In The Philosophic Consultant, acclaimed business consultant, philosopher, and author Peter Koestenbaum links deep insights of philosophy with practical business issues. Throughout this one-of-a-kind resource, Koestenbaum shows consultants and human resource practitioners how they can foster philosophical leadership within their organizations to positively affect the business environment. The book promises tangible results-- credibility, trust, and thoughtful attention-- and demonstrates how to apply philosophy, share knowledge with others, and use this newfound thoughtfulness to achieve bottom-line results.

This article aims to introduce the recent movements regarding philosophical practice in Japan. In order to understand them in a better way, the historical development and background of philosophical practice shall be shown briefly in the first part. In the second part, three cases of relatively popular philosophical practices in Japan, that is, philosophy cafe, philosophy for/with children and philosophical consulting in the business settings are described as successful practices.

The EARN Theory of Well-Being includes a practical model for ascertaining and analyzing the well-being of individuals or groups; in its most recent iteration, EARN Theory includes insights from Lang's Network Theory of Well-Being, Revamped, which states that well-being is a matter of instantiating a holistically authentic positive causal network. Both EARN Theory and the Network Theory of Well-Being, Revamped are informed by the science of well-being and guided by a sense of justice. Presented as an inference to the best (...) explanation, the argument for EARN Theory is naturalistic while also inclusive of existential and moral considerations. EARN Theory gives us something to strive for where our well-being is concerned, and it helps us to articulate personal and societal reasons that our well-being gets derailed or diminished at times. EARN Theory has numerous practical applications, including philosophy-based consulting, self-help endeavors, and public policy reform that promotes a renewed notion of justice. (shrink)

Considerable debate has occurred about the proper role of philosophers when offering ethics consultations. Some argue that only physicians or clinical experienced personnel should offer ethics consultations in the clinical setting. Others argue still further that philosophers are ill-equipped to offer such advice, since to do so rests on no social warrant, and violates the abstract and neutral nature of the discipline itself.I argue that philosophers not only can offer such consultations but ought to. To be a bystander when one's (...) discipline does offer insights and methods of value discernment is pusillanimous. But this position requires a view of clinical medical ethics as one that arises out of the clinical practice of medicine, and not just from an application of general ethical principles to the practice of medicine. I conclude with some skills that trained philosophers can bring to the consultation service, and note that all consultations are in the form of recommendations that the patient, family, and physician are still free to accept or reject. Philosophers in the clinical setting do not make decisions. (shrink)

In the realm of Philosophical Practice, there remains a lack of clarity surrounding the essential characteristics that define a practice as “philosophical”. This paper aims to establish seven minimal criteria that must be met by a philosophical consultancy in order to be considered genuinely “philosophical”. Additionally, it explores the question of how one can assess the quality of such a philosophical consultancy. I provide a (non-exhaustive) answer from an Aristotelian point of view, according (...) to which goodness is a matter of balance. In the context of philosophical consultancy, the consultant should find this balance in two respects: first, between their concern for the topic and their concern for the individual seeking counsel, and, secondly, between a hermeneutical and a critical attitude in dialogue. Finally, I present a visual representation of my findings that can serve as a tool for evaluating whether a consultancy is philosophical and whether it is balanced. __ En el ámbito de la práctica filosófica, sigue habiendo una falta de claridad en torno a las características esenciales que definen una práctica como "filosófica". Este artículo pretende establecer siete criterios mínimos que debe cumplir una consultoría filosófica para ser considerada genuinamente "filosófica". Además, explora la cuestión de cómo se puede evaluar la calidad de dicha consultoría filosófica. Aporto una respuesta (no exhaustiva) desde un punto de vista aristotélico, según el cual la bondad es una cuestión de equilibrio. En el contexto de la consultoría filosófica, el consultor debe encontrar este equilibrio en dos aspectos: en primer lugar, entre su preocupación por el tema y su preocupación por el individuo que busca consejo, y, en segundo lugar, entre una actitud hermenéutica y una actitud crítica en el diálogo. Por último, presento una representación visual de mis conclusiones que puede servir de herramienta para evaluar si una consultoría es filosófica y si está equilibrada. (shrink)

This case consultation offers three cases that illustrate a collaborative consultation model for psychiatric ethics that we have developed in outpatient clinic and in emergency psychiatry over the last 10 years. After we present these cases, we discuss three points of interest: 1) the characteristics we found to be important to our collaborative project, 2) the benefits of an integrative approach, and 3) ways that our collaborative moral reasoning developed our awareness of and sensitivity to ethical issues. We end by (...) raising some topics on which commentators could engage.Potter began working with El-Mallakh more than 10 years ago. Her impetus was that she was writing a critique of the criteria used in borderline... (shrink)

Pojem filosofie nabyl v průběhu historie řadu podob a významů. Kromě tradičního teoretického zaměření se lze setkat s přístupem, který vyzdvihuje praktický dopad filosofování na život člověka. Příspěvek představuje koncept filosofické praxe a reflektuje její současný stav na území České republiky. Autoři vymezují filosofickou praxi jako disciplínu filosofie, a načrtávají její možné dělení na dílčí oblasti. Nastíněny jsou její historické kořeny, které autoři identifikují v antickém Řecku. Dále se věnují systematickému představení doposud sepsaných materiálů k filosofické praxi a přehledu její (...) realizace na území České republiky. Detailní pozornost věnují autoři popisu tří jejích oblastí, mezi které patří filosofie pro děti, filosofický workshop a filosofická konzultace. Kromě teoretického vymezení reflektují rovněž své vlastní postupy v uvedených oblastech. Článek čerpá především ze zahraniční odborné literatury, konkrétně z textů a dalších materiálů filosofických praktikantů. Jeho cílem je představit českému čtenáři doposud podrobněji neřešený koncept filosofické praxe a připravit tak pole pro možnou debatu na akademické rovině. -------- The concept of philosophy has had several forms and meanings throughout the history. Besides the traditional theoretical focus, we may also encounter the approach that highlights a practical impact of philosophizing on one’s life. This text introduces the concept of philosophical practice and reflects its current situation in the Czech Republic. Authors characterize philosophical practice as a discipline of philosophy and present its possible division into subsections. They also present its historical roots, which can be found in ancient Greece. Moreover, authors introduce available sources dealing with the philosophical practice and describe how this discipline is actually practiced in the Czech Republic. Detailed attention is given to three of its sections, namely philosophy for children (P4C), philosophical workshop, and philosophical consultation. Authors present theoretical background and also reflect their own methods in these sections. The text draws primarily from scholarly literature from abroad, particularly from the manuscripts and other sources produced by philosophical practitioners. The aim of this text is to introduce the concept of philosophical practice to the Czech reader and prepare the field for further academic discussion. (shrink)

Healthcare ethics consultation is therefore one of the most consequential, institutionally accepted, and widespread forms of public philosophy in the United States. In this chapter, the authors begin with an overview of the development of healthcare ethics and its emergence as a concrete practice embedded in healthcare settings. They then describe the core ethical principles that inform the everyday practice of ethics consultations and the generally accepted steps involved in conducting a consultation. The authors discuss the role of clinical ethicists (...) in medical education and policy development. Finally, they conclude with some remarks on the distinctive contributions made by those with philosophical training to these endeavors and the importance of continued engagement by philosophers in this important public work. (shrink)

The problem of ethical consultations in the clinical setting should be reasonable, but it cannot be reduced to reason and philosophical theory alone. I will argue that emotions are constitutively and discursively relevant features of the evaluative experience of persons. Ethical consultations should include emotions. Emotions like shame and guilt are complex and learned reactions of persons, which form one basis of ethical reflection. I argue that ethical consultation can rely neither on a strict theory or method nor on (...) a philosophical theory that is external to the situational triggers of consultations in the clinical setting. Emotions are one essential trigger of the need for ethical consultations. I will show that methodologically consultation depends on understanding the evaluative experiences of persons who cooperate in the clinical setting. Moreover, such evaluative experiences includes emotive reactions as well as reason. My conclusion is that ethical consultation in the clinical setting needs a conceptual understanding of epistemic, justificatory and methodological inclusiveness. This circumstance can be summarized: ethical consultations need the ongoing development of a moral hermeneutics of clinical consultation. (shrink)

The French bioethics laws of 1994 contain the principles of the anonymity and non commodification of all donations of body parts and products including gametes in medically assisted reproduction. The two revisions of the law, in 2004 and 2011 have upheld the rule. In view of the latest revision process, the French government organized a large public consultation in 2009. Within the event a “consensus conference” was held in Rennes about different aspects of assisted reproduction. In what follows we shall (...) first describe the anonymity clause for gamete donations in the French law and the debates surrounding it. We shall then analyse the procedure used for the 2009 public consultation and the related consensus conference, as well as its upshot concerning the anonymity doctrine. In this respect we shall compare the citizens’ own recommendations on the gamete anonymity issue and its translation in the consultation’s final report drafted by a philosopher mandated by the organizing committee. Whereas the final report cited some fundamental ethical arguments as reason for upholding the provisions of the law—most notably the refusal of the ‘all biological’ approach to reproductive issues—citizens were more careful and tentative in their position although they also concluded that for pragmatic reasons the anonymity rule should continue to hold. We shall argue that the conservative upshot of the public consultation is due to some main underlying presuppositions concerning the citizens’ role and expertise as well as to the specific design of the consensus conference. Our conclusion will be that public consultations and consensus conferences can only serve as an empirical support for devising suitable bioethics norms by using second-order normative assumptions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics ConsultationPat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)(John La Puma, M.D., from the Department of Medicine at Lutheran General Hospital in Chicago, contacted the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature and suggested bioethics consultation as a topic for the Scope Note Series. He provided an extensive list of citations about ethics consultations collected by him and by David Schiedermayer, M.D., for their new book Ethics Consultation: A Practical Guide.)In Ethics Consultation in (...) Health Care, editors John Fletcher, Norman Quist, and Albert R. Jonsen (I, 1989) define ethics consultation as "the provision of specialized help in identifying, analyzing, and resolving ethical problems that arise in clinical care. In medical ethics the area of consultation has grown rapidly since 1978 when Edmund D. Pellegrino (II, 1978) noted, "we cannot separate technical-moral decisions from the philosophic principles we use to justify them. Medicine and ethics must be engaged with each other at every level."In 1980 Albert Jonsen raised the question of whether an ethicist could be a consultant and said that the ethicist as consultant is a casuist, one whose moral reasoning is based on a system of reasoning that is applied to particular cases. He describes historical casuistry in Western culture, comparing it to modern moral philosophy, and suggests that a "new casuistry seems timely" for ethics consultation (II, Jonsen 1980). By 1984 ethicist Ruth Purtilo recorded her thoughts following an ethics consultation. She raised questions about the ethicist's place on a hospital staff and how to make that role appropriate and beneficial to all concerned, saying that "the ethicist retreats after the consultation; under no circumstances would the outcome of an ethics consultation be that the ethicist became the primary care giver or assumed ongoing responsibility for the clinical management of a case" (II, Purtilo 1984). Nevertheless, in 1992 two physician-ethicists who had been called as ethics consultants for a patient who had requested that he be removed from his ventilator reported that they became the persons who turned off the ventilator and administered the drugs that eased his dying (II, Edwards and Tolle 1992).In recognition of the growing number of persons identifying themselves as [End Page 433] consultants, the Society for Bioethics Consultation was founded in October 1985 as a professional society of persons engaged in bioethics consultation. It encourages and supports consultation, assists in establishing clinical education programs, and raises funds for consultation education. Although the Society has no permanent office, the president (currently, George Kanoti in the Cleveland Clinic Foundation's Bioethics Department) conducts its work and plans an annual meeting.The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) established new criteria concerning ethics in its 1992 Manual (III, JCAHO 1992) and in a special issue of QRB devoted to ethics consultation (I, Defining Quality 1992). These publications undoubtedly have contributed to the increased use of experts in medical ethics. The Manual notes that all organizations seeking accreditation should have some sort of "mechanism for the consideration of ethical issues arising in the care of patients and to provide education to care givers and patients on ethical issues in health care." A health care institution's eligibility for JCAHO accreditation, which is required for federal reimbursement, requires adherence to this specification (III, JCAHO 1992).The new International Directory of Bioethics Organizations provides an index of 129 different groups that indicated to the authors that they offer bioethics consultations. Of these, 83 are in the United States and 46 are in other countries. The ethics consultants included in the directory encompass a broad group of professionals who will assist patients, families, and primary care medical staff in finding solutions to ethical dilemmas resulting from use of new technologies or new treatments in health care. Consultants often come from the health fields: physicians, nurses, and other health personnel, but other professionals are also active as ethics consultants. Lawyers, pastoral counselors, philosophers, and social workers also offer bioethics consultation services (III, Nolen and Coutts 1993).Drs. Siegler, Pellegrino, and Singer wrote in 1990 that "Physician-ethicists and professional ethicists will continue to work side by side in the future. One is not likely to replace the other, nor is this desirable, because... (shrink)

The philosophical method is critical to ethics consulting. To be truly effective, ethicists need grounding in ethics theory, abstract reasoning and conceptual analysis. A Practical Guide to Clinical Ethics Consulting allows ethicists to understand problems from practitioners' points-of-view, and allows for a genuine appreciation of the working life of practitioners.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Clinical Ethics Consult: Transforming Ambivalence to ActionEve MakoffAs palliative care practitioners, we’re good at diffusing explosive family dynamics and holding space for patients and families in emotional crises. We also help everyone involved with the care of seriously ill patients focus on what is best based on the values of the most important person in the room; the one in the hospital bed. So, when we call for (...) a bioethics consultation from a clinical ethicist, it’s because something has gotten stuck or, perhaps, we could benefit from a reframe—or a new set of eyes to ground the scenario or the emotional miasma that tends to linger and drift when on the cusp between life and death.In the 1990s, at least in my medical school and residency programs, medical ethicists in the hospital were not often a part of direct patient care. They were like philosophers, available to curbside and advise on ethically murky cases but at a distance from the trenches. These wise, generally older men with white beards parceled out all potential ethical sides of the case, leaving us to decide the best way forward. The Socratic Method1 was often employed, so we were left to grapple with the ambiguity that exists in most issues about what’s right or wrong. It sometimes felt frustrating but now I realize the importance of honing the skill of tolerating the feeling of not immediately knowing the best way to proceed in the practice of medicine. As it turned out, by the time I started practicing palliative care in 2013 and began to regularly collaborate with what was then our clinical ethics partners in care, our ethics director Dr. F was also a wise older man with a white beard. But he and the rest of his (non-male, un-bearded) team didn’t have that untouchable ivory tower kind of protection around them. They were accessible. They dug into the hard stuff right alongside us when they were asked to get involved.One time when I consulted ethics on a case, I’d been navigating a switch from practicing internal medicine to palliative care. At the time I was dealing with personal ambivalence—feeling mired in the heaviness that infused my workdays and unsure if I could take it. It turned out that a clinical consultation, and a family meeting with Dr. F, helped in more ways than one.That day, we gathered in the medical intensive care unit conference room. It doubled as a storage closet, so the team, including our patient’s family, dragged in chairs and stools and crowded around the oblong melamine table next to the whiteboard with half-erased arterial blood gas calculations. We hunched together to see where things stood and make some essential decisions.As we do in family meetings, we reconfirmed our roles on the team: ICU fellow, resident, and medical student. Nurses fluttered in and out as their patient care allowed. The patient’s daughter with silver-streaked hair was in attendance, as well as her son, who was slumped in his seat. Both looked sleepless and frazzled. And finally, Dr. F and myself—clinical ethicist and palliative care doctor—gathered. Dr. F then took the lead, announcing our intention to come together and discuss what was best for our patient—their mother. Dr. F then requested a medical update from the ICU team.“Mrs. Lyons is on a ventilator. She’s sedated and medicated for pain. But her organs aren’t doing well. She’s not getting better,” the resident read off of his white paper of scribbles. [End Page 12]Suspended between her life and her death, Mrs. Lyons lay unperturbed but unreachable, and her family was agonizing about what to do. For days our palliative team had discussed the options with the family—we could cut back on the medications and try to wake her up, knowing she’d likely have considerable pain, and to what end? We could reconsider that surgery for her infected bowels, but she’d likely not survive.Or we could let her go—discontinue the ventilator and likely let her die.They could not decide... (shrink)

Nurse Ethicists bring a unique perspective to clinical ethics consultation. This perspective provides an appreciation of ethical tensions that will exist beyond the consult question into the moral space of patient care. These tensions exist even when an ethically preferable plan of action is identified. Ethically appropriate courses of action can still lead to moral dilemmas for others. The nurse ethicist provides a lens well suited to identify and respond to these dilemmas. The nurse–patient relationship is the ethical foundation of (...) nursing practice and this relational ontology is well suited to addressing ethical dilemmas that exist prior to and beyond the initial consult question. This paper will describe one nurse ethicist’s phronetic and pragmatic approach to a clinical ethics consult elucidated through feminist ethics and systems thinking. This paper will describe the theoretical basis for this method, present a case, and describe how this consultation approach provides a rich analysis based around relationships and responsibilities that also highlights the important ethical tensions within the social structure that exists around the patient and continue after the consult question is answered. (shrink)

While making an important point for a strong role of philosophers and philosophical work in bioethics, Blumenthal-Barby and colleagues (2022) fail to mention one of the most pressing tasks in this...

This paper explores the intersections between Elliot D. Cohen’s Logic-Based Therapy and Amy Morin’s "13 Things Mentally Strong Women Don’t Do" (HarperCollins 2019) with a focus on the ways that they shed light on and mutually support each other. With its six-step method (including the identification of Cardinal Fallacies, the refutation of those fallacies, the reinforcement of their corresponding Guiding Virtues, the use of Uplifting Philosophies, and the implementation of plans of action), Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation provides a systematic rational (...) framework for understanding how our interpretation of facts and our opinions/value judgments about those facts interact in order to form habits, i.e., patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behavior, that can lead to a fulfilling or a not-so-fulfilling life. For its part, "13 Things that Mentally Strong Women Don’t Do" 1) helps us understand how these habits specifically affect women, 2) provides uplifting philosophies from a woman’s perspective, and 3) contributes to plans of actions by suggesting practical exercises for implementing these plans, all in order to help us develop those good habits or virtuous patterns of thought, feelings, and behavior that allow us to live our best lives. (shrink)

What is Plato attempting to accomplish in the Laches? A cursory reading leaves one with the strong impression that the main topic of discussion is the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. However, an equally cursory survey of the major interpretations of the Laches reveals that few, if any, scholars agree with that impression. Their view is that the main topic of conversation in the Laches is courage, the examination of which takes place in the second main section (...) of the dialogue. On this view, neither the first half of the dialogue nor the concluding short section is philosophically significant since neither adds to the discussion of courage. What is left obscure on that view is what Plato is doing in these “insignificant” sections. In addition, that view does not help us to understand Plato’s emphasis on education throughout the dialogue. It seems, then, that the initial question has led to a second one: is the Laches a unity both philosophical, and philologically? Both of these questions are inextricably intertwined. The question of the unity of the Laches can be dealt with fully through a consideration of a unifying theme or argument, and the question of the integrating theme can be considered only in the light of the structure of the dialogue. I contend that a unifying thread of argument can be found in the Laches and that the traditional view of the dialogue results in cutting it into two parts having little philosophical or literary relation to each other. I propose, first, to show that the traditional interpretation is untenable, and second, to offer a counterinterpretation which avoids the necessity of regarding the first and concluding parts of the dialogue as philosophically insignificant and which provides a unifying theme. These two goals will be achieved in the following way: it will be shown that the assumption that the main conversation of the Laches is about courage implies the destruction of the unity of the Laches and leaves unclear what Plato is doing in the first half of the dialogue. And, second, a counterinterpretation will be offered showing that the central theme of the dialogue is the educational consultant. It will be shown that this theme unifies the dialogue, makes clear what Plato is doing in otherwise obscure passages, and puts into proper perspective the discussion of courage. We must now consider the traditional interpretation of the Laches. (shrink)

Most businesses in India undergo disproportionate development as their focus is on making more and more profit. They seem to have no concern for the environment, the welfare of their employees or the unethical practices they follow. This has resulted in problems such as an increase in business rivalry, a widening employer–employee gap, a disconnect with environmental concerns as well as a general disinterest in the well-being of the world. The need of the hour therefore is to weave value-based business (...) models for India based on its rich philosophical thought, deep culture and evolved knowledge systems. This paper proposes to meet this need by initiating value-based consultancy based on ancient Indian philosophical thought. It proposes that it should be done with a focus on the human values approach as reflected in the theory of Purusarthas, different dimensions of Yoga and Vedanta philosophy to improve businesses and business practices from a holistic perspective. This philosophical intervention will certainly help businesses to develop more clarity about unethical practices and the ways to control them. (shrink)

This essay examines the strengths and weakness of Newman’s argument in “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine” that the lay faithful throughout history are the guarantors of orthodox doctrine by examining Newman’s understanding of the lay faithful, the sensus and consensus fidelium, and his historiographical methodology.

Models for clinical ethics case consultation often make reference to ‘balancing’ or ‘weighing’ moral considerations, without further detail. In this paper, we investigate balancing in clinical ethics case consultation. We suggest that, while clinical ethics services cannot resolve ongoing deep philosophical debates about the nature of ethical reasoning, clinical ethicists can and should be more systematic and transparent when balancing considerations in case consultations. We conceptualise balancing on a spectrum from intuitive to deliberative, and argue that good balancing in (...) case consultation involves articulating reasons for giving something more or less weight. We develop a framework of four practical strategies for better balancing in clinical ethics case consultation: intuitions as a launchpad, drilling down, pairwise comparison and group deliberation. (shrink)

The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh which had flourished for a few years after 1738 was as good as dead in 1748. Lord Morton, its President, now lived most of the time in London whence he wrote to Sir John Clerk in 1747 that he regarded the Society as ‘annihilated’, apparently thinking that the death of Colin MacLaurin in 1746 and the temporary retirement to the countryside of its other Secretary, Andrew Plummer, had put an end to it. Sir John (...) had hoped to revive it through association with the Royal Society of London, but Morton did not encourage him in this scheme, about which he had ‘great doubts’. The Society needed a mathematician and an experimenter who could carry on the consulting work which MacLaurin had done, but Morton glumly wondered if ‘the new professor of Mathematics [Matthew Stewart] will be as zealous as MacLaurin had been.’ The Society's other officers, Dr John Clerk and Alexander Lind, are not known to have tried to revive the Society. Perhaps they were discouraged by the fact that ten of the members of the Society were dead, and that six more had left the kingdom. At least three others were likely to have been habitually absent from meetings because they lived some distance from Edinburgh. Of the remaining forty-five known members in 1748, nine were over sixty-one years of age with four being between seventy-one and seventy-six. In 1737 the average age of thirty-eight of the founders had been 46.0, but by 1748 it had risen to 53.9 for the thirty-three men for whom it can be calculated. Disruption, death, and age had diminished enthusiasm for the Society and jeopardized its survival. Only two meetings are known to have been held in 1746. Sir John's letter to Morton about affiliation with the Royal Society is the only clear sign of life in 1747. We may well ask why this floundering body survived, to whom and to what it owed its revival? The answers to these questions tell us something about the intellectual needs and interests of the Edinburgh intelligentsia of the mid-eighteenth century. (shrink)

The essay by Potter and El-Mallakh proposes "on the ground" consultations in psychiatric ethics as a novel style of bioethics deliberation. The continual dialogue between a moral philosopher and clinician creates the opportunity for informal real-time ethical thinking as cases unfold, instead of formal ethics committee reviews and instead of the artificially simple scenarios found in much bioethics literature. The essay has important practical implications for ethics pedagogy during psychiatric training and in mental health settings more generally. It also has (...) important theoretical implications for the cross-talk between... (shrink)

Un Canguilhem philosophe à part entière revient aujourd'hui sur le devant de la scène grâce, d'une part, à l'édition des Œuvres complètes reprenant l'ensemble des textes publiés par l'auteur de son vivant et, de l'autre, à la constitution du Fonds Canguilhem qui a mis à disposition pour consultation l'ensemble de ses écrits inédits. Considérée dans son ensemble, l'œuvre de cet étrange philosophe apparaît comme une extraordinaire méditation sur le problème de la création et de l'erreur à l'ère des sciences de (...) la vie ; une méditation au cours de laquelle on voit la tradition philosophique elle-même, notamment celle de l'idéalisme, s'ouvrir aux problèmes posés par la biologie et s'engager dans la voie d'une « pensée du vivant ». Commencée au contact de l'esthétique d'Alain comme une méditation sur l'erreur en tant qu'acte créateur, la réflexion de Canguilhem s'ouvre, de façon à la fois cohérente et inattendue, sur la révolution darwinienne et retrouve dans l'initiative même du vivant la puissance créatrice du sujet et de l'erreur. (shrink)

Philosophical practice, an art of living rooted in ancient traditions, is enriched by modern techniques such as individual counseling, Socratic group dialogues, and organizational consulting. Philosophical counseling, a key aspect of this practice, employs traditional philosophical frameworks and rational reasoning to address clients' concerns, distinguishing itself from psychotherapy while respecting individual autonomy. The growing Western interest in Asian philosophies also underscores a shared pursuit of wisdom, spirituality, and meaning. This paper examines the development, key features, and leading (...) proponents of philosophical practice, its relationship with academic philosophy, and the tensions between their differing aims and methods. The outlook for philosophical counseling is promising, offering an alternative to medical approaches for existential issues and expanding its scope to personal guidance, conflict resolution, and life‐skill development. Its future trajectory hinges on societal trends toward secularization, the de‐medicalization of mental health, and the increasing recognition of philosophy's intrinsic practical value. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche was immensely influential and, counter to most expectations, also very well read. An essential new reference tool for those interested in his thinking, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context identifies the chronology and huge range of philosophical books that engaged him. Rigorously examining the scope of this reading, Thomas H. Brobjer consulted over two thousand volumes in Nietzsche’s personal library, as well as his book bills, library records, journals, letters, and publications. This meticulous investigation also considers many of the (...) annotations in his books. In arguing that Nietzsche’s reading often constituted the starting point for, or counterpoint to, much of his own thinking and writing, Brobjer’s study provides scholars with fresh insight into how Nietzsche worked and thought; to which questions and thinkers he responded; and by which of them he was influenced. The result is a new and much more contextual understanding of Nietzsche's life and thinking. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) are not moral authorities. Standardization of CECs’ professional role does not confer upon them moral authority. Certification of particular CECs does not confer upon them moral authority (nor does it reflect such authority). Or, so we will argue. This article offers a distinctly Orthodox Christian response to those who claim that CECs—or any other academically trained bioethicist—retain moral authority (i.e., an authority to know and recommend the right course of action). This article proceeds in three parts. (...) First, we discuss recent movements toward the certification of CECs in the United States, focusing primarily on proposals and programs put forth by the American Society for Humanities and Bioethics (ASBH). Second, we outline two secular reasons to be concerned about the relevant trends toward certification. For one thing, certification is currently being advanced via political dominance, rather than gaining authority by reliance on rigorous philosophical argument or reason. For another, the trends operate on the assumption that there exists a secular, content-full, canonical, morality. There is no such morality. Next, we argue that Orthodox Christians should resist the current trends toward certification of CECs. Specifically, we unpack ways in which the ASBH’s certification program (and those like it) conflict with Orthodox claims about moral authority and the moral life more generally. We conclude that Orthodox Christians should resist the current certification trends. (shrink)

This commentary shows how philosophical counseling offers an alternative way for consultants to facilitate "closure" in bioethical disputes.

Can’tstipation, or capacity disavowal, is a key topic and issue in Logic-Based Therapy and Consultancy. It also is a popular issue among clients of general Philosophical Practice. Despite the assumptions regarding the wisdom and detachment of philosophers from common problems, they are not immune from can’tstipation. On the contrary, philosophers develop their specific ways of being can’tstipated. LBT lists seven types of can’tstipation. Throughout this text, I will describe the custom-tailored versions of these seven types in the life (...) of the generic contemporary philosopher. Given that philosophers nowadays are predominately part of the academic world, their can’tstipation will often be connected to the trials and tribulations of academic life. (shrink)

Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship in greater (...) detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy. (shrink)

In a practice like ethics consultation, quality and accountability are intertwined. Critics of ethics consultation have complained that clinical ethics consultants exercise power or influence in patient care without sufficient external oversight. Without oversight or external accountability, ethics consultation is seen as more sophistical than philosophical. Although there has been more discussion of accountability, concern for quality in ethics consultation is arguably more important, because it represents a central challenge for the field, namely, how to structure a responsible practice (...) of ethics consultation. (shrink)

In most children’s hospitals, there are very few ethics consultations, even though there are many ethically complex cases. We hypothesize that the reason for this may be that hospitals develop different mechanisms to address ethical issues and that many of these mechanisms are closer in spirit to the goals of the pioneers of clinical ethics than is the mechanism of a formal ethics consultation. To show how this is true, we first review the history of collaboration between philosophers and physicians (...) about clinical dilemmas. Then, as a case-study, we describe the different venues that have developed at one children’s hospital to address ethical issues. At our hospital, there are nine different venues in which ethical issues are regularly and explicitly addressed. They are ethics committee meetings, Nursing Ethics Forum, ethics Brown Bag workshops, PICU ethics rounds, Grand Rounds, NICU Comprehensive Care Rounds, Palliative Care Team case conferences, multidisciplinary consults in Fetal Health Center, and ethics consultations. In our hospital, ethics consults account for only a tiny percentage of ethics discussions. We suspect that most hospitals have multiple and varied venues for ethics discussions. We hope this case study will stimulate research in other hospitals analyzing the various ways in which ethicists and ethics committees can build an ethical environment in hospitals. Such research might suggest that ethicists need to develop a different set of “core competencies” than the ones that are needed to do ethics consultations. Instead, they should focus on their skills in creating multiple “moral spaces” in which regular and ongoing discussion of ethical issues would take place. A successful ethicist would empower everyone in the hospital to speak up about the values that they believe are central to respectful, collaborative practice and patient care. Such a role is closer to what the first hospital philosophers set out to do than in the role of the typical hospital ethics consultant today. (shrink)

The question I investigate concerns the ethics of clinical ethics consultation. To begin, I reconstruct and critically assess a widespread understanding of clinical medical ethics, one most prominently advanced by Mark Siegler. That examination reveals an overtly political strategy designed to reinforce physician authority. Next, John La Puma's work is discussed. Arguably the most prominent of Siegler's students, and certainly the most prolific, La Puma appears attentive to the problems in Siegler's view regarding clinical judgment. I conclude, however, that La (...) Puma assumes a relatively flexible system of formal rules and more extensive informal codes which define the concepts and procedures of medical consultation and which he simply transcribes for ethics consultation. ;Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have apparently endorsed this medicalized strategy. They contend that the view of ethics advocated by these physicians represents a "new" casuistry consistent if not identical to their own theory. I show that the casuist method of clinical ethical decision making simply appropriates features of the diagnostic apparatus embedded in the political economy of the enterprise of medicine and makes the role of ethicist parasitic on that of the physician as expert. Their casuistry, I argue, merely serves as a means to reinforce the standardized apparatus of professional authority exercised in medical procedures and concepts. ;Finally, I sketch an alternative way to think about how experience with other persons informs ethical decision making. On the basis of an extensive and nuanced account of an ethics consultation, I argue that to consult as a clinical philosopher in any situation is, necessarily, to be focused on that individual situation for its own sake. Clinical philosophy, as a result, must be done by attending strictly to what appears as it appears: the issues, concerns, and questions expressed, in their own terms, by those individuals whose situation it is. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that by discarding the significance of philosophical methods and tools, the picture of field philosophy offered in Socrates Tenured is more akin to public interest consulting than to philosophy.

This paper contends that philosophers should consult the work of intellectual historians, who write on the history of the social formation of philosophy in the U.S., in order to understand our past role in American society and our intellectual niche in the academy. By understanding the history of our field as a social and cultural phenomenon, and not as a set of ideas that transcend their human contexts, we will be in a better position to set a future course for (...) our discipline. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of (...) intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule. (shrink)

This book proposes a review of important Western philosophies and their significance for managers, management academics, and management consultants. It argues that management is an applied philosophical endeavor.

The founder of Psychical Research, though he has not yet received the honour due to him, seems to have been King Croesus of Lydia, who reigned from 560 to 546 B.C. He carried out an interesting experiment, recorded in detail by Herodotus,2 to test the clairvoyant powers of a number of oracles. He sent embassies to seven oracles, six Greek and one Egyptian. They all started on the same day. On the hundredth day each embassy was instructed to ask its (...) oracle, “What is King Croesus, the son of Alyattes, now doing?” The answer was to be written down and brought back. The oracle of Delphi replied as follows, in hexameters, as its custom was: “I know the number of the sands and the measures of the sea. I understand the dumb, and I hear him who does not speak.” Then it went on: “There comes to my mind the smell of a strong-shelled tortoise, which is being cooked along with lamb's flesh in a brazen vessel; brass is spread beneath it, and with brass it is covered.” As a matter of fact, this answer was perfectly correct. Herodotus tells us that “having considered what would be the most difficult thing to discover and to imagine,” Croesus “cut up a tortoise and a lamb, and himself boiled them together in a brazen pot.” What happened afterwards illustrates the difficulties of this sort of investigation, difficulties which still perplex us to this day. Croesus argued, reasonably enough, that if the Delphic priestess had clairvoyant powers, she probably also had the precognitive powers, she probably also had the precognitive powers which she claimed to have. But when he consulted the oracle later about his forthcoming expedition against the Persians, he received two answers, one of which was ambiguous—“When Croesus crosses the Halys he shall destroy a great empire”—and the other correct, but too obscure to be easily interpreted. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Philosophy may be accused of being an exclusive theoretical enterprise. Although it is concerned with the important issues of life it may appear to be a purely academic matter pursued by few educated scholars and therefore somehow detached from everyday way of being of people uneducated in philosophy. In the field of the philosophy of sport, the essential ambition is to provide relevant insights into a vast area of sport that will promote our philosophical understanding and knowledge of (...) the relevant topics. This paper offers another perspective on the role of philosophy in sport. I argue that philosophy is not just about reflecting from an academic distance, but the process of philosophizing could be situated within the sporting practices. This type of relationship between philosophy and sport is already apparent in ancient Greece where philosophers (such as Pythagoras or Socrates) liked to be engaged in physical exercises and to combine them with philosophical discussions with athletes. The article explores a practical role of philosophy in sport, namely the process of philosophical thinking and dialogue with athletes and their coaches. It offers insights into methodology, goals, benefits, and limits of using philosophy in practice. I reflect on my personal experience of being a mental coach and philosophical consultant in sport in the Czech Republic. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the relevance of using philosophy (philosophical practice) in the sporting environment. In doing so, I reflect on the nature and purpose of philosophical thinking and its possible relation to sport psychology and mental coaching. (shrink)

When I was Dickinson Miller's assistant from 1940 to 1942, I soon realized that I had encountered an unusually powerful, acute, and original mind and a writer whose clear but vivid style matched the high quality of his intelligence. These traits were apparent in his comments about eminent philosophers with whom he had associated - particularly William James but also Santayana, Dewey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein - and in the mutual criticism he demanded of his writing and my first efforts. I (...) was pleased and felt immensely privileged to share in his planning of a book devoted to "analysis, the method of philosophy at work" as in his articles on the knowledge-problem, induction, and free will. In view of the penetration of his articles, such a book seemed long overdue as James had insisted even in 1905. When Miller's projected book on "analysis at work" did not appear by 1956, I consulted him about putting together a collection of his published essays. Such a collection seemed but slight homage to one who had made such a striking contribution to American philosophy in rela tion to James and one from whom I had learned so much. He felt, however, that such a collection would be inappropriate and preferred to concentrate on a book, never finished, on "the principles of practical intelligence", the application of intelligence in a "morality of results" for human welfare. (shrink)

This article is a transcript of an interview with David Shaw, the author of the book, “An Ancient Greek Philosophy of Management Consulting: Thinking Differently about its Assumptions, Principles and Practice”, published with Springer in 2022. It discusses his reasons for looking to the ancient Greek philosophers for new ideas about management consulting, and how his papers for this journal have contributed to the development of the book.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Salonnières and the Philosophes in Old Regime France: The Authority of Aesthetic Judgment*Jolanta T. PekaczDuring the eighteenth century a significant shift occurred in the perception of the authority of aesthetic judgment in France, from a group usually referred to as “polite society” and widely considered the exclusive source of taste (goût) to various competing groups arrogating to themselves the right to judge artistic matters. 1 In the present (...) article I discuss the changing recognition of the genders as arbiters of taste, exemplified by Parisian salonnières on the one hand, and the philosophes on the other, during two eighteenth-century quarrels over the French and Italian operas: the Querelle des Bouffons in the 1750s and the controversy between Gluckistes and Piccinistes in the 1770s. I argue that by the end of the 1770s, as a result of the collapse of the old paradigm of “polite society” of which salons were a part, Parisian salon women lost the position (however illusory it might have been) which they enjoyed in the seventeenth century as arbiters of taste. While the philosophes attended feminine salons, [End Page 277] they rejected the idea of consulting salonnières on the matters of taste (and on other matters), as was previously the case, and relegated them to formal, if not merely decorative, roles of guardians of good manners and propriety, the roles accepted by salonnières.The ousting of the salonnière from aesthetic arbitration exemplified by the two operatic quarrels may be viewed as a continuation of the process of exclusion of salon women from discursive development that began in the seventeenth century, as discussed by Erica Harth in Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime (1992) and, most recently, by Joan DeJean in Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (1997). In the seventeenth century the norms of feminine bienséance (decorum, propriety) allowed a woman to establish a salon but made it impossible for a salonnière to create a space intellectually comparable to that of the French Academy. After having lost a gendered competition for intellectual space with the Academy by the 1680s, the salon, as Erica Harth put it, “proved a discursive dead end for women.”In this essay I carry through this argument into the eighteenth century and demonstrate that salon women lost a competition with the philosophes not only in the intellectual but also in the aesthetic sphere. Salonnières did not choose not to make aesthetic judgments out of respect for the exclusive right of the philosophes to make such judgments 2 but rather were silenced by the philosophes and complied in order not to violate the limits of feminine bienséance in the public sphere, that is, to survive as salonnières. The seventeenth-century ideals of feminine bienséance taken over by eighteenth-century salonnières were no longer perceived as sufficient (or legitimate) to recognize women as arbiters of taste. In fact these ideals proved to be as detrimental as a source of authority for salon women in the siècle des lumières as they were ambiguous in the grand siècle.Ironically, not only were the eighteenth-century Parisian salonnières ousted from aesthetic arbitration, but neither did they succeed in their roles as guardians of propriety and good manners for the philosophes, that is, in keeping the Enlightenment discourse civil. In both operatic quarrels the dominant genre of discourse was a pamphlet, a libelle, not a salon conversation. While during the Querelle des Bouffons the philosophes were unanimously pro-Italian, the Gluck-Piccini quarrel caused a deep split among them, followed by fratricidal fighting, which seriously undermined their authority in public matters.I. The negative connotation associated with the epithets pedant, savant, and their derivatives in seventeenth-century French treatises on honnêteté indicates [End Page 278] that the authority of judgment of “persons of quality” in matters of taste resulted from the code of bienséances in social relations. Blaise Pascal probably best summarized arguments for the superiority of an honnête person (as opposed to a professional) in the realm of aesthetics; being an... (shrink)

This text is an innovative exploration of philosophy and madness in the context of the critical engagement of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Included is a play in which, after a mental breakdown, Martin Heidegger undergoes psychoanalytic treatment from Dr. Medard Boss. Boss is essentially caught between two intellectual giants: his patient, Heidegger, who challenges him to evolve beyond traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, and his mentor, Freud, who acts as a “ghostly” consultant in facilitating Heidegger’s return to health. The dialogue (...) of the play consists of actual quotes taken from the major thinkers themselves, which enhances the authenticity of this fictitious production. In addition, the theoretical perspectives of Freud, Heidegger, Boss, and Ludwig Binswanger are included to enhance the readers’ background knowledge. In the process of disclosing these brilliant theorists, this book uncovers what each orientation has to offer the others. (shrink)