In this pa per the au thor pres ents a crit i cal, philo soph i cal, eth i cal and epistemological vi - sion of ar chi tec ture as a sci en tific and hu man is - tic dis ci pline. In this con text, ar chi tec ture is syn on y mous with i) a sym bolic, con cep tual and aes thetic rep re sen ta t..

In as far as every philosophy appears at a certain point in time it later inevitably becomes a historical fact. If its content is then to be recognizable, if it is to be reclaimed as philosophy in the present, then we ourselves must have a philosophical conception of history and, furthermore, a conception of philosophy's own historicity. Only since Kant has modern metaphysics expressly and methodically developed such a conception within its systematic claim to truth. Moreover, for the presentday (...) philosophy and its relationship to a completed metaphysics such a conception is indispensable - under the presupposition that the history of philosophy is to be taken seriously as philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Hidden Wisdom: Medieval Contemplatives on Self-Knowledge, Reason, Love, Persons, and Immortality by Christina Van DykeAnn W. AstellA Hidden Wisdom: Medieval Contemplatives on Self-Knowledge, Reason, Love, Persons, and Immortality. By Christina Van Dyke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xxv + 228. $41.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-19-886168-3.Building upon Étienne Gilson’s The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard (1940), which identified a systematic structure in the thought of a great contemplative (...) theologian, Jean Leclercq’s paradigm-shifting book, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God (1960), won a place for medieval monastic theology alongside Scholastic theology, broadening the canon for scholars of medieval theology. That theological canon has long since been further broadened to include the books of women mystics.Van Dyke’s book similarly aims to widen the canon of texts studied under the rubric of medieval philosophy to include contemplative writings by women and men, some of whom are also regarded as mystics. This short, wise, and winning book is “perhaps the first book-length reintegration of the medieval contemplative tradition into discussions of medieval philosophy” (208).Van Dyke urges her fellow philosophers to engage seriously with meditative and mystical writings as a corrective of historically false claims: first, that “women didn’t do philosophy in the Middle Ages” (1); second, that mystical and contemplative writings, by definition, lack philosophical/rational content; third, that Scholastic disputations arose purely within the “isolated bubbles” of the universities and did not reflect ongoing societal and ecclesial “conversations that frequently included women” (2). Beyond this corrective [End Page 707] function, Van Dyke argues that the pairing of contemplative with Scholastic texts enriches the study of medieval philosophy through complementation by reinforcing philosophy’s status as a transformative pursuit of wisdom, highlighting its inherent variety as a field, engaging the historical voices of men and women alike in discussions of topics of common interest, and demonstrating the mutual complementarity of the Scholastic and contemplative philosophical traditions, which have distinctive emphases and provide different angles of approach to given questions and topics.What topics? The adjective “hidden” in the title has a double meaning. It gently points to the medieval contemplative tradition as “hidden” to presentday philosophers who, Van Dyke hopes, will discover its philosophical richness. The adjective also pairs with the adjectival noun “contemplatives” in the subtitle, suggesting the interplay in Van Dyke’s vocabulary, which treats “mystic” (a word often glossed as “hidden to the senses”) and “contemplative” as synonyms, but favors the latter as more directly indicative of willed and embodied cognition. In this choice, she draws encouragement both from Bernard McGinn’s broad definition of mysticism (namely, as a contemplative way of preparing one for the direct experience of God’s presence) and from Nicholas Watson’s description of mystical experience as “phenomenological” and “transcendent” (20); she distances herself from the purely psychological interests of William James and the homogenizing views of Evelyn Underhill.In chapter 1, “Mysticism, Methodology, and Epistemic Justice,” Van Dyke takes her fellow philosophers to task for defining “mysticism” narrowly in a way that excludes “embodied, non-unitive states... visions, auditions, and other somatic experiences” (4). This too-narrow definition, she argues, has worked “‘against the recognition of women’s experiences as properly mystical’” (10), excluded meditative practices belonging to the contemplative path practiced by medieval Christians, and effected “the exclusion of philosophers from most of the ongoing interand intradisciplinary conversations about mysticism” (20).The subtitle of Van Dyke’s book conveniently lists five topics—self-knowledge, reason, love, persons, and immortality—that reflect the major themes of chapters 2 through 6. These short chapters each have a similar arrangement, showcasing both the questions common to Scholastics and contemplatives and the differences in their approaches.Chapter 2, “Self-Knowledge” opens with the observation, “The importance of self-knowledge is a truth universally acknowledged in the contemplative philosophical tradition” (33). According to Van Dyke, university-based discussions about the self tend to inquire “about ‘what’ we are and how we come to know this, while contemplative and mystical discussions tend to focus on ‘who’ we are and to emphasize the significance of self... (shrink)

This essay examines some of the arguments in David Deutsch's book The Fabric of Reality , chief among them its case for the so-called many-universe interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), presented as the only physically and logically consistent solution to the QM paradoxes of wave/particle dualism, remote simultaneous interaction, the observer-induced 'collapse of the wave-packet', etc. The hypothesis assumes that all possible outcomes are realized in every such momentary 'collapse', since the observer splits off into so many parallel, coexisting, but (...) epistemically non-interaccessible 'worlds' whose subsequent branchings constitute the lifeline-or experiential world-series- for each of those proliferating centres of consciousness. Although Deutsch concedes that his 'multiverse' theory is counter-intuitive, he none the less takes it to be borne out beyond question by the sheer observational/predictive success of QM and the conceptual dilemmas that supposedly arise with alternative (single-universe) accounts. Moreover, he claims the theory resolves a range of longstanding philosophical problems, notably those of mind/body dualism, the various traditional paradoxes of time, and the freewill/determinism issue. The essay suggests on the contrary, that Deutsch unwittingly transposes into the framework of presentday quantum debate speculative themes from the history of rationalist metaphysics, often with bizarre or philosophically dubious results, and that he rules out at least one promising rival account, namely Bohm's 'hidden variables' theory. It goes on to consider reasons for resistance to that theory among proponents of the 'orthodox' (Copenhagen) doctrine, and for the strong anti-realist, at times even irrationalist bias that has characterized much of this discussion since Bohr's debates with Einstein about quantum non-locality, observer-intervention, and the limits of precise measurement. Finally, the contrast is pointed out between Deutsch's ontologically extravagant use of the many-worlds hypothesis (akin to certain ideas advanced by speculative metaphysicians from Leibniz down) and those realist modes of counterfactual reasoning- e.g. in Kripke and the early Putnam- which deploy similar arguments to very different causal-explanatory ends. (shrink)

A directional trend of floral evolution, due to the selective activity of pollinating insects, birds and bats, is here described and discussed. Six clearly distinguishable levels in the evolution of flower types are correlated with six corresponding stages of sensory development of pollinating insects . This sequence of floral evolution was used for classification of present-day flower types , and for identification of flower imprints in fossilized clays, muds, and fine sands. It was also used as a practical yardstick to (...) determine the relative sensory ability of various groups of pollinating insects to distinguish flower types .This zoophilous trend of floral evolution is directed towards improvement of fine biochemical qualities of higher plants, and in this respect it is comparable to the evolution of cultivated plants of man. In both cases better looking individuals of the most useful species are preserved for further crossings and selections, whereas individuals of poor quality are neglected or rejected. During a roughly estimated 200 million years, the selective activity of pollinating insects has produced a variety of plants with high biochemical qualities. These have served man as progenitors of presentday cultivated plants. By similar reasoning, it took prehistoric man about 4,000 years to develop existing cultivated plants from wild progenitors.Un cours directionnel de l'évolution des fleurs, résultant de l'activité sélective des insectes polliniseurs, oiseaux et chauve-souris est ici décrit et discuté.Six niveaux clairement distincts dans l'évolution des types de fleurs sont associés à six étappes correspondantes dans le développement sensoriel des insectes polliniseurs . Cette séquence dans l'évolution des fleurs a été utilisée pour la classification des types de fleurs actuels , et pour l'identification des empreintes de fleurs sur les argiles, boues et sables fins, fossiles. Elle a été également utilisée comme étalon de référence pour déterminer les capacités sensorielles à distinguer les types de fleurs de divers groupes d'insectes polliniseurs .Ce cours zoophile de l'évolution des fleurs tend à une amélioration des propriétés biochimiques fines des plantes supérieures et, en ce sens, est comparable à l'évolution des plantes cultivées par l'homme. Dans les deux cas, les individus les plus beaux des espèces les plus utiles sont mis à l'abri de nouveaux croisements ou sélections, tandis que les individus de mauvaise qualité sont négligés ou rejetés. Durant une période grossièrement estimée à 200 millions d'années, l'activité sélective des insectes polliniseurs a produit une variété de plantes aux grandes qualités biochimiques et nutritives. Celles-ci ont servi l'homme en tant qu'ancêtres des plantes actuellement cultivées. Par des raisonnements analogues, il a fallu 4000 ans pour que l'homme préhistorique développe les plantes actuellement cultivées à partir de leurs ancêtres sauvages. Avec les méthodes d'élevage modernes, l'homme est à même d'accélérer considérablement l'évolution des plantes cultivées.Die Entwicklung der meisten Angiospermengruppen ist seit der Kreidezeit und wahrscheinlich noch früher vollkommen von der Insektenbestäubung abhängig geworden, während viele Insektengruppen ihre Entwicklung und ihre ganze Existenz den Blütenpflanzen als ihren Nährquellen Verdanken. Diese wechselseitige Zusammenwirkung der Insekten und Pflanzen hat eine gemeinsame Entwicklungsrichtung verursacht, die man neuerdings alsgerichtete Evolution bezeichnet hat. Eine durch die selektive Tätigkeit der pollenübertragenden Insekten, Vögel und Fledermäuse gerichtete Entwicklungsrichtung der Blütentypen ist hier kurz zusammengefasst.Sechs klargelegte Altersstufen in der Blütenevolution entsprechen den sechs Etappen in der Sinnesentwicklung der betreffenden pollenübertragenden Insekten . Diese Stufenfolge wurde für die Klassifikation der gegenwärtigen Blütentypen und auch für die Bestimmung der versteinerten Blütenabdrücke auf Tonerde, Schlammarten, feine Sandsteine und auf andere geologische Ablagerungen angewendet. Mit dieser Stufenfolge wurden ferner noch die Fähigkeitsgrade der anthophilen Insekten näher festgestellt.Die zoophile Richtung der Blütenevolution ist demnach mit der Verbesserung der biochemischen Eigenschaften der höheren Pflanzen derart eng verbunden, dass man diese mit der Züchtungstätigkeit der Menschen vergleichen kann. In beiden Fällen werden die Individuen mit höheren Qualitäten bevorzugt, während weniger auffallende Exemplare vernachlässigt oder abgewiesen werden. Ungefähr nach 200 Millionen Jahren haben die Insekten eine grosse Menge von biochemisch wertvollen höheren Pflanzen geschaffen. Von diesem Material hat der prähistorischer Mensch während ungefähr 4000 Jahre seine Kulturpflanzen ausgewählt und weiter entwickelt. Mit den modernen Züchtungsmethoden wird es aber wohl möglich sein die jetzigen Kulturpflanzen noch bedeutend zu verbessern und das auch innerhalb einer kürzeren Zeitspanne als diese Insekten und der prähistorische. Mensch es vermochten. (shrink)

This paper proposes a series of theoretical considerations on the performing styles used in contemporary theatre, according to the relationship the actor establishes with the audience. If Diderot was the first to question frontal relationship, and asked the performer to ignore the spectator, this programme will only be accomplished one hundred years later, with the emergence of the director. Later on, theoreticians such as Meyerhold, Vakhtangov or Copeau will ask for a partial return to performing facing the audience, as a (...) sign of the return to the theatrical tradition dominated by the exigencies of the stage and not by those of the truth. With Piscator and Brecht theatre rediscovered frontality, as a sign of the wish to engage the auditorium as an active partner of dialogue. The author discusses several avatars that this new frontality acquires in presentday theatre. (shrink)

1. Badly understood words are the main hindrance to the discovery of truth. But they need not be, especially in physical science, where the senses, experience, and geometrical reasoning prevail. Reflection on motion led ancient philosophers into opinions about it so absurd that they are almost forgotten and merit no attention. But even the better presentday scientists, in their treatment of motion, employ language too abstract and of doubtful reference--for example, the attraction of gravity, effort, latent forces, and the (...) like--which make otherwise learned writings unintelligible. Hence this essay. (shrink)

Cette réaction est suscitée par l’article de Laurent Le Maux, récemment publié dans ce Journal. Le Maux affirme que Ludwig von Mises était le défenseur d’un système de réserves fractionnaires et un précurseur des économistes contemporains partisans des réserves fractionnaires. Nous critiquons la manière dont Le Maux utilise la littérature ancienne dans ce domaine, et nous montrons qu’il n’est pas suffisamment au fait des travaux de Mises et des problèmes qui divisent les défenseurs et les opposants du système de réserves (...) fractionnaires. Les écrits de Ludwig von Mises fournissent la preuve accablante qu’il était, et il le disait lui-même, un économiste qui développait l’approche de la Currency School dans le domaine des problèmes bancaires.This paper takes issue with an article by Laurent Le Maux that recently appeared in this journal. Le Maux claims that Ludwig von Mises was an advocate of fractional-reserve banking and a precursor of presentday economists defending fractional reserves. We criticise Le Maux’s treatment of previous literature in the field, and show that he is insufficiently acquainted with Mises’ work and with the problems that divide advocates and opponents of fractional reserves. Ludwig von Mises’ writings provide overwhelming evidence that he was, and saw himself as, an economist who developed the approach of the Currency School toward problems of banking. (shrink)

The bipolar type systems in the sense ofKretschmer, Jaensch, Jung and psychology of form current in presentday psychology are subjected to criticism from the point of view of their practical utility for the diagnosis of human beings, since they are unable to do justice to the complexity of human nature. The author sees two chief problems in the concept of type. According to their function, types are comparable with ultimate forms in which conclusions are drawn from a number of (...) familiar characteristics as to the simultaneous occurrence of the remaining characteristics which are more difficult to apprehend empirically. Their nature places types in close analogy to forms and melodies. Assignment to certain types is not a mere classification, but a heuristic speculation. The response of primitive organisms to complexes of characteristics represents a phylogenetically older form of typological conclusion. Special emphasis is laid upon the intimate relation existing between the typological method of apprehension and the active side of organisms. Brief reference is made to the way in which types can be statistically derived, the apriority problem of the type and the transmission of types by heredity.Les systèmes de types bipolaires usuels dans la psychologie actuelle d'aprèsKretschmer, Jaensch etJung et la psychologie de la structure de formes sont soumis à une critique établie du point de vue de son application pratique au diagnostic humain, car ils ne permettent pas de venir à bout de la nature humaine. L'auteur voit dans la notion des types deux problèmes principaux: d'après leur fonction les types sont comparables à des syllogismes dans lesquelles à l'intérieur d'une série de caractères associés on déduit d'un certain nombre de caractères connus la présence de caractères individuels difficiles à saisir empiriquement. D'après leur nature les types sont en analogie avec les figures et les mélodies. L'ordonnancement des types n'est pas une simple classification mais une entreprise heuristique. La recherche des complexes de caractères dans les organismes primitifs représente une forme phylogénétiquement ancienne de la déduction typologique. La relation étroite entre le mode de conception typologique et la manière d'agir des organismes est particulièrement souligné. La déductibilité statistique, la question d'apriorité des types et leur hérédité sont brièvement effleurées. (shrink)

Is copyright a property right? Common law and civil law jurists have debated that issue for over three centuries. It remains at the heart of battles over copyright’s scope and duration today, even if its import lies principally in the rhetorical force of labeling a right as "property," not in any doctrinal consequence flowing directly from that label. In parallel to their common law and civil law counterparts, presentday rabbinic jurists engage in lively debate about whether Jewish law recognizes (...) copyright as a property right. And, as in secular law but for different reasons, that issue has significant repercussions in Jewish law. As discussed in rabbinic court decisions and writings, whether Jewish law accords authors a right of ownership in their works impacts such issues as whether it is permissible, without license from the author or publisher, to copy and distribute software and sound recordings, perform music in wedding halls, make copies for private and classroom use, and download songs from the Internet. There are numerous, and at times profound, differences in the terminology, form of argument, doctrinal specifics, and overarching legal framework of Jewish and secular law. Nonetheless, the arguments within the Jewish law debate have some intriguing parallels with those of secular copyright law. In fact, one finds the direct, if largely unstated, influence of secular copyright just below the surface in the debate in Jewish law about whether copyright is property. (shrink)

This book by an internationally reputed Indian scientist traces the developments of Science, Religion and Philosophy in human civilization through the ages. The common underlying bond-more specifically, a linkage of philosophy with both science and religion-has been examined incisively. All the three sub-areas of human culture have been presented from a holistic point of view, and at the same time, stressing some of their irreconcilable basic differences in scope and outlook. Meant primarily for general readers, the book achieves a fine (...) balance between basic comcepts, historical evolution and a critical unbiased analysis of rituals, dogmas, unresolved queries and it leads to an enlightened view of 'humanism', 'Nature', 'Unity of man', need for a new paradigm of social and political order transcending globalization and control of resources of weaker nations by supremacy in global power equation. The book reviews the wisdom of the ancient Hindus, Buddhism, Jainism and of the three semitic religions-Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It presents a concise account of the Indian Vedas, Vedangan, Saddarsana, the two epics and the Bhagavadgita, of the philosophy and science of the Greeks, science and technology of ancient Egypt, Babylonia and China. A valuable special feature is a summary of the status of present-day science, starting with the classical phase, and ending with the developments in the last century comprising the Theory of Relativity, quantum physics, genetics, various aspects of human consciousness, modern astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology. Last but not least, the author critically reviews some of the presentday fashionable discourses on 'science as the best way to reach God' and leads the readers to an appraisal of the on-going researches on the unification of the four fundamental interactions of physical sciences. He ends with the inexorable conclusion that this unification, when fully achieved, would still not strictly identify the unique force as 'God as concieved in different religions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Common Sense and Theological 9 9 Exper_,ence on the Bas s o,f Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy NATHAN ROTENSTREICH The position of Franz Rosenzweig's thinking within the framework of presentday philosophy is difficult to ascertain. Though he was deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, his chief work, The Star o] Redemption (Der Stern der Erlgsung, 1921), was conceived outside the main discussions of the philosophical controversy in the twenties. He (...) formulated his ideas side by side with the trends of German philosophy, but not by way of keeping pace with these trends. Yet his polemic against traditional philosophy in general, and against idealism in particular brings Rosenzweig close to the character of the rebellion represented by Existenz-Philosophie. 1 I The question of grounding a philosophical system or a set of philosophical ideas with an objective toward faith clearly poses the difficulty, in terms of the ultimate authority, of maintaining the validity of such a system of ideas. Could that authority be reason, which as a source of ideas and confirmation is outside faith while having consequences or expressions within the scope of faith? Or is faith, asserting the existence of God and his relations to world and man, an independent source? In case faith is an independent source, does it have the guarantee of its validity in its own boundaries, or does it still point to a source of validity which is outside faith and yet is not reason? It seems that Franz Rosenzweig was willy-nilly in his concern with this question. As said before the first approach would have been to construct a system along rational lines. This, however, would have done violence to a basic anti-rationalistic trait in Rosenzweig's thinking that can be clearly discerned in his The Star o] Redemption, in his Kleinere Schri]ten and in his small book, Understanding the Sick and Healthy, published until now in English only. Rosenzweig's criticism of rationalism may be summed up as follows: a) Reason strives for a unified conception of the world; and in support of this monistic fiction its assimilative energy is ready to seize upon all arguments that militate against the doctrines and practices of faith. b) Reason tends to ignore the existence of the individual which it regards as 1On the relation between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger, see Karl LSwith, "M. Heideggerand F. Rosenzweigor Temporality and Eternity," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,III (Sept., 1942),53-77. [353] 354 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY merely one of the variations of an all-inclusive unity. The question of the relation of the particular to the general or of the individual to the whole, which has engrossed philosophers since time immemorial, has no place in rationalistic systems. c) Since reason places the understanding above the things to be understood (and hence also above the data of religious experience, including the existence of God), we find that from a speculative and historical point of view rationalism has a strong bias against religion or theology. The other way open to Rosenzweig was to rely on the principle of Revelation, but he could not adopt this principle as the basis of his system for the following reasons" a) The first reason can be understood from Schelling's paradox: He who adheres to Revelation does not philosophize, and he who philosophizes finds Revelation inadequate for his purposes. Since Rosenzweig was basically a philosopher --despite his protestations to the contrary--he was precluded by that very fact from appealing to the evidence furnished by Revelation. On the contrary, he sought to find a non-rational basis for Revelation itself. b) The second reason that precluded Rosenzweig from taking the traditional course of relying on Revelation is implicit in that principle itself as Rosenzweig understood it. Revelation in his system has no enlightening or cognitive significance, or what is called in Christian theology Kerygma, instructive knowledge. In Revelation, he says, God reveals only revelation; He reveals himself to man and to man alone.2 In his view, then, Revelation does not transmit informative content and hence has no dogmatic significance. It is a dialogue that posits the existence of the participants, the existence of God, and (highly important for... (shrink)

The nineteenth-century pioneer and only expert in Byzantine Studies in the territory of presentday Latvia, the Baltic German classical philologist Eduard Kurtz, was born in Mitau (Mītava, Jelgava) on December 20, 1845 into the family of a local teacher, Johann Heinrich Kurtz and Wilhelmine Auguste (née Jacobi), as the seventh of eleven children.

If a comparison is made between the constitutional principles of 1831 with regard to the working of the parliamentary system and presentday political practice, then it appears that there has been an evolution in which the role of the parties is fundamental. Until about 1850 virtually no party-system existed in Belgium. The monarchy supported by the conservative forces of the nobility, the church and the landowners controlled the system. In the second half of the century there was a simultaneous (...) increase in the influence of parliament and the breakthrough of economic and political liberalism without the parties yet being able to impose the rules. Such rule making did not happen until around the turn of the century when the civil parliament became democratic and the big parties became integrated within it. From then on control over parliament and executive decision-taking came about through the party-structures. The period of crisis preceding the second world war obviously weakened this trend considerably; after 1945 it re-emerged even more strongly. (shrink)