In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The New Liberalism of L. T. Hobhouse and the Reenvisioning of Nineteenth-Century UtilitarianismDavid WeinsteinIn the eyes of some, modern liberal theorizing has fallen victim to tyrannizing conceptual dualisms that have rendered it a tedious dialogue of predictable positioning and strident partisanship. On the one hand those who dream the dream of unencumbered selfhood are said to be locked in a bitter struggle with those who long for the (...) rebirth of encumbering community. On the other hand and in a not wholly unrelated way, Kantians are supposedly and forever beating back the phoenix of consequentialism. In short, the tyrannizing dualisms of individualism vs. communitarianism and Kantianism vs. consequentialism allegedly and detrimentally channel much modern liberal theorizing.But such rivalries, however real or fanciful, need not be philosophical liberalism’s singular fate. Nor do these rivalries exclusively characterize its variegated past. My aim is to challenge the cogency and expose the historical limitations of one of these tyrannizing dualisms, namely that between Kantianism and consequentialism, by way of examining L. T. Hobhouses’s new liberalism. In my view this seeming rivalry within liberalism is a convenient straw man readily weakened by more scrupulous attention to liberalism’s new liberal past. 1 [End Page 487]Principally, I hope to show that Hobhouse’s rendering of liberalism privileged good but not at the price of stultifying welfare pooling, individuality but not at the cost of pitiless individualism. Hobhouse’s version of new liberalism may not have been quite utilitarian, but it nevertheless took maximizing good seriously while retaining a firm commitment to strong moral rights and the flourishing of individuals as ends. Hobhouse’s new liberalism, then, was as robustly juridical and as authentically liberal as it was fundamentally consequentialist.The Rational Good and Moral PersonalitySelf-realization was the normative hinge of Hobhouse’s new liberalism. Self-realization, in turn, can not be understood without examining Hobhouse’s notion of the rational good. Hence, The Rational Good, published later in his life in 1921, occupies a vital position in his thought though recent scholarship has all but ignored this work. 2In this work Hobhouse begins by asking “whether there is a Rational, and therefore demonstrable, standard of values to which the actions of man and the institutions of society may be referred for judgment.” 3 For Hobhouse, such a standard exits and the remainder of the book endeavors to persuade us accordingly.In a chapter entitled “The Good,” Hobhouse claims that the proposition that something is good expresses a “disposition” and asserts a “fact.” The disposition consists of a favorable “practical attitude” towards pleasurable feelings, which certain (self-realizing) experiences invariably entail. In Hobhouse’s words “the judgment ‘This is good’ is not only the expression of an attitude but also the assertion of a fact, and the fact which it asserts is a harmony between an experience and a feeling.” 4 Hence, we deem good only those self-realizing experiences that are harmonious in the sense that they generate feelings of pleasure. A pleasure-producing experience is a harmonious experience and, assuming that it is also self-realizing, we are disposed to pronounce it “good.”Now separate harmonious experiences, unless rationally coordinated, will likely clash, thereby generating overall disharmony or pain. Experiences which we separately judge as good may turn out to be bad on the whole. A good life, therefore, is a satisfying coherent life. Only a rationally coherent life is fully self-realizing and constitutes the rational good. In short “that what we reasonably call good or what is really good must be a harmony of the [End Page 488] totality of feeling with the totality of experience so far as it affects feeling. Thus, Practical Reason is the effort of the mind towards harmony within itself, and with nature.” 5But if, for Hobhouse, practical reason is an ongoing “effort” in coordination, then the fully rational good is a formal ideal which actual lives succeed more or less skillfully in realizing. Hence, Hobhouse also introduces the “realized good” as the practically possible good, and the distance one goes in realizing his or her own good is, as Hobhouse says, “what we call character.” 6 To... (shrink)

In this study, David Weinstein argues that nineteenth-century English New Liberalism was considerably more indebted to classical English utilitarianism than the received view holds. T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, D. G. Ritchie and J. A. Hobson were liberal consequentialists who followed J. S. Mill in trying to accommodate robust, liberal moral rights with the normative goal of promoting self-realisation. Through careful interpretation of each, Weinstein shows how these theorists brought together themes from idealism, perfectionism and especially utilitarianism to (...) create the new liberalism. Like Mill, they were committed to liberalising consequentialism and systematising liberalism. Because they were no less consequentialists than they were liberals, they constitute a greatly undervalued resource, Mill notwithstanding, for contemporary moral philosophers who remain dedicated to defending a coherent form of liberal consequentialism. The New Liberals had already travelled much of the philosophical ground that contemporary liberal consequentialists are unknowingly retravelling. (shrink)

This book addresses identity-formation as it relates to social inclusivity. The stigmatized Other have long been marginalized in their social relations with the mainstream. This book reconstitutes the thinking which displaces social exclusiveness, replacing it with new ideas promoting social cohesiveness, reciprocity, and social inclusivity.

This paper examines the tensions between liberalism, Hegelian idealism and organicism in the thought of the nineteenth-century British ‘new liberals’ such as T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. It maintains that these thinkers drew upon Hegelian conceptual motifs to help them compensate for what they saw as orthodox liberalism's lack of social responsibility. Ultimately, however, they rejected Hegel's state theory and turned to organicism and Social Darwinism to help them imagine an alternative notion of community. Yet, through the process (...) of first embracing Hegel, then rejecting his state theory, then evoking the organic, the new liberals were caught in an ironic philosophical cycle that ultimately led them to endorse a social vision wherein family relations governed the political order. In the end, the paternalistic form of politics to emerge from this idea of the ‘family state’ was often in conflict with these thinkers' own professed support for liberal political causes. (shrink)

It is conventional to distinguish between an old liberalism, with a robust conception of private property and a limited role for government in the economy, and a new liberalism that permits government to override individual property rights in the pursuit of the general welfare. The New Deal is often taken to mark the dividing line between these two forms of liberal governance. But when we focus on property rights through the magnifying lens of Takings Clause jurisprudence, we find (...) that the movement away from strong property rights begins not with the New Deal but in the late 19th century, at what is normally taken to be the peak of constitutionally protected private property. The much-criticized decision in Kelo v. New London (2005) represents, not a break with past doctrine, but rather its logical consequence. Protecting individual property-holders against expansive state powers of eminent domain runs into a structural conundrum: while categorical restraints on state power limit government's ability to promote important public purposes, an explicitly purposive approach renders all limits on government power (including individual rights) vulnerable to an aggregative calculus. The most plausible response is a two-tier approach: respect for legally established categories in ordinary circumstances, regardless of their aggregate consequences, and consequentialism in circumstances of emergency, when the lives or basic wellbeing of citizens are at stake. Judged against this template, the consequentialism guiding modern takings clause jurisprudence in ordinary, non-emergency circumstances is hard to justify. (shrink)

The reply to five reviews of Bourgeois equality in a symposium in EJPE observes that all the reviewers admit the great force of ideas in causing the Great Enrichment. Materialism is dead. Liberalism reigns.

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ABSTRACTIt is contended that British Idealists, New Liberals and Liberal Imperialists were all in favour of imperialism, especially when it took the form of white settler communities. The concession of relative autonomy was an acknowledgement of the potential of white settler communities to go the way of America by severing their relationship with the Empire completely. Where significant differences emerge in their thinking is in relation to non-white territories in the Empire where native peoples comprised the majority, and the British (...) Government and its agents administered in trust ‘lower’ peoples on the scale of civilisation with the ostensible goal of guiding them towards self-determination in the Empire. The differences in degree of commitment to these ideals were largely expressed in terms of the pejorative categories of ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ imperialism, which were flexible and manipulated for political gain, rather than analytic precision. Liberal Imperialists and New Liberals were opposed to each other in terms of the degree to which they supported imperialism, whereas British Idealists aligned themselves on both sides of the divide. (shrink)

This article focuses on the following three novel and original philosophical approaches to classical liberalism: Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s perfectionist argument from meta-norms, Gaus’s justificatory model, and Kukathas’s conscience-based theory of authority. None of these three approaches are utilitarian or consequentialist in character. Neither do they appeal to the notion of a rational bargain as it is typical within contractarianism. Furthermore, each of these theory rejects the idea that classical liberalism should be grounded on considerations of interpersonal justice (...) such as those that are central to the Lockean tradition. It is argued that these three theories, despite their many attractive features, fail to articulate in a convincing manner some central classical liberal concerns. (shrink)

John Gray argues that the modern conception of man is common for all variants of the liberal tradition. The version of liberalism which is defended in this paper cannot be called ‘classical’ because it refuses the conception in question (it refuses such elements of it as, for example, claims of universality, idea of neutral Reason, idea of human nature). That is why the best label which can be given to it is ‘postmodern’ or ‘communitarian’ liberalism. Moreover, postmodern (...) class='Hi'>liberalism does not express any reluctance toward community as such. It only requires a community which respects the rights of individuals to autonomous, moral and comprehensive choices. In this sense one can say that postmodern liberalism renounces anti-social biases while remaining faithful to individualism, which - starting with the social and the common - arrives at the truly individual. In this way it can revitalize the sense and meaning of humanism understood as the idea of life of human beings who can create their own lives independently and freely in the political and social milieu, promoting justice and solidarity. (shrink)

Editor’s AbstractIn this essay (adapted from a lecture), Huang Yushun rejects what he calls the trend toward “New Confucian Religion” (xin rujiao), emphasizing the ways that Confucianism as a secular, lived philosophy must develop in the modern world. Echoing Li Minghui's claim that Confucianism and liberalism are compatible, Huang advocates “Confucian liberalism” (rujia ziyouzhuyi) and criticizes many themes central to earlier essays in this volume.

This article explores the extent to which the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 coheres with the normative precepts of liberalism as an international political theory. Beginning with a Lockean liberal theory of the state, this article first examines the evolution of international liberalism in order to identify the fundamental normative postulates of liberal theory as it pertains to international relations, especially regarding the use of military force. The article then advances two interrelated arguments: First, that the underpinnings (...) of the decision to invade Iraq embodied in the Bush Doctrine draw heavily from the liberal tradition, though still depart from it in important ways. Second, that the Bush Doctrine as manifested in the Iraq war reflects in many ways the liberal thinking that prevailed during the interwar years and is therefore susceptible to a similar charge of ‘utopianism’ that was leveled against interwar liberalism by E. H. Carr in his Twenty Years' Crisis. (shrink)

In this collection, thirteen prominent philosophers and political scientists address the nature of liberalism, its origins, and its meaning and proper interpretation. Some essays examine the writings of liberalism's earliest defenders, like John Locke and Adam Smith, or the influence of classical liberalism on the American founders. Some focus on the Progressive movement and the rise of the administrative state, while others defend particular conceptions of liberalism or examine liberal theories of justice, including those of John (...) Rawls and Robert Nozick. Several essays discuss the U.S. Constitution, seeking to determine whether it is best viewed as empowering the federal government to achieve certain ends, or as strictly limiting its power to ensure the broadest freedom for individuals to pursue their own ends. Other essays address the limits of economic freedom or focus on the nature and extent of property rights and the government's power of eminent domain. (shrink)

The debates between liberalism and the New Left, which broke out in the middle of the 1990s, are a phenomenon rarely seen among mainland Chinese intellectuals since 1949. They are large-scale, spontaneous debates without official manipulation or ideological constraint. The debates involve Chinese scholars on the mainland and overseas, and have drawn the attention of Hong Kong and Taiwan intellectuals. Several collective papers on the debates have been published, and other selected papers are in the process of being compiled (...) and published. The debates are continuing. As an active participant in the debates and as a researcher in the history of Chinese thought in the 1980s and 1990s, I would like to summarize the main issues of the debates and to analyze why liberalism and the New Left emerged in the 1990s. (shrink)

The two reforms that most contributed to the idea of an antipodean social laboratory at the end of the 19th century were the old age pension and state arbitration of the minimum wage. Both are said to reflect the influence of the new liberalism, buttressed by the emergence of the labour movement into politics. This paper argues that debates on the old age pension at the turn of the 19th century illustrate a more tangled set of liberal trajectories than (...) either a narrative of a unified Deakinite consensus, or of a new liberal importation, would allow. While there was clearly some new liberal influence in how New South Wales debated the pension, in Victoria an older tradition of colonial liberalism — which emphasized self-governance as much as social reform — meant that it was seen as much as a reward for good moral character as a measure to deal with poverty. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 6, September 2019, Page 679-680.

In this paper, we offer a Leftist critique of standard liberal defenses of the public school. We suggest that the standard arguments employed by mainstream liberal defenders of the public school are generally inadequate because they fail to provide a credible representation of their historical object, let alone effective remedies to our current problems. Indeed, many of these narratives, in our view, are grounded in fantasies about what public schools, or teaching and learning, are or could be, as much as (...) they are grounded in the historical realities of public schools or the realities of so-called privatization. We speculate whether the self identification of the proponents of this cause as ‘progressive’ is not part of this ideological construction and if the underlying political agenda is not in fact more conservative. (shrink)

"Liberalism" is widely used to describe a variety of social and political ideas, but has been an especially difficult concept for historians and political scientists to define. Burckhardt, Mill, and Tocqueville define one type of liberal thought. They share an aristocratic liberalism marked by distaste for the masses and the middle class, opposition to the commercial spirit, fear and contempt of mediocrity, and suspicion of the centralized state. Their fears are combined with an elevated ideal of human personality, (...) an ideal which affirms modernity. All see their ideals threatened in the immediate future, and all hope to save European civilization from barbarism and militarism through some form of education, although all grow more pessimistic towards the end of their lives. Aristocratic Liberalism ignores the national boundaries that so often confine the history of political thought, and uses the perspective thus gained to establish a pan-European type of political thought. Going beyond Burckhardt, Mill, and Tocqueville, Aristocratic Liberalism argues for new ways of looking at nineteenth-century liberalism. It corrects many prevalent misconceptions about liberalism, and suggests new paths for arriving at a better understanding of the leading form of nineteenth-century political thought. The new Afterword by the author presents a novel description of liberal political language as the "discourse of capacity," and suggests that this kind of language is the common denominator of all forms of European liberalism in the nineteenth century. Aristocratic Liberalism will be valuable to students of history, political science, sociology, and political philosophy. (shrink)

Liberalism without Perfection offers an introduction to the debate between liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. This book is a new account and defence of Rawlsian political liberalism, one of the most discussed, but widely misunderstood and criticized theories in contemporary political theory.

Liberalism in Russia is one of the most complex, multifaced and, indeed, controversial phenomena in the history of political thought. Values and practices traditionally associated with Western liberalism—such as individual freedom, property rights, or the rule of law—have often emerged ambiguously in the Russian historical experience through different dimensions and combinations. Economic and political liberalism have often appeared disjointed, and liberal projects have been shaped by local circumstances, evolved in response to secular challenges and developed within often (...) rapidly-changing institutional and international settings. This third volume of the Reset DOC “Russia Workshop” collects a selection of the Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism conference proceedings, providing a broad set of insights into the Russian liberal experience through a dialogue between past and present, and intellectual and empirical contextualization, involving historians, jurists, political scientists and theorists. The first part focuses on the Imperial period, analyzing the political philosophy and peculiarities of pre-revolutionary Russian liberalism, its relations with the rule of law, and its institutionalization within the Constitutional Democratic Party. The second part focuses on Soviet times, when liberal undercurrents emerged under the surface of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. After Stalin’s death, the “thaw intelligentsia” of Soviet dissidents and human rights defenders represented a new liberal dimension in late Soviet history, while the reforms of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” became a substitute for liberalism in the final decade of the USSR. The third part focuses on the “time of troubles” under the Yeltsin presidency, and assesses the impact of liberal values and ethics, the bureaucratic difficulties in adapting to change, and the paradoxes of liberal reforms during the transition to post-Soviet Russia. Despite Russian liberals having begun to draw lessons from previous failures, their project was severely challenged by the rise of Vladimir Putin. Hence, the fourth part focuses on the 2000s, when the liberal alternative in Russian politics confronted the ascendance of Putin, surviving in parts of Russian culture and in the mindset of technocrats and “system liberals”. Today, however, the Russian liberal project faces the limits of reform cycles of public administration, suffers from a lack of federalist attitude in politics and is externally challenged from an illiberal world order. All this asks us to consider: what is the likelihood of a “reboot” of Russian liberalism? (shrink)

In recent years the concepts of individual autonomy and political liberalism have been the subjects of intense debate, but these discussions have occurred largely within separate academic disciplines. Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism contains essays devoted to foundational questions regarding both the notion of the autonomous self and the nature and justification of liberalism. Written by leading figures in moral, legal and political theory, the volume covers inter alia the following topics: the nature of the self (...) and its relation to autonomy, the social dimensions of autonomy and the political dynamics of respect and recognition, and the concept of autonomy underlying the principles of liberalism. (shrink)

The fraught ideological relationship between liberalism and imperialism has been theorized primarily through the British, French, and American empires. This article moves beyond the experiences of these “great powers” by turning to Spain and its preeminent twentieth-century liberal thinker, José Ortega y Gasset. Unlike his British, French, and American counterparts, Ortega articulated liberalism not to promote or defend the forging of empire but rather to cope with the disorienting effects of its unequivocal loss in the wake of the (...) Spanish–American War. The experience of imperial loss, I argue, informed Ortega’s call for a “new liberalism” that could enable Spain’s national and cultural renewal. Reading Ortega’s thought in this context thus reveals the lasting impact that imperial dispossession can have upon certain strands of liberalism. It also suggests that, in order to fully capture the relationship between liberalism and empire, it is necessary to incorporate a wider range of historical sources and imperial trajectories. (shrink)

In her book, Socially Undocumented: Identity and Immigration Justice, Amy Reed-Sandoval discloses and criticizes a kind of oppression that is uniquely suffered by a group she identifies as "socially undocumented." The problem with her account is not with the identification of this group nor in her conclusions or recommendations, but in taking an overly constrained version of liberalism as her starting point. This non-radical version of liberalism does not have the necessary resources to properly recognize as unjust the (...) kind of oppression that Reed-Sandoval is most concerned with. I therefore argue in this essay that in order to properly recognize this kind of oppression as unjust, one must either subscribe to a “Goldilocks” version of liberalism or rely on a political theory that gets beyond liberalism. (shrink)

Political liberalism’s central commitments to recognizing reasonable pluralism and institutionalizing a substantive conception of justice are inconsistent. If reasonable pluralism applies to conceptions of justice as it applies to conceptions of the good, then some reasonable people will reject even many liberal conceptions of justice as unreasonable. If so, then imposing these conceptions of justice on citizens violates the liberal principle of legitimacy and related public justification requirements. This problem of justice pluralism requires that political liberals abandon their commitment (...) to institutionalizing a substantive conception of justice. Instead, political justification should be limited to the public justification of a modest scheme of rights and a set of constitutional rules. Justice pluralism chastens the ambitions of political liberalism while pushing the political liberal research program in new and promising directions. (shrink)

While Okin's feminist appropriation of Rawls's theory of justice requires that principles of justice be applied directly to the family, Rawls seems to require only that the family be minimally just. Rawls's recent proposal dulls the critical edge of liberalism by capitulating too much to those holding sexist doctrines. Okin's proposal, however, is insufficiently flexible. An alternative account of the relation of the political and the nonpolitical is offered by Jürgen Habermas.

A radical new interpretation of liberalism, viewing it not merely as a political philosophy or set of political precepts, but as a personal orientation and way of living.