La possibilité d’une définition naturaliste de la santé et d’une distinction entre le normal et le pathologique qui ne repose pas sur des normes culturelles, sociales ou subjectives est au cœur des débats en philosophie de la médecine. Or le concept statistique de la normalité, fondamental pour une définition objective de la santé, soulève d’importantes difficultés. Christopher Boorse défend une « théorie bio-statistique » qui, en articulant ce concept à une notion non normative de fonction biologique, résoudrait ces difficultés. L’identification (...) de la santé et de la normalité au sens statistique demeure toutefois centrale dans sa définition. Après avoir précisé le rôle que joue la normalité statistique dans la BST, nous dégageons, à partir de l’épidémiologie contemporaine, un certain nombre de problèmes et questions que cette définition naturaliste soulève.The liability for a naturalist definition of health and for a value-free distinction between the normal and the pathological is at the core of discussions on health and disease in philosophy of medicine. But the statistical concept of normality, a central one for any objective definition of health, raises numerous problems. Christopher Boorse argues for a « biostatistical theory » which aims at solving these difficulties by articulating a statistical concept of normality and a non-normative concept of biological function. However the BST is still based on identifying normality and health with the most frequent. After analyzing in details the true role of statistical normality in BST, I will show how results and data from modern epidemiology can be mobilized to reveal several limits and difficulties with respect to this naturalist definition of health and disease. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is a specific form of cosmogony—the conception of cosmogonic objectivation, interpreted as a tragedy or cosmogonic fall. This conception is examined on the basis of the evidence furnished by two sets of materials: firstly, the original texts and paraphrases of the Valentinian Gnostics of the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD, and secondly, the writings of the Russian philosophers Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Karsavin and Nikolay Berdyaev. The research reveals a series of specific features common to (...) both of these: in particular, the conception of cosmogonic objectivation appears to be connected with the doctrine of the absolute person’s fall, and with the motive of self-alienation. (shrink)

Discussion de la phénoménologie de la religion, et notamment certaines propositions de Heidegger ou Falque.

The problem of inferiority, of subjectivity, of conscience, is not only a metaphysical or psychological problem; it is susceptible to objective scientific study at the neurophysiological level. This study must not stop, however, at an analysis of cerebral function but must also recognize that conscience results from the self-being of the individual at himself in certain structures of his brain and that a cerebral process is or is not conscious according to whether or not it is integrated into the structure (...) of the whole. This is best developed in man by virtue of the cerebral complexity which makes possible the verbalization of one self. The spiritual always appears as a functional, nonlocalizable aspect of the whole of the aggregate individual. (shrink)

Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the content of (...) inner awareness is not relevant to the content of the thematic process at the core of the act. However, Gurwitsch assigns an essential function to inner awareness by virtue of its content; namely, it helps to constitute the respective objectivating act as a unitary phenomenon over time. Perhaps, therefore, theoretically relegating inner awareness to the margin of an objectivating act amounts merely to an effort to allow for straightforward objectivation without falling into inconsistency. That is, some objectivating acts seem not to include inner awareness and, presumably, this would be explained by reference to intrinsic inner awareness that is no more than concomitant, as opposed to its being interwoven with outer awareness taking place in the central area of an objectivating act. (shrink)

La recherche actuelle cherche à démontrer qu'il existe une sociologie chez Foucault et l'oeuvre foucaldienne est aussi une oeuvre sociologique. L'oeuvre de Foucault offre plusieurs avantages conceptuels à la pensée sociologique et sa pensée peut être entendue comme une expérience qui nous conduira aussi à une pratique autoréflexive de la sociologie. Mais ce qui rapproche le plus Foucault des sociologues, c'est toujours sa tentative de comprendre le sujet à travers un social qui est devenu historique et cette Histoire nous revient (...) à chaque fois en tant que forme culturelle. La question centrale de Foucault est ce social qui occupe une place considérable dans la constitution de l'individu, pourtant l'individu n'est jamais complètement contraint. Les grandes lignes de la pensée foucaldienne consistent à élaborer une pensée critique, une pensée qui est parvenue finalement à réunir l'objectivation et la subjectivation. La sociologie foucaldienne a pour objectif de mettre en lumière la question "qui sommes-nous en train de devenir?" pour construire un diagnostic sociologique d'une modernité paradoxale. (shrink)

The subject of the present work is noema and its structure in various stages of the objectivating process. Despite its great importance, this issue has never been adequately explained, neither by Husserl nor by his followers. The main objective is to provide the theory that would describe the structure of noema and its function without simplifying the case or appealing to non-phenomenological data. This has been achieved by way of analysis divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of (...) noema. The second section is devoted to analysis of the process of objectivation, i.e., how an active awareness of the object in a logical sense is constituted by a series of passive experiences. The third section refers to a noema as found at different stages of objectivation. It explains how the increasing level of activity, which turns out to be a noetic function, causes changes to the structure of a noema. The last section summarises the results and stresses the advantages of the developed theory in comparison with other interpretations, especially those offered by Drummond, Smith and McIntyre. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 213 Seiten: 91-122.

This article seeks to offer a socially and politically situated analysis of the disenchantment produced by sociological research categorised as critical. It offers a step-by-step comparison of how a study on voluntary work (that produced disenchantment for some, truism for others) was received. It also gives weight to the fact that a research process can also lead to the politicisation of research. The article sheds light on two arguments for the autonomy of engagement that lies at the heart of the (...) critique of a critique: one concerning the autonomy of the actors’ “citizen engagement” and of their relation to work, and the other concerning the autonomy of the researcher’s work and its “commitments”, generally presented as “research neutrality”. This reflexive attention to the effects of the research investigation not only on others but also on the author of the research ultimately questions the social and political scope of the “conception of hostile worlds” inscribed in the “doctrine of separated spheres” of work and commitment that, in the present case, concerns both the object and the practice of research. (shrink)

Author starts from hypothesis that Spinoza has developed ideas that are much wider than «modern project» and foresees concepts that were actualized by philosophy of the end of XXth c. Namely: 1) Spinoza opposes to desomatization of human: in modern philosophy ontological horizon of body was hardly considered. Spinoza takes ontological position of mind-body parallelism. Spinoza becomes «post-modernist» due to thinking and extension being attributes of single substance. 2) Mind-body parallelism is equivocal to contemporary problem of differences, in particular for (...) definition in self-identity through differences. The author shows theses showing Spinoza`s importance: 1) fact of the bode is rationally grounded; 2) body is unique and is not reducible; 3) mind cannot make concept of a human without hers body. Therefore, researches of XXth c. draw on Spinoza`s heritage, being with it in appreciable resonance. (shrink)

Stanford's goal is to explain the uniquely human tendency to externalize or objectify “distinctively moral” demands, norms, and obligations. I maintain that there is no clear phenomenon to explain. Stanford's account of which norms are distinctively moral relies on Turiel's problematic work. Stanford's justification of the claim that we “objectify” moral demands ignores recent studies indicating that often we do not.

Je vais reconstruire quelques aspects de la genèse naturelle de la conscience dans les écrits hégéliens d’Iéna, avec le but de montrer que cette reconstruction est essentielle pour comprendre la genèse des capacités fondamentales qui sont présupposées par l’interaction de la reconnaissance. En particulier, je vais défendre la thèse suivante: Hegel a jeté une base pour une Naturphilosophie de la reconnaissance, en esquissant une sorte d'histoire naturelle de l’évolution de la relation consciente à soi-même, relation qui commence par le soi (...) organique étant doué des capacités communicatives qui lui permettent d’interagir avec l’environnement et avec ses semblables. Avant touts, je vais suivre le fil rouge qui mène de la Differenzschrift aux leçons de philosophie de la nature et de philosophie de l’esprit dispensées par Hegel à Iéna pendant le semestre d’été deu 1803 et le semestre d’hiver du 1803-4 et qui seront le sujet principale de ma reconstruction interprétative. Cette reconstruction s’articule en cinq phases. Dans une première partie, j’aborderai la question de la reconnaissance naturelle a partir du problème de la différentiation et de l’interaction sexuelle. Dans une deuxième partie, je parlerai de la conception hégélienne du soi organique proto-intentionnel et de sa structure proprioceptive et communicative. Dans une troisième partie, j’aborderai le sujet de la structure pratique de la Begierde (de l’appétit) en tant que forme d’intentionnalité pratique et des formes d’interactions conflictuelles proto-recognitives qui surgissent de cette intentionnalité. Dans une quatrième partie je vais m’occuper de la question de la voix animale comme acte expressive expressif qui manifeste l’aspiration par l’être naturel à voir reconnue sa propre individualité.Dans une cinquième partie je vais analyser la forme de reconnaissance qui se manifeste avec la génération du fils et qui constitue la matrice naturelle de la raison en tant que première forme d’objectivation. Après avoir esquissé les aspects défectueuxifs des formes naturelles de la reconnaissance, j’avancerai enfine vais finalement avancer la thèse à laquelle ma reconstruction aboutit : les formes de conscience spirituelle réflexive qui se déploient dans l’esprit présupposent la conscience reconnaissante préréflexive et sont des réorganisations plus complexes de ses structures fondamentales. (shrink)

La Philosophie du Procès est une doctrine dynamique de l’individu. Chaque individu, chaque entité actuelle exprime l’Univers tout entier, mais chaque individu vit et existe en vue de l’expression de soi d’autres individus. L’accomplissement de l’entité actuelle en elle-même est la satisfaction; le mouvement d’objectivation de soi par lequel elle se transcende pour servir à la détermination et à l’accomplissement d’une autre est la décision.

The bone of contention that divides Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons in their 1940–1941 debate is that Schutz acknowledges an ontological break between the commonsense and scientific worlds whereas Parsons only considers it “a matter of refinement.” Schutz’s ontological distancing that disconnects the “world of consociates” where social reality is directly experienced in face-to-face contacts, and the “world of contemporaries” where the Other is experienced in terms of “types” has been crucial to social scientists. Implicated in the break is that (...) all intellectual attempts to understand experiences of Others must be based on the “models” constructed in the “world of contemporaries” (or “predecessors”); hence, epistemologically, to grasp the subjective point of view with a here-and-now understanding is an outright impossibility. Based on a Schutzian perspective, the author suggests that the sociologist must objectivize the Thou-orientations involved in his/her analysis in order that s/he can possibility grasp the subjective point of view in objective terms. (shrink)

This paper takes as its starting point the fact that Bourdieu’s views on sociology as a science have not been sufficiently and adequately understood and discussed. It traces the links between his conception and that of the French tradition of historical epistemology which is critical of positivism. How Bourdieu extends their views, and those of Bachelard especially, beyond the realm of the natural sciences, to the social sciences and sociology in particular, is discussed. In the process he introduces new concepts (...) and methods, such as that of participant objectivation. His perspective reveals a convergence between the natural sciences and the social sciences as human endeavours striving for universal truths. This is reinforced and widened to include the humanities as well as demonstrated by his analysis of the literary field. The paper concludes with the observation that Bourdieu’s post-positivist science is a salutary alternative to the postmodern critique of science. (shrink)

In this paper, we engage with Chinese diasporas research through recourse to Bourdieu’s relational, reflexive sociology. We start with the historical and recent developments of Chinese diasporas research and point out the potential of using Bourdieu to strengthen the theoretical underpinnings of this research. While we see a steady stream of Bourdieu-informed Chinese diasporas studies and acknowledge their contribution and innovation, we observe that some studies use Bourdieu’s capital and/or habitus without field. In response, we draw on Bourdieu’s relationalism to (...) highlight the significance of ‘fielding’ Chinese diasporas research. In addition, we turn field analysis onto Chinese diasporas researcher-selves through Bourdieu’s reflexive tool of participant objectivation. In this vein, we ponder over the positions and position-takings of Chinese diasporas researchers within and beyond the academic field of Chinese diasporas. To conclude the paper, we make a call to shift the intellectual landscape by developing a research agenda to sociologise Chinese diasporas challenged by complex and difficult issues of power, politics, and participation. Our critical sociological approach may have implications for doing scholarship reflexively and relationally in other research fields. (shrink)

Objectivization forces the requirement of a high likelihood that an informant will be right if she is to be classified as a good one, but this does not, argues Craig, equal 1, for that figure has little basis in practical life. Nevertheless, the example of a lottery, and, in particular, the claim that one will not win, brings closer to our real experience the idea that one may not always be advised to act on information that has a chance of (...) less than 1 of being true. A similar push towards this stringent idea is sometimes exerted by the wish to draw inferences from multiple premises and to be able to rely on the result. However, though real situations can require a very high likelihood, they do not force us to set it at 1; that final push comes from reflection lying outside the framework of everyday practice. (shrink)

Introduces the principle of objectivization, which explains how concepts interpreted subjectively in the early stages of the state of nature, concepts that answer to the relatively immediate needs of the isolated individual, become objectivized, i.e. refer to entities that fulfil more universal needs, as the individual both becomes more reflective and finds himself in a social setting. This principle is invoked by Craig in the context of admitting that someone may know without being a good informant, for the fully objectivized (...) concept of knowledge seems not to be identifiable with the concept of a good informant, but he insists that the point and nature of the former is still best understood in terms of the latter. (shrink)

This article uses participant objectivation in sociology and philosophy as two knowledge fields to provide a reflexive comparison of their synced field effect in historical circumstances. Drawing on the philosopher and historian of science Gaston Bachelard, I theorize fielded knowledge as a social relation that combines the prior presence of folk knowledge with a socioanalytic exchange between field and folk that includes positions of either defense, replacement or critique. A comparison of post-Wittgenstein Anglophone philosophy and post-sixties American sociology describes (...) their mutual confrontation with folk psychology as an “epistemological obstacle” that generates a remarkable concern with action as a position-taking on the folk relation. A reflexive objectivation of folk knowledge is therefore necessary for a revised understanding of action that correlates with the distinction of sociology’s knowledge capital and how it fares as an explanatory resource in competitive circumstances. The article concludes by leveraging the synced field effect even further to make a recommendation that sociologists can increase the distinction of their knowledge capital by producing discourse that can recognize, legitimate and officialize experiences that otherwise remain obscure, nameless or impossible within the bounded universe of folk psychology. (shrink)

The ArgumentContemporary natural sciences succeed remarkably well in ensuring a relatively continuous transmission of their cognitively relevant traditions and in creating a widely shared background consensus among their practitioners – hermeneutical ends seemingly achieved without hermeneutical awareness or explicitly acquired hermeneutical skills.It is a historically specific – emerging only in the nineteenth century – cultural organization of the Author-Text-Reader relation which endows them with such an ease of hermeneutical achievements: an institutionally fixed form of textual and intertextual practices, normatively posited (...) ways of adequate reception and criticism, etc. The same organization also explains a number of their often-discussed epistemic and cultural characteristics: their depersonalized objectivity, the social closure of their discourse and their reduced cultural significance, the shallow historical depth of their activated traditions, etc.The cognitive structure and the social function of contemporary natural sciences are intimately interwoven with a set of sui generis cultural relations that are partially fixed in the textual characteristics of their literary objectivations. A comparative hermeneutical analysis of natural sciences as a specifically constituted and institutionalized cultural genre or discourse-type brings into relief those contingent cultural conditions and relations to which some of their fundamental epistemological characteristics are bound, or at least with which they are historically closely associated. (shrink)

The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this ‘status raising’ is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals (...) with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone. Introduction Variables, propositions, time Induction first Causation Redundant causation Objectivization. (shrink)

In this essay, I address the question of whether the indisputable progress being made by the neurosciences poses a genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency. I begin by situating free will as an ineliminable component of our practices of attributing responsibility and holding one another accountable, illustrating this via a discussion of legal discourse regarding the attribution of responsibility for criminal acts. I then turn to the practical limits on agents' scientific self-objectivation, limits that turn out (...) to be mirrored philosophically in the conceptual problems that plague reductionist strategies. Having shown that free will is rooted in unavoidable performative presuppositions belonging to agents' participant perspective, I then take up the difficult issue of how to reconcile an epistemic dualism of participant and observer perspectives with the assumption of ontological monism. I critically review a range of proposed physicalist solutions, including non-reductionist and (standard) compatibilist approaches. An underlying problem with scientistic, physicalist approaches is the methodological fiction of an exclusive ?view from nowhere? which relies on the problematic move of disengaging the objectivating perspective of the scientific observer from the investigators' participant perspective of those engaged in scientific practice. Since there is no way of getting around the requisite complementarity of both the observer's encounter with the objective world and the participant's involvement in shared lifeworld practices, the remaining option is to take an epistemological turn. But even the recognition that science is ultimately constituted from within the lifeworld still leaves us with the question as to how the human mind can understand itself as the product of natural evolution. I conclude with some tentative suggestions as to how this difficult question might be addressed. (shrink)

La responsabilité du fait d’autrui a fait l’objet de mutations successives tout au long du xx e siècle, soit que les régimes légaux aient été adaptés et façonnés afin de garantir une réparation automatique de leurs dommages aux victimes, soit que le juge ait fait usage de son pouvoir créateur pour inventer de nouveaux régimes de responsabilité pour répondre aux évolutions sociales et aux nouveaux enjeux indemnitaires. Si la tendance est globalement à l’objectivation de la responsabilité du fait d’autrui, (...) des incohérences sont apparues qui s’expliquent par le mode de création du droit jurisprudentiel, par petites touches, au gré des besoins exprimés dans les prétoires. À l’heure de réécrire le code civil, les promoteurs de la réforme promettent de nouvelles métamorphoses. Ils ne se sont pas bornés à importer la jurisprudence mais se sont assignés la mission plus ambitieuse de restituer à la responsabilité du fait d’autrui sa cohérence perdue, tout en garantissant un équilibre entre la responsabilité encourue par le civilement responsable et l’importance de l’autorité exercée sur autrui. Pour servir cet objectif, les projet et proposition de réforme précisent la nature de la responsabilité du fait d’autrui et se prononcent en faveur d’un régime dual de responsabilité du fait d’autrui. Cette étude envisage les conséquences théoriques et pratiques de la réforme à venir et propose des pistes de réflexion pour remédier aux inconvénients qu’elle pourrait induire. (shrink)

The significance of the research topic is found in the analysis of the problem of thinking, one of the most important abilities of man, which today, in combination with knowledge, appears as a means of creating a new world and man. The purpose of the study is to identify the main content load of thinking in the process of its formation and development in the system of various intellectual and cognitive practices, in the culture of communication, which determines its role (...) in the acquisition and transformation of the surrounding reality - natural, social, spiritual. Objectives of the study - to identify the main directions of development of thinking - logical, philosophical, psychological, to reveal the content of the concept of "productive thinking", its development in classical epistemology and post-classical philosophy of science, which show the polymeaningfulness of the phenomenon of thinking. Methodology of the research - analytical-historical, contaminant, rational-heuristic methods are used, which allows to carry out a systematic analysis of thinking, which acquired a variety of forms and means in the history of philosophy and culture; methods of contemporary socio-philosophical and cognitive analysis showed the relationship of theoretical foundations of thinking with practical principles. The result of the study is the conceptualization of the problem of thinking as an effective intellectual, heuristic, cognitive and theoretical tool in the development of knowledge, objectivized in concepts, principles, and laws. The establishment of the role of thinking in the development of scientific knowledge, in the creation of new paradigms of knowledge is also an important aspect. The result of the analysis is the development of scientific-theoretical and methodological approaches in identifying the heuristic, creative essence of thinking, whose influence on the objective and subjective world causes their transformation and the transition to a new quality. Conclusion - the solution of theoretical problems of intellectual and intellectual activity as a factor in the formation and development of philosophy, culture and creative activity of man. (shrink)

The article presents problems of intellectual intuition in metaphysics from a semiotic point of view. There are various types of intuition in philosophy: rational intuition, irrational intuition, and sensual intuition. All of them are immediate ways of cognition. Classical metaphysics uses intellectual intuition as its main method to find out and justify its statements. The main problem of intellectual intuition is an intersubjective approach to the object of metaphysics. The main aim of this paper is the objectivization and rationalization of (...) intellectual intuition in language. The semantic notion of meaning and the pragmatic notion of understanding are the fundamental tools which are used to translate the issue of intuition from the subject-ma$er level into the language level. This operation allows to look at intuition in a non-psychological manner. It enables the objectivization of the method of intellectual intuition in the light of the understanding of meanings. (shrink)

In this contribution, we look – both historically and in the present – at how children are objectified in data and how it is assumed that this objectivation is a way to dismiss ideology, or at least to separate the ideological from the scientific. We argue, however, that the separation of data from ideology is itself a highly ideological choice. As Freire points out: education never was and never can be objective. The objectivation of the child and, more (...) generally, of pedagogy means that the agenda that this serves remains veiled. A closer look at what data are put forward as the means to objectify education reveals that this agenda is deeply individualistic and fit to serve a competitive capitalist society. We argue that if this is the case, it ought to be the result of democratic debate and, therefore, we need more, not less, ideologies in pedagogy, because facts and data are always embedded in ideologies. And so they should be. (shrink)

English summary: The idea of spiritual guidance as a philosophical practice lies at the center of Senecas thought, and can provide us with a new perspective on our own moral conduct, as well as the meaning of philosophy itself. Through a close philological, historical, and philosophical study, Ilsetraut Hadot breathes new life into Senecas work and restores it to its place at the heart of western philosophy. French description: Seneque et la philosophie du present : la distance qui les separe (...) est precisement ce qui nous permet de nous voir nous-memes plus objectivement et de mieux comprendre les insuffisances de nos systemes philosophiques contemporains. L'idee de direction spirituelle en tant que pratique philosophique est au centre de la pensee de Seneque et, dans toute sa specificite, nous ouvre une perspective nouvelle sur notre conduite morale aussi bien que sur le sens de la philosophie elle-meme. Car ce sont paradoxalement Seneque et la tradition de la direction spirituelle qui nous apportent des concepts et des exercices precieux pour decouvrir, dans notre passe philosophique, notre vraie actualite. Ainsi, grace a sa lecture rigoureuse, a la fois philologique, historique et philosophique, Ilsetraut Hadot restitue a la richesse de l'oeuvre de Seneque son role essentiel au coeur de l'histoire de la pensee occidentale. C'est a nous d'utiliser cette lecture pour mettre en pratique l'experience de la philosophie. (shrink)

Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific (...) inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism. (shrink)

Le magicien qui croit à l'efficacité des rituels de pluie n'obéit pas à une autre logique que l'homme de science, explique Durkheim. Les croyances religieuses doivent s'analyser comme le produit de raisons, expliquent Tocqueville et Weber. Les percées scientifiques les plus spectaculaires des sciences sociales sont celles qui ont réussi à déplacer les frontières du rationnel : à démontrer que la croyance ou le comportement qu'un regard superficiel juge spontanément irrationnel s'explique comme l'effet de raisons subjectivement fortes et objectivement fondées. (...) Ce déplacement de l'irrationnel au rationnel est indispensable si l'on veut expliquer les changements dans les croyances, les normes, les valeurs et les institutions qu'on observe dans les sociétés contemporaines. (shrink)

Dans un contexte de crise du systeme capitaliste - une crise qui n'est sans doute qu'une etape de plus dans une fuite en avant qui dure depuis 30 ans, par laquelle ledit systeme tente desesperement de dissimuler la contradiction fondamentale qui l'habite (chercher a maintenir a tout prix la forme de la valeur alors meme que tout la denonce comme une forme fondamentalement depassee, perimee et anachronique de la richesse sociale) - ce livre part de notre impuissance pratique et de (...) l'impossibilite ou nous sommes actuellement de penser un autre monde. Et il rapporte cette impossibilite au fait de la privation de monde (et de la privatisation du monde) comme au fait majeur resultant du dispositif capitaliste. Ce dispositif a fait de nous ce que les philosophes modernes ont pense que nous etions: des sujets separes de l'objectivite, des sujets sans monde, retires du monde, spectateurs desinvoltes d'un monde qui n'est plus le leur. La perte du monde et la separation d'avec l'objectivite sont deux manieres d'exprimer un meme phenomene: celui de l'alienation. Ce dispositif a produit l'illusion du sujet souverain et la realite d'une masse d'individus depossedes de leur puissance. Au coeur de ce diagnostic, on trouvera une relecture de Marx, une tentative de mise en dialogue de Heidegger avec Marx et une confrontation critique avec des representants contemporains (Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault) ou actuels (J. Butler, S. Zizek, A. Honneth) de la critique sociale. La perspective est celle d'une objectivation des sujets qui en fasse des individus sociaux capables d'un usage commun de leur monde. (shrink)

This paper examines the psychology of existential guilt with Martin Heidegger and Rollo May’s conceptualizations as the point of departure. The concept of existential guilt describes preconditions for responsibility and accountability in life choices and the relationship to the potential given in the life of a human. It might also be used as a starting point to examine an individual’s relationship to the potential offered in their life and life context and, in this way, the hitherto unlived life of an (...) individual. The following questions are discussed in contexts of identity development, perfectionism, and current cultural shifts in conceptualizations of selfhood: How can humans relate to the fact that only limited parts of who they might be can ever be actualized? Moreover, how can they relate to the fundamental ambiguity and “groundlessness” in the contexts of life where choices are made? There are striking parallels between the role of exploration in the Eriksonian approaches to healthy identity development and the ontological groundlessness that stands out as a premise for existential guilt. There are also parallels between identity fore-closure and normative identity styles and “falling” into das Man in the existential framework. Perfectionistic ideals easily become an objectivization – and closure – of possible alternatives and choices. In contemporary theories of constructions of selfhood, the dangers of alienation from the community on the one hand and escape into what might become totalitarian collectivism on the other is pointed out. The contextualization of personal responsibility offered through the concept of existential guilt might address both dangers. It provides a perspective on how personal responsibility is embedded in contexts of human relationships, relationships to nature, and the finitude, freedom, uncertainties, and suffering that is given through human existence. Existential guilt can wake sorrow and regret over opportunities overlooked and lost. However, most of all, it can be seen as a drive toward repair in the relationship toward both oneself and the other. It takes the form of receptivity, an openness to a life not yet lived, and creative use of imagination. (shrink)