The aim of this paper is to investigate whether or not ethical conflicts can be identified, analysed and solved using ethical principles. The relation between the physician and the patient with ischemic heart disease (IHD) as life style changes are recommended in a secondary prevention program is used as an example. The principal persons affected (the patient and his or her spouse) and the ethical principles (respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice) are combined in a two (...) dimensional model. The most important person affected by the recommendations is the patient. His or her autonomy is challenged by the suggested life style changes, the purpose of which is to promote the future wellbeing and health of the patient. The spouse is indirectly involved in and affected by the process. He or she often feels neglected by caregivers. Ethical conflicts can both be identified and analysed using ethical principles, but often no solution is implied. Most (if not all) physicians would strongly encourage life style changes, but surprisingly there is no uncontroversial justification for this conclusion using principles. (shrink)

In this paper I shall focus attention on a principle which lies at the heart of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is to be found explicitly or implicitly stated at many places in the Essay , but its clearest expression is at E.II.viii.11, where Locke writes that ' Impulse [is] the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in'. Let us call it 'the impulse principle'. The first task is to describe what exactly the term (...) impulse means here and to what the principle amounts. Next, I shall consider the kind of role the principle plays in the Essay and whether Locke changed his mind about it in the fourth edition. Then, in the main part of the paper, I shall try to show how the impulse principle helps make possible Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In the course of my discussion I shall refer to some of Locke's pre- Essay writings: the Epitome, the Abr g , his review of Newton's Principia and Draft C.1 It is a subsidiary aim of the paper to show how these writings - particularly the Abr g which ran to over ninety pages of the Biblioth que universelle and was published in 1688 - can be of help in disentangling the main line of argument in Locke's Essay. (shrink)

The DDE yields counterintuitive verdicts about certain cases: it may deem it permissible to kill a certain number of people when they are not used as means and their death is not intended, but deny that killing fewer of these people is permissible if that requires intending their death, or using them as means. To accommodate the judgement that we may kill the lesser number in such cases, supporters of the DDE may appeal to Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary (...) Permissibility. The principle says, roughly, that if it is permissible to kill n people when not intending their death, or using them as means, then it is permissible to kill n − m people in a way that does involve intending their deaths, or using them as means, as ‘secondarily permissible’. In this article I argue that appealing to the PSP to solve the puzzling cases of the DDE is generally misleading and that it fails in particular cases. The crux of my argument is that the PSP allows killings that go against the grain of the DDE. (shrink)

The focus of this small contribution to studies in the history of philosophy of American education falls upon the backside of the cultural upheaval between 1880 and 1920. The general purpose is to relate aspects of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of education to pedagogical principles in the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, a document of the National Education Association’s Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, published in 1918. An attempt is made to implement this purpose by (...) analyzing the educational principles in the NEA report, by clarifying Spencer’s educational principles in relationship to the report, and by explaining Spencer’s philosophical principles and relating them to the CRSE document. In addition to similarities between specific Spencerian principles and the 1918 report, especially noted is the ideological proximity of the “spirit” of Spencer’s evolutionary naturalism and empiricism to the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education. (shrink)

In genomic research, cohort and large-scale population studies are proliferating along with accompanying infrastructures (databases and biobanks). Population-based research links samples and data from multiple sources often obtained for other purposes. The normative frameworks of many countries are largely based on 1980 OECD principles which limit the uses of personal data, especially for secondary purposes. These limits, now found in legislation, policies and research guidelines, pose major barriers to population-based research.This text examines similarities and differences between epidemiology, public (...) health research and genomics. It also distinguishes between primary and secondary uses of personal information. In a comparative and critical analysis of the normative landscapes of five countries, Québec (Canada), Germany, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, three barriers are identified: the impracticability of re-consent; the shortcomings of the review process (ethics and privacy) and certain multi-jurisdictional issues. Recommendations are proposed. (shrink)

Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is compared with Descartes’s argument (in the Principles of Philosophy) for the distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible qualities. I argue that following Descartes, Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is an essentially a priori argument, based on our conception of substance, and the constraints on intelligible bodily interaction that this conception of substance sets.

Locke establishes the primary-secondary quality distinction in two steps. First, he identifies the primary qualities by means of a separability argument that involves transdictive inference about the properties of the minute, imperceptible parts of matter. Second, he identifies the secondary qualities by means of a dispensability argument that relies on the principle that bodies normally act by ‘impulse.’ I suggest this principle is also justified through transdictive inference. This allows us to see Locke’s claims about primary and (...) class='Hi'>secondary qualities as unified, fallibilist and rooted in empiricism and the methodology of Newtonian science. (shrink)

BackgroundSystems medicine is the name for an assemblage of scientific strategies and practices that include bioinformatics approaches to human biology ; “big data” statistical analysis; and medical informatics tools. Whereas personalized and precision medicine involve similar analytical methods applied to genomic and medical record data, systems medicine draws on these as well as other sources of data. Given this distinction, the clinical translation of systems medicine poses a number of important ethical and epistemological challenges for researchers working to generate systems (...) medicine knowledge and clinicians working to apply it.DiscussionThis article focuses on three key challenges: First, we will discuss the conflicts in decision-making that can arise when healthcare providers committed to principles of experimental medicine or evidence-based medicine encounter individualized recommendations derived from computer algorithms. We will explore in particular whether controlled experiments, such as comparative effectiveness trials, should mediate the translation of systems medicine, or if instead individualized findings generated through “big data” approaches can be applied directly in clinical decision-making. Second, we will examine the case of the Riyadh Intensive Care Program Mortality Prediction Algorithm, pejoratively referred to as the “death computer,” to demonstrate the ethical challenges that can arise when big-data-driven scoring systems are applied in clinical contexts. We argue that the uncritical use of predictive clinical algorithms, including those envisioned for systems medicine, challenge basic understandings of the doctor-patient relationship. Third, we will build on the recent discourse on secondary findings in genomics and imaging to draw attention to the important implications of secondary findings derived from the joint analysis of data from diverse sources, including data recorded by patients in an attempt to realize their “quantified self.”SummaryThis paper examines possible ethical challenges that are likely to be raised as systems medicine to be translated into clinical medicine. These include the epistemological challenges for clinical decision-making, the use of scoring systems optimized by big data techniques and the risk that incidental and secondary findings will significantly increase. While some ethical implications remain still hypothetical we should use the opportunity to prospectively identify challenges to avoid making foreseeable mistakes when systems medicine inevitably arrives in routine care. (shrink)

Background: Nurses are the largest professional group in healthcare and those who make more decisions. In 2014, the Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe launched the “Guide on the decision-making process regarding medical treatment in end-of-life situations” (hereinafter, Guide), aiming at improving decision-making processes and empowering professionals in making end-of-life decisions. The Guide does not mention nurses explicitly. Objectives: To analyze the ethical principles most valued by nurses working in palliative care when making end-of-life decisions and investigate (...) if they are consistent with the framework and recommendations of the Guide; to identify what disputed/controversial issues are more frequent in these nurses’ current end-of-life care practices. Design: Qualitative secondary analysis. Participants/context: Three qualitative datasets including 32 interviews from previous studies with nurses working in palliative care in Portugal. Ethical consideration: Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Research Lab of the Instituto de Bioética (Ethics Research Lab of the Institute of Bioethics) (Ref.04.2015). Ethical procedures are thoroughly described. Findings: All participant nurses referred to autonomy as an ethical principle paramount in end-of-life decision-making. They were commonly involved in end-of-life decision-making. Palliative sedation and communication were the most mentioned disputed/controversial issues. Discussion: Autonomy was highly valued in end-of-life care and decision-making. Nurses expressed major concerns in assessing patients’ preferences, wishes, and promoting advance care planning. Nurses working in palliative care in Portugal were highly involved in end-of-life decision-making. These processes embraced a collective, inclusive approach. Palliative sedation was the most mentioned disputed issue, which is aligned with previous findings. Communication also emerged as a sensitive ethical issue; it is surprising, however, that only three nurses referred to it. Conclusion: While the Guide does not explicitly mention nurses in its content, this study shows that nurses working in palliative care in Portugal are involved in these processes. Further research is needed on nurses’ involvement and practices in end-of-life decision-making. (shrink)

Social scientific reasoning (SSR) is essential to social science education and to a democratic society as a whole. Students are challenged to analyze and reason about social problems such as social inequality, crime, and poverty. However, students experience difficulties with SSR. This study addresses the research question: Which design principles can guide teachers in designing lessons that promote social scientific reasoning? In this design-based research, four social science teachers employed a conceptualization of SSR and its levels together with three (...) initial design principles to develop curriculum materials and activities. These design principles and curriculum materials were piloted in two secondary education classes (9th and 10th grades) and evaluated by four social science teachers, four social science teacher educators and 90 students. The study produced six design principles that can promote students’ SSR. In combination with the curriculum materials, those design principles can help develop teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge and guide the design of tasks and units that develop SSR. (shrink)

In this research, religious courses in Kyrgyzstan secondary schools were discussed. With the independence of Kyrgyzstan, the return to national, spiritual and religious values was revived. In the first year of independence, the Law on Freedom of Belief and Religious Institutions was adopted. Freedom of religion is recognized within the framework of the Law. Accordingly, the search for teaching religion lessons within general education has begun. While the first searches began to take place as a result of civil initiatives, (...) the Iyman course began to be taught by the state. However, when the official curriculum of the Iyman course was determined, it was understood that it was not a religious course. The society continued to seek religious lessons again. Freedom of religion could only be realized by rearranging the Law according to social and political needs. This research aimed to analyze and reveal the religion courses in secondary schools. As a result of the different understanding of the constitutional principle of secularism in the first years of independence, this constituted a major obstacle to the inclusion of religion lessons in the school curriculum. The political revolutions of the people that took place in the history of the country paved the way for religious education. Later, the events that took place in society in the name of religion accelerated the political will and the formation of the legal foundations of religious education in practice. Thus, religion lessons began to be taught in secondary schools. However, on the grounds that the content of religion lessons did not meet the expectations of society, it was possible to organize religion lessons again in 2022. In this study, using descriptive research methods, the history of religion education, its legal development, and the state standard of religion education, curriculum, textbooks, and course teachers were examined. (shrink)

Drawing on our Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model, we argue for the usefulness of distinguishing between basic operating principles of learning processes (associative linking vs. propositional reasoning) and secondary features pertaining to the conditions of their operation (automatic vs. controlled). We review empirical evidence that supports the joint operation of associative and propositional processes in the formation of new associations.

According to the Thomistic tradition, the Principle of Totality (TPoT) articulates a secondary principle of natural law which guides the exercise of human ownership or dominium over creation. In its general signification, TPoT is a principle of distributive justice determining the right ordering of wholes to their parts. In the medical field it is traditionally understood as entailing an absolute prohibition of bodily mutilation as irrational and immoral, and an imperfect obligation to use the parts of one’s body for (...) the perfection of the bodily whole. TPoT is thus a key element of the system of principles within which an individual exercises her right to life: it helps specify the nature, scope and limits of those actions by which an agent permissibly acts in order to preserve her life. While the Thomistic tradition and the Catholic Church have drawn clear conclusions from the principle regarding, e.g., direct sterilization and non-therapeutic experimentation on human subjects, less attention has been given to the implications of TPoT for non-therapeutic procedures that may positively impact biological functioning or supra-biological goals–that is, for human “enhancement.” We will explore the degree to which TPoT non-univocally guides our use of both artifacts and bodies. We will argue that a careful analysis of these distinct kinds of totalities suggests that the application of TPoT to artifacts and bodies is strongly isomorphic, which is what tempts advocates of the Principle of Autonomy to invalidly infer the absolute dominium of the individual over her body. The inference is invalid because this isomorphism also includes a principle of intrinsic value whose function is to resist the instrumentalization of both artifacts and bodies in some contexts; we are not even related to artifacts as advocates of absolute autonomy believe we are, let alone to our bodies. Rather, the limits of human dominium are determined by the nature and finalities, inherent or acquired, of the objects in question, and it will be argued that articulating these limits raises important, understudied, and fascinating questions about the permissibility of various kinds of human enhancement. (shrink)

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at (...) the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that two principles held by many metaphysicians and philosophers of mind are inconsistent: there is no systematic overdetermination, and some causal effects are also determined by their metaphysical grounds. Call this “The Problem of Secondary Effects.” After introducing the problem and noting philosophical theories that face it, the paper offers further clarification by considering three potential strategies for solving it. All fail. An approach that sacrifices ‘secondary effects’ is briefly sketched as a solution.

Should a principle of charity be applied to the interpretation of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experience (...) is therefore no motive for resisting the natural, Galilean response to a scientific understanding of light and vision. The best interpretation of colour experience ends up convicting it of widespread and systematic error. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to render a detailed analysis of the correspondence with Clarke in order to shed some light in the relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Most of the secondary literature takes for granted that Leibniz derives the Principle of Identity of Indiscernible from the Principle of Sufficient Reason in at least some parts of the correspondence. This would render the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles a merely (...) contingent truth and not a necessary principle. I will argue that this interpretation is misleading, and that Leibniz never abandoned the idea that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessary truth. Although he is continuously using the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his argumentation, he keeps in parallel a strong argumentation that entails the necessity of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to point out first some contextual facts that may determine a correct understanding of the correspondence. It will be also necessary to frame the discussion about the principles into the broader debate on the possibility of Newtonian space. Finally, it will be shown that the mentioned hypothesis is supported by textual evidence throughout the entire correspondence. (shrink)

The present study explores Greek parents? views on parental educational involvement and its impact on adolescent scholastic and social development. Specifically, aspects of parental involvement such as the achieved objectives of current parent?school communication, the psychological climate dominating teacher?parent interactions and parents? suggestions for improvement of current policies and practices are examined. Four hundred and seventy?five parents participated in the study. Findings showed that family?school communication is believed to be insufficient in Greece, despite the fact that parents tend to: (1) (...) regard their cooperation with teachers as determinative of adolescent academic and psychosocial development; (2) consider teachers to be friendly and caring; and (3) believe that secondary school provides some opportunities for constructive parental involvement. These paradoxes are discussed and explained as a result of radical changes in current social and educational values, principles and objectives. (shrink)

A formal, logical, theory of events is developed and used as the basis for a definition of causation and to provide a pragmatics for causal counterfactuals. The theory begins with with a logical formalization of events as represented in the planner strips. The resulting inertial theories include a common sense law of inertia and their pragmatics is based on the principle of chronological minimization. The theory of events is then developed by removing some of the simplifying assumptions of the strips (...) representation. To begin with the assumption that events always succeed, given that their preconditions are true when they occur, is dropped. Instead a common sense law of change is introduced with the effect that events normally succeed but may fail if some qualification (some unusual or unexpected condition) arises. The pragmatics of the resulting causal theories is provided by refining the pragmatics of inertial theories. In particular, where there is a conflict between change and inertia, preference is given to change. The resulting defeasibility of events makes it possible to remove the strips assumption that only one event occurs at any given time; as conflicting events now result in failure rather than inconsistency. However it is desirable to provide a means for adjudicating between conflicting events. Consequently the theory is extended so that qualification preferences can be specified and the pragmatics are refined accordingly. A further strips assumption is that the effects of an event are invariant. In order to remove this assumption a distinction is drawn between primary events, events of the kind described above, and secondary events. Secondary events are invoked by primary events in appropriate contexts, they are causally dependent on primary events and when successful produce the additional, variant, effects of the primary events which invoke them. As a result, both the context-dependent effects of events (their ramifications) and non-deterministic events (events whose outcome is uncertain) can be represented. The theory of primary and secondary events is then used as the basis for a definition of causation which can be seen as providing a formal account of Mackie's definition of a cause as an inus condition. A major theme of this paper is the conflict between the opposite but complementary principles of change and inertia. For much of the paper the emphasis is on restricting the effects of inertia and favouring change. The resulting imbalance becomes unnatural when considering the combined effects of several events. However the definition of causation makes it possible to state a law of change and inertia, which is used to regulate change and inertia and thus ensure a proper balance between them: while caused change is preferred to inertia, inertia is preferred to uncaused change. The theory is then used to provide a pragmatics for causal counterfactuals, thereby extending the representation of actual causal reasoning to counterfactual causal reasoning. This is illustrated by the use of causal counterfactuals in order to obtain explanations. (shrink)

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution (...) of public funds for research and innovation. There are reasons why the world's combined innovative capacity has spewed forth iPhones and space shuttles but not yet managed to produce clean energy or universal access to clean water. (Stilgoe 2013, xii) I derive great optimism from empathy's evolutionary antiquity. It makes it a robust trait that will develop in virtually every human being so that society can count on it and try to foster and grow it. It is a human universal. (de Waal 2009, 209) Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this respect, RRI re-focuses technological governance from standard debates on risks to discussions about the ethical stewardship of innovation. This is a radical step in Science & Technology (S&T) policy as it lifts the non-quantifiable concept of values into the driving seat of decision-making. The focus of innovation then goes beyond product considerations to include the processes and – importantly – the purposes of innovation (Owen et al. 2013, 34). Shared public values are seen as the cornerstone of the new RRI framework, while market mechanisms and risk-based regulations are of a secondary order. What are the values that could drive RRI? There are different approaches to the identification of public values. They can be located in democratically agreed processes and commitments (such as European Union treaties and policy statements) or they can be developed organically via public engagement processes. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For instance, although constitutional values can be regarded as democratically legitimate, their application to specific technological fields can be difficult or ambiguous (Schroeder and Rerimassie 2015). On the other hand, public engagement can accurately reflect stakeholder values but is not necessarily free from bias and lobbyist agenda setting. We argue that if RRI is to be more successful in resolving policy dilemmas arising from poorly described and uncertain technological impacts, basic universal principles need to be evoked and applied. When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. One could describe them in the following manner: Research and innovation should be conducted responsibly. Publicly funded research and innovation should be focused fairly on socially beneficial targets. Research and innovation should promote and not hinder social justice. The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution of public funds for research and innovation. This paper is in three parts. The first part discusses the above principles and introduces the Rawlsian Difference Principle. The second part identifies how RRI is currently applied by public funding bodies. The third part discusses the operationalisation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle in responsible funding decisions. (shrink)

Incidental findings and secondary findings, being results that are unrelated to the diagnostic question, are the subject of an important debate in the practice of clinical genomic medicine. Arguments for reporting these results or not doing so typically relate to the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence. However, these principles frequently conflict and are insufficient by themselves to come to a conclusion. This study investigates empirically how ethical principles are considered when actually reporting IFs or SFs (...) and how value conflicts are weighed. A qualitative focus group study has been undertaken, including a multidisciplinary group of professionals from Belgian centres for medical genetics. The data were analysed thematically. All eight Belgian centres participated in this study. Ethical values were frequently referred to for disclosure policies on IFs and SFs. Participants invoked respect for patient autonomy to support the disclosure of IFs and opt-out options for IFs and SFs, non-maleficence for the professional delineation of reportable IFs and opt-out options for IFs and SFs and beneficence for the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs, the delineation of reportable IFs and a current decline of actively pursued SFs. Professional assumptions about patients’ genetic literacy were an important factor in the weighing of values. In line with the traditional bioethical discourse, the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs might be interpreted as a “technological, soft paternalism”. Restricting patients’ choices might be acceptable, but then its motives should be valid and its beneficent outcomes highly plausible. Hence, the presuppositions of technological, soft paternalism - patients’ inability to make informed decisions, normative rationality, the efficacy of beneficent outcomes and the delineated spectrum of beneficence - should be approached critically. Moreover, distributive justice should be considered an important value in the delineation of the current scope of the ethical debate on IFs and SFs. This study of guiding values may stimulate the debate on the ethical grounds for a solid policy on IFs and SFs internationally. (shrink)

Commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have sparked profound controversies concerning adequate approaches to risk regulation. Scientific uncertainty and ambiguity, omitted research areas, and lack of basic knowledge crucial to risk assessmentshave become apparent. The objective of this article is to discuss the policy and practical implementation of the Precautionary Principle. A major conclusion is that the void in scientific understanding concerning risks posed by secondary effects and the complexity ofcause-effect relations warrant further research. Initiatives to approach the acceptance (...) or rejection of a number of risk-associated hypotheses is badly needed. Further, since scientific advice plays a key role in GMOregulations, scientists have a responsibility to address and communicate uncertainty to policy makers and the public. Hence, the acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension. (shrink)

In his 1786 essay on the pantheism controversy, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant implies that ‘the maxim of reason's self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ is reason's first principle for orienting itself in thinking supersensible objects. But Kant does not clearly explain what the maxim or principle of reason's self-preservation is and how it fits into his larger project of critical philosophy. Nor does the secondary literature. This article reconstructs Kant's discussion of the principle of reason's self-preservation in (...) ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ It suggests that this principle is best understood as the discipline of pure reason. The principle of reason's self-preservation performs the same methodological function that Kant assigns to the discipline of pure reason. This principle establishes the rule of law in reason and subjects reason to its own laws. In so doing, it prevents reason's dialectical errors and also grounds reason's faith (Vernunftglaube), which in turn systematically conditions the practical use of reason. (shrink)

In chapter 3 of Wild Animal Ethics Johannsen argues for a collective obligation based on beneficence to intervene in nature in order to reduce the suffering of wild animals. In the same chapter he claims that the non-identity problem is merely a “theoretical puzzle” which doesn’t affect our reasons for intervention. In this paper I argue that the non-identity problem affects both the strength and the nature of our reasons to intervene. By intervening in nature on a large scale we (...) change which animals come into existence. In doing so, we enable harmful animals to inflict harms on other animals, and we put other animals in harm’s way. The harms that these animals will inflict and endure are foreseeable. Furthermore, since non-human animals aren’t moral agents, harmful animals cannot be morally responsible for their harmful actions. I argue therefore that by causing animals to exist, knowing that they will inflict and suffer harms, we become morally responsible for those harms. By engaging in identity-affecting actions then we take on secondary moral duties towards the animals we have thereby caused to exist, and these secondary moral duties may be extremely demanding, even more so than the initial costs of intervention. Finally, these duties are duties of justice rather than duties of beneficence, and as such are more stringent than purely beneficence-based moral reasons. Furthermore, this conclusion flows naturally from several plausible principles which Johannsen explicitly endorses. (shrink)

The non-discrimination principle is one of the essential principles in the area of European public and private law too. The importance of this principle also takes a great place in field of company law, especially in the area of “freedom of establishment of the companies” in the European Single Market. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the general concept of “free movement of people, capital, goods and services,” in ESM. In fact, freedom of establishment is a (...) substantive part of the process of creation the internal market in EU. The freedom of establishment is based on the Treaty of the functioning of EU. According to article 49 from TFEU, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. This prohibition also applies to restrictions on setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. In-depth exploration of this issue is conditioned by the interpretation of the Court of justice of European Union, which embodies the real legal regime of freedom of establishment. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the principles of healthy and fair competition and equal access of the companies too. This article seeks to elaborate fundamental theoretical aspects of this issue, considering certain case - study analyze of CJEU judgements. The main focus is on the non-discrimination principle, legal effects of the CJEU judgments, free market and competitiveness, and finally, determination of the concept of primary and secondary establishment of companies in EU. (shrink)

The article “Prevention of corruption in public procurement: importance of general legal principles” examines the importance of general legal principles in the sphere of public purchases. The purpose of the work is to analyse the information on possible methods of prevention of and fight against corruption. The main result of the work is the conclusion that strict adherence to the general legal principles is one of the corruption-reducing factors. While combating corruption in the field of public procurement, (...) general legal principles should not be divided into primary and secondary principles, because they are all equally important and complement each other. Audit of the normative acts regulating public procurement shall be performed in the Member States of the European Union; positivisation of the following principles will effectively prevent manifestations of corruption in the area of public procurement: the principle of responsibility; principle of permanent composition of the procurement commission; the principle of in dubio pro reo; the principle of compensation; the principle of control; the principle of objectivity; the principle of completing the procurement procedure within a reasonable time period. (shrink)

A fundamental tenet of the primary/secondary quality distinction is that objects possessing only primary qualities cause (or cause ideas of ) secondary qualities. While Berkeley acknowledged the causal hypothesis "that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary qualities,... depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture and motion of the minute particles of matter" ( Principles §10), he seems to provide no reply to it. This paper defends the thesis that Principles §10 (...) contains an implicit reply to the causal hypothesis. It was a widely accepted principle that the cause of a phenomenon must be numerically distinct from its effect. Call this the distinctness thesis. Insofar as Berkeley shows that the primary qualities cannot be conceived as entities distinct from all secondary qualities, there is no ground for claiming numerical distinctness between the alleged cause and its effect. So, the causal hypothesis is rejected. The paper shows that the distinctness thesis was widely accepted and provides evidence that Berkeley accepted it. It sketches a distinction between an ontological and an epistemological approach to the Berkeley's works. It concludes with some speculation on why Berkeley did not make his criticism of the causal hypothesis explicit. (shrink)

We argue that the fundamental assertion underlying Mach's critique of Newton's first law is that inertial motion is not motion in the absence of causes; rather, it is motion whose cause lies in some homogeneous aspect of the environment. We distinguish this formal requirement (Mach's principle) from two hypotheses which Mach considers concerning the origin of inertia: that the distant stars play (1) a merely “collateral” or (2) a “fundamental” role in the causal determination of inertial motion. -/- In his (...) later writings, Mach deliberately avoids referring to the concept of causation, and indeed, this has made the interpretation of Mach's principle a subject of widespread controversy. However, in his earlier writings, the substance of Mach's critique is less ambiguously expressed. Therefore, close attention is given to Mach's early writings and the evolution of his thought. Various accounts in the secondary literature on Mach's principle, in particular those of Norton and DiSalle, are assessed on this basis. We end with a defence of the Machian status and legitimacy of the early Einstein's research program. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: COVID-19 elicited a rapid emergence of new mutual aid networks in the US, but the practices of these networks are understudied. Using qualitative methods, we explored the empirical ethics guiding US-based mutual aid networks' activities, and assessed the alignment between principles and practices as networks mobilized to meet community needs during 2020–21. We conducted in-depth interviews with 15 mutual aid group organizers and supplemented these with secondary source materials on mutual aid activities and participant observation of mutual (...) aid organizing efforts. We analyzed participants' practices in relation to key mutual aid principles as defined in the literature: 1) solidarity not charity; 2) non-hierarchical organizational structures; 3) equity in decision-making; and 4) political engagement. Our data also yielded a fifth principle, "mutuality," essential to networks' approaches but distinct from anarchist conceptions of mutualism. While mutual aid networks were heavily invested in these ethical principles, they struggled to achieve them in practice. These findings underscore the importance of mutual aid praxis as an intersection between ethical principles and practices, and the challenges that contemporary, and often new, mutual aid networks responding to COVID-19 face in developing praxis during a period of prolonged crisis. We develop a theory-of-change model that illuminates both the opportunities and the potential pitfalls of mutual aid work in the context of structural inequities, and shows how communities can achieve justice-oriented mutual aid praxis in current and future crises. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality (...) means that the PSP has a firm foundation in inductive-causal reasoning. (shrink)

Kant’s justification of possession appears to beg the question (petitio principii) by assuming rather than proving the legitimacy of possession. The apparent question-begging in Kant’s argument has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the secondary literature. A detailed terminological, textual, and logical analysis of Kant’s argument reveals that he provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it (...) is in Kant’s Critical sense ‘metaphysical’ because it applies the pure a priori ‘Universal Principles of Right’ to the concept of finite rational human agency. The application of this principle implicitly involves a ‘Contradiction in Conception’ test. I explicate this test in detail and show, inter alia, how Kant’s argument relates to the modern natural law tradition. I further argue that Kant’s ‘Universal Principle of Right’ is justified by appeal to a fundamental principle of justification, the Principle of Mutual Acceptability. This justification also suggests that the debate between Kantians and Utilitarians about whether human ‘dignity’ is an incommensurable value is moot because Kant’s test of the Categorical Imperative need not appeal to ‘dignity’. Finally, I show that the limited rights to possession and use justified by Kant’s argument suffice for his social contract argument for the legitimacy of the state. (shrink)

About 80 or 90 percent of high school graduates associate their life plans with study in higher and specialized secondary educational institutions and with work in the area of professions of mental labor. However, the real prospect for the majority of youth entering independent life in the 1970s and 1980s is the acquisition of a labor skill. Today the choice of a path in life by youth is in many respects spontaneous and random. Only about 40 percent of those (...) entering higher educational institutions are confident of the correctness of their choice, and about one-third of the graduates are unhappy with the choice they made. When he takes a job, a young person, after ten years in school, is not only compelled immediately to fill gaps in his knowledge and relearn things but to reorient himself psychologically. For many it is only at that moment that the tortuous "search for themselves" begins, and in connection with a job, a migration from job to job. The losses to all concerned that this involves have a common source: the gap between school and life has not yet been closed. (shrink)

A legal system consists of a complex body of practices—primary and secondary—, particularly practices of reasoning and justification. The intellectual, theorized aspect of legal order is embodied in legal doctrine: the corpus of norm-sentences, norms and rules, principles, doctrines and concepts used as basis for legal reasoning and justification. It includes elaborate conceptual structures of principles and doctrines, explicit and sophisticated forms of reflection and criticism. It is only when we have understood the nature of legal doctrine (...) that we can comprehend the workings of courts, lawyers and even legislatures. Concerning the need for a new conception of legal theory one question arises, above all, especially when external and internal observation as well as the critical reflection of the premises and presuppositions of all dealings with the law permit a degree of distance, the question, namely, whether it is not an increasing application of scientific methods that is needed, in the sense that the development of a legal theory from the beginning involves the integration of a norm-descriptive point of view and intellectual stand-point with the norm-prescriptive theory of law, by way of complementing each other, as it were (multi-level-approach to law). This, at least, appears to be the only way of clarifying also the relationship between le­gal theory and philosophy and the theory and sociology of law. The inevitable consequences of the development of a theory of norms and action also have to be drawn from this. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Latin Aristotle Commentaries, V: Bibliography of Secondary Literature, and: Latin Aristotle Commentaries, I.2: Medieval Authors M–ZWilliam J. CourtenayCharles H. Lohr. Latin Aristotle Commentaries, V: Bibliography of Secondary Literature. Unione Accademica Nazionale, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Subsidia XV. Florence: SISMEL–Editioni del Galluzzo, 2005. Pp. xiv + 567. Cloth, €90.00.Charles H. Lohr. Latin Aristotle Commentaries, I.2: Medieval Authors M–Z. Unione Accademica Nazionale, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Subsidia XVIII. (...) Florence: SISMEL–Editioni del Galluzzo, 2010. Pp. xiii + 208. Cloth, €95.00.These two books are part of a series of volumes that will bring into final publication form one of the most significant scholarly achievements of the last half-century, Charles Lohr's inventory of the authors and manuscripts of Latin commentaries on the works of Aristotle up to 1650. The project began in the 1960s, and the initial results for the Middle Ages were published sequentially as articles in Traditio between 1967 and 1974, and the inventory for the period from 1500 to 1650 appeared in Studies in the Renaissance and Renaissance Quarterly between 1974 and 1981. The project was modeled along the lines of two great research tools achieved earlier in the twentieth century at Freiburg by Friedrich Stegmüller, namely his Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (1947) and his Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi (1940–). Now, through the Unione Accademica Nazionale and SISMEL, both of Lohr's inventories in revised and expanded form are being published as stand-alone volumes. The first two that appeared were Latin Aristotle Commentaries, II: Renaissance Authors (Subsidia VI, 1988), followed by Latin Aristotle Commentaries, III: Index initiorum—index finium (Subsidia X, 1995). The two volumes being reviewed here are the next two installments.The first of these, the Bibliography of Secondary Literature, is a much-expanded version of Lohr's Commentateurs d'Aristote au moyen-âge latin: Bibliographie de la littérature secondaire récente, Vestigia 2 (Fribourg-Paris, 1988). The intent of that volume was, as the title indicates, to provide a list of the scholarly literature on Aristotelian commentaries since the publication of the articles in Traditio, as well as some older literature that had not been included earlier in the entries for each author. The present version of this work is more than twice as large as the 1988 version, adding books and articles that were missed in the earlier bibliographies as well as publications since 1986 (the cutoff date for the earlier edition). Moreover, the Commentateurs d'Aristote provided a bibliography only for medieval commentaries, while the new Bibliography of Secondary Literature begins with a section covering literature about translations of the works of Aristotle and their Wirkungsgeschichte, then [End Page 141] the section for the literature on medieval authors, and finally the section for bibliography on Renaissance authors.The organization of the bibliography for authors that have generated extensive literature is more complex than for the others. The longer bibliographies are divided into works concerned with biographical information and manuscripts; general accounts; and, depending on the contributions of a specific author, sections on logic, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and practical philosophy. Within each of these sections the literature is arranged by date of publication, moving from the older to the most recent (limited, of course, by the cutoff date at which this volume was prepared for publication, apparently around 2003). The principle of inclusion was broad, citing works that relate tangentially to the subject areas of Aristotelian philosophy mentioned. And although bibliographies of this kind should be made available on the Internet, where they can be continually expanded and updated, it is useful and pleasurable to have such a volume on the shelf at one's fingertips, particularly for those of us still attuned to a print culture.The other volume, Latin Aristotle Commentaries, I.2: M–Z, published in 2010, is the second half of the revised edition of medieval authors and their commentaries on Aristotle's works. Some bibliography is included here in the individual entries, but only what relates to the manuscripts. The entries consist of a brief biographical sketch of the author, followed by the list of commentaries (both extant and lost), each one with an... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ARISTOTELIAN FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. Pontijicia Universitas Gregoriana Rome, Italy INTRODUCTION* I N THE Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2,1 Thomas Aquinas identifies what is often spoken of as "the first principle of practical reason"-that is, "that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Thomas explains: All other precepts of the natural law are based upon (...) this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) *I am grateful to Peter Ryan, S.J. and Stephen Brock for commenting on a draft of this paper. 1I shall use a number of abbreviations: ST= Summa Theologiae; An.Post. =Posterior analytics; An.Pr. =Prior analytics; DA =De anima; EE =Eudemian ethics; EN = Nicomachean Ethics; GA =De generatione animalium; lnsomn. =De insomniis; Int. = De interpretatione; Metaph. =Metaphysics; MM= Magna moralia; Phys. =Physics; R. =Republic; Rhet. =Rhetorica; SE =Sophistici elenchi; FPPR =the first principle of practical reason; PNC =the principle of non-contradiction. I also use a number of transliterated Greek terms such as akolasia (depravity), akolastos (depraved person), akrasia (weakness of will), akrates (person subject to weakness of will), egkrateia (continence in spite of temptation), egkrates (person who remains continent in spite of temptation ), and phronesis (practical wisdom). I use them for brevity's sake and since they have also found their way into the standard philosophical vocabulary, at least in Aristotelian studies. I also speak in this essay as if Aristotle was the author of MM. For an argument in favor of a qualified understanding of this thesis, see note 14. For the Greek text of the works of Aristotle I have for the most part used the Oxford Classical Texts. The one major exception is Susemihl's edition of the MM: Franz Susemihl, ed., Aristotelis: Magna moralia (Leipzig: Tuubner, 1883). For most (but not all) of the translations from Aristotle, I have made use of Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For English translations of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, I have used the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920). 441 442 KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.' As its name suggests, the first principle of practical reason (FPPR) is no incidental tenet. Thomas compares it in this same article to the first principle of theoretical reason, better known as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): "that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time."3 On the other hand, it is also commonly acknowledged that Thomas's (philosophical) ethical theory is Aristotelian. How is it then that we never hear of an Aristotelian first principle of practical reason, either in the secondary literature or (as it seems) in Aristotle himself? I shall argue in this essay that there is such a principle in Aristotle's ethical theory and that it has the logical status that Thomas attributes to it. It is none other than the well-known paradoxical Socratic principle that no one deliberately does wrong4-understood in a certain way. (I shall refer to this principle as "the Socratic Principle.") I shall also argue that Aristotle has a fairly elaborate theory about how, psychologically, a person accommodates himself to a violatiqn of the first principle of practical reason. I shall leave one issue unaddressed: whether (as in the question from ST above) Aristotle's FPPR includes "all other precepts of the natural law." It will be apparent, however, 2 The best exegesis of this article of ST is Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A... (shrink)

How was the world generated and how does matter continue to be ordered so that the world can continue functioning? Questions like these have existed as long as humanity has been capable of rational thought. In antiquity, Plato's Timaeus introduced the concept of the Demiurge, or Craftsman-god, to answer them. This lucid and wide-ranging book argues that the concept of the Demiurge was highly influential on the many discussions operating in Middle Platonist, Gnostic, Hermetic and Christian contexts in the first (...) three centuries AD. It explores key metaphysical problems such as the origin of evil, the relationship between matter and the First Principle and the deployment of ever-increasing numbers of secondary deities to insulate the First Principle from the sensible world. It also focuses on the decreasing importance of demiurgy in Neoplatonism, with its postulation of procession and return. (shrink)

According to a subjectivist view of some concept, C, there is an a priori implication of subjective responses in C's application or possession conditions. Subjectivists who intend their view to be descriptive of our practice with C will hold that it is possible for there to be true empirical claims which explain such responses in terms of certain things being C. Mark Johnston's "missing-explanation argument" employs a substitution principle with a view to establishing that these strands of subjectivism are inconsistent. (...) I suggest that Johnston's substitution principle survives an attempt by Alex Miller to show that it is unreliable, but that it is prey to a counterexample which cannot be explained away by the proponent of the missing-explanation argument. I conclude that the missing-explanation argument poses no threat to subjectivism. (shrink)

This paper examines how the metaphysical theses of the Liber de causis are read in De ecclesiastica potestate of Giles of Rome. The hypothesis of this study is that the causal models developed in both texts are different, and therefore the metaphysical theses of the first cannot be the basis for the political theses of the second. Both in the Liber de causis and in De ecclesiastica potestate there is only one causal chain, i.e. in both texts “all power” comes (...) from God. However, this does not imply that in the Liber de causis “the power of all” comes from God. On the contrary, in the Liber de causis, the secondary causes are sovereign in their action. Thus, the political model of the “plenitudo potestatis” - and of expiry of the legal order - built in De ecclesiastica potestate cannot be derived from the metaphysics set out in the Liber de causis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE IMPACT OF VER/TATIS SPLENDOR ON CATHOLIC EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY AND SECONDARY LEVELS* CARDINAL PIO LAGHI Prefect of the Sacred Congregationfor Catholic Education INTRODUCTION T HE TOPIC which has been proposed to me, "The Impact of Veritatis Splendor on Catholic Education at the University and Secondary Levels,'' requires a note of clarification with regard to the word impact. When this Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul (...) II appeared, it was received with much comment, both positive and negative, on the part of the press and the other media. This is one aspect of the topic proposed : to trace in a synthetic way a picture of the reactions which the document stirred. Such would certainly be an interesting study, but I would perhaps be led to traverse much terrain before arriving at the nucleus of what I feel is my duty to say to you. I shall limit myself, therefore, to commenting on two positive reactions appearing in Italian newspapers immediately after the publication of the Encyclical. The first was in the well-known Roman newspaper, Il Tempo, under the title, "An Act of Consistency in an Epoch of Doubt." It states: "If lighthouses had been moved every month, the sailors in the night would have seen the ships of history dashed against the rocks; and no voyager would have reached his homeland again if the North Star, within the Zodiac, had to obey vacillating positions of fashions and ideologies.... The papal document stirs discussions.... Nevertheless it is very much of current interest. While many ships finish on the rocks because they have * This paper was originally presented at the Forum on Catholic University Education at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, 3 November 1995. 1 2 CARDINAL PIO LAGHI sailed following fireflies instead of lighthouses and while the ruling classes have shipwrecked for having chosen compasses that lie, there is abroad a need to see the permanence of certain values recognized in the midst of all that changes, the necessity of an ethical nucleus linked to principles of the human person, honesty, freedom and responsibility." This is a positive reaction, then, which welcomes the Encyclical as a text which says things that have to be said, giving basic directions for a journey, and stating the things no one dares to speak but of which everyone knows the necessity in daily living. This is also the substance of another comment on the Encyclical that I think it would be useful to cite. Carlo Bo, a university professor and a well-known figure in Italian intellectual life, writes: "Modern culture no longer has objective criteria for distinguishing good from evil,'' and he adds, "John Paul II has fought against Communism in defense of freedom; now he criticizes Western culture, which makes of freedom an absolute value.... The exaltation of freedom leads to ethical relativism, against which the Pope raises his voice." Agreement and basic approval are transparent in these lines, but the title under which they appear is "A Call to Order." Immediately the image is evoked-negative to the sensitivities of our times-of a commander intent on imposing order on his soldiers. The heart of the problem perhaps, at least with regard to the teaching of moral theology in the Catholic context, is in the clear perception of the need for an unchanging point of reference, of a lighthouse for the voyage, and at the same time the fear of speaking of this need, of making it the subject of reflection, communication, and teaching. There is a kind of widespread fear which keeps us at a distance from the truth, from the permanent foundations of human acting, from the objective and the universal; a fear which is perhaps the principal cause on account of which so great a part of contemporary humanity risks dying of thirst while standing before a spring of cool water. In order not to appear authoritarian or negative, one keeps silent, does not speak, expresses oneself in a partial or even an erroneous way with regard to all that is most necessary for life. It would be difficult not to see in this a problem which is typically an educa- THE IMPACT OF VERITATIS SPLENDOR 3... (shrink)

The Wadsworth series of Studies in Philosophical Criticism under the general editorship of Alexander Sesonske, presents collections of critical writings related to a single classical philosophical text for use in undergraduate teaching. Although others of Berkeley's writings are drawn upon by various authors, the selections in this volume are divided into five problem areas which are covered in the Principles. Many of the essays present strong points of view and should help involve students in the dialogue of philosophy. In (...) some, Berkeley serves chiefly as the occasion for the exercise of contemporary philosophical techniques. This accords with the intended function of the series to show the relevance of historical texts to current issues, openly acknowledging that each time teaches the philosophical past in its own terms. The section "Minds and Ideas" includes essays by S. A. Grave, Turbayne, and Monroe Beardsley. The section "Perception and Existence" reprints Mill on the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, Hume on Personal Identity, Chisholm on Phenomenalism, and an essay by Konrad Marc-Wogau on the Esse-Est-Percipi principle. The third section is "Philosophy and Science." It has two essays, one by T. E. Jessop, the other, Popper's note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach and Einstein, which makes considerable use of De Motu. "Primary and Secondary Qualities" are treated in a selection from Thomas Reid, and an essay by Jonathan Bennett. The final section, "The Existence of God," consists of articles by Bennett and E. J. Furlong. There is a short general bibliography and a list of critical essays which includes many items from the 1950s and 1960s on each sectional topic.--M. B. M. (shrink)

In this study, secondary school DKAB (Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge) lesson’s belief learning domain has been examined structurally. In this context, the basic principles of belief have been discussed according to Māturīdīsm, Ash'arism, Mutazilite and in places according to Shia. The common points and different aspects of the ideas in the domain of belief of these schools have been examined in a comparative way. Subjects such as the attribute of taqwin/creation, which is the main discussion between Māturīdīsm (...) and Ashʿarism, whether Allah can be known by reason, whether the good and the evil are determined by reason or nass/verses are the examples. Additionally existance of the immutable attributes and that whether they are eternal or not, that whether ru’yatullah/seeing God is possible or not and the conditions of the afterlife which have been points of discussion between Mutazilite and Ahl es-Sunnah have been handled in the article. Surely these are matters of extensive discussion; this study evaluated these topics in the pedagogical context of the belief learning domain of the DKAB lesson. Firstly the theological background of the belief learning domain of DKAB lesson has been handled. Then learning outcomes which are the first elements of the curriculum have been classified. And thirdly the text books which are the second dimension of the curriculum have been analyzed. The method of the study is document analysis. Belief is the first of the learning domains designated as worship, morality, Prophet Muhammad and culture, and it is also of great importance because it is the basis of other learning domains. Belief learning domain is in the interest of curriculum designers in terms of having some pedagogical features but it must also be in harmony with theological acceptances as it is one of the basic components of religiosity. The theological background is also directly related to the political and legal context of the lesson, such as doctriner and non-confessional status. Because when various interpretations of religion do not have common points or when the common points are weak, the non-confessional feature will always be a controversial matter. In theological texts God has been described as essential, the almighty, the omniscient and one who intervenes in the history. Discussions between Kalam schools and philosophical schools about God's attributes, or the discussions within the Kalam schools are very important in terms of reflecting God-universe-human relationship. One of the most important problems in this issue is that the conception of God is not decisive, and that the conception of matter and human must be compatible with the conception of God. Developing a theology in the context of God's attributes, excluding matter and human conceptions leads to an over-abstraction of the theological background. Moreover, changes in the conception of matter and human will harm the conception of God, and the contribution of religious education to those who searching for meaning will decrease. The fact that the faith principles of Islamic religion do not vary depending on the sects strengthens the status of non-confessional religous education. In addition, an essential God conceptualization facilitates the management of people their lives. For believers, life has a purpose and it is a preparation for the afterlife. Furthermore in the context of cultural knowledge, gaining in-depth knowledge is a remarkable support for social life. On the other hand, the achievements in the lesson curriculum are at the first levels in terms of taxonomy and this shows that the lesson does not support high level learning and identity formation. Considering the speed and severity of the transformation in social life, it is necessary to provide some qualities that will support the construction of self and personality of those who take religious education. However, the low level of objectives of the curriculum and the one-dimensionality of Bloom's taxonomy used in the curriculum have been an unsolved problem for a long time. This points out the importance of developing a curriculum of religious education, taking into account the theological background and the individual and social dimensions of human beings. On the other hand, it can be thought that there are some problems in the establishment of the relationship between God-universe-human in the textbooks. Although the content is suitable for personal God representation and gives prominence to causality tought, when it comes to the idea of order of the universe, it contradicts with personal God representation and moral development. When the idea of order is over-objectivized in the textbooks, it becomes unclear how God intervenes in the universe. So, it remains suspended that the learners how make sense of events and their actions. (shrink)

The main designs of modern theories of syntax assume a process of syntagmatic organization. However, research on first language acquisition leaves no doubt that the structured combination of single lexical items cannot begin until a critical mass of lexical items has been acquired such that the lexicon is structured hierarchically on the basis of hierarchical feature bundling. Independent of a decision between the main views about the design of a proto language (the grammarless “Holophrastic view”,Arbib & Bickerton 2010: 1,Bickerton 2014) (...) or the ‘Compositional View’ as taken byRizzi (2010),Carstairs-McCarthy (2010), and others. What seems to be the minimal offset for language is the existence of grammatical categories like verb and noun, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, functional categories as needed for the expression of all kinds of agreement between the distinct categories to form recursively structured complexes. I follow the different stages of complexification asking whether there is paradigmatic next to syntagmatic organization and what its added value is for the evolution of grammar. The conclusion will be that paradigmatics is an indismissible part of the organization of early language in that it structures the lexicon so as to make primary and secondary syntactic merge possible and, consequently, is also a prerequisite for movement. The guiding idea of this position is Roman Jakobson’s insistence on the twofold organization of language and grammar. The two organizational designs, syntagmatics and paradigmatics, are manifest within each module: in the phonetic, the morphological, the syntactic, the semantic, and the pragmatic form (consider Jakobson’s1971a,breiterated argument). (shrink)

In November 1664, a comet appeared in the European skies; by early March 1665, it had disappeared, but, at this very moment, another comet appeared, which stayed among the stars until mid-April. Observations of these two comets were made all over Europe, and even beyond. Although most secondary literature dedicated to these two comets has been focused on England and Italy, France was not to be outdone in terms of observations, small talk and publications. In this paper, I would (...) like to use the books that were published on these comets in France as a dispersive prism to understand the ongoing controversies about which principles should be accepted in natural philosophy in the mid-sixties. There were indeed several intellectual and institutional circumstances that gave a specific twist to the French debate: the sixties marked the beginning of the war between Jesuits and Cartesians that was to enflame learned France until the late nineties at least, they were also the period of gestation for the future Académie des sciences, and, finally, it is also during these years that French elites began to discredit systematically the practice of astrology as a popular superstition. My working hypothesis in this paper is that, in such circumstances, the two comets of 1664–1665 were an occasion for each camp to advocate publicly its positions about the proper principles for natural philosophy. By natural philosophical principles, I mean both ontological and epistemological principles. (shrink)