The notion of moral exemplarity, though repeatedly alluded to in John Stuart Mill’s writings, is rarely treated as an essential element of his democratic theory. This article, however, highlights and explains the centrality of exemplarity in Mill’s project of fostering public-minded citizens for a successful democracy. In Representative Government, Mill conceives the exemplary influence of deliberative elites as a necessary condition for making local deliberative bodies the main site for the cultivation of a public spirit. Mill’s Romantic reading of (...) Plato’s Gorgias suggests that this move resulted from his radical skepticism about the power of reason to motivate virtuous behavior along with his corresponding faith in the moral exemplar’s aesthetic force of beauty to improve the spectator’s conduct. Mill’s emphasis on the necessity of exemplary influence for achieving a civic ideal based on a detailed account of its moral psychology reveals him to be a unique political thinker who continues to invite contemporary interest. (shrink)

The Logic of Leviathan The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes.

The forms of status quo critique that current approaches to realist political theory enable are unsatisfactory. They either formulate standards of constructive critique, but remain uncritical of a great range of political situations, or they offer means for criticising basically all political situations, but neglect constructive critique. As part of the endeavour to develop a status quo critique that is potentially radical and constructive, realists might consider possibilities to use non-standard social practices – social practices that (...) function differently than stipulated by existing political forms – as resources for critique. The article shows how the capacity of non-standard social practices to serve as resources for critique might be exploited. It also defends the proposed procedure against the likely objection that it relies on moralist argumentation. The evaluation of the status quo and the selection of social practices need normative argumentation, but such argumentation can be grounded in the actual to an extent that safeguards its realist nature. (shrink)

This article explores critiques and reformulations of Habermas’s concept of communicative action as presented by feminist authors. Numerous articles considering communicative action as developed by Habermas from a feminist perspective have been published, but no systematic analysis of these arguments exists. This article aims to fill the gap by providing an examination of various readings of communicative action from a feminist standpoint. If, on one hand, the article collects the dispersed feminist critique of communicative action and offers insight into feminist (...) argumentation, its aim is, on the other hand, to reflect the critique itself. Therefore, attention is devoted both to feminist readings of communicative action, as well as to the potential shortcomings of these readings that are detected by a closer examination of Habermas’s own works. The article’s aim is also to show how feminist critics, in their interpretations and reformulations of communicative action, focus on an explication of the inclusive elements of communicative action. (shrink)

How and why should hope play a key role in a twenty-first century democratic politics? Alan Mittleman offers a philosophical exploration of the theme, contending that a modern construction of hope as an emotion is deficient. He revives the medieval understanding of hope as a virtue, reconstructing this in a contemporary philosophical idiom. In this framework, hope is less a spontaneous reaction than it is a choice against despair; a decision to live with confidence and expectation, based on a rational (...) assessment of possibility and a faith in the underlying goodness of life. In cultures shaped by biblical teaching, hope is thought praiseworthy. Mittleman explores the religious origins of the concept of hope in the Hebrew Scriptures, New Testament, rabbinic literature and Augustine. He traces the roots of both the praise of hope, in Jewish and Christian thought, and the criticism of hope in Greco-Roman thought and in the tradition of philosophical pessimism. Arguing on behalf of a straightened, sober form of hope, he relates hope-as-a-virtue to the tasks of democratic citizenship. Without diminishing the wisdom found in tragedy, a strong argument emerges in favour of hope as a way of taking responsibility for the world. Drawing on insights from scriptural and classical texts, philosophers, and theologians - ancient and modern, Mittleman builds a compelling case for placing hope at the centre of democratic political systems. (shrink)

Introduction: Dead gods, divine kings, and deadly politicians -- The emergence of the lotus-self: personhood and identity -- Dead gods and people's revolts: political theory in religious acts -- The divine king and his five bodies: living history and the logic of interreligious dialogue -- Governance and deadly politicians: history as cultural criticism -- History without force: finding present space and place of time -- Constructing Nigeria's greatness: neglected paths of community, narratives, and care of the soul -- (...) Mythos, virtues, and national transformation: the search for a standard of citizenship moral behavior -- African traditional religion and critical theory: a framework for social ethics. (shrink)

Natural philosophers seem to have good reasons to prefer that the kallipolis, the maximally just community of the Republic, is never realized. If such a community is realized, philosophers are under the obligation of a just demand that they govern. However, a life that contains governance as a significant part is not the happiest life a philosopher can live. The happiest life for a philosopher is one consisting entirely or largely in philosophical contemplation. I confront this puzzle by arguing that (...) natural philosophers gain benefits in the kallipolis that are not available to them in other communities, primarily opportunities for correction and punishment. While other communities may offer philosophers more opportunities for philosophical contemplation, these communities do not provide a reliable mechanism for counteracting potentially dangerous moral blindness. In contrast to other communities, the kallipolis institutionalizes and reliably replicates the structures necessary for counteracting moral blindness. (shrink)

As noções correlatas de senhorio e liberdade foram estudadas na IdadeMédia de forma diferente de hoje. Em inúmerosdocumentos encontra-se a menção de liberdadeda gleba, direito de locomoção, direito de disporda propriedade. Os acadêmicos de fins do séculoXIII e do século XN haverão de volver-se paraeste problema devido à disputa entre o papa e aautoridade civil. Sem dúvida, o que mais aprofundoua questão foi Guilherme de Ockham, ao examinara condição dos fiéis dentro da Igreja.

Citizens, political leaders, and scholars invoke the term 'democracy' to describe present-day states without grasping its roots or prospects in theory or practice. This book clarifies the political discourse about democracy by identifying that its primary focus is human activity, not consent. It points out how democracy is neither self-legitimating nor self-justifying and so requires critical, ethical discourse to address its ongoing problems, such as inequality and exclusion. Wallach pinpoints how democracy has historically depended on notions of (...) goodness to ratify its power. The book analyses pivotal concepts of democratic ethics such as 'virtue', 'representation', 'civil rightness', 'legitimacy', and 'human rights' and looks at them as practical versions of goodness that have adapted democracy to new constellations of power in history. Wallach notes how democratic ethics should never be reduced to power or moral ideals. Historical understanding needs to come first to highlight the potentials and prospects of democratic citizenship. (shrink)