An exposition of Karl Marx’s argument in the Grundrisse for the logical development of money, this essay is divided into three parts. Since Marx is concerned to distinguish himself and his method from that of the seventeenth century political economists, I begin my paper with a brief reflection on “the scientifically correct method” or the “theoretical method” (Grundrisse 101 and 102). The second part of this paper considers how Marx justifies beginning his reflection with the concept of production (...) in general. To understand the importance that Marx attributes to production, one must also appreciate the way in which distribution, exchange, and consumption belong to the sphere of production. In the remaining pages of this section of my paper, then, I attempt to reconstruct Marx’s argument for the way in which these concepts (distribution, exchange, and consumption) are to be understood in relation to the sphere of production. (shrink)

The article argues that abstract and impersonal domination and abstract violence are two fundamental and constitutive aspects of modern bourgeois society. Drawing on the late theoretical production of Karl Marx—particularly the money chapter of the Grundrisse—and secondary sources grounded in a categorical reading of his work, our findings reveal that the capitalist social formation is characterized by a high degree of abstraction, which entails the subsumption of social interdependence under capital as the dominant social relation of modernity. This implies, (...) on the one hand, that individuals are enmeshed in structures of social domination (abstract and impersonal) and, on the other, they are mediated by a form of violence defined as an abstract thirst for value. (shrink)

Marx’s concept of value has been subject to significant criticism. Robinson argues that the concept is awkward and obscure, as it is meant to explain the prices of commodities and thus must be a kind of price, but it is not. Consequently, Robinson holds that the concept of value makes no sense. Furthermore, according to Harvey, Marx in the _Grundrisse _confuses value with price. It seems to me that both Robinson’s criticism and Harvey’s exegesis are based on serious misunderstandings. In (...) this article, I first unpack Marx’s criticism of Darimon’s proposal concerning time chits. The upshot is that, for Marx, production relations enjoy a priority, and a monetary reform like Darimon’s cannot fulfill the function of revolutionary change. So, time chits become a triviality. Second, I suggest a reconstruction of what I call Marx’s “nonconvergency thesis.” The thesis states that there is a supervenience between value and price. Marx says that Darimon is ignorant about this thesis, and his proposal relies on the delusion that the two are convergent. Therefore, I maintain that Harvey’s claim is misleading, as he overlooks the nonconvergency thesis articulated in the _Grundrisse_. And Robinson’s condemnation of the concept of value should be dismissed because her understanding is very much the same as Darimon’s, in that she ignores the two-layered ontological structure between value and price. (shrink)

In recent publications Paolo Virno and Carlo Vercellone have called attention to Marx’s category of the general intellect in theGrundrisse, and to the unprecedented role its diffusion plays in contemporary capitalism. According to Virno, the flourishing of the general intellect, which Marx thought could only take place within communism, characterises post-Fordist capitalism. Vercellone adds that Marx’s account of the real subsumption of living labour under capital is obsolete in contemporary cognitive capitalism. Both authors regard Marx’s value theory as historically obsolete. (...) I argue that these views rest on a confusion of value and wealth, a neglect of Marx’s account of the role of ‘free gifts’ to capital, an underestimation of the role of the general intellect in the period prior to the rise of post-Fordism/cognitive capitalism, and an underestimation of the restrictions on the diffusion of the general intellect in contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

This paper reads Marx’s distinction between the method of inquiry and presentation as distinct and Marxist pedagogical logics that take the form of learning and studying. After articulating the differences and their current conceptualizations in educational theory, I turn to different interpretations of the Grundrisse and Capital. While I note the differences, I maintain these result from Marx’s alternation between learning and studying, to the different weights Marx gives to both. Marx sought to understand, articulate, learn, and relay the (...) precise logics of capital, of its contradictions, and of how the working class has and can seize on these contradictions to institute the revolutionary transition to communism. At the same time, he knew he couldn’t do this because no one can fully delineate and learn about capitalism so long as it exists, as capital is by definition a dynamic social relation. I show how readings of both books are products and productive of Marx’s own pedagogical constellation through their content and form of presentation. The argument is that this is a political and constellational pedagogy that’s contingent and singular rather than resolvable and unifiable. (shrink)

Recent studies have made the familiar observation that the economic categories in Marx’s works are presented in the dialectical form of the logical categories in Hegel’s works. The purpose of this article is to move beyond this observation by demonstrating that Marx’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectical method articulated in the Science of Logic implicates, in opposition to his own explicit statements, the philosophical argument of his Grundrisse in an inferential commitment to Hegel’s idealism. Marx, it is argued, cannot appropriate (...) Hegel’s conception of rational cognition as a dialectical movement from universality to particularity to individuality while at the same time dispensing with the absolute idealism from which that conception derives its coherence. (shrink)

In these brief remarks I propose a reading of the “Fragment on Machines” in Marx's Grundrisse. This reading recognizes in the “Fragment” the central problematic of the Grundrisse's fundamental analyses of the relation between objectified labor and living labor, the meaning of this relationship within a comprehensive interpretation of the theory and, finally, the meaning of the contradiction within the relation itself which is essential for the comprehension and critique of the entire capitalist mode of production. Here this (...) “Fragment” will be analyzed from the viewpoint of the criticism of fetishism, thus indicating some of the Fragment's ambiguous elements. (shrink)

What is one to do with a work whose modest opening lines by the editor proclaim it to be “one of the most crucial documents in European Marxism since … well, since maybe ever”? Almost as if to reinforce this claim, the book comes padded with no fewer than three introductions, three prefaces, and a long epilogue. This alone should alert the unaware reader that the impenetrability of the text is due not to any conceptual profundity — as epigones would (...) have it — but to an unimaginable theoretical confusion. The publisher's PR frontwoman seeks to market Negri as a “Eurocommunist theoretician” jailed for his explosive revolutionary views. (shrink)

This is a work of historical critical exegesis. It aims to establish the influence of the Science of Logic (SL) of G.W.F. Hegel on the Grundrisse of Karl Marx. It is the first work in the history of Marx Studies to demonstrate that the Hegelian logic guided Marx's doctrinal development, and that the ordering of the logical categories in the SL is reflected in the ordering of economic categories in the Grundrisse.

The aim of this short note is to draw the attention of scholars in the field of medieval philosophy to the publication of several volumes, already issued or in preparation, of the new Ueberweg dedicated to medieval philosophy in the Byzantine and Latin worlds. The note includes an overall description of these volumes and various references concerning the future development of the Ueberweg as a whole.

Written between 1857 and 1858, the Grundrisse is the first draft of Marx’s critique of political economy and, thus, also the initial preparatory work on Capital. Despite its editorial vicissitudes and late publication, Grundrisse contains numerous reflections on matters that Marx did not develop elsewhere in his oeuvre and is therefore extremely important for an overall interpretation of his thought. In this collection, various international experts in the field, analysing the Grundrisse on the 150th anniversary of its (...) composition, present a Marx in many ways radically different from the one who figures in the dominant currents of twentieth-century Marxism. The book demonstrates the relevance of the Grundrisse to an understanding of Capital and of Marx’s theoretical project as a whole, which, as is well known, remained uncompleted. It also highlights the continuing explanatory power of Marxian categories for contemporary society and its present contradictions. With contributions from such scholars as Eric Hobsbawm and Terrell Carver, and covering subject areas such as political economy, philosophy and Marxism, this book is likely to become required reading for serious scholars of Marx across the world. (shrink)

This essay revisits the question of alterations in Marx’s view of method from the 1857 “Introduction” to Capital. In the wake of the belated upsurge of interest in Marx’s notebooks of 1857–8, posthumously published as the Grundrisse, a dominant interpretation has been developed in Marx scholarship which characterizes the method of the “Introduction” as an ascent from the (transhistorical) abstract to the (historical) concrete and, upon such characterization, stresses the mature Marx’s departure from it. Rereading the 1857 “Introduction” with (...) an emphasis on the theoretical import of its examples, I argue, against this interpretation, that although this text does not provide a fully worked-out account of method, it nevertheless offers invaluable insights into some of the central methodological problems with which Marx was concerned and in response to which his dialectical method was developed. In particular, I highlight what could be called Marx’s critical historicist approach to the categories and argue that this approach, together with his specific understanding of the process of the reproduction of the concrete in thought, constitute the lasting pillars of Marx’s dialectical method, in the 1857 “Introduction” as well as in Capital. Finally, in a concluding section, I re-examine the methodological status of the commodity and argue that the post-1857 emergence of the commodity as Marx’s favourite starting point does not represent a fundamental change, or a reversal, in his view of method. (shrink)

The aim of the „Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre“ is to analyse the theoretical faculty. The starting point of this analysis is the proposition that the I posits itself as determinated by the Non-I. My thesis, which can be proven in Fichte´s text, is that it is the notion of the picture which serves as a point of orientation in the analysis of the cognitive faculty, as Kant calls it. The cognition of an object comes about as a dialectical relationship (...) between the picturing i, the picture and the pictured object, which Fichte calls the real thing. I would like to investigate how much Fichte follows the Kantian analysis of the cognitive faculty on the one hand and how much he differs from it on the other hand. This investigation will take into account a question which is very important for every epistemology taking its starting point in subjectivity, namely the question of how the i can recognize that the objects of its cognition are real things and not the products of his phantasy. Fichte explicitly raises this very question. At the end of this paper, I attempt to show what kind of answer Fichte gives to this questionee. (shrink)

Book digitized by Google from the library of the University of Wisconsin - Madison and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse noted early on in his writings on social theory the importance of both Hegel’s and Marx’s development of the dialectic of necessity and freedom to conceptualize the possibility of a postcapitalist society of freedom emerging from the actually existing capitalist societies. Marcuse was not only the first Marxist to analyze all of Hegel’s philosophic works, he also recognized the significance of and provided analyses of lasting importance of previously unpublished works of Marx, principally the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (...) of 1844 and the Grundrisse. We reexamine Marcuse’s work guided by the dialectical concepts of freedom and necessity, capitalist and postcapitalist society. (shrink)

The title of this edition is quite misleading and the edition is disappointing. The Dietz Verlag edition of Marx's Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie is over a thousand pages long. Virtually unavailable until recently, it is considered by many to be among Marx's most interesting and important works. It consists primarily of Marx's unpublished writings from 1857-1858. A serious study of the Grundrisse must be made for a full understanding of Marx. It places the discussion of the (...) 'young' vs. the 'old' Marx on a new level of sophistication because here is a work written by the mature Marx that is pervaded with Hegelian themes. It contains highly interesting speculations about the Asiatic mode of production, the theory of surplus value, and the possibility of the development of a middle class, which is not available in Marx's other writings. McLellan, Nicolaus, Marcuse, Lichtheim, and others have noted the importance of the Grundrisse for gaining new insight into Marx's thought. Unfortunately, McLellan has translated what amounts to about one tenth of this work in a manner which while it whets one's intellectual appetite is not very useful for pursuing or pinning down Marx's reflections in the Grundrisse. These bits and fragments will have to do until we have a full translation of the Grundrisse.--R. J. B. (shrink)

I investigate Husserl's thesis that consciousness of futurity (protention) is constitutive of time-consciousness. I argue that consciousness of future states of presently perceived objects—what I call 'objective' protentions—are not constitutive of time-consciousness. Rather, Husserl's thesis only holds for 'empty' protentions—the expectation that some future state will succeed my present state.

Excerpt from Grundriß zu Einem System der Politik Die übergang53eit wirb gan3 natürli About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated (...) in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The time of „philosophical systems“ seems to be definitively over since Kant and Hegel. On this background, the publication of the work „Neues System der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss“ (New System of Philosophical Sciences in Ground Plan) is a truly spectacular philosophical event: Dirk Hartmann deliberately follows Hegel‘s „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse“ of 1817 in the title of his work, in order to make clear the intention and claim of his opus magnum: In contrast to the increased (...) fragmentation and specialization of philosophy in the 20th century, Hartmann focuses on the philosophical treatment of the whole: In seven volumes, he discusses the classical philosophical problems in their interdependent context, not cataloguing them one after the other, but by consistently developing them from one another. Volume I deals with central epistemological problems: „What is knowledge?“, „Is knowledge even possible?“, „Are there forms of substantial non-empirical truth?“, „Is there an ideal language?“, „Can logic be reasoned?“ and „What is science?”. Since this is the first volume of the entire system, the question „What is philosophy?“ is raised at the very beginning too, and the reasons why philosophy should begin with epistemology are expounded. Finally, the criterion of meaning guiding the entire work, the principle of knowability, is justified and defended against pertinent objections. (shrink)

Excerpt from Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse Unb mit jener eifernen @raft gn (R)tanbe gebraebt toorben bie bor ?i[iem unfern %rennb anbgeicbnete, ibobi aber in ber ?in@fiibrnng, 2[norbnnng nnb in ber gang tonnbérbaren ecbiteftonif, mit ber jebe @eite unb jeber $ranm bebanbeit, in bern %ieif3e, ber jebem qbintet beb (R)ebänbeb angetoanbt ift, in bein einen ebenmiifgigen unb bocb toieber berfcbiebenen (c)tbte, ber bon ber (R)bitg;e bi@ gur (R)rnnbtage ficb bewerten Iäfit, unb ber ba(R) (...) (R)ange jenen sbanten be 9rittetatter@ an bie (R)eite fetgt, bie aneb anf befä;ränften unb engen btätgen erricbtet, trot; bem bnrcb ibre @rbabenbeit bon ber 11rngebnng abgieben, unb naeb ibren (c)bben ben (c)inn 5n ricbten toiffen. I(R)enn toa@ bat ber bentfcbe (R)eift niebt afie@ begriinbet ober 311 begrünben berfncbt? Rnit ber (R)dpanfei unb bein (R)baten ift man bei nné trnnrer bei ber (R)anb, 2riffe 311 Einfügen (R)ebänben werben tbobt aa berfertigt, unb ibre 2in(R)fiibrnng bern C nfet ber niebt mebr baran benit übertaffen, aber fetten finb bie (R)ebanfen, tbeicbe bie 2ibftraftion abfcbtobrenb, aneb (R)eftatten Werben, feitener ber nn; ermnbiicbe (R)eift ber in jebe weitergefcbrittenefläerf bicbtnng feineé (R)tofieö bie %rifcbe be8 qinfangß unb ben bermebrten be6 bnrebianfenen $?reifeß bringt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis was prepared in 1975-77 at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, under the supervision of Prof. Raymond ARON. It was submitted in 1977 in fulfilment of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree in Social Sciences (Doctorat de 3e cycle en sciences sociales). The oral examination (soutenance de thèse) was held in January 1978, with the examination committee consisting of Prof. Aron, Bartoli, Boudon and Brochier. This 250 page unpublished dissertation was the first study ever written (...) in French on Karl Marx's Grundrisse - a 1857-58 manuscript preparatory to Marx's main economic work, Capital. The dissertation reviews Marx's successive projects for his economic work since the 1844 Manuscripts and then proceeds to a presentation and critical discussion of Grundrisse. The proposed interpretation explains the linkage that Marx operated in 1857-58 between Ricardo's economics and Hegel's dialectics, and it emphasizes that Marx was at that time primarily trying to reconstruct the dynamics of capitalism, without going to the stage of developing a formal theory of value and exploitation, as he will eventually do in Capital. (shrink)

Philosophy from above or from below? Higher ideas or empiricism? -/- These questions have been at the forefront of the differentiation of university subjects in Germany since the mid-19th century. Questions about aesthetics or the beautiful, the true and the good and about what is beautiful, good and true played a central role. -/- Cf. my contribution in Grundriss zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1/2, Die Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts: Deutschsprachiger Raum 1830-1870. ed. Gerald Hartung, Basel: Schwabe, 2023, 425-447 and (...) here the original manuscript or the 2nd citable edition 2024 with extended bibliography and weblinks, published in: UB Heidelberg. Publication platform for art and visual studies, Arthistoricum. -/- . (shrink)

Our work represents the culmination of a study that is a search for a method. It is a search that has led us away from the remnants of Cartesianism that are found in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, which we do not deal with here, and toward a comparative study of Karl Marx and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which we do take up in detail. The present manuscript argues, in fact, that both Marx and Merleau-Ponty operate with a method that may be (...) called an existential dialectic.By means of careful and extended analysis of The Structure of Behavior we attempt to uncover Merleau-Ponty’s method, calling special attention to its sometimes ignored dialectical character. We then proceed to argue that Marx is operating with a type of phenomenological/existential method, and this is true not only of the young Marx but also of the mature Marx of the Grundrisse and Capital. Finally, with the assistance of Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness, we point up the dialectical character of Marx’s method. Thus, it is by uncovering this approach in the text of each of these thinkers and by comparing the method of each man with that of the other that we show that both Marx and Merleau-Pontyoperate with an existential dialectical method.This in depth methodological comparison of Marx and Merleau-Ponty represents the first study of its kind. It is hoped that “The Existential Dialectic of Marx and Merleau-Ponty” will contribute to the on-going and important dialogue between Marxists and existentialists. (shrink)

This book considers Karl Marx’s ideas in relation to the social and political context in which he lived and wrote. It emphasizes both the continuity of his commitment to the cause of full human emancipation, and the role of his critique of political economy in conceiving history to be the history of class struggles. The book follows his developing ideas from before he encountered political economy, through the politics of 1848 and the Bonapartist “farce,”, the maturation of the critique of (...) political economy in the Grundrisse and Capital, and his engagement with the politics of the First International and the legacy of the Paris Commune. Notwithstanding errors in historical judgment largely reflecting the influence of dominant liberal historiography, Marx laid the foundations for a new social theory premised upon the historical consequences of alienation and the potential for human freedom. (shrink)