Confucius and Plato live in the so called Axial age and in a social and political situation that presents similarities. Thus, both thinkers, inspired by their passion for virtue and justice and the desire for a better political organization, introduce ways to restore peace, order and harmony. They develop, accordingly, a political and moral theory that aims at combining knowledge and power through ethics. The sage-king and the philosopher-king are, respectively, the capstone of the political system that (...) they introduce. Therefore, both of them propose a pattern of political management, which, as it differs from the old political example, introduces new aspects on governance by placing knowledge, ethics and education as the foundation of governance. However, we observe some fundamental differences between the two thoughts, related to a different perception of the world that is philosophically presented in terms of being/becoming. The main points, in which the Confucian sage-king and the Platonic philosopher-king differ, therefore emerge; in these points we generally distinguish the basic differences between the Greek and the Chinese thought. (shrink)

In the Mengzi there is a hypothetical situation relating how the ancient sage-king Shun 舜 would respond if his father had committed murder. This has recently become a source of debate among Chinese philosophers. Here we will apply arguments made by Johannes de silentio (Kierkegaard's pseudonym) about the “teleological suspension of the ethical” related to the action of the biblical Abraham, and link them up to alternative interpretations of the actions of Shun. This challenges the current and traditional (...) interpretations of his actions, suggesting how this new approach can overcome ethical quandaries related to the Mengzian account of Shun's behavior. (shrink)

이 글은 『상서』의 성왕들에게 나타나는 구체적인 모습으로서의 겸손(謙遜)의 기원 또는 그 계기를 『상서』 내부에서 찾아본다. 이를 위해, 성왕들이 세상을 이해하는 방식을 복선화음(福善禍淫: 착한 사람은 복을 받고 나쁜 사람은 재앙을 받음)의 원리로 규정하고, 이를 ‘확신의 윤리(ethics of confidence)’라고 명명한다. 반면, 성왕들은 덕에 대한 특정한 이해, 왕이라는 정치적 지위와 책무, 자기 행위의 한계성으로 인해 자신의 덕에 대해 확신하지 못하는데, 이를 ‘불확신의 윤리(ethics of uncertainty)’라고 명명한다. 이런 불확신의 윤리는 확신의 윤리에서 비롯될 수 있는 자만과 교만, 그로 인한 방탕과 사치, 태만, 타인에 대한 부정적인 (...) 평가 등 같은 부작용으로부터 성왕들을 보호해주는 최선의 방책이 된다. 따라서, 성왕들은 세상에 대한 확신과 자신에 대한 불확신 사이의 긴장의 마음 상태를 성공적으로 유지하는 자들이라고 하겠다. 그리고 우리가 보통 미덕이라고 부르는 성왕들의 겸손은 바로 불확신의 윤리에서 비롯된 것임을 밝힌다. (shrink)

For some of the world's great thinkers, including Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel, philosophy is a vast system of fixed, capital-T Truth for humankind to discover, explore and comprehend. For others, even among those with philosophies as diverse as William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophy is simply a tool, or a process for ascertaining individual factual truths specific to a given time and place. It is often said that if you ask any ten philosophers to define their subject, you're likely to (...) get ten different answers. Here, presented for non-specialist readers, is an easy-to-understand survey of ideas put forth by 100 important philosophers, from the pre-Socratics of ancient Greece to the analytic philosophers of the present day. Each thinker is summarized in a single illustrated page, or in many instances, in a two-page spread. Each entry includes the philosopher's birth and death dates, titles of major works, major influences, a capsule biographical sketch, and a brief summary of his or her most important ideas. In addition to philosophers in our own Western tradition, readers will find Chinese sages, including Confucius and Lao-tzu, the Indian Buddhist philosopher Ngrjuna, and thinkers representing other cultures. Just a few of the 100 important thinkers represented in this book are: Plato Aristotle Augustine of Hippo Roger Bacon Thomas Aquinas Thomas Hobbes John Locke Rene Descartes Baruch Spinoza Immanuel Kant G.W.F. Hegel Friedrich Nietzsche William James Ludwig Wittgenstein Martin Heidegger Jean-Paul Sartre Alfred Jules Ayer Willard V.O. Quine Thomas Kuhn Donald Davidson and many othersThe text is enhanced with more than 250 illustrations and a glossary of philosophical terms. (shrink)

While the traditional interpretation takes Mengzi 孟子 to be trying to persuade King Xuan 宣 of Qi 齊, I take him to be manipulating King Xuan with insincere flattery. My interpretation has several advantages. On the traditional interpretation, Mengzi is naïve about King Xuan’s motives, and confused about basic aspects of his own views, but my interpretation makes Mengzi into a canny sage with a clear, comprehensive grasp of his doctrines. My interpretation also brings the dialog (...) into harmony with the rest of the book, and with common sense on several points. It thus makes the dialog a more nuanced, coherent, and plausible work. Next, my interpretation shows Mengzi to possess a more complete list of virtues, and a longer list of character improvement strategies than is usually thought. Finally, by attributing to Mengzi a promising strategy for curing rulers prone to rages, lust, and greed, I show that Mengzi’s work fills a pressing contemporary need. (shrink)

The idea of the Confucian sage-king can be politically dangerous if the implication is that anyone can become a sage through learning. But Confucians after the Han dynasty generally saw the task of...

Introducing the sixth and final installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” Allen looks at the symposium retrospectively and concludes that it has mainly concerned “sage knowledge,” defined as foresight into the development of situations. The sagacious knower sees the disposition of things in an early, incipient form and knows how to intervene with nearly effortless and undetectable (quiet) effectiveness. Whatever the circumstance, the sage handles it with finesse, never doing too much but also never leaving (...) anything undone that must be accomplished. Quiet, when it is knowingly and effectively quiet (not pusillanimous or poor in spirit), is about what not to do, how not to approach a problem, what not to decide, what is not known, what will not work. Allen explains these principles in terms of traditional Chinese thought, Daoist and Confucian: wei we wei, or “doing-not-doing,” means effective inaction. What makes such wisdom possible is not mystical insight, he argues, but discipline in a certain kind of art. The sage has no need of reasons (let alone doctrines), only effectiveness; and he does not need truth or justice, only subtlety. The detachment of a quietist has little, if anything, to do with transcending perspectives. Detachment is good as a means to flexibility, and instead of transcending perspectives, a sage is skilled in the quiet art of never getting stuck in one. To be effectively quiet is not so much to be silent as to be inaudible, invisible; the sage “vanishes into things.”. (shrink)

This chapter explores the question of Confucius as a sage of “profound greatness” who embodies the fullness of Dao in his being (xuansheng 玄聖). It also discusses briefly the development of Lunyu learning in early medieval China. Xuanxue is often translated as “neo‐Daoism”. The merit of this translation is that it points to a new hermeneutical engagement with tradition, with a sharp focus on the concept of Dao. The idea of Confucius as a sage of profound greatness, wonders, (...) and mystery opens up a rich space for intellectual development. Whereas suwang may be of particular value to understanding the Confucius of history, xuansheng brings the sage into the present, into the thick of philosophical debate about the source, direction, and end of human existence. Different views on whether the sage experiences emotions can be found already in the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi argues that all phenomena ultimately rest on stillness and quiescence. (shrink)

In one of his most recent articles, “Stingy King Meets Savvy Sage: Rethinking the Dialog between King Xuan of Qi and Mengzi,” Howard Curzer criticizes the traditional interpretations of 1A7 of the _Mengzi_ 孟子 for misinterpreting the passage as delineating how Mengzi guides King Xuan of Qi (Qi Xuan Wang 齊宣王) to extend his compassion from an ox to his subjects. According to Curzer, the passage will not make sense unless we accept that King Xuan (...) only pretends to have felt compassion toward the ox, and his pretension is exploited by Mengzi to establish a psychological ground for his character formation out of nothing (Curzer 2020 ). This essay reexamines 1A7 in the light of Curzer’s view and clarifies certain interpretative issues that will affect our understanding of Mengzi’s theory of moral cultivation. The essay argues that an adequate interpretation of 1A7 cannot be developed along Curzer’s line of thought. Nevertheless, Curzer’s sensitivity about Mengzi’s savviness in offering moral guidance is that which an adequate interpretation ought to reflect. (shrink)

A translation of a popular Buddhist work on worldly ethics by Tibet's most famous philosopher. Leadership. Power. Responsibility. From Sun Tzu to Plato to Machiavelli, sages east and west have advised kings and rulers on how to lead. Their motivations and techniques have varied, but one thing they all have had in common is that their advice has been as relevant to the millions who have read their works as it has been to the few kings and princes they were, (...) on the surface, addressed to. The nineteenth-century Buddhist monk and luminary Jamgön Mipham’s letter to the king of Dergé, whose small kingdom straddled China and Tibet during a particularly turbulent period, is similar in the universality of its message. This work, however, is unique in that it stresses compassion, impartiality, self-control, and virtue as essential for long-lasting success—whether as a leader or an individual trying to live a meaningful life. Mipham’s historic contribution to ethics and governance, until now little studied outside of Buddhist circles, teaches us the importance of protecting life, fair taxation, environmental sustainability, aiding the poor, and freedom of religion. Both present day leaders and those they lead will find this classic work, finally available in English, profoundly illuminating on political, societal, and personal levels. (shrink)

Abstract Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism (...) about wisdom, and show that many of the elements of the Stoic picture can be preserved in a more plausible fallibilist approach. Specifically, I propose to develop a Stoic fallibilist virtue epistemology that is based on the Stoic model of the moral virtues. This model of the intellectual virtues will show that (in keeping with a folk distinction) the wise person is never befooled, though that person might be fooled. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0158-0 Authors Sarah Wright, Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 107 Peabody Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we (...) misuse names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

In this book, Julia Ching offers a survey of over 4,000 years of Chinese civilization through an examination of the relationship between kingship and mysticism. She investigates the sage-king myth and ideal, arguing that institutions of kingship were bound up with cultivation of trance states and communication with spirits. Over time, the sage-king myth became a model for the actual ruler. As a paradigm, it was also appropriated by private individuals who strove for wisdom without becoming (...) kings. As the Confucian tradition interacted with the Taoist and the Buddhist, the religious character of spiritual and mystical cultivation became more pronounced. But the sage-king idea continued, promoting expectations of benevolent despotism rather than democratization in Chinese civilization. (shrink)

In the past two decades, scholars in China and beyond have vigorously demonstrated that the just war discourse is integral to classical Confucianism and that the classical Confucian idea of “punitive expedition” can be best understood in terms of humanitarian intervention. The sceptics, however, claim that in describing the ancient sage‐king's bloodless punitive expeditions, what classical Confucians really had in mind was not so much to endorse morally justified forms of aggressive war but to highlight the paramount importance (...) of the ruler's moral self‐cultivation and benevolent government. This paper examines closely the disagreement between the two positions and offers a more historically grounded justification for the just war interpretation of classical Confucianism. It pays special attention to the importance of ritual order in classical Confucian political theory and discusses how the Warring States political circumstances led thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi to shift their attention from ritual order to the well‐being of the people. (shrink)

Confucius associates the good and the beautiful. Li (translated variously as “ritual propriety,” “ritual,” “etiquette,” or “propriety”) embodies the entire spectrum of interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. I argue that Confucius attempts to introduce an ethical ontology, not of “what,” but of “the way.” The “way” of reality becomes known with the deliberate participation to the Dao. In other words, through interaction. The way people co-exist demonstrates the rationality of the associations of living and functioning together. Li, (...) as an aesthetic-moral principle, embodies the entire spectrum of one’s interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. Li is a constitutive element of Confucian ethics and politics, highlighting the importance of beauty, and not only goodness, in human action. The worthiness of human action is judged both aesthetically and morally. Moreover, I hold that Confucius’ ethical ontology is not an ontology of “whatness” but of “howness,” according to the Dao, since Confucius primary concern was not to define the Dao, but to restore the Dao of the ancient sage-kings. The morality of the action is dependent on the way it is performed, according to the mandates of the Dao. (shrink)

Confucian moral philosophy doesn't seem to provide a theory of excuses. I explore an explanatory hypothesis to explain how excuse conditions might be built into the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names. In the process, I address the issue of the motivation for the theory. The hypothesis is that the theory provides not only excuse conditions, but also exception and conflict resolution roles for an essentially positive morality rooted in the traditional code of 禮 li/ritual, transmitted from the ancient sage (...) kings. The relatively fixed content of this text-like moral code required aggressive interpretive leeway to cope with the problems endemic in rule deontological and etiquette-like normative schemes. (shrink)

Those who see Confucianism as a premodern imperial ideology or a traditional religion have no problem characterizing its social ideal as inherently hierarchical, as this is fairly typical of such systems of thought. From this perspective, rather than valuing equality Confucianism takes for granted inequalities among people, and justifies social hierarchies and unequal distribution of power, resources, prestige, and other goods as part of its ethics and its ideal of good government by sagely kings, the justification sometimes involving metaphysical claims (...) about cosmic and religious hierar-chies.1 While some reject Confucianism for its supposed opposition to egalitarianism from perspectives that consider equality a.. (shrink)

A fair amount of recent Xunzi scholarship has focused on the problem of moral transformation. The problem being addressed supposedly arises this way. According to Xunzi, human nature is innately or inherently evil; individuals, nevertheless, can become moral agents capable to embracing and loving moral principles. Unfortunately, Xunzi does not provide any account of how individuals whose characters are inherently evil can transformed into full moral agents. Several scholars have proposed various ways in which Xunzi could address the problems, but (...) all are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In this paper, I will develop my own reading of Xunzi’s moral philosophy. My approach is to put Xunzi in the context of classical Confucianism, a tradition that shaped Xunzi’s thinking on his metaphysical assumption about the world, his reverence for the wisdom of sage kings, and his emphasis on education as the necessary condition for virtue development. (shrink)

In the Mengzi there is a hypothetical situation relating how the ancient sage-king Shun would respond if his father had committed murder. This has recently become a source of debate among Chinese philosophers. Here we will apply arguments made by Johannes de silentio about the “teleological suspension of the ethical” related to the action of the biblical Abraham, and link them up to alternative interpretations of the actions of Shun. This challenges the current and traditional interpretations of his (...) actions, suggesting how this new approach can overcome ethical quandaries related to the Mengzian account of Shun’s behavior. (shrink)

As ardent followers of Mencius and Zhu Xi, virtually all Korean Neo-Confucians during the Chosŏn dynasty rejected the Way of the Hegemon by understanding it as directly opposed to the Kingly Way, a humane government allegedly conducted by ancient sage-kings. However, Yi I [Formula: see text]珥 (1536–1584), a prominent Neo-Confucian scholar-official in sixteenth-century Korea, endorsed the Way of the Hegemon as compatible with the Kingly Way by reconceptualizing it, otherwise predicated on strong consequentialist ethics, in a way consistent with (...) Confucianism’s deepest concern with the well-being of the people. In Confucianizing the Way of the Hegemon through the creative re-reading of the Book of Rites from a Xunzian standpoint, Yi I proposed a new method of moral self-cultivation specifically tailored for a Confucian ruler—called political self-cultivation in this paper—that combined the traditional Neo-Confucian recovery model of self-cultivation with a strong sense of political responsibility. (shrink)

Disc 1. Life's great questions: Asian perspectives ; The Vedas and Upanishads: the beginning -- Disc 2. Mahavira and Jainism: extreme nonviolence ; The Buddha: the middle way -- Disc 3. The Bhagavad Gita: the way of action ; Confucius: in praise of sage-kings -- Disc 4. Laozi and Daoism: the way of nature ; The Hundred Schools of preimperial China -- Disc 5. Mencius and Xunzi: Confucius's successors ; Sunzi and Han Feizi: strategy and legalism -- Disc 6. (...) Zarathustra and Mani: dualistic religion ; Kautilya and Ashoka: Buddhism and empire -- Disc 7. Ishvarakrishna and Patanjali: Yoga ; Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu: Buddhist theories -- Disc 8. Sima Qian and Ban Zhao: history and women ; Dong Zhongshu and Ge Hong: eclecticism -- Disc 9. Xuanzang and Chinese Buddhism ; Prince Shotoku, Lady Murasaki, Sei Shonagon -- Disc 10. Saicho to Nichiren: Japanese Buddhism ; Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva: Hindu Vedanta -- Disc 11. Al-Biruni: Islam in India ; Nanak and Sirhindi: Sikhism and Sufism -- Disc 12. Han Yu to Zhu Xi: Neo-Confucianism ; Wang Yangming: The study of heart-mind -- Disc 13. Dogen and Hakuin: Zen Buddhism ; Zeami and Sen no Rikyu: Japanese aesthetics -- Disc 14. Wonhyo to King Sejong: Korean philosophy ; Padmasambhava to Tsongkhapa: Tibetan ideas -- Disc 15. Science and technology in premodern Asia ; Muhammad Iqbal and Rabindranath Tagore -- Disc 16. Mohandas Gandhi: Satyagraha, or soul-force ; Fukuzawa Yukichi and Han Yongun -- Disc 17. Kang Youwei and Hu Shi ; Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong -- Disc 18. Modern legacies ; East and West. (shrink)

This article discusses two interpretations of musical harmony around the 3rd century BCE based on the Xunzi 荀子 and the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋, comparing the concepts of resonance between sound and qi 氣 in each interpretation. The Xunzi supports the moral influence of the sage kings’ music where ethical resonance between sound and bodily qi serves as firm ground for musical harmony begetting social harmony. In contrast, the Lüshi Chunqiu advocates the idea of physical resonance between sound and cosmic (...) qi whereby musical harmony acts as a contributor to cosmic harmony. In discussing resonance between sound and qi, the Xunzi restricts its scope to the human realm while the Lüshi Chunqiu extends it more broadly to the cosmic realm, which indicates that humans foster cosmic harmony. This broader perspective is an adequate reflection of the germinating idea of a resonant correlation between the human and cosmic realms. (shrink)

Zhong, as it appears in the second story in the Baoxun Testament, is both a physical object that can be lent, as well as an admirable idea to be passed down the generations. Where Zhong appears in the Changmai Chapter of the Yizhoushu, it appears to be a document on punitive laws that is as an object that can be transferred from person to person; it is a receivable object but also as a representation of the idea of Great Rectitude, (...) which is of key importance in the realm of politics. The CM Chapter, like the BX, also makes appeal to the stories of ancient sage kings to argue the rationality of the views it transmits and refers to ‘ancient lost teachings’ and sayings attributed to King Wen of Zhou. Taken together, these points of similarity form the basis for comparison between the BX and the YZS: CM. Furthermore, when we compare the BX with the Duxun Chapter of the YZS, we find confirmation of the legal import of the term Zhong as it appears in the first story of the BX. The common ground shared between the BX, as one of Qinghua University’s collection of Bamboo Manuscripts, and the YZS makes the latter a suitable key for interpreting terms seen in the former text. (shrink)

How does skill relate to dào 道, the ethically apt path and its performance? Two early Chinese ‘masters’ anthologies that make prominent use of craft metaphors imply profoundly contrasting answers to this question. For the Mòzǐ 墨子, a key to following dào is to set forth explicit models or standards for guiding and checking performance. By learning to consistently apply the right standards, we can develop the skill needed to follow the dào of the sage-kings reliably, just as a (...) carpenter uses a set square to produce square corners or a wheelwright uses a wing compass to fashion round wheels. Following dào—and thus the ethical life—is strongly analogous to the performance of skills. Like an artisan’s craft, dào has a fixed end that can be explicitly articulated. A sharply contrasting stance is implied by the renowned skill exemplar Páo Dīng the butcher in the Zhuāngzǐ 莊子. Praised for how his every movement in carving up cattle is perfectly attuned, yielding a display of skill matching that of an exquisite dance or musical performance, the butcher responds that what he actually cares about is dào, which is ‘advanced beyond skill’. Intriguingly, most of what Páo Dīng says in explaining this point pertains to how he developed his craft, performs his work, and overcomes new challenges. The implication is that the process of acquiring, performing, and extending skills exemplifies dào, yet there is something more to dào than skill. What is this something more? A skill is the ability to competently perform a task with a specified end. In the Zhuāngzǐ, a key difference between skill and dào, I will suggest, is that dào is unlike skill in having no fixed, predetermined ends. Dào is a general, open-ended process, one that is continually shifting and transforming. We can never fully master dào, nor even know exactly where it will lead, as the nature of dào is such that we must regularly find creative ways of extending it as we proceed along it. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore Xunzi’s 荀子 problem, which was originally proposed by David S. Nivison. The problem revolves around a tension in Xunzi’s writings about human nature. In his chapter “Human Nature is Bad (Xing’e 性惡),” Xunzi states that humans have inborn selfish desires and natural feelings, and if they do not control or regulate these desires and feelings, there will certainly be chaos. However, in the chapter “The Regulations of a Sage King (Wangzhi 王制),” Xunzi argues (...) that human beings possess yi 義, which is an important feature distinguishing them from other creatures. I try to analyze how yi should be understood in the Xunzi by focusing on the relationship of yi with fen 分 (division) and li 禮 (ritual). In the process, I also consider Hall and Ames’s understanding of yi as “meaning-bestowing,” and pay attention to Xunzi’s mention that yi is something that enables human beings to jump from natural to social divisions. (shrink)

Yet this perfectionist theme of Confucianism did not begin with these masters. Instead, they were working within and in response to a longstanding political tradition that can be traced back to the mythical beginning of Chinese civilization according to which the legendary sage-kings established a realm of peace, prosperity and harmony. One can hardly ascertain the historical truth of these myths, but the historical imagination of these sage-king nonetheless informed Confucianism's foundational understanding of the nature of politics (...) in what was eventually canonized as the Five Confucian Classics. These five sets of books contain the stories, sayings and poetry of the ancient sagely leaders, which are deemed as the default authoritative source of wisdom by Confucians throughout the ages. (shrink)

This essay examines prominent New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s account of Confucian democracy by focusing on his key notion of “self-restriction.” According to Mou, true sage-kings would willingly respect ordinary people’s individual endeavors in the political realm and endorse democracy as a form of government. This move of self-restriction then aligns Confucianism with democracy in a way that fundamentally restructures traditional Confucian rulership. I make contributions on two fronts. First, I offer a reading of Mou’s self-restriction different from existing ones (...) that can help to disambiguate many aspects of Mou’s political thought. Second, what is often left out of existing discussion on Mou is the narrative of political myth and distinctive personality types associated with it. For Mou, political leadership’s impetus for transcending rule-based order and the people’s aspirations for the “superman” run deep and lie in the lasting appeal of political myth. Invoking Nietzsche, I discuss the sense in which transforming traditional rulership is not only a question of ought—why Confucians ought to adopt self-restriction—but a question of how it is possible for self-restriction to fulfill its mission. Commentators on his thought have so far largely glossed over this second aspect of Mou’s thought, thereby selling short the complexity of the idea of self-restriction. My key argument is that Mou’s self-restriction shows an effort to revamp the superman’s politics of the extraordinary into a politics of the ordinary. (shrink)

Classical Confucian thought is deeply concerned, on the one hand, with individual moral self-cultivation and, on the other, with the widespread establishment of a moral social order. These twin aspirations find expression in the legends of Yao, Shun, King Wen, and other sage-kings who achieved perfection in both realms. Yet a serious tension arises, because despite Confucius’s and Mencius’s moral purity and devotion, their political impact is marginal. They consistently teach that humaneness and rightness will transform the world, (...) and work energetically to put this principle into action. Yet their own experience is an uneasy fit with this principle, as moral decay remains the norm among the rulers of their.. (shrink)

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we (...) misuse names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

The conversations between Meno and Socrates and between Mencius and King Xuan are philosophical dramas whose "plots" are intellectual arguments. Although both texts present historical characters at particular times in their lives, the texts were written some years after the events they describe by disciples of Socrates and Mencius. The authors had a number of motives: they wanted to represent what the characters thought and said, to explain the philosophical theories underlying the dramatic plots, and to justify the failure (...) of their mentors to teach something very important. Meno did not learn how to live a good life. Xuan did not become a sage king. It is argued here that while both dramas end in failure, Socrates leaves the conversation confidently optimistic about the future. The conversation between Mencius and Xuan, on the other hand, has deeply tragic overtones. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Confucian concern for transmitting cultural objects, practices, and attitudes as a link between past and present. Confucian thought idealized a golden past, where practices (Confucius), Classics (Mencius), and rituals (Xunzi) established by the Sages-King held specific lessons for the present. Whether for Classical Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism (Zhu Xi), cultural mediations inherited from the past are integrated into self-cultivation: the attempt to become a superior person (Junzi君子), someone able to be in charge of public government because (...) of a moral and intellectual lineage. (shrink)

Hak San 鶴山 Yi Jeong-ho 李正浩 conceptualized and drew the “Hunminjeongeum-do” 訓民正音圖 (Diagram of Hunminjeongeum) using the basic initial consonants and 11 medial vowels of Hunminjeongeum 訓民正音 (It is the Korean alphabet, also called Hangeul). In the process, he added several strokes that were not part of the 28 letters of Hunminjeongeum to the “Hunminjeongeum-do” to emphasize the shapes of stars. This was intended to demonstrate the similarity between the “ Hunminjeongeum-do” and the “Jeongyeok Eight Trigrams Diagram” (正易八卦圖), thereby suggesting (...) that the Zhouyi 周易 philosophy embedded in the creation of Hunminjeongeum inherently contains the Jeongyeok 正易 (Correct Zhouyi) philosophy. Furthermore, he created the Celestial Diagram of Hunminjeongeum using the 28 Lunar Mansions of the ecliptic, which he referred to as the Jeongeum cheonmun-do 正音天文圖. In this diagram, he included the two central positions, elevated as the Emperor of Heaven and the Great Emperor, and applied a 30- day month calendar using all of these elements. In fact, it is based on the discussion in the Jeongyeok regarding the “Diagram of the 28 Lunar Mansions’ Energy Flow chart” (二十八宿運氣圖). The Jeongeum cheonmun-do can be found to contain similar concepts to those in the records of astronomical calendrical science from the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋, written during the Warring States period in China, and the “ Yaodian” 堯典 chapter of the Shujing 書經. Moreover, it is closely related to the circular diagram of the Fuxi 64 Hexagrams and also shares commonality with the star illustrations found in the Cheonsang yeolcha bunyajido 天象列次分 野之圖, a celestial map engraved in the early Joseon Dynasty. Haksan sought to demonstrate through the Jeongeum cheonmundo that ‘the intention of King Sejong, the Sage King, to illuminate the Heavenly Way and care for the affairs of the people upon his ascension to the throne is revealed in the creation of the miraculous letters Hunminjeongeum, and that the spirit of its creation embodies the Confucian concept of the Heavenly Way.’. (shrink)

Kin Milinda asked the sage, “How are you known? What is your name?”“I was named Nãgasena by my parents, the priests and the others… But Nāgasena is not a separate entity. Just as the different parts of the chariot when they are brought, together form a chariot, so when the constitutive elements of existence are brought together in a body, they form a living being”.Later the king asked, “What becomes reborn, Nāgasena?”“The name and the form (nāmarūpa) are reborn”.“Is (...) it this name and this form that are reborn?”“No, but through this name and this form, deeds, whether good or bad, are performed, and by these deeds, the karma, another name-and-form is reborn”.This dialogue from the first century B.C. explains, with a slightly different meaning, a cardinal notion for Hinduism, the principle of individuation. Designated by the composite nāma (name) and rūpa (form), this notion illustrates the consubstantial relationship between the person and his name. (shrink)

(The Kindle book can be ordered for $3.21 from Amazon) -/- Thinking is a fundamental activity of our species – those that give names to other creatures and call themselves humans. Textbooks tell us that there is about 1.2 kg of matter called the brain inside the human body. It sounds small but actually is proportionally the biggest among all animals on Earth. -/- I became more aware of thinking at around 5th grade upon hearing about an ancient paradox. It (...) can be summarized as follows. -/- ¤ -/- Once upon a time, there was a stupid king. In his kingdom lived a sage who was highly respected for his intelligence. The King did not appreciate this fact. Maybe the Sage made fun of the King’s intellect, but I am not so sure. Anyway, one day, the King summoned the Sage, intending to kill him. -/- The King said, “Wise man, I heard you earn a living by thinking and arguing. Now I give you two options to die.” -/- The Sage said, “Please tell me the choices, Your Majesty.” -/- The King continued, “You live by your tongue, so I will let you say one sentence before you die. If what you say is true, you will die by hanging. If what you say is false, you will die by beheading.” -/- Little did the King know that this was a stupid order. After a short while, the Sage confidently spoke his “last words”, which actually were what saved his life: -/- “Your Majesty, I am about to be beheaded!” -/- ¤ -/- As a “wild animal” going out into life from a young age, my brain spent a lot of time and energy looking for food. Now that I have become older, my body no longer needs so much sustenance. However, my mind craves a different type of nourishment: food for thought. -/- Food for thought can directly lead to food (on the table). My main job as a scientist exemplifies what I have just stated. Maybe we were wrong. Maybe it has been “thought for food” all along, like in such a sequence as TFFTTTFTFFTTFFFT... -/- In the hyper-chaotic infosphere today, we are surrounded by the noises of information, not only as wavy shores or waterfalls but also mega-tsunamis, through Twitter, Facebook, Tiktok, Instagram, Youtube, etc. More than ever, tranquility and calmness are necessary. Like what you have seen in wilderness video clips, predators such as lions, bears, and alligators act lightning-fast when catching prey. But when food is served, the natural world returns to its peaceful, soothing silence. -/- This short book is in its own tidy infosphere, where each little story is also brief and self-contained. Despite this small appearance, I hope the content inside carries the value of tranquility and life observation. The book is petite, but pretty sure not malnourished. A not-too-small detail is that the way the content was shaped and distilled reflects some innovations of mine and my research team: the mindsponge theory, a new theory of serendipity, the bayesvl R package, the BMF analytics, as well as other experiences from working in the field of science. After all, scientific works were my main source of food (before this book sells well – if it does). -/- Welcome to the priceless sober moments – with a chicken-burger price tag! -/- I hope this book will bring readers some moments of calmness, peaceful smiles, and maybe a couple of good laughs too. -/- ~~~ -/- *This update: December 12, 2023 (Third edition, with additions). (shrink)

A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the (...) account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided. It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems. (shrink)

Semantics is the discipline that studies linguistic meaning generally, and the qualification ‘formal’ indicates something about the sorts of techniques used in investigating linguistic meaning. More specifically, formal semantics is the discipline that employs techniques from symbolic logic, mathematics, and mathematical logic to produce precisely characterized theories of meaning for natural languages or artificial languages. Formal semantics as we know it first arose in the twentieth century. It was made possible by certain developments in logic during that period. This article (...) chronicles those developments and how they led to the development of formal semantics. (shrink)

A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended by Plantinga. (...) Appropriate causal chains and reliable cognitive processes only seem at best to ensure that a belief proposed for acceptance is the belief the testifier wants accepted; they do not ensure that it is rational to accept the belief. This particularly applies where there is much at stake, where it seems rational to seek some form of evidence, if available. Some brief comments are made on Trinitarian self-testimony. Another model of the ‘inner witness’ is briefly sketched out, based on the analogy with conscience. This model may capture some of the features of Plantinga’s approach, but leaves room for a free rejection of divine self-testimony, in a way that the perceptual analogy does not. A point connected to Plantinga’s aims is then made about the link between evidence, value and divine self-testimony, in relation to religious experience. Finally, it is suggested that the earlier proof may apply in a particular sense to all knowledge of God, including that based on natural theology. (shrink)

Thomas Hoccleve wrote his Regement of Princes in 1411 and addressed it to the patronage of Henry, Prince of Wales, who was to succeed to the throne as Henry V two years later, on the death of his father, Henry IV. The Regement is a book of the governance of princes, drawn from the De regimine principum of Aegidius Romanus and from other similar works including the Secreta secretorum, which purports to be a compendium of Aristotle's advice on kingship to (...) Alexander the Great. Like these works, Hoccleve's Regement lays out a series of unexceptionable moral principles that should guide a prince's behavior: the prince is exhorted, for instance, to be prudent, just, liberal, and receptive to counsel. These recommendations are supported with citations from biblical and classical authorities and a wealth of narratives exemplary of kingly and unkingly conduct. Princes were to look in such books as in a mirror, and there see displayed the image of what they should truly be. They were “Mirrors for Princes.” Princes welcomed them and on occasion commissioned them, not because they specially desired to have instruction in the business of government from clerks, nor because they would much appreciate being told things they did not wish to hear, but because it was important that they should represent themselves as receptive to sage counsel. They are not simply political public relations exercises but, equally, they are not “books of instruction.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Satyr Play in Plato's SymposiumM. D. UsherIn the Symposium, Socrates jokingly declares that "the satyric—nay silenic—drama" of Alcibiades' drunken panegyric was perfectly clear to the guests that evening at Agathon's house (222d3-4).1 Though this statement implies an extended treatment of a theme, discussions of silenic elements in the dialogue have rarely ventured far beyond the overt comparison of Socrates to a Silenus or Marsyas figure in Alcibiades' speech (215a4-222b7).2 (...) Yet, as Paul Zanker has observed (1995, 38), "There is surely more than one aspect to the comparison of Socrates to Silenus." In fact, the final scenes of the Symposium are riddled with satyric motifs, many of which Plato inverts or otherwise adapts, in the pointed critique of wealth, beauty, and sexual attraction that he achieves in the character of Socrates.Let me begin defending this thesis with a Platonic analogy and suggest that if we look at the big letters first, we will be able to read the smaller ones more readily: Though it has only recently, and only in passing, been adduced as a source (Clay 2000, 74), much of the scene involving Alcibiades and Socrates is modeled on the myth of King Midas' capture of the satyr Silenus.3 While the extant sources for the Midas legend are disparate and fragmentary, an investigation into its literary provenance and the uses to which it was put in antiquity (section 1 of this essay) suggests that the encounter between Midas and Silenus was something of a literary set piece that had been used as a vehicle for popular wisdom and philosophic critique long before Plato's time. Indeed, in [End Page 205] reusing the story in just this fashion in his lost dialogue, the Eudemus,4 Aristotle highlights both its popularity and antiquity, describing it as "having been carried about on the lips of men for many years now."5The finer print (section 2) involves another source never previously adduced in discussions of the Symposium, Euripides' Cyclops, where we will consider both what is particular to that play (our only complete satyr drama) and what is typical of the genre.6 Cyclops was produced in the last five years of Euripides' life,7 when an impressionable Plato, that "nursling of Attic drama,"8 was in his early twenties.An awareness of the extent of Plato's use and adaptation of satyr lore in the Symposium is essential for a full appreciation of his philosophy of love, his technique as an author, and the purpose of the dialogue. Einstein once said that the secret to creativity is hiding one's sources. In constructing the final scenes of the Symposium, Plato is deeply unoriginal in precisely this sense. It would be well to emphasize at the start, however, that the satyric motifs adduced here—as legendary and mythic material—would have had a wide currency in many media, and one need not advance or defend arguments for strictly literary dependence. Indeed, it will be seen that the way Plato incorporates silenic elements into the Symposium is suggestive and indirect, though no less compelling, important, or even intentional for that reason. That Plato's purpose in including them is as apologetic as it is literary and philosophical is discussed in a concluding section where I attempt to bring some recent readings of Plato under one head. [End Page 206]I. The Capture of SilenusSome minor variants notwithstanding,9 the basic outline of this story is as follows: Silenus is captured while sleeping by Midas' henchmen, who have tricked him by spiking a river with wine; whereupon, in exchange for his release, Silenus agrees to reveal to Midas hidden wisdom about man and the nature of the world.10 Both the apprehension of the satyr while sleeping and the conversation that follows in the myth are adapted by Plato in the part of the Symposium where Alcibiades describes his unsuccessful romantic overtures toward Socrates. Having prevailed upon Socrates to come to dinner and spend the night, Alcibiades approaches the satyr-sage in bed and asks if he is sleeping (218c3). By Plato's inversion, however, it turns out that Socrates, unlike the... (shrink)

Ignorance is a necessary condition for life. The will to truth is against the will to power. There is a contradiction between understanding and strength, or knowledge and action. In other words, knowledge prevents life. The more you know, the less you are capable of action. Life is there to be lived not to be known. In my paper, I try to show the contradiction between wisdom and life in Nietzsche’’s writings. I especially concentrate on Beyond Good and Evil and, (...) to a lesser degree, some of his other works. I will show how this very contradiction makes Nietzsche’’s own project of overman impossible. Is the overman a wise person or a strong person; a sage or a hero; a philosopher or a king? The overman cannot be both wise and strong, and hence, the philosopher-king is a paradoxical term. In the end of my essay, I suggest a solution to the problem within the Nietzschean understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

The historical criticism of the Book of Proverbs has substituted the pre‐Enlightenment view that Solomon was the real author with the finding that Israel’s post‐exilic sages added the name and prestige of the wisest of kings to their work. However the pre‐Enlightenment commentators of Proverbs recognised that the name Solomon is integral to the text of Proverbs. This article recognises this textual datum and reads Prov 1–9 from an unusual angle today, namely as if Solomon were the author and principal (...) speaker. In such a reading of Prov 1–9 the portrait of Solomon emerging from within the text is sharpened by a comparison with the depiction of Solomon in 1 Kgs 1–11.The article seeks to make the point that the character of Solomon so construed in a textual comparison of Prov 1–9 and 1 Kgs 1–11 is but one of a number of diverse portraits made of Solomon in Proverbs throughout the centuries of commentary. In the first part of the article we study three early commentaries, those of Bede, of Hugo Grotius, and of Augustin Calmet. We show that the portrait of Solomon discovered in our own reading of Prov 1–9 in the second part of the article takes its place alongside numerous others. However we today are able to be more faithful to the biblical text than the early commentators because we need not harmonise Proverbs with 1 Kings, as the early commentators felt obliged to do. A contemporary intertextual study of Prov 1–9 can recoup a valid aspect of the ancient literary tradition, that of making Solomon integral to Proverbs. The Solomon we have discovered in Prov 1–9 is the one that spoke through Proverbs at its first publication. In Prov 1–9 the royal attribute is set aside. Solomon is represented as an Israelite teaching parent. (shrink)

In this thesis, I examine recent proposals for the creation of African and Native American forms of Indigenous philosophy and show how the discussions and debates in these fields challenge the disciplinary boundaries of modern Academic Western philosophy. With regard to African philosophy, I critique the debates in the Anglophone literature, teasing out those aspects of the debates which pose substantial epistemological challenges to mainstream [Western] philosophy, focusing, in particular, on assumptions about the intersections between philosophy, culture, science, and universality (...) which manifest themselves in the Euro-traditional critiques the "Professional" school philosophers make of the Afri-traditional approach of the "Ethnophilosophy" school philosophers. Looking at the works of such "Ethnophilosophers" as Kagame, Mbiti, Wright, and Gyeke and the critiques made of them by "Professional" school philosophers such as Wiredu, Bodunrin, Oruka, and Appiah, I present and critique both sides of the universal European argument, the literacy argument, the objective individual male argument, and the logical-scientific vs. magical-religious arguments, highlighting the epistemological implications of each. With regard to Native American Philosophy, I discuss recent proposals being made by Native American academic philosophers, and also do a philosophical analysis of traditional Native American culture as expressed in a variety of Native-authored sources. I argue, based on the works of Native authors, that three main methodological problems condition the formulation of Native American philosophy, namely 'problems of conquest,' 'problems of translation,' and 'problems of identity' and that each of these problems manifest as epistemological problems. I then go on to make proposals for five possible beginning points for the formulation of Native American philosophy by identifying themes which recur in the works of philosophers Deloria, Cordova, and Hester; traditional sages such as Black Elk, and Lame Deer; critical theorists such as Warrior, Guerrero, Gunn-Allen, Durham, and Forbes; and novelists Silko and King. I argue that both African and American forms of Indigenous philosophy provoke a reevaluation of many of the epistemic frames heretofore assumed to be universal in modern academic philosophy. (shrink)