This article provides a reading of al-Fārābī's (d. 950) thought on the soul in the context of the theory of perfection. Although al-Fārābī's theory of the soul has been the subject of various studies and the importance of the subject of perfection in al-Fārābī's philosophy has been revealed, how this subject pervades al-Fārābī's narrative and philosophy in general has not been shown in detail through texts with a phenomenological approach. With phenomenological approach here, the article aims to analyze the problem (...) through al-Fārābī's lens in reference to his texts. This article seeks to contribute to the literature to show how the issue of perfection is embedded in the theory of the soul and the classification of sciences. For this purpose, issues such as the theory of degrees, which permeate the whole of al-Fārābī's philosophy, are also examined in the context of the idea of perfection and tajawḥur.The article's main problem is determining how al-Fārābī's approaches in the theory of the soul are shaped through the idea of perfection. In this con-text, the main argument of the article is as follows: Al-Fārābī combines the material and immaterial aspects of the soul by emphasizing the concept of substantialization (tajawḥur) in his theory of the soul and constructs a theory that should be called the dynamic theory of the soul. The claim put forward in this study is that the idea of perfection is a theory that affects the whole of al-Fārābī's philosophy and should be the basis for the interpretation of al-Fārābī's philosophy. Although this issue has been analyzed from different perspectives, this study's main problem is showing how the idea of perfection permeates the theory of the soul and how it affects al-Fārābī's preferences. In this respect, a close reading of al-Fārābī's texts on the subject has been conducted to justify this claim. While this reading is carried out in the context of the soul's relation with matter and its perfection through the sciences, the issue of happiness as the soul's ultimate goal is left out due to its complexity that would require a separate study.In this framework, the study first shows how al-Fārābī constructs the idea of substantialization (tajawḥur). Subsequently, the article focuses on the description of substantialization through the intellect. Al-Fārābī's explanations in the context of the concept of ḳuwwa are also examined in terms of the role this critical concept plays in the process of substantialization of the soul and intellect. This is because al-Fārābī interprets the Aristotelian meaning of the concept of potentiality by explaining this concept in a way that regulates the soul's transformation processes. This study emphasizes that al-Fārābī's interpretation is shaped within the framework of his dynamic theory of the soul.Al-Fārābī grounds the process of the soul's coming into existence in terms of being an intermediate being between material and immaterial existence. This justification is important in terms of observing al-Fārābī's position vis-à-vis dualist and materialist conceptions of human beings. Al-Fārābī adopts neither a fully dualist nor a fully materialist approach. The point emphasized in this study is that this approach gives al-Fārābī's theory of the soul a dynamic character. On the other hand, al-Fārābī clearly emphasizes that intellectual perfection is realized through the sciences. In this respect, the substantialization of the soul through the intellect also manifests itself as a scientific perfection. For al-Fārābī, the science of logic constitutes the dynamo of the perfection of the faculty of thinking. In this respect, al-Fārābī's classification of sciences is based on the idea of perfection. (shrink)

While there has been a resurgence in Malebranche scholarship in the anglophone world over the last twenty years, most of it has focused on Malebranche’s theory of ideas, and little attention has been paid to his philosophy of mind. Schmaltz’s book thus comes as a welcome addition to the Malebranche literature; that he has given us such a well-researched and carefully argued study is even more welcome. The focus of this work is Malebranche’s split with Descartes on the question of (...) our knowledge of the nature of the mind; the book concentrates specifically on Malebranche’s rejection of the claim that we know the nature of the mind better than we know the nature of body. Schmaltz maintains that Malebranche’s arguments for his position are, for the most part, successful against the Cartesians who opposed him, though he claims—and this is perhaps the central claim of the book—that “Malebranche took his negative thesis concerning our knowledge of the soul to involve not so much a rejection of Cartesianism as an internal correction of it”. While acknowledging that Augustine was “the primary inspiration for [Malebranche’s] view of the ideas that are the objects of perception”, Schmaltz’s interpretation of Malebranche’s theory of the soul “presents it as fundamentally Cartesian”. According to Schmaltz, not only is Malebranche closer to Descartes in this regard than is generally thought, he is closer to him than are many other Cartesians. Part 1 of the book examines Malebranche’s position that while we have certain knowledge of the soul’s existence, we have only confused knowledge of its nature. Part 2 focuses on Arnauld’s objection that if in fact we had no clear idea of the soul, we could not, despite Malebranche’s claims to the contrary, know anything of its immortality, spirituality, or freedom. (shrink)

The article highlights the conceptual issues related to Kant’s analysis of the soul, a concept of utmost importance for the metaphysics and psychology of German academic philosophy (Schulphilosophie) of the Enlightenment was significantly dependent on the developed and systematically presented philosophical and scientific ideas and concepts of Christian Wolff. Kantian philosophy, its themes, and conceptual language were formed in the crucible of Wolfean discourse, and from the early 1770s in the struggle against it, which led to the emergence of a (...) new, critical philosophy – transcendental idealism, in which the problem of the soul, consciousness, and self-awareness became fundamental. It is this issue that was thoroughly covered in the «Critique of Pure Reason» and other works that were published later, after the first Critique. The article draws attention to Kant’s Lectures, which, on the one hand, demonstrate his critical attitude towards the so-called Wolfians, their metaphysics, and psychology, and, on the other hand, the lecture materials illustrate Kant's new conceptual position, and, what is important, develop, supplement and clarify it. The sources of Kant’s lectures are highlighted, taking into account the fact that we have at our disposal lecture notes, the authors of which are either unknown or, if known, their authorship is still somewhat doubtful, since they are notes that different people have rewritten. The article analyses lecture notes on psychology, the authors of which are more or less well-known, and experts recognize these notes as quite valid. The conceptual content of these lectures allows us to look at Kant’s understanding of the problem of the soul in a somewhat broader context compared to the «Critique of Pure Reason», where this problem is analyzed in connection with the paralogisms of reason and the transcendental deduction of categories. In his lectures on psychology, Kant draws attention to the problem of the interaction of the soul with the human body, the «location of the soul», linking it not so much to the organs of the human body (for example, the head) as to the location of a person as a bodily being in the world makes all acts of consciousness, self-awareness, and sense perception possible. Kant emphasizes the basic importance of such a spatial location of a person for the soul, as something that belongs to a person with a certain integrity, and not a separate organ, to act properly, to perform its cognitive functions. The article analyses the problem of existence, which is important for critical philosophy, its various modalities, and predication, with a special emphasis on the problem of the existence of metaphysical objects - the soul, God, and the world as a whole. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:570 BOOK REVIEWS like reasonable rule for economic life. This effort is worthy of more attention than is possible here, but let it be noted that it must inevitably suffer the same fate as any ethical calculus: someone must decide for others what is their due and what is not. How much wealth, for example, makes for a concentration [of wealth] that would be " demonstrably detrimental to some (...) people's exercise of their generic rights "? His is ultimately an entitlement or rights ethic, rather than an aitial ethic of goal-purposive fulfillment for the individual, projected outwards for a common good scenario. While his rejection of goal ethics's inability to detail principles for distribution of goods is noteworthy, it does not appear that a tightened version of generic rights theory will come closer to either of Phillips's desiderata: a justification of moral reasoning apart from any theory of nature or a calculus for its application. Desan and Phillips wish to think against the limits of the human situation. For Desan, rising above limitation is a moral task and obligation facing us each, if there is to be a common future. His call is to be World Citizen in a Polis of Nations. Phillips's vision is more concrete, a distribution of benefits to benefit all with well-being and freedom. But this mundane task is no less difficult than Desan's transcendent one. Indeed, according to Augustine, even the Divine Mind must utilize an artifice in dealing with human creation: "He loves each of us as though there were only one of us." Both ethicists have striven to show us how we might think this vision for ourselves, i.e., for each other of us. ]OIIN B. DAVIS, O.P. ' Detroit, Michigan Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. By HUGH TREVOR-ROPER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 317. $27.50 (hardbound). Even to list the changes and events which occurred in seventeenth century England is a difficult task: the century spans the period from the death of Queen Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution and beyond, through the Civil War, the accession and exile (twice) of the Stuarts, the rise of science, the transformation of the theological and religious issues of the English Reformation, to name only the most obvious. To conceive a book, in the form of occasional essays, which not only addresses these changes and events but does so by establishing the connections which were present with European currents at the same time surely tempts fate, even when it does not tempt reviewers. BOOK REVIEWS 571 But Hugh Trevor-Roper is a master, both of the period under survey and of the form of the essay. With one exception, each of these essays began as a lecture or seminar paper, and the pleasantly legible style in which they are written must bear some trace of that origin. The occasional flashes of wit, mixed with rthe fairly non-technical style, make the book a joy to read and a welcome escape from the usually constipated style of scholarly prose. In his Introduction, the essayist clearly sets forth his thesis that English intellectual history does not exist apart from the currents of European intellectual history (a thesis for which Trevor-Roper has already staked a claim). That leads to what may very well be the major problem with these essays: its end is in its beginning. The list of names cited in these essays only partially coincides with the list of names in the index; the former is much longer than the latter. And while the style of the essay welcomes the reader to the period, it also throws up more names and places and events than can be explained or even annotated adequately. This occurs both on a large and on a small scale. The first essay, on "Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist" contains such a vast array of names that at times it becomes the prosopo· graphical equivalent of a telephone book. On a large scale, there is the problem with a definition of Arminianism. No definition, at least no formal definition, is attempted-and this is probably wise. But, particularly in... (shrink)

This edition replaces the earlier translation by Walter Lowrie that appeared under the title The Concept of Dread. Along with The Sickness unto Death, the work reflects from a psychological point of view Søren Kierkegaard's longstanding concern with the Socratic maxim, "Know yourself." His ontological view of the self as a synthesis of body, soul, and spirit has influenced philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre, theologians such as Jaspers and Tillich, and psychologists such as Rollo May. In The Concept of (...) Anxiety, Kierkegaard describes the nature and forms of anxiety, placing the domain of anxiety within the mental-emotional states of human existence that precede the qualitative leap of faith to the spiritual state of Christianity. It is through anxiety that the self becomes aware of its dialectical relation between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. (shrink)

The existence of imagination and imaginative perceptions in cognitive system of human being is a topic all philosophers agree about it, but they disagree about the explanation the way the individual alquire imaginary forms as well as the nature of imagination and imaginative perceptions. Ibn Sina considers human soul as having various faculties and considers the imaginative faculty as an intermediate stage in the actualization and acquisition of perceptual forms. In his different books he propounds arguments for the material (...) nature of imagination and in consequence of imaginal forms, but apparently such arguments are based on the principles of Islamic tradition, because he ultimately changes his position and in his "Mubahithat" offers a detailed argument on the abstract nature of imagination and imagnitive perceptions, although he finds it difficut to justify such a notion on the basis of prepatetic principles. His saying on the different degrees of intellect, immortality of souls, children's souls and immortal souls on the stage of material intellect is justifiable with belief in the abstract nature of imagination and perceptual forms. Suhravardi refuses to accept the multiple inner faculties of Ibn Sina, and refers all faculties to an entity and regards these faculties as a shadow of what is in the Nur Esphahbad. For the explanation of acquisition of imaginative perception, he resorts to imaginal world and suspended ideas. (shrink)

Patriarchal institutions govern all aspects of women's lives: their minds, their bodies, and their souls. Additionally, they govern the ways in which women are perceived by others and the ways in which women perceive themselves. (Re) Interpretations: The Shapes of Justice in Women's Experience, is a collection of essays on language, religion, war, sex trafficking, and medicine-the patriarchal structures that form the basis of western society and, thus, are in many ways inherently unjust. The essays illustrate the multitude of ways (...) that women have found to work within and without these structures to create justice. Traditional theories of justice cast it as a cardinal virtue, unbiased and impartial. The essays in this book, however, remove justice from the abstract and return it to the specific: most of the essays use personal narratives to highlight the connections all people share. The women discussed here are challenging the authority of existing patriarchal narratives by telling their versions, and, thus, calling attention to and challenging their own political and social realities. Reflecting a focus on global connectedness and interdisciplinarity, the writers of these essays aim not only to raise questions, but also to show ways in which women are creating new pathways for themselves. Only by exploring solutions will women reclaim justice. From L.A. to Zimbwabe, women have stories to tell about their experiences of justice in the inherently patriarchal institutions of Language, Religion, War, Sex Trafficking, and Medicine. This relevant and thought-provoking collection captures the trials that women across the world face and the hope they create through their courageous actions. Through both personal narrative and factual overview, these essays emphasize that as people committed to justice, women must not simply raise the questions, but they must also explore solutions in order to reclaim justice for themselves, their daughters, their sisters, and their mothers. Contributors: Yifat Bitton, Stephany Ryan Cate, Jo Scott-Coe, Susan Dewey, Carmela Epright, Carmen Faymonville, Adam Gaynor, Pauline Greenhill, Denise Handlarski, Alison Jobe, Marc J.W. de Jong, Jodie M. Lawston, Jody Lisberger, Kristy Maher, Susan Maloney, Mickias Musiyiwa, Ruben Murillo, Annemarie Profanter, Natalie Wilson, and J. Carter Wood. (shrink)

Plato had a great deal to say about the nature and function of the soul, much of it inspired by Socrates’ death by hemlock. According to Plato, the body and soul are two separate entities. The soul, Aristotle hypothesized, is a sort of non‐corporeal nervous system that directs sensory perception, movement, and thought, a great blob of form that animates a matter, entirely useless without a vessel to fill. In direct opposition to Plato and Socrates, Aristotle believed the physical and (...) metaphysical comprised an integrated system, and, therefore, the soul could not exist separate from a body. Medieval theologian, and later saint, Thomas Aquinas, really, really tried to tint the stained‐glass windows rose by combining the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies on the nature of our spiritual guts. Thomas leaned much more heavily on Aristotle than he did on Plato when formulating his own theory of post‐demise, body–soul logistics. (shrink)

The paper aims to show that ανoια is the general term for the diseases of the soul, and that μανία and αμαϑία are not necessarily two distinct species but two levels of the same disease: ignorance signifies the cognitive state, whereas madness indicates both a cognitive state and a specific phenomenal character. Plato's other remarks on psychic ailments can be incorporated into this account. The result can also be accommodated to the general theory of the soul–body relationship in the dialogue. (...) Incarnated souls cannot work without the corresponding activity of the body, even if this does not rule out the possibility for the soul to exist in a discarnate state. (shrink)

In the creation myth of the Timaeus Plato describes God as wishing that all things should be good so far as is possible. Wherefore, finding the whole visible sphere of the world not at rest, but moving in an irregular fashion, out of disorder He brought order, thinking that this was in every way an improvement. To achieve His end He placed intelligence in soul and soul in body, reflecting that nothing unintelligent could ever be better than something intelligent . (...) From this account of creation it would seem that God confronted a chaotic world whose disorderly motions existed in full independence of the principle of soul. Yet, in his doctrinal pronouncements in the Laws and the Pbaedrus on the origin of motion, Plato declares soul to be elder born than bodies and the prime source of all their changes and transformations. (shrink)

The central thesis of Souls Exist is since the idea of God has lost credibility in much of contemporary society, the idea of the soul has suffered a similar fate. In the modern world, the concept of soul is not a meaningful reality for most individuals. The author emphasizes the dehumanizing consequences for those who are not conscious of the existence of their soul and the need for its development. Discussion of the soul's importance is founded on existential (...) realities, not religious myths. The epigraph of Souls Exist is a quotation from St. Augustine in his capacity as a philosopher: "There are only two questions for philosophy; the soul and God." In Souls Exist, this short list is reduced to one. Souls Exist is a metaphysical work and assumes metaphysical consciousness on the part of the readers. The author is an independent philosopher; consequently, the orientation of his writing is neither religious nor academic, but free-spirited and subjective. The issues raised in this work are of great importance for contemporary culture. The initial edition of Souls Exist was published in 1988. This second edition has been extensively revised with an added epilogue that reconsiders the question of God for philosophy. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984; Swinburne 1986) argues that human beings currently alive have non{bodily immaterial parts called souls. In his main argument in support of this conclusion (modal argument), roughly speaking, from the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of their body and a few additional premises, he infers the actual existence of souls. After a brief presentation of the argument we describe the main known objection to it, called the (...) substitution objection (SO for short), which is raised by Alston and Smythe (1994), Zimmerman (1991) and Stump and Kretzmann (1996). We then explain Swinburne's response to it (1996). This constitutes a background for the discussion that follows. First, we formalize Swinburne's argument in a quantified propositional modal language so that it is logically valid and contains no tacit assumptions, clearing up some notational issues as we go. Having done that, we explain why we find Swinburne's response unsatisfactory. Next, we indicate that even though SO is quite compelling (albeit for a slightly different reason than the one given previously in the literature), a weakening of one of the premises yields a valid argument for the same conclusion and yet immune to SO. Even this version of the argument, we argue, is epistemically circular. (shrink)

This article explores Marsilio Ficino's interpretation of Plotinus's notion of tutelary daemon, as found in Enneads III.4. While Plotinus considered external daemons as philosophically insignificant and described one's personal daemon as the highest part of one's soul, Ficino placed great emphasis on the existence of outer daemonic entities which continuously interact with human beings. As a consequence, for Plotinus the soul's tutelary daemon corresponded to man's capability for intellectual knowledge, that is, to his ability to become emancipated from (...) the material world, which, from a Platonic point of view, was made of appearances. Ficino, by contrast, tends to identify the soul's daemonic power with the faculty which he saw as the gateway for the action of external entities: the imagination. The imagination – like a mirror – reflects and retains images of other levels of life and acts as the surface on which external daemons project the forms of their own imagining. Ficino provides a complex account of the relationships between the soul and various layers of daemonic interventions, in which he combines Plotinus's view on personal daemons with elements coming from later forms of daemonology, such as that of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Synesius and Proclus. (shrink)

This essay challenges the portrayal of philosophical idealism as sinful ‘confinement in the self’, arguing that this obscures a relationship between Hegel and Bonhoeffer characterised by variation rather than contradiction. I first trace a limited congeniality between their respective critiques of the ‘beautiful soul’ and the ‘privately virtuous’, showing how both thinkers resist moral isolation through the call to confession. Second, I follow their attempts to overcome an oppositional logic between such social exchange and divine agency, rooted in the syntax (...) of Hegel’s phrase ‘God existing as community’. This provides sharper focus to Bonhoeffer’s variations, changing the subject from God to Christ and the attendant act from reciprocal confession to intercessory prayer. Rather than merely defensive revision, I argue that this reveals an agile Christology which can sustain an ethical posture of ‘being for others’ through the withheld confession and broken trust typical of a communion of sinners. (shrink)

This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much (...) because of freedom from the body as the infusion of pure intelligibles. Thus, the roles of these two types of self-knowledge (particular and universal) are reversed from the case of the embodied soul, where self-consciousness is an effortless concomitant to thought and self-knowledge requires a painstaking labor. I conclude by wondering whether the cognition enjoyed in the separated state has some utility for the soul’s future, re-embodied existence. (shrink)

Medieval thinkers unanimously believed a human soul has various powers. Yet, the latter point is also nearly the only one they agreed upon. In the paper, I focus on two contrary opinions maintained by Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham. Whereas Henry of Ghent held powers of the soul are defined with respect to the activities they are powers-for, Ockham refuted such a contention. To make his point Ockham launches a thought experiment: if God created an intellective soul without (...) creating anything else, wouldn’t the powers in this soul still exist fully? Upon succinctly presenting Henry of Ghent’s view on the powers of the soul, I provide a detailed analysis of Ockham’s counterargument. I argue Henry could still reply to Ockham’s rebuttal, and show how the latter bares a remote resemblance to Avicenna’s flying man argument. (shrink)

Aristote, pendant l'Antiquité grecque, affirmait que "tous les hommes ont un désir naturel de savoir". De cette formule sont nées des questions essentielles dont une des plus importantes : comment connaît-on? Pour y répondre, Descartes, au début de la modernité, a également pensé à une disposition naturelle de l'homme à connaître. En supposant que "le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée", il faisait de la raison le signe distinctif existant entre l'homme et les autres êtres vivants. (...) La raison caractérise l'homme et s'emploie suivant une pluralité de modalités et en fonction des différentes sensibilités intellectuelles. Cet ouvrage, Le pluralisme des rationalités. Etats des lieux, débats et interrogations, est un ensemble de textes dont les auteurs expriment, en fonction de leurs sensibilités philosophiques, des champs d'expression de la raison. (shrink)

In order to get out of present day discussions between determinism and free will, creationism and evolution, bios and zoē, human existence and biological life – those dead end binaries of our present day thinking into which we have manoeuvred ourselves – we need to revisit the Ancient discussions relating to the care of the soul and human existence. I will draw together these two themes from Jan Patočka’s writings by anchor-ing them in his account of Socrates who (...) was the first to emphasise the idea of human re-sponsibility not only for thinking but also for human acting in the world. I will argue that the significant common feature – the care for our own being, our existence – brings Patočka’s reflections on the care for the soul and care for our human existence together. While, according to Patočka, the notion of the care for the soul was displaced from the philosophical reflection by the modern scientific venture, the idea of human existence is, although problematic from the scientific point of view, still a part of our experience.Para librarnos de discusiones contemporáneas entre determinismo y libre albedrío, creacionismo y evolución, bios y zoē, existencia humana y vida biológica, estos binomios, callejones de salida del pensamiento de hoy en los que nos hemos metido, tenemos que volver a escuchar las discusiones de la Antigüedad sobre el cuidado del alma y la existencia humana. Voy a recuperar estos dos temas de escritos de Jan Patočka, anclándolos en su interpretación de Sócrates, el primero en poner énfasis en la idea de responsabilidad humana no solo de su pensamiento sino también de su actuar en el mundo. Argumentaré que el significativo rasgo común, esto es, el cuidado por nuestro propio ser, nuestra existencia, es lo que une las reflexiones de Patočka sobre el cuidado del alma y el cuidado de la exitencia humana. Mientras que, según Patočka, la noción del cuidado del alma ha sido desplazada de la reflexión filosófica por la empresa científica moderna, la idea de la existencia humana, a pesar de lo problemático que puede resultar desde un punto de vista científi-co, todavía forma parte de nuestra experiencia. (shrink)

'God necessarily exists, since it is not possible for things to be otherwise, as Aristotle shows in the Metaphysics.' So Mehmed II, the Ottoman conqueror of both Constantinople and Trebizond, tells George Amiroutzes, the Byzantine scholar and native of Trebizond, in the beginning of Amiroutzes' dialogue The Philosopher, or On Faith. The dialogue is a literary recreation of the conversations between Mehmed, a Muslim, and Amiroutzes, a Christian. In the course of The Philosopher, the two debate the role of logic (...) and rationality in religious debate, the nature of God, and the fate of the body and soul in the afterlife. Surprisingly complex and subtle arguments emerge, firmly situated in their fifteenth-century context but steeped in the long Greek philosophical tradition. Previously known only from a sixteenth-century Latin translation, The Philosopher was recently rediscovered in a Greek manuscript in Toledo. In this volume, John Monfasani presents both the editio princeps of this manuscript and the first translation of the text from the Greek, with an introduction that discusses the life of Amiroutzes and the text as well as two appendixes that offer texts and translations of two additional documents related to Amiroutzes and The Philosopher. (shrink)

abstract: I provide a novel interpretation of Aristotle's account of the unity of soul, treating it as resolving the apparent incompatibility of the existence of psychic parts and the soul's status as a unifying form. This incompatibility, I contend, rests on a problematic assumption: mereological actualism, or the claim that parts are actually distinct and prior to the whole. Aristotle successfully undermines actualism and formulates an alternative conception of parthood within De Anima 's figure-soul analogy. As triangles are (...) only potentially present within quadrilaterals, so lower psychic parts are potential parts of higher souls. This picture treats a soul not as a mere aggregate of capacities, but as essentially unified and prior to its parts. Finally, I argue that this picture can be illuminated and must be read against the background of his hylomorphic account of the unity of form given in Metaphysics H.6. (shrink)

This paper re-evaluates Derek Parfit’s attack on the commonly held view that personal identity is necessarily determinate and that it is what matters. In the first part we first argue against the Humean view of personal identity; secondly, we classify the remaining alternatives into three kinds: the body theory and the brain theory, the quasi-Humean theory, and the soul theory, and thirdly we deploy Parfit’s arguments and related considerations to the point that none of the materialistic alternatives is consistent with (...) the commonly held view. This leaves us with the alternative: either we accept the radical and highly implausible materialistic view Parfit calls ‘Reductionism’, or we accept the view that we are nonphysical indivisible entities—Cartesian egos, or souls. The second part of the paper discusses Parfit’s objections against the Cartesian view: that there is no reason to believe in the existence of such nonphysical entities; that if such entities exist, there is no evidence that they are enduring ; that even if they exist and are enduring, they are irrelevant for the psychological profile and temporal continuity of a person; that experiments with ‘brain-splitted’ patients provide strong evidence against the Cartesian view. We argue that these objections are in part mistaken, and that the remaining part is not strong enough to make the Cartesian view less plausible than Reductionism. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to make a contribution to the growing interest in Nietzsche's relation to traditions of therapy in philosophy that has emerged in recent years. It is in the texts of his middle period that Nietzsche's writing comes closest to being an exercise in philosophical therapeutics, and in this chapter I focus on Dawn from 1881 as a way of exploring this. Dawn is a text that has been admired in recent years for its ethical naturalism and for its (...) anticipation of phenomenology. My interest in the text in this chapter is in the way it revitalises for a modern age ancient philosophical concerns, notably a teaching for mortal souls who wish to be liberated from the fear and anguish of existence, as well as from God, the ‘metaphysical need’, and romantic music, and are able to affirm their mortal conditions of existence. As a general point of inspiration I have adopted Pierre Hadot's insight into the therapeutic ambitions of ancient philosophy which was, he claims, ‘intended to cure mankind's anguish’. This is evident in the teaching of Epicurus which sought to demonstrate the mortality of the soul and whose aim was, ‘to free humans from “the fears of the mind”.’ Similarly, Nietzsche's teaching in Dawn is for mortal souls. In the face of the loss of the dream of the soul's immortality, philosophy for Nietzsche, I shall show, has new consolations to offer in the form of new sublimities. Indeed, for Nietzsche it is by reflecting, with the aid of psychological observation, on what is ‘human, all too human’, that ‘we can lighten the burden of life’. Nietzsche's thinking in Dawn contains a number of proposals and recommendations of tremendous value to philosophical therapeia, including a call for a new honesty about the human ego and human relations, including relations of self and other and love, so as to free us from certain delusions; the search for an authentic mode of existence which appreciates the value of solitude and independence; the importance of having a rich and mature taste in order to eschew the fanatical. After an introduction to Nietzsche's text the chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first main part I explore various aspects of his conception of philosophical therapy, including purification of the higher feelings and liberation from the destructive effects of ‘morality’ and Christianity. In the second main part I explore his conception of ‘the passion of knowledge’, which is the passion that guides modern free spirits as they seek to overcome the need of religion and constraints of ‘morality’, and to access the new sublimities of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on three issues in Francisco Suárez’s account of the separated soul: the status of the separated soul as a person, the separated soul’s knowledge of itself, and the question of the soul’s nature both as form of the body and as existing outside the body. I place his discussion in dialogue with St. Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) and show the ways he departs from those two thinkers. Finally, I show that his account (...) of these problems makes for a philosophically probable account of the resurrection of the body. (shrink)

The notion that we spring into existence ex nihilo at birth strikes many people as counter-intuitive. By contrast, the idea that we have an eternal identity appeals to some deep intuition about the self. And indeed, belief in the soul's pre-mortal existence has a long history in Western thought. Terryl Givens offers the first systematic exploration of this fascinating if generally unfamiliar feature of Western cultural history.

This complex and subtle book is difficult to summarize. The author intends it as a supplement to existing commentaries on Plato’s Meno, rather than as a straightforward commentary of his own. His approach to Plato builds upon that of Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, and the Tübingen School, but is not reducible to any of these and contains other influences as well, such as Heidegger. In addition to taking with minute seriousness the dramatic composition of the dialogue, Brague combines precise and (...) sensitive philological tools with a marked ontological interest. He reads the Platonic dialogue in a bipolar perspective. Dialogues are tests of friendship but at the same time, as "works" or literary texts rather than objects, they may have a sense in themselves. Brague cites Proust in this context, but one thinks also of Derrida. Consequently the dialogue has both an intrinsic order, corresponding to the rhythmic development of its theme, and also an allusive dimension or a lacuna suggested by the text, to be filled in by the reader. In a similar sense one may say that the theme of the Meno is bipolar. The first pole is the theme of the nature of the soul, hence of virtue, and more specifically, of Meno’s soul. Meno’s defective nature is the basis for a continuous "degradation" in the stages of the dialogue. Alternatively, it is the basis for Meno’s "anthropological" approach to virtue. The key to the Meno is that the Good is missing from the dialogue. This observation provides a transition to the second thematic pole. The structure of the dialogue reflects the stages of Plato’s esoteric teaching as presented by K. Gaiser : dialectic, geometry, politics. This raises a question for Brague, which he does not seem to me to answer : if this is the order of Plato’s secret system, how is the degraded presentation of the system, relative to Meno’s defective soul, isomorphic to the hierarchical structure of the system? Granting that politics is lower than dialectic, there must be a better and a worse presentation of politics. Brague’s approach entails that the degraded image of the structure nevertheless reveals the structure itself. But if the Good is absent from the image, how are we to infer that it is present in the structure? A similar problem suggests itself with respect to what Brague calls the key to the movement of the dialogue: the distinction between the limiting and the limited and correspondingly, "the powerlessness of the limit" in Meno’s case. In the last and longest section of the book, there are many fine analyses and illuminating insights, too many to do justice to here. One may call special attention to the connection between the episode of recollection and geometry on the one hand, and the duality of principles in Plato’s system. I also found unusually helpful Brague’s exposition of the "feminine" nature of Plato’s teaching of genesis, of the link between Plato’s use of anakineisthai and the dramatic device of a prologue, and the significance of katasëmainesthai in conjunction with the theme of "growing" and preserving virtuous youths. In sum: this is a book to be read carefully and slowly by every serious student of Plato. It is almost as difficult, and hence as controversial, as a Platonic dialogue. It is marked throughout, even when influenced by contemporary schools of thought, by a genuine interest in Plato’s manner of thinking and writing. This is not exactly a common property of contemporary books on Plato.—S.R. (shrink)

Anyone interested in Greek philosophy or in contemporary theories of hierarchy will profit from reading this book. It is a model of correct methodology since O’Meara carefully studies the relevant Greek texts in a chronological order, which he constantly illumines through references to secondary literature. As a result, it offers helpful insights into Plotinus, as these examples indicate. Although the Greek word for "hierarchy" does not itself occur in the history of thought prior to Pseudo-Dionysius, the conception of hierarchic structures (...) is found clearly in Plotinus’ view of existents related to one another as higher/lower, prior/posterior, causally independent/dependent, and so on. His presentation of those structures varies, though. At times he utilizes the Platonic contrast between the sensible and intelligible realms, which, however, are linked through participation. On other occasions he speaks of the One, the Intellect and the Soul. The second of these is occasionally linked with intelligibility, being, and number. The third with reference to the visible universe is described as Nature and Logos. But the hierarchical ordering which remains constant from beginning to end of the Enneads is that of the three hypostases: the One, Intellect, and Soul. These Plotinus often presents from different perspectives and with varying emphases, with the result that one realizes his hierarchical arrangements are not an a priori source of his philosophizing but emerge from it. (shrink)

Throughout its history of almost a millennium and a half, Sanskrit kāvyaśāstra was resolutely obsessed with the task of unravelling the ontology kāvya. Literary theoreticians in Sanskrit, irrespective of their spatio-temporal locations, unanimously agreed upon the fact that kāvya was a special mode of expression characterized by the presence of certain unique linguistic elements. Nonetheless, this did not imply that kāvyaśāstra was an intellectual tradition unmarked by disagreements. The real point of contention among the practitioners of Sanskrit literary theory was (...) the prioritization of certain formal elements as the ‘soul’ of literature. This strong sense of intellectual disagreement on the question of what constituted the soul of kāvya eventually paved the way for the emergence of new frameworks of criticism and extensive scrutiny of the existing categories, thus playing a vital role in keeping this tradition alive and new.But towards the turn of the 20th century, Sanskrit kāvyaśāstra tradition underwent an epistemic rupture primarily because of a change in the way the idea of literariness was understood. During this phase, the traditional Formalistic notions about literature underwent a radical transformation, and the style and language of literature eventually became similar to everyday speech. This trend played an important role in severing Sanskrit kāvyaśāstra’s natural tie with literature. Eventually, the vigour in which new treatises in Sanskrit literary poetics were produced also dwindled. This did not mean that the scholarship in Sanskrit poetics vanished. Scholars in Sanskrit poetics continued to flourish in India, but in a different form and shape. In other words, the focus of scholars in Sanskrit poetics slowly got shifted from the production of new treatises in Sanskrit poetics to the creation of the intellectual history of this field and the application of these theories to evaluate the literary merit of modern literary texts. Though these two approaches played a vital role in disseminating the knowledge about Sanskrit poetics in modern times, they were caught up in an ontological certitude. In other words, neither of these two directions attempted to study these theoretical positions from a standpoint other than that of literary theory. To borrow a Barthian terminology, these two approaches treated Sanskrit poetics as a ‘work,’ instead of a ‘Text.’ This paper aims to intervene in this lacuna of scholarship by proposing the Derridian idea of ‘play’ as a methodological framework to unearth the potentialities lying dormant in these theories and to move beyond the ontological certitude traditionally imposed on these theoretical positions. The new methodological praxis that I put forward in this paper is further exemplified through a non-canonical reading of Ānandavardhana’s avivakṣita-vācya-dhvani. (shrink)

This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of philosophy, (...) nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning and the separation from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body and his relation with the soul – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible. (shrink)

Bering's analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider past and present adult soul beliefs and the psychological functions they serve. We suggest that a valid folk psychology of souls must consider features of adult soul beliefs, the unique problem engendered by awareness of death, and terror management findings, in addition to cognitive inclinations toward dualistic and teleological thinking.

The nature of the human being in general and the existence and nature of the soul in particular has been discussed throughout the history of thought. As a knowing subject, man firstly tried to know himself. While making this questioning, he not only wondered about his phenomenal existence (body), but also about his spiritual identity, which he did not doubt was out there somewhere. This curiosity has created an ongoing scientific journey from anatomy to physiology, from science to (...) philosophy, from medicine to sociology, from biology to neurobiology, from psychology to neuropsychology, from chemistry to neurochemistry. In the end, various human conceptions have been developed in accordance with the scientific and philosophical background of each civilization. The ancient tradition of thought, which is the common accumulation of humanity, has largely included man in a dualist definition. Along with modern science, many devices have been developed to study human beings physically. Numerous data have been reached with the opportunities provided by technology, and these data have provided great usefulness in understanding what aspects a human being has in terms of physics and metaphysics. However, with the increase in our knowledge of the natural world and human, which is a part of it, the perspectives of the period were forced into paradigmatic changes. The philosophical movements that developed and changed in parallel with scientific knowledge, the decline of religion, especially in the Western world, regressed the dominant models in the interpretation of knowledge. Notions of human have inevitably taken their share from this great change. Is the subject behind the actions separate/independent from the body/brain and completely autonomous and rational? Or is it just the body/brain or its functionality, as modern neuroscience suggests? Does this coherent functionality arise entirely or in part from natural causation? Is there an essence or a distinctive feature that makes us human? If so, is this essence/property physical or is it a metaphysical substance? What answers did the early theologians give to these questions? What are the points of overlap between the hypotheses developed mainly on religious knowledge, partly on medical knowledge of the period via largely logical reasoning, and the definitions of human and soul revealed by contemporary experimental science? This line forms the main frame of the article. In summary, this study; It aims to identify the parallels and similarities of approach between the spiritual theories of the early theologians and current scientific data, which we see as two important phases of the ongoing ancient investigation. It is thought that the theories developed in this first period, when the transformation due to the acculturation process is not sufficiently determinative on thought, are more original and valuable. After giving brief information about the definitions of soul, mind, self and consciousness, which are among the basic concepts of the problem, the thoughts of early Mu‘tazilī and Ahl al-Sunnah thinkers on the subject are presented comparatively with current scientific data. We tried to make a healthy descriptive inference by making analytical and semantic arguments on the data obtained during the research. (shrink)

The view that the soul can exist separately from the body is commonly associated with dualism. Since Plato’s Phaedo (Phd.) argues that the soul is immortal and survives the death of the body, there seems to be reason to call Plato, in that dialogue at least, a ‘dualist’. Yet, as we know, there are many kinds of dualism, so we have thereby not said very much. Let me therefore start with some distinctions. First of all, we can distinguish between two (...) kinds of dualism which say that the soul is a different kind of substance from the body. On one version, call it ‘strong’ substance dualism, no properties of mind can also be properties of body. Mind is defined as a kind of thing that uniquely has a certain property or set of properties, say consciousness, just as body is defined by its unique properties, say spatial extension. This would seem to be Descartes’ view. On another version, call it ‘weak’ substance dualism, no essential or defining properties of mind are also properties of body. This leaves it open whether the mind and body may share some accidental or non-defining properties. Finally, there is an even weaker kind of dualism which we may call property dualism. According to this view, there are mental properties which are distinct from and irreducible to bodily properties.4 However, these mental properties may or not be properties of an underlying substance that also has bodily properties. In other words, the same thing may have both mental and bodily properties, so having mental properties is not enough to make something a different kind of substance. (shrink)

Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul DAVID APOLLONI VROM Phaedo 78b to 8od, Socrates attempts to answer Simmias' fear that, even if the soul has existed eternally before birth, it might be dispersed and this would be the end of its existence . His answer is an argument which attempts to show that the soul is incomposite because it is similar to the Forms and dissimilar to physical objects. To date, this argument -- the so-called Aftin- (...) ity Argument -- has not received much sympathy from Plato's commentators, who universally consider it the weakest of Plato's arguments for the immortal- ity of the soul? The lack of sympathy and enthusiasm for this argument is not difficult to understand. Just consider the following outline of the argument. The soul is invisible, therefore the soul is more similar to the Invisible, i.e., the Forms, which are always the same, than are bodies, which are visible and which are constantly changing, and which are more similar to the Visible than is the soul . Further, the soul is more like the Always the Same in that when it uses the body to see or hear or perceive, it is "dragged" by the body into the Never the Same, and the soul "wanders and is confused and whirls as if intoxicated" insofar as the soul has come in contact with such things . Whereas when the soul considers by itself, it goes to the realm of the Forms, and ceases its wandering. Therefore the soul is more like the Always.. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant grounds his postulate for the immortality of the soul on the presupposed practical necessity of the will’s endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law. Given the important role that this postulate plays in Kant’s ethical and political philosophy, it is hard to understand why it has received relatively little attention. It is even more surprising considering the attention given to his other postulates of practical reason: the existence of God and (...) freedom. The project of this paper is to examine Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul, examine critiques of this argument, and show why the argument succeeds in showing that belief in the moral law also obligates one to believe in the soul’s immortality. (shrink)

Traditional Christian belief in the existence of human life after death within a transformed material universe should be capable of rational justification if one chooses carefully the philosophical scheme underlying those claims. One should not have to appeal simply to the power of a loving God to justify one's beliefs. A revision of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme is proposed that allows one to render these classical Christian beliefs at least plausible to a broad range of contemporary thinkers as a consequence (...) of a cosmology based on the principle of universal intersubjectivity and the need for a common ground between opposing subjectivities. (shrink)

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that it is ruled (...) by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue o.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide ed. by Caleb M. CohoeAttila HangaiCaleb M. Cohoe, editor. Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Hardback, $99.99.Guiding readers through Aristotle's science of the soul, this volume covers many major topics of De Anima (DA) and addresses specific questions, including perennial interpretive problems. The self-contained chapters approach the text either by illuminating its context or by (...) elucidating key psychological concepts. While some contributions refer to relevant [End Page 318] positions by Aristotle's predecessors or contemporary philosophers, connections drawn to other Aristotelian texts predominate. Throughout, the emphasis is on philosophical questions. The result is a first-rate philosophical guide through this densely written treatise, which allows experienced readers of DA to deepen their understanding of Aristotelian psychology. Since most chapters approach interpretive issues from new angles and presuppose familiarity with the existing scholarship, beginners may want to start elsewhere.In Reeve's reading (chapter 1), Aristotle pursues dialectic in DA to define the soul as the first principle for the science of life. He construes dialectic as "going through puzzles and solving them by appeal to endoxa" (21), and equates it with induction from perceptual experience to knowledge of principles and causes. Contesting this view, Carter (chapter 2) argues that the physicist's method is not dialectical because the predecessors' views, conflicting as they are, do not constitute endoxa. Through close readings of DA II.2–5, he shows that Aristotle investigates earlier theories to assess how well they explain the main functions of the soul. One pertinent theory takes the soul to be attunement (harmonia). Shields (chapter 4) elucidates Aristotle's case for hylomorphism as an advance over the harmonia theory. Although harmonia (as the proper arrangement of parts) implies normativity, it falls short of rendering the soul as a final cause with its own good, so it cannot explain the unity of the body. Frey's chapter 5 on the soul's unity deals with this latter function. The problem of unity stems from the fact that each level in the hierarchy of souls—nutritive, perceptual, rational—can be defined independently, yet a posterior soul presupposes the existence of all prior ones. The key Frey uses to understand unity is potential presence. Just as a triangle is present potentially in a quadrangle—for division of the latter yields triangles—so too is the nutritive soul present potentially in the perceptual soul, although not due to a separating act. This, however, has counterintuitive implications: animal nutrition would be the function of a perceptual soul; furthermore, the nutritive soul of the embryo (in Frey's biological example) would first be present potentially (as undeveloped) and, once actualized (when developed), would revert to potentiality (at the development of the perceptual soul). Frey's other proposal is more promising. It turns on the notion of natural continuity: having an internal cause for a characteristic change with a unitary goal. Thus, the soul's unity for Frey (despite his reservations) seems to boil down to teleology: the soul sets a goal achieved through the manifestation of species-specific life functions. Invoking the biology of animal reproduction, Gelber (chapter 6) complements the teleological unity regarding the nutritive soul-part with the unity constituted by the continuity of the processes of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, namely, unity by material and efficient causes.Among the three contributions on reason (nous), Scheiter (chapter 3), examining its separability, breaks with the traditional interpretation and takes Aristotle to show (in DA III.4 and I.3) that reason is independent not only of bodily organs but of any magnitude (megethos). This envisages DA III.4–8 as an investigation into how reason functions as a different kind of capacity. It turns out, according to Kelsey's insightful chapter 11, that reason's actuality—insight (noēsis)—is the same as its intelligible object (noēton), and so intelligibility depends on separation from matter by the actuality of reason, making all and only the immaterial things intelligible and intelligent. Cohoe (chapter 12) draws the conclusion: human reason for Aristotle—being the defining part of the human soul, most... (shrink)

Care of the soul is arguably the core concept in Patočka’s phenomenology. However, what is the soul? In this paper I seek to determine its ontological meaning, connecting the concept of caring for the soul with that of the movement of existence. Starting from Patočka’s affirmative presentation of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, I interrogate the “orthodox” Platonic concept of caring for the soul and develop an alternative notion, putting emphasis on action in the world. I demonstrate the impossibility of (...) identifying the third movement with true existence, or with the care for the soul, whether conceived as the performance of philosophy or as political action. Finally, I outline a reinterpreted concept of care for the soul in which the self-moving of the soul is not ontologically prior to responding. The soul is inherent in action; and it is free only as responding to the world and responsible only in being free. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Soul and the Brain The Soul and Scientific Methodology Soul‐Body Causal Interaction and the Conservation of Energy.

Fortunately, there is heat; and Freudenthal is keen to promote it as an overlooked central factor in Aristotle’s theory of material substance. He begins in agreement with the many scholars who argue that Aristotle’s theory of the four elements underdetermines the plain fact that there are organic substances which exhibit both synchronic and diachronic unity. He goes further than most, however, by arguing that left unaugmented Aristotle’s account of the four basic elements would positively preclude the existence of these (...) forms of unity. For Aristotle embraces the Presocratic picture of the four elements as engaged in “endemic strife”, so constituted that their natural propensities lead them to separate and dissolve rather than to unite and synthesize. Thus, for example, each of the four elements has a natural direction, which ought to result in fire and air ever moving upward and away from earth and water, which will move downward if unimpeded. Hence, as Aristotle himself recognizes, some agent force is required to hold the four elements together when they are mixed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Standards of Music Education and the Easily Administered Child/Citizen: The Alchemy of Pedagogy and Social Inclusion/Exclusion Thomas S. Popkewitz and Ruth Gustafson University of Wisconsin-Madison Educational standards are forsome a corrective device to promote the twin goals of excellence and equity by making explicit the performance outcomes ofschooling. For others, performance standards do not do what they say and install the wrong goals for teaching. But various sides in (...) the debate assume that school subjects teach the subjects and what is needed are more effective and efficient classroom practices. Our approach is different. We consider the standards of school subjects as related to the conditions of state governing. School subjects inscribe principles that administer the conduct ofthe child who is to grow into the "reasonable citizen." The Standards Movement is more than what is publicly discussed. Pedagogy embodies particular ways ofthinking or a system ofreason in which pedagogy orders who we are, who we should become, and who are not qualifiedto become that "we." If we think of modern schooling as an inscription device in the fonning of the citizen through the development ofthe child, the crux of the debate is not whether to have standards. It is how particular standards are inscribed through pedagogicalpractices. Ifwe treat school subjects as analogous to a uniform system of taxes, the developmentofuniformmeasurements, andurban planning in the modem state, our concern is with the boundaries created about the rules and standards of reason and the reasonable person. Pedagogygoverns inadoublesense: schoolmusic embodies representations that constitute the objects that children act on as real, and it generates principles to orderand patrol the borders that qualify and disqualify individuals for participation. The standards that govern music education can be thought about as an alchemy.1 The field of music is transported and translated into school subjects andpedagogical content. As the sorcerer ofthe middle ages sought to turn lead into gold, a specializedpedagogyplaces children in a new set ofrelations that is no longerthe academic field of music. Why is the alchemy important? First, the alchemy ofschool subjects is a particular system of reason that fabricates the kinds of people administered in schooling. Second, the alchemy reconfigures the sensitivities and awarenesses of the field of music to make the child's "soul" the site of administration. That soul in music and other school subjects is talked about today as personaldevelopment, self-reflection,personality, and character. Third, school subjects are sites in which the relations between the state, society, community, and individuality are worked and reworked to produce the borders ofinclusion and exclusion. The first section of this paper considers school subjects as a practice of governing that administersprinciples (orstandards ifwecanplay with that word) about who we are and should be. The second section considers psychology as the translation device that transports academic disciplines into school subjects. It may seem odd at firstglancebutthesamepsychologicaltransportation systems exist across school subjects. The historical intervention of the transportation system, we argue in the third section, has little to do with understanding music or science, but with governing the soul. In that section we examine the different cultural practices that overlap to©Philosophy ofMusic Education Review 10, no. 2 (Fall, 2002): 80-91. Thomas S. Popkewitz/Ruth Gustafson 81 generate principles that orderthe nature ofmusic, the child/childhood, teaching, and reflection and subjectivity in music education. The discussion is not about the internal structure or the goodness ofmusic education but the particular frames of reference that form the evidence and possibilities of reform in school subjects. We take up the task ofinquiry into the alchemy of music as part of a broader project to show the contingency ofthe arrangement that we live by showing how thought has played a part in holding those arrangements together and to contestthe strategiesthatgovernthehumanpossibilities. The Art ofGoverning: Standards as Mapping Who We are/to Become Themodern state governs through developing a precise system of classifications and the correct sorting devices to chart a course ofaction that will change society for the better and which will prevent any futurejoining ofthe ranks ofthe poorly performing. To govern is to develop systems ofclassification that calculate and make legiblepeople fortheadministrationofthe society and the citizen. Mass schooling is a central institution in... (shrink)

There is a famous saying, whose origin is uncertain, that no good deed goes unpunished. Although not cited by him, this was no doubt the thought that inspired George Mavrodes’s (1986) well-known article “Religion and the Queerness of Morality.” In it he argued that although not logically incoherent, a certain sort of world in which moral obligations existed would be “absurd . . . a crazy world” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). The world he had in mind was what he called “Russellian,” (...) after a notorious passage in Bertrand Russell’s essay “The Free Man’s Worship” (Russell 1903). There, Russell portrayed us as living in a wholly materialistic universe governed by impersonal forces and “accidental collocations of atoms,” with no objective purpose or meaning to existence. The greatest of human achievements would ultimately be buried “beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.” We could only, concluded Russell, safely build the “soul’s habitation” [sic] on a “firm foundation of unyielding despair” (Russell 1903, 32). In such a world, according to Mavrodes, the performance of moral obligations does, at least sometimes, lead to no net Russellian benefit, that is, any benefit to the agent that is possible within a Russellian world. Indeed, such actions sometimes confer a net Russellian loss. “We have,” he says, “moral obligations whose fulfillment will result in a net loss of good to the one who fulfils them” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). That such a world would be “queer,” “crazy” and “absurd,” according to Mavrodes, should only strike those who believe that moral obligations are wholly objective and run deep in the fabric of reality. He does not purport to address the sceptic, the subjectivist, the expressivist, the nihilist or the existentialist. His aim is at those who believe in a rational moral.. (shrink)

In the ground-breaking 2018 judgment of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India ushered in a new era by decriminalizing homosexuality, marking a pivotal moment in the country's legal history. However, this progressive stride was accompanied by persistent questions concerning homosexual rights that remained unexplored within both cultural and legal frameworks. Despite the legal acknowledgment, members of the homosexual community are often professed merely as 'individuals' and not fully integrated into mainstream society. This perception (...) is aggravated by the absence of a societal 'stamp of marriage,' reinforcing their marginalization. In the realm of Hindu law, the sanctity of marriage is deeply rooted in the scriptures, which explicitly define it as the union of 'two souls.' Remarkably, these very scriptures also assert that a soul is inherently without gender, elucidating that gender is a characteristic exclusive to the human body. It is crucial to recognize that Hindu law, including the relevant Acts, draws extensively from these scriptures, making them a fundamental source of legal principles. The legislation, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, essentially serves to codify and organize the pre-existing Hindu law without seeking to undermine the intrinsic values enshrined within the Holy Scriptures. This article aims to delve into the unaddressed aspects of homosexual rights within the contemporary legal framework, shedding light on the denied rights that persist. While global attitudes are progressing towards recognizing and safeguarding homosexual rights, the Indian government and cultural factors appear hesitant to renounce orthodox and conservative stances. This article seeks to analyse and critique these aspects, exploring the challenges hindering the full acceptance and integration of homosexual individuals into the broader societal fabric despite the transformative legal landscape initiated by the Navtej Singh Johar case. (shrink)

Throughout its long history metaphysics has been variously conceived. At its most sublime, it has been taken to be the study of the super‐sensible, in particular of the existence of a god, the nature of the soul, and the possibility of an afterlife. When the young Ludwig Wittgenstein entered the lists, it was entirely reasonable to conceive of metaphysics in this manner. Its subject matter was held to be the language‐independent and thought‐independent de re necessities of the world. The (...) Tractatus is dominated by three problems: first, the nature of logic and logical necessity; secondly, the essence of the proposition and hence the characterization of the general propositional form; and thirdly, the intentionality of the proposition. Logical propositions are combinations of elementary propositions by means of truth‐functional logical connectives. The metaphysics adumbrated in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought, was required for the possibility of representation and for the possibility of logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perception of the Self George S. Pappas Differences of detail aside, we may think ofboth Locke and Berkeley as accepting the same view of the mind. They agree that there are minds, and that each mind is a simple, immaterial substance. Sometimes the word 'soul' is used instead of'mind'; but in this context, the different terminology is not consequential. Moreover, Locke and Berkeley employ essentially the same argument for (...) their shared view about minds. More exactly, they use the same argument for the limited thesis that there is something distinct from perceptions and from ideas perceived, and that this somethingis aperceiver, or that which perceives. The argument, given in more detail below, claims that we are aware ofour own minds in, or while we are engaged in, perception. The kind ofawareness is said to be or to involve a reflex act, a concept we associate with Berkeley, though I think it is one he appropriated from Locke. Hume, ofcourse, rejects the view ofLocke and Berkeley. He rejects the very notion of an immaterial mind or soul, finding it to be meaningless. And he rejects as well the limited thesis that there is something which perceives and which is distinct from all perceptions. In this paper I will restrict attention to Hume's arguments for rejecting the limited thesis. 1. Rejection ofthe limited thesis Hume investigates the limited thesis of Locke and Berkeley in the well-known section ofthe Treatise which deals with personal identity (Treatise 1.4.6). Here is how he expresses the view of "some philosophers": Theke are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on selfeither by their pain or pleasure.1 Thus, Hume represents the argumentofthosehe opposes as containing two premises: Volume XVIII Number 2 275 GEORGE S. PAPPAS (1)In perception, one is aware ofone's self, and aware ofthe simplicity of the self. (2)In being thus aware of the self and its simplicity one gains an idea of a simple self. These premises, in turn, support a double conclusion: (3)There are simple selves (minds). (4)We have an idea of a simple self(mind). Hume does not take the trouble to cite the second premise given here in the passage I have quoted, butitis clear that he has it in mind, since he proceeds directly to a criticism of it. The criticism is quite familiar inform, encapsulatingwhat I call aderivabilityargument. Here is what Hume says: all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd?... It must be some one impression, that givesrise toeveryreal idea. But selfor person is not any one impression, but that to which our severahmpressionsandideas are suppos'd to have areference. Ifany impression gives rise to the idea ofself, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. (T 251) He is also sharply critical ofthe first premise. Hume says: when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particularperception orother, ofheatorcold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myselfat any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (T 252) So, minimally, Hume's arguments amount to this: (1) is false; hence, we have nogroundforclaiming(3). Similarly, (2) is false, so that we have no ground for claiming (4). Actually, of course, Hume asserts stronger claims, maintaining that (3) and (4) arefalse, and not merely that we lack adequate support forthem. Buttoshowtheirfalsityrequires additional argumentbeyond whatis providedin the above-quoted passages. Here I will not consider those additional arguments, except to note... (shrink)

Humanity's creative role within the living pattern of nature. Explores important scientific discoveries that reveal the self-organizing intelligence at the heart of nature. Examines the idea of a living cosmos from its roots in the earliest cultures, to its eclipse during the Scientific Revolution, to its return today. Reveals ways to reengage our creative partnership with nature and collaborate with nature's intelligence. For millennia the world was seen as a creative, interconnected web of life, constantly growing, developing, and restoring itself. (...) But with the arrival of the Scientific Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries, the world was viewed as a lifeless, clock-like mechanism, bound by the laws of classical physics. Intelligence was a trait ascribed solely to human beings, and thus humanity was viewed as superior to and separate from nature. Today new scientific discoveries are reviving the ancient philosophy of a living, interconnected cosmos, and humanity is learning from and collaborating with nature's intelligence in new, life-enhancing ways, from ecological design to biomimicry. Drawing upon the most important scientific discoveries of recent times, David Fideler explores the self-organizing intelligence at the heart of nature and humanity's place in the cosmic pattern. He examines the ancient vision of the living cosmos from its roots in the "world soul" of the Greeks and the alchemical tradition, to its eclipse during the Scientific Revolution, to its return today. He explains how the mechanistic worldview led to humanity's profound sense of alienation, for if the universe only functioned as a machine, there was no longer any room for genuine creativity or spontaneity. He shows how this isn't the case and how, even at the molecular level, natural systems engage in self-organization, self-preservation, and creative problem solving, mirroring the ancient idea of a creative intelligence that exists deep within the heart of nature. Revealing new connections between science, religion, and culture, Fideler explores how to reengage our creative partnership with nature and new ways to collaborate with nature's intelligence. (shrink)

Theologians and Old Testament scholars have been at odds with respect to the best interpretation of the imago Dei. Theologians have preferred substantialistic (e.g., image as soul or mind) or relational interpretations (e.g., image as relational personhood) and Old Testament scholars have preferred functional interpretations (e.g., image as kingly dominion). The disagreements revolve around a number of exegetical questions. How do we best read Genesis 1 in its literary, historical, and cultural contexts? How should it be read theologically? How should (...) we read Genesis 1 as a canonical text? This book charts a path through these disagreements by offering a dogmatically coherent and exegetically sound canonical interpretation of the image of God. Peterson argues that the fundamental claim of Genesis 1:26-28 is that humanity is created to image God actively in the world. "Made in the image of God" is an identity claim. As such, it tells us about humanity's relationship with God and the rest of creation, what humanity does in the world, and what humanity is to become. Understanding the imago Dei as human identity has the further advantage of illuminating humanity's ontology. Canonically, knowledge of the contours and purpose of human existence develops alongside God's self-revelation. Tracing this development, Peterson demonstrates the coherence of the OT and NT texts that refer to the image of God. In the NT, Jesus Christ is understood as the realization of God's image in the world and therefore the fulfillment of the description of humanity's identity in Genesis 1. In addition to its specific focus on resolving interdisciplinary tensions for Christian interpretation of the imago Dei, the argument of the book has important implications for ethics, the doctrine of sin, and the doctrine of revelation. (shrink)