du « préjugé », l’herméneutique « critique » entend réhabiliter la fonction du jugement et revendique la légitimité d’une méthode. Cette correction est appelée par un double constat : les herméneutiques particulières, en privilégiant l’adhérence à l’objet, se sont engagées dans diverses formes de positivisme où la question du sens était suspendue au profit de savoirs historiques « objectifs » ; l’herméneutique philosophique, en tant que théorie générale (...) de la compréhension, s’est détournée de la question de l’interprétation et de sa validité au profit d’une enquête sur les conditions ontologiques de toute compréhension. À partir de la proposition de Peter Szondi d’opposer à l’« herméneutique philosophique » une « herméneutique matérielle » (§1) et de l’effort de Jean Bollack pour réhabiliter le questionnement herméneutique dans la philologie et réciproquement (§2), on s’interrogera sur la possibilité de constituer une herméneutique critique (§3) dans laquelle l’interprétation s’accomplit dans l’exercice d’un jugement. (shrink)

In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and the “Society Must Be Defended” lectures (1975–1976), Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault present unexpected engagements with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. This article contextualizes and elucidates their interpretations of Hobbes by foregrounding the genealogical aspect of their projects. Their readings of Leviathan reflect common methodological commitments and figure the distinct but related problematics which Foucault and Arendt articulate, encapsulating the differences between their influential conceptions of power. The article concludes with a reading of Hobbes’ theory (...) of the liberty of subjects, which, while not explicitly addressed by Arendt or Foucault, lends support to their treatments of his text. Comparing their readings of Hobbes opens a potentially generative dialogue between their critiques of sovereignty and racialized state violence. (shrink)

In reviewing the contents of the first to five speakers, we back up to the United States in writing "real and reasonable method" when the issues faced in: scientific research methods than in the general concept Concept in humanities research methods; and people in the academic literature on the low-order. We first consider how the amount of Dilthey and Heidegger deal with these issues. Ⅰ. Natural sciences and humanities approach argue Dilthey tried to explain the expression of human literature, there (...) is a independent but equally effective method of theoretical foundation. In German, Geisteswissenschaften range widely from the arts and sociology. The rise of hermeneutics, Dilthey, in his famous thesis, the mean deep to begin with Homer to explain the hope臘who traveled through Roman times and hope臘. However, Dilthey still seek to achieve "universal and effective " results, which makes him turn to the scientific method. Heidegger's teacher, Hu stopper Seoul , rather than with the mathematical background of the humanities, to use phenomenology to philosophy as a "rigorous science ". Conversely, neural science and philosophy with Heidegger humanities background. This makes Heidegger's hermeneutics of Dilthey and his interest. Heidegger was a critic of scientific objectivity, and even have commentaries description: "Scientists do not think" . His search for the source of the problem of modernity to Descartes who, because of Cartesian subjectivity of the world as a projection. Ⅱ. Up to the U.S. desire to restore the respect for human studies of up to U.S. desire to restore respect for the human sciences, but he does not find the key steps in Dilthey, but in Heidegger's "Art works of origin >. Ⅲ. Up to the United States after the Western aesthetic of Kant's critique of Gadamer to use his real art of management for the new hole to criticize the police after Kant the aesthetic development. This is the "true management and methods" section of the important elements. Ⅳ. Heidegger in breakthrough in the art lecture on Heidegger, providing up to restore the emphasis on the United States who required breakthrough in the planning literature. Ⅴ. Methods exist regardless hermeneutics the implications of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can be seen as a new understanding of the analysis, so that his exposure to critical science and humanities in the nature of the two methods. Ⅵ. The universality of hermeneutics Gadamer in the "real and reasonable method" after the publication of a thesis advocated, he analyzed the universality of understanding can be applied in science and humanities in the training. Regardless of this guide provide us some background to explore the "real management and methods" in the 14 key concepts, these concepts will be in the seventh, eight speakers presented. After reviewing the content of Lectures 1-5, we turn to the issue that Gadamer was confronting when he wrote Truth and Method: the general sense of the superiority of scientific methods of research over humanistic methods, and the lower status of the humanities in academe . We first consider this issue in Dilthey and Heidegger. Section Ⅰ: The Contest over Methods in the Natural and Human Sciences Dilthey attempted to articulate a separate but equally valid methodological basis for interpretation in the humanities. In Germany, the range of the Geisteswissenschaften was wide, from art to sociology. In his famous essay on the rise of hermeneutics, Dilthey started, significantly, with the Greek interpreters of Homer and moved up through Greek and Roman times. Nevertheless, Dilthey was still seeking to achieve "universally valid" results , which moved him in the direction of scientific methods. Heidegger's teacher, Husserl, had a background in mathematics rather than the humanities and wanted to use phenomenology to make philosophy into a "rigorous science." Heidegger, in contrast, had a humanistic background in theology and philosophy and especially Greek philosophy. This caused him to be interested in Dilthey and his hermeneutics. Heidegger was a critic of scientific objectivity and once even remarked, "The scientist does not think." He traced the problems of modernity back to Descartes, who saw the world as a projection of his subjectivity. Section Ⅱ. Gadamer's Desire to Restore Respect to the Human Studies Gadamer desired to restore re spect to the human sciences, but he found the decisive step for doing so not in Dilthey but in Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art. Section Ⅲ: Gadamer's critique of Western aesthetics since Kant Gadamer used his new insight into the truth of art to criticize the development of aesthetics since Kant. This is a major element in the first section of Truth and Method. Section Ⅳ: Heidegger's Breakthrough in "The Origin of the Artwork" Heidegger's lectures on art offered Gadamer the breakthrough he needed in his project of restoring respect to the humanities. Section Ⅴ: The Implications of an Ontological Hermeneutics for Method Gadamer's new philosophical hermeneutics as an analysis of understanding put him in a position to criticize method per se in both the sciences and humanities. Section Ⅵ: The Universality of Hermeneutics In an essay published after Truth and Method Gadamer moved toward asserting the universality of his analysis of understanding as applying both to scientific disciplines and to the humanities. Understanding here was understanding universally, in general, in all respects. With this introduction we have some background for exploring the fourteen key concepts in Truth and Method itself that will be presented in lectures 7 and 8. (shrink)

This paper examines Angela Davis’s 1969 Lectures on Liberation and her critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s views regarding freedom and enslaved agency. Across four sections, the paper etches out Davis’s response to what she calls Sartre’s ‘notorious statement’ through her own existential reading of Frederick Douglass’s resistance to chattel slavery. Instead of interpreting Davis’s existential insights through the work of Sartre or other Western continental philosophers, the paper engages Lewis Gordon, George Yancy, Frank Kirkland, and LaRose Parris to develop an (...) alternative frame for assessing Davis’s existential thinking. Embracing a diverse lineage of existential philosophy, the paper argues for Black-centered approaches to existential philosophy that resonate with, but are not reducible or indebted to, European existentialism. (shrink)

Depuis sa première réception en France, l’œuvre de Nietzsche n’a cessé d’y cons-tituer une référence forte, devenue centrale au cours des années soixante. S’impose alors ce que Vincent Descombes appellera d’ailleurs le moment français de Nietzsche, illustré par une généralisation de la mise à distance interprétative des catégories philosophiques, morales et politiques de la modernité. Mais d’une façon qui peut sembler paradoxale, la méthode nietzschéenne fut souvent mise au service de l’idéal émancipateur moderne. Les années quatre-vingt virent l’émergence d’une réévaluation (...) libérale et humaniste des présupposés de ce nietzschéisme français. L’analyse de Brigitte Krulic s’inscrit dans cette révision critique en appelant à une lecture tocquevillienne de Nietzsche, par quoi il faut entendre une analyse de son œuvre qui rende compte de sa situation historique et morale intermédiaire, entre l’âge aristocratique et l’âge démocratique. Référence à Tocqueville qui passe en réalité par la médiation de Louis Dumont, dont Krulic prolonge ici les thèses développées dans Homo æqualis II. L’Idéologie allemande, sur l’adaptation complexe de la pensée allemande à la modernité: l’éloge nietzschéen de la hiérarchie illustrerait à son tour un entre-deux problématique entre la sortie individualiste de la tradition et un arrière-plan holiste. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:156 BOOK REVIEWS and appreciation of Mary's place in our faith lives needs to be con· tinually nourished. This book contributes much to fulfill this need. In the book the author gives a good historical background to each of the issues raised: Mary's Motherhood, Virginity, Immaculate Concep· tion and Assumption. His chapter on Private Devotions and Appari· tions is a good analysis of the facts and gives some good (...) insights into a particularly delicate aspect of our Marian heritage. Throughout the book the author displays a familiarity with the latest scriptural developments regarding Mary and these are blended well with theological reflection which help to clarify and deepen our grasp of the mystery who is Mary. It will serve as an excellent intro· duction for those who are interested in pursuing further certain Marian themes. It sets up clearly the " state of the question. " And for anyone wishing to have a clear and intelligible understanding of the Catholic position on Mary, this is a book to read. This book is well structured; one's interest is captured and maintained throughout. The reviewer's hope is that this is but the first of several works on Mary by Fr. Frederick Jelly. GEORGE KIRWIN, O.M.I. Boston, Massachusetts The Risk of Interpretation: On Being Faithful to the Christian Tradi· tion in a Non-Christian Age. By CLAUDE GEFFRE. Translated by David Smith. New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987. Pp. vi + 298. $12.95 {paperback). Several years ago, M.-D. Chenu described himself, in his preface to Claude Ge:ffre's A New Age in Theology {New York: Paulist, 1972), as " one who, not without some boldness and certain risks, has reacted against decay in theology and envisaged opportune breakthroughs in historical and speculative method. " In the present work, Geffre shows himself likewise willing to take the risk involved in the work of theology. Since theology is a hermeneutical task "from beginning to end," it involves "the risk of distortion and error," but unless theology is willing to take that risk by presenting a creative interpretation of Christianity, it runs the no less serious risk of "simply handing on a dead past" {pp. 1-2). The present work comprises a collection of fifteen articles and lectures, three of which were previously unpublished, eight of which have been reworked, and all of which have been organized into a consistent BOOK REVIEWS 157 presentation. The hook is divided into three parts, concerned respectively with theological methodology, certain "fundamental realities of Christian revelation, " and Christian praxis in face of the new histori· cal, social, and cultural conditions of our non-Christian age. The author begins with a lucid presentation of the shift that has occurred in the last twenty years from a theology which understood itself as " constituted knowledge " to a theology of "pluralistic interpretation " (i.e., from " dogmatic theology to hermeneutical theology ") (p. 11). Under the influence of such thinkers as Dilthey and Gadamer, theologians have become aware of the critical importance of the present situation of the interpreter or speaker in establishing the meaning of a text or articulating a speculative truth. This new awareness of " a certain kind of dogmatic theology that is offered to us as the only authentic way of interpreting the christian message" (p. 14). In Chapter II, Geffre takes up the structuralist critique of hermeneutics. He responds to their contention that the meaning of a text can he found only in " the structures of the text and the mechanics of its functioning" by making judicious use of Paul Ricoeur's notion of the " world of the text, " and thus separates himself both from the position of the structuralists and from the sort of hermeneutics which pretends to find the meaning of a text by discovering the intention of its author. He thus shows how theology may employ much that is valuable in the method 0£ the structuralists without falling victim to their criticisms. Geffre contrasts the hermeneutical model for doing theology with what he calls the " dogmatic model, " characterizing them as " two paradigms of theological study... separated by an epistemological revolution " (Chapter III). While the dogmatic model, which was characteristic of theological work from the Council... (shrink)

Martial Gueroult est exemplaire parmi les historiens français de la philosophie : ses travaux permettent d’étudier la divergence des dimensions de l’activité d’interprétation (commentaire, méthodologie, fondation). Cet article procède à une lecture de ses monographies emblématiques, essaie de comprendre la limitation du champ de leurs objets, se risque à une critique de l’idéalisme radical pour finalement expliquer que le manuscrit de la Dianoématique n’ait jamais été publié, sans pourtant que son auteur en désavoue l’intention : son principal défaut relevait d’une (...) contradiction théorique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, CritiqueJosé R. Maia NetoAntony McKenna and Gianni Paganini, editors. Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004. Pp. 589. Cloth, €90.00.Pierre Bayle is an early modern philosopher who has received relatively little attention given the philosophical relevance and historical influence of his work. Fortunately this situation has been rapidly changing in recent years. (...) This volume, edited by Antony McKenna and Gianni Paganini, is a good sample of the volume, quality, scope, and polemical nature of current Bayle scholarship. The book contains twenty-five articles by the main Bayle scholars from France, Italy, England, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States. It also contains an introduction by the editors, who give an overview of current scholarship, summarizing its main trends and achievements, and a useful name index. The articles are organized in five sections, each dealing with some aspect of Bayle's life and thought.The first set of articles, gathered under the heading, "Interlocutors, Friends and Enemies," deals with Bayle's personal relations as a Huguenot exiled in the Netherlands. Luisa Simonutti deals with Bayle's relations to one of the radical Reformed groups in Holland, the Quakers. Although Bayle disagreed with their religious views, he respected and maintained [End Page 476] healthy intellectual exchanges with them. Hans Bots examines Bayle's view of the "republic of letters," of which he was a major architect—a republic whose right to citizenship required the suspension of religious, political, and national partisanship and engagement in free intellectual debate. H. H. M. van Lieshout contests the entrenched view that Bayle lived as a recluse scholar in Rotterdam. Both she and Bots show how Bayle's main work, the Dictionary, exhibits his life committed to the "republic of letters." Finally, Hubert Bost focuses on Bayle's activity as a journalist, crucial in this republic but also revealing the difficulty of the pursued ideal of neutrality.The next three sections of the book deal with Bayle's thoughts on religion and philosophy. Anna Belgrado denies the late Bayle scholar Elizabeth Labrousse's thesis that Bayle's thought is wrought with Protestantism. Bayle's views on the Jews, the Middle Ages, and women are examined, respectively, by Myrian Yardeni, Gregorio Piaia, and Maria-Cristina Pitassi, who concur in concluding that, although not free from the prejudices of his time, Bayle's views are more complex and balanced than those of his contemporaries.Bayle's political views and in particular his view on tolerance receive a good deal of attention in the volume. Stefano Brogi explains Bayle's attack on the "rational theologians" (Le Clerc), at first sight puzzling given their defense of religious tolerance, pointing out Bayle's radical opposition between faith and reason. According to Jean-Michel Gros, it is this radical separation of philosophy from theology that renders Bayle's view of tolerance so modern, unlike Locke's, for instance, which still has a theological ground. Jonathan Israel explains another apparent puzzle: Bayle's defense of absolute monarchism despite his philosophical and religious ideas, which were no less radical than Spinoza's. Bayle, unlike Spinoza, does not support republicanism because of his pessimistic view of human nature. John Christian Laursen shows that the political menace posed by the Millenarians explains Bayle's unusual lack of tolerance towards them.One of the most influential contemporary Bayle scholars, Gianluca Mori, summarizes his view of Bayle as a philosophical atheist, and he is contested in this by Jean-Luc Solère, who argues that for Bayle, materialism does not provide a coherent metaphysical system alternative to the Christian one, so that Bayle's position amounts to a radical skepticism with regard to reason. In his contribution to the volume, Mori argues that Bayle's skepticism is restricted, and is not relevant to the issue of theism versus atheism. He replies to Solère's objections to his interpretation in an appendix to his article. Mori's interpretation relies on the method of reading Bayle's text as containing irreligious views hidden beneath apparently orthodox claims. Thomas Lennon relies on the opposite approach to argue... (shrink)

When Western Marxist sociologists, such as Jean Buadrillard, constructed their critical theory of consumer society, they took the consumer society as an objective fact and methodologically restricted themselves to the non-historical method of sociology, making them unable to grasp the correct meaning of Karl Marx's historical materialist methodology. Thus, they were unable to adequately critique and transcend consumer society. After spending the early 1850s building a theoretical foundation, Marx pointed out in 1857–1858 Economical Manuscript and 1861–1863 Economical Manuscript that (...) the governing model of capital was so complicated that it made consumption very important to the socio-economic form. Moreover, he explained the way of surpassing the conscious form of fetishism developed in consumer society from the perspective of the development of capitalist production. (shrink)

This collection contains such a wealth of topics that it deserves the attention of anyone seriously interested in what its title denotes, namely the philosophy of the history of philosophy. The content of the various essays, along with their translated titles, can be described as follows. "The New Aspects of the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy" claims to be, but is not, an introduction to the other essays; it abounds in obscurities and does not even make the effort of (...) integrating the various contributions into some common themes. "Meta-philosophy and History of Philosophy" is partly a methodological discussion of the connections among philosophy, metaphilosophy, and history of philosophy, and partly a discussion from a psychological-psychoanalytical and cultural anthropological point of view of questions like the following: whether anything like progress exists in the history of philosophy, what is the meaning of the whole philosophical history, and what are its prospects for the future. "Heidegger, Schelling, and German Idealism" discusses the relations between the history of philosophy and the philosophy of existence, using primarily Heidegger’s lectures on Schelling as a case study. "Hermeneutic Experience and Philosophical Historiography" is a discussion primarily of the theory of historical interpretation in Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, and secondarily of some of its consequences for the study of the history of philosophy; it is highly informative, but one cannot fail to lament the fact that the author reports Gadamer’s critiques of historicism without any explicit indication that, besides Dilthey’s version, there exists Croce’s brand of historicism, which in my judgment is very similar to Gadamer’s hermeneutics as reported in this essay. "History of Art as History of Philosophy?" is a thoughtful and provocative brief discussion of the divergence between the histories of art and of philosophy; it also suggests that, nevertheless, data and facts from art-history can be used by the historian of philosophy for the reconstruction of the philosophical concepts of epochs and cultures whose available historical records abound in the field of art but are lacking in the area of philosophy. "The Hegelian Left and the History of Philosophy" is an analysis of some of the historiography of the 19th century Hegelian Left. "-Philosophy and the Theology of Secularization discusses the interconnections among philosophy, history of philosophy, the contemporary historical situation, and political philosophy, developing a Gentilean critique of the theology of secularization; it argues that Gentile’s critique refutes some presuppositions of this theology, namely, the idea of the progressive character of contemporary history and that of the irreversible process of secularization. "Philosophy of Religion and History of Philosophy," though terminologically and stylistically obscure, is a very stimulating justification of the thesis that an adequate philosophy of religion is to be grounded on a philosophy of history, which in turn is to be grounded on an all-encompassing history of philosophy; independently of the adequacy of this justification, the author makes a number of very suggestive comparisons between the history and historiography of philosophy and the history and historiography of the Church, such as the following: the analogy of the relationships between theology and Church history and between philosophy and philosophical history, the analogy between the "history of ideas" and ecumenical Church history, the analogy between the position of Hegel in philosophical history and that of Jesus in Church history, and the analogy between the visible/ invisible Church distinction in religious studies and the history/theory distinction in philosophical inquiry. "Beyond the Historical Disease" discusses to what extent philosophical hermeneutics solves Nietzsche’s problem that there is a conflict between historiographical awareness and the capacity to make history; it answers that, in spite of its insights, hermeneutics fails, and that the solution lies in the direction of certain suggestions found in Sartre’s Question of Méthode. "Interpretation and Translatability of Philosophical Texts" discusses certain problems in the theory of meaning from the point of view of analytical philosophy, and in relation to the meaning of philosophical passages. "Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Analytical-Philosophical Historiography" is an interesting mixture of a critique of the view that contemporary analytical philosophy is ahistorical, a discussion of the similarities between Popper’s epistemology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and a study of the interplay between Popper’s epistemology and his interpretation of Plato in The Open Society and its Enemies. "Information Theory and Philosophy" studies the relation between science and the history of philosophy by comparing and contrasting certain philosophical ideas of Leibniz and Kant with recent results in information theory. A final essay deals with "The Myth of Faust in Kierkegaard."—M.A.F. (shrink)

Kant characterizes Critique of Pure Reason as “a treatise on the method”. But he does not clearly work out the Doctrine of Method of the Critique. Most interpreters of the Critique do not work out the Doctrine of Method either. This paper outlines the systematic place and significance of the Doctrine of Method within the structure of the Critique. It suggests that the Doctrine of Method supplies the methodological conditions, or systematic laws, of possible cognitions of reason. In other words, (...) the Doctrine of Method is the primary locus of critique or reason’s self-cognition, i.e., reason’s cognition of the laws that make its possible cognitions systematic. (shrink)

La pensee de Jean-Jacques Rousseau continue d'appeler les lectures critiques les plus diverses et de susciter des interpretations parfois contradictoires. Jean-Jacques Rousseau d fendit passionn ment les valeurs de la communaut d mocratique.Citoyen de la petite r publique de Gen ve il recueillit avec ferveur l'enseignement des Hommes illustres de Plutarque et les le ons de l'Antiquit r publicaine. Mais Jean-Jacques est aussi le philosophe du XVIIIe si cle qui fit reconna tre avec le plus d' clat (...) son irr ductible singularit. Quand il engagea sa grande entreprise autobiographique, il souligna surtout sa diff rence. Et dans cette qu te personnelle, toute particuli re, Jean-Jacques trouvait l'appui d'une conviction chr tienne protestante. Rousseau recueillait ainsi sa mani re la double tradition de la Reforme et de l'Antiquit r publicaine. Mais alors que ces deux dimensions coexistaient dans la r publique calviniste de Gen ve, Rousseau fut conduit les dissocier, dans un 'triste et grand syst me' qui opposait avec une douloureuse obstination les valeurs de l'Homme et celles du Citoyen. L'enqu te conduite en ce livre explore les profondeurs de ce paradoxe qui fait la grandeur de Rousseau. (shrink)

The dialectical method, Marx Insisted, was at the basis of his account of society. In 1858, in a letter to Engels, he wrote: In the method of treatment the fact that by mere accident I again glanced through Hegel's Logic has been of great service to me... If there should ever be the time for such work again, I would greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence, in two or three printer's sheets, what is rational in the (...) method which Hegel discovered.1 But he never did find the time for this work. As a result, Marx's dialectical method and the ways in which it draws on Hegel's philosophy remain among the most controversial and least well understood aspects of Marx's work. My purpose in this paper is to explain some of the basic presuppositions of this method and to bring out their significance for Marx's theories. I shall do so by focusing critically on G.A. Cohen 's account of Marxism in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. In this important and influential work, Cohen contrives to give an account of 2 Marxism in entirely non-dialectical – indeed, in anti-dialectical – terms. By criticising Cohen 's views I will seek to show that the dialectical method is the necessary basis for an adequate theory of history and an indispensable part of Marx's thought. The major purpose of Cohen 's book is to develop and defend a particular interpretation of historical materialism, the Marxist theory of historical development. Cohen claims that his account is an `old-fashioned' and a `traditional' one ; and, indeed, in certain respects it is. For, in contrast to the tendency of much recent Marxist writing, Cohen strongly emphasises the materialistic and deterministic character of Marx's theory of history. He insists that the development of the productive forces is the primary motive force for historical change, and portrays Marxism as a form of technological determinism. However, there are various different forms of materialism, not all of them Marx's. (shrink)

In this final lecture, I used instructions coming from the outside as well as rhetorical philosophy up to the achievements of the United States in the way, cited the following as high as 20 U.S. I think that the achievements in philosophy, this 20 achievements are as follows: 1. Re- definition of hermeneutics, resulting in a "philosophical hermeneutics" . understand the concern of the moment rather than the ability to explain the object. 3 allows us to explain thus an awareness (...) event. 4 to become a historical understanding of events . 5 from the hermeneutic methodology In order to understand the events into ontology. 6 to understand a sight change and self-understanding of the event. 7 principles of change as history, literature and art. 8 offers a new aesthetic and poetics. 9 provides a way to deal with representational and abstract art of art. 10 and then regardless of the art real management problem. 11 reaffirmed the non-scientific literature and hermeneutics in true sense. 12 In order to read the classical works of the original to provide a new treatment. 13 new associate with the traditional relationship. 14 the art of interpretation be linked to a reading process. 15 In order to have affected the critical nursing science, history, sociology, etc. methods. 16 criticism of the limitations of the natural scientific thinking. 17 critique of modernity . 18 provides a large amount of pull on the Park map , Hegel and Heidegger books. 19 He described the dialogue by way of consultations In order to understand the contribution. 20. Tree up hermeneutics of tradition and openness to other cultures of the ancient model. With this eight p.m. description of achievements, but also showing a structure of these nine days the future of speech. In this final lecture I take an approach from the outside and ask what Gadamer has achieved in philosophy, then list twenty of what I see as his philosophical accomplishments. These achievements are as follows: 1. Redefines hermeneutics, creating a "philosophical hermeneutics." 2. Focuses on the moment of uptake instead of the object of interpretation. 3. Makes us aware of interpretation as an event. 4. Makes the event of understanding an historical event. 5. Changes hermeneutics from a methodology to an ontology of the event of understanding. 6. Makes understanding an event of transformation of horizon and self-understanding. 7. Transforms history, literature and art as disciplines. 8. Offers a new aesthetics and a new poetics. 9. Offers a view of art that is able to deal with representation and nonrepresentational art. 10. Reintroduces the question of truth in art. 11. Revalidates literature and humanities as true in a nonscientific sense. 12. Offers a new rationale for reading the classics. 13. Forges a new relationship to tradition . 14. Relates interpretation of art to the reading process. 15. Offers a critique of method that has influenced nursing, history, sociology, etc. 16. Offers a critique of the limits of scientific thinking. 17. Offers a critique of modernity. 18. Offers major books on Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. 19. In describing dialogue in understanding, he contributes to understanding negotiation. 20. Sets an example of hermeneutical openness to tradition, antiquity, and other cultures. The framework of these lectures during these nine day is presented through accounting for the twenty achievements. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article discusses dialectics as a method of critique which takes concepts it primal object of inquiry. Through a reading of Theodor W. Adorno’s lecture course Introduction to Dialectics, it argues that for dialectical critique concepts are living organs of social reality whose work must observed in terms of constellations of experiences and practices, and through specific historical sites and social processes. The article reconstructs three moments in Adorno’s thinking of critique’s relation to conceptuality: the “pedagogical effect” of concepts on (...) our habits of thought, the socio-historical formation of concepts as “fields of force”, and the need of a “micrological method” of engagement with social reality. Within this framework, the article shows that the movement of dialectical critique is prompted by the cognitive utopia of using concepts to reach material reality, as well as by the ethical demand of making justice to what is not grasped by the existing conceptual order of society. By combining both moments, the goal of dialectical critique is not to identify the correct meaning of concepts, but to work through them as to unlock the normative imagination of society. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Ferry stands opposed to the philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis, claiming that it relies upon an arbitrary ontological decision. According to Ferry, Castoriadis’ philosophy does not respect the Kantian critique of reason. In this contribution, I reply to this objection. I comment on his specific methodological operation: elucidation. I show that this method does not go beyond Kantian finitude, and that it allows him to justify his ontological concepts. In the last part of this article, I interpret his method (...) as a ‘grounded constructivism’ and I explain how it contributes to those philosophical theories. (shrink)

Dans cette étude du grand livre que Schmitt a consacré à l’histoire du droit international, Le Nomos de la terre, on tente de reconstituer la logique d’une pensée qui, partie de l’idée d’un lien essentiel entre le droit et la « limite », aboutit à une critique de la résurgence moderne de la « guerre juste » comme « guerre pour l’humanité ». Si l’actualité et la sagacité de certaines analyses restent frappantes, on rappelle aussi ici ce que fut « (...) l’envers de la critique », soit l’accompagnement théorique que Schmitt a fourni à la politique du « grand espace » nazi et son rejet ultérieur de la notion de « crime contre l’humanité », où peuvent se lire les effets d’un « antihumanisme » radical.This paper is a study of Schmitt’s book The Nomos of the Earth. We try to investigate the historical background and the political consequences of Schmitt’s genealogy and criticism of the humanitarian « just war ».Schmitts Verständnis des « Nomos » begründet seine Polemik gegen die destabilisierenden Folgen des Universalismus und gegen den « Krieg für Menschheit ». Heute findet diese Kritik eine neue Aktualität. Aber sowohl mit seiner Rechtfertigung der « Grossraum »-Politik als auch mit seiner Verwerfung des Begriffs des « Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit », hat Schmitt die gefährlichsten Konsequenzen aus seinem juristischen « Antihumanismus » gezogen. (shrink)

1. Kant on the “Conditions of the Possibility” of Experience -- Claude Piché // 2. Plato and Kantian Transcendental Constructivism -- Tom Rockmore // 3. Kant and Fichte on the Notion of (Transcendental) Freedom -- Violetta L. Waibel // 4. Fichte, Transcendental Ontology, and the Ethics of Belief -- Steven Hoeltzel // 5. Transcendental Philosophy as “Therapy of the Mind”: Fichte’s “Facts of Consciousness” Lectures -- Benjamin D. Crowe // 6. From Transcendental Philosophy to Hegel’s Developmental Method -- William F. (...) Bristow // 7. How Transcendental Is Cohen’s Critical Idealism? -- Halla Kim // 8. Heidegger’s Failure to Overcome Transcendental Philosophy -- Eric S. Nelson // 9. Others as the Ground of Our Existence: Levinas, Løgstrup, and Transcendental Arguments in Ethics -- Robert Stern // 10. Raising Validity Claims for Reasons: Transcendental Reflection in Apel’s Argumentative Discourse -- Matthias Kettner // 11. Transcendental Arguments Based on Question-Answer Contradictions -- Yukio Irie // 12. Consequences of the Transcendental-Pragmatic Consensus Theory of Truth -- Michihito Yoshime // 13. On Jürgen Habermas’s Cognitive Theory of Morality -- Yasuyuki Funaba . (shrink)