This paper examines the concept of evidence, with specific focus on the problem of evidence in Husserl's phenomenology. How this problem was dealt with and resolved by philosophers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant is compared and contrasted with Husserl's approach, and the implications of the solution offered by Husserl discussed. Finally, in light of the issues outlined, it is assessed whether or not Husserl can be said possibly to have been philosophically inclined towards notions such as (...) idealism, empiricism, solipsism and scepticism. (shrink)

The power exercised by technology companies is attracting the attention of policymakers, regulatory bodies and the general public. This power can be categorized in several ways, ranging from the “soft power” of technology companies to influence public policy agendas to the “market power” they may wield to exclude equally efficient competitors from the marketplace. This Article is concerned with the “data power” exercised by technology companies occupying strategic positions in the digital ecosystem. This data power is a multifaceted power (...) that may overlap with economic (market) power but primarily entails the power to profile and the power to influence opinion formation. While the current legal framework for data protection and privacy in the EU imposes constraints on personal data processing by technology companies, it ostensibly does so without regard to whether or not they have “data power.” This Article probes this assumption. It argues that although this legal framework does not explicitly impose additional legal responsibilities on entities with “data power,” it provides a clear normative indication to do so. The volume and variety of data and the reach of data-processing operations seem to be relevant when assessing both the extent of obligations on technology companies and the impact of data processing on individual rights. The Article suggests that this finding provides the normative foundation for the imposition of a “special responsibility” on such firms, analogous to the “special responsibility” imposed by competition law on dominant companies with market power. What such a “special responsibility” might entail in practice will be briefly outlined and relevant questions for future research will be identified. (shrink)

This article reviews contemporary response to several contrasting strands of recent empirical work. It begins with discussing the scope and rationale of evidence law. Experimental studies on eyewitness memory and testimony illustrate the potential value of empirical studies to the practice of investigations, prosecutions, and appeals. This article discusses several lines of empirical inquiry employing diverse methodologies, experiments, surveys, and approaches and reviews their limitations, and implications and significance for the understanding and practice of law. Many of the contributions (...) from empirical legal studies are provisional and their precise value for practice is uncertain or ambiguous, but they raise important issues worthy of serious consideration. By identifying problems with eyewitness evidence and the limitations of many of the forensic sciences, and in many other ways, empirical and experimental studies have substantially outpaced legal experience. Indifference to empirical legal study is likely to reduce the social legitimacy of legal institutions. (shrink)

This article reviews contemporary response to several contrasting strands of recent empirical work. It begins with discussing the scope and rationale of evidence law. Experimental studies on eyewitness memory and testimony illustrate the potential value of empirical studies to the practice of investigations, prosecutions, and appeals. This article discusses several lines of empirical inquiry employing diverse methodologies, experiments, surveys, and approaches and reviews their limitations, and implications and significance for the understanding and practice of law. Many of the contributions (...) from empirical legal studies are provisional and their precise value for practice is uncertain or ambiguous, but they raise important issues worthy of serious consideration. By identifying problems with eyewitness evidence and the limitations of many of the forensic sciences, and in many other ways, empirical and experimental studies have substantially outpaced legal experience. Indifference to empirical legal study is likely to reduce the social legitimacy of legal institutions. (shrink)

Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article (...) had a dramatic impact, as epistemologists began trying to ascertain afresh what knowledge is, with almost all agreeing that Gettier had refuted the traditional definition of knowledge. They have made many attempts to repair or replace that traditional definition of knowledge, resulting in several new conceptions of knowledge and of justificatory support. In this respect, Gettier sparked a period of pronounced epistemological energy and innovation — all with a single two-and-a-half page article. There is no consensus, however, that any one of the attempts to solve the Gettier challenge has succeeded in fully defining what it is to have knowledge of a truth or fact. So, the force of that challenge continues to be felt in various ways, and to various extents, within epistemology. Sometimes, the challenge is ignored in frustration at the existence of so many possibly failed efforts to solve it. Often, the assumption is made that somehow it can — and will, one of these days — be solved. Usually, it is agreed to show something about knowledge, even if not all epistemologists concur as to exactly what it shows. (shrink)

We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference (...) from a developmental perspective. (shrink)

Evidences are important proofs to support judicial trials. Automatically extracting evidences from judgement documents can be used to assess the trial quality and support “Intelligent Court”. Current evidence extraction is primarily depended on sequence labelling models. Despite their success, they can only assign a label to a token, which is difficult to recognize nested evidence entities in judgment documents, where a token may belong to several evidences at the same time. In this paper, we present a novel evidence extraction architecture (...) called ATT-MRC, in which extracting evidence entities is formalized as a question answer problem, where all evidence spans are screened out as possible correct answers. Furthermore, to address the data imbalance problem in the judgement documents, we revised the loss function and combined it with a data enhancement technique. Experimental results demonstrate that our model has better performance than related works in evidence extraction. (shrink)

Starting with Jaakko Hintikka’s seminal work, epistemic logic has now grown up to a huge academic industry. When we look back to its history, however, there is a practical paradox. While Hintikka’s original purpose was to facilitate epistemological discussion, most subsequent work of epistemic logic has been done outside of philosophy, and has been ignored by most mainstream epistemologists. At the current point, one might naturally wonder, does epistemic logic still have something to do with epistemology? Along (...) with Hintikka and a growing number of formal epistemologists, we believe the answer is “yes”. Contemporary epistemology has largely focused on the goal of providing an analysis of knowledge and an answer to skepticism. To avoid skepticism, many epistemologists prefer to define knowledge in terms of evidence and relevant alternatives. A typical saying is that “in order to know that p, one only needs evidence to eliminate all relevant alternatives, rather than all alternatives”. We see such a project as perfectly congenial to the spirit of Hintikka’s epistemic logic. In this paper, we propose an epistemic logic to deal with evidence and relevant alternatives explicitly, and extend EREL to its dynamic version to investigate how different notions of knowledge behavior with the decrease and increase of relevant alternatives. To illustrate its philosophical application, we provide a new formalization of the so called factivity problem of epistemic contextualism. We conclude with some remarks on further developments of our framework. (shrink)

Neuroscience hasn’t shown how quite similar sensory circuits encode quite different colors and other qualia, nor how the unified pictorial form of images is encoded, nor how these codes yield conscious images. Neuroscience’s fixation here on cortical codes may be the culprit. Treating conscious images partly as retinal substances may avoid these problems. The evidence for conscious retinal images is that (a) the cortical codes for images are quite problematic, (b) injecting retinas with certain genes turns dichromats into (...) trichromats without cortical help, (c) retinas can discern colors by themselves without cortex, (d) retinal distortions appear in images but cortical distortions don’t, (e) retinal detectors support finely detailed colors, but V4 detectors don’t, due to their big receptive fields, (f) retinal activity has pictorial form, but viable cortical codes for pictorial form don’t exist. So, the colors and unified pictorial form of images arguably arise mainly across arrays of retinal detectors—not from abstract cortical codes. Images may be hidden in retinal activity beyond what EEGs show of it (cf. Strawson’s monism). Also, cortex refines these retinal images but cortical impairment (anesthesia, lesions, etc.) blocks awareness of them, for they’re no longer accessible to the mind’s subject-centered consciousness, resident in cortex. This proposal is largely testable and based in recent evidence. It avoids neuroscience’s elusive, problematic coded images and enigmatic explanations of how they become conscious. (shrink)

The notion of individualised evidence holds the key to solve the puzzle of statistical evidence, but there’s still no consensus on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed various accounts of individualised evidence in terms of causal or modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like appropriate causation, sensitivity and safety. In this paper, I show that each of these fails as satisfactory anti-luck condition, and that such failure lends abductive support to the following (...) conclusion: once the familiar anti-luck intuition on knowledge is extended to individualised evidence, no single causal or modal anti-luck condition on knowledge can succeed as the right anti-luck condition on individualised evidence. This conclusion casts serious doubts on the fruitfulness of the move from anti-luck conditions on knowledge to anti-luck conditions on individualised evidence. I expand on these doubts and point out further aspects where epistemology and the law come apart: epistemic anti- luck conditions on knowledge do not adequately characterise the legal notion of individualised evidence. (shrink)

In placing education at the centre, as The Main Enterprise of the World, Philip Kitcher has undertaken a monumental task. He has come to the field of philosophy of education captivated by the importance of its substantive preoccupations for the advancement of democratic aims. Accordingly, his book argues that the most salient obstruction to preparing citizens who will contribute to society is the seeming irreconcilability of the demands of industry, on the one hand, and of students’ personal growth, on the (...) other. In spite of his desire to accommodate diverse accounts of the human good, and his recognition of the formative role of culture, broadly conceived, there are strains in his account of human fulfilment deriving from the disjunction of the self and others. It is not evident, on his Deweyan onto-epistemology, that there is adequate attention to the imprint on an individual, and on the beliefs they come to form, of proximal social groups. The nature of the balance between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ influences, between those that are near and those that are far, can profoundly affect the plausibility of Kitcher's account of a socially based sense of fulfilment. (shrink)

The first part of the paper distinguishes between a real past which has nothing to do with historical events and an historical past made up of hypothetical events introduced for the purpose of explaining historical evidence. Attention is next paid to those so-called ancillary historical disciplines which study historical evidence, and it is noted that the historical event is brought in to explain the particular constellation of different kinds of historical evidence which are judged to belong together. The problem (...) of explaining events is then taken up, and an attempt is made to defend the view that such explanation must presuppose general laws. And this is followed by a discussion, partly speculative, of social-historical laws. The final section of the paper tries to argue that the subjective intentions of individuals are irrelevant to historical explanation. (shrink)

We report an experiment investigating the “special-process” theory of insight problem solving, which claims that insight arises from non-conscious, non-reportable processes that enable problem re-structuring. We predicted that reducing opportunities for speech-based processing during insight problem solving should permit special processes to function more effectively and gain conscious awareness, thereby facilitating insight. We distracted speech-based processing by using either articulatory suppression or irrelevant speech, with findings for these conditions supporting the predicted insight facilitation effect relative to silent working or (...) thinking aloud. The latter condition was included to investigate the currently contested effect of “verbal overshadowing” on insight, whereby thinking aloud is claimed to hinder the operation of special, non-reportable processes. Whilst verbal overshadowing was not evident in final solution rates, there was nevertheless support for verbal overshadowing up to and beyond.. (shrink)

A. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. (...) Ayer begins by considering Hume's formulation of the problem of induction and then explores the inferences on which we base our beliefs in factual matters. In other essays, he defines the three kinds of probability that inform inductive reasoning and examines the various criteria for verifiability and falsifiability. In his extensive introduction, Graham Macdonald discusses the arguments in _Probability and Evidence_, how they relate to Ayer's other works, and their influence in contemporary philosophy. He also provides a brief biographical sketch of Ayer, and includes a bibliography of works about and in response to _Probability and Evidence_. (shrink)

This is an account of the evolution of ideas and the confluence of support and vision that has eventuated in the founding of the Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics (JERHRE). Many factors have contributed to the creation of this rather atypical academic journal, including a scientific and administrative culture that finally saw the need for it, modern electronic technology, individuals across the world who were committed to somehow finding common ground between researchers and those charged with (...) ethical oversight of research, a network of helpful colleagues, and a university whose administration gave moral support to the endeavor in a time of fiscal austerity. Perhaps equally important were the decisions to make JERHRE a nonprofit undertaking, to emphasize the implications of empirical research for specific best practices, to serve the educational needs of those concerned with human research, and to seek to stimulate the interest of students in gaining an evidence-based understanding of the research contexts in which they decide to work. This article explores the ‘chemistry’ that has made it possible to develop a somewhat unorthodox journal and set of related activities. (shrink)

God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is non-inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that (...) this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic fideists believe that God exists, that there is no discoverable probabilifying evidence (inferential or non-inferential) of God's existence, and that it is nevertheless acceptable-morally if not otherwise-to have faith that God exists. Lovering argues that each type of theistic philosopher faces a problem unique to his type and that they all share two particular problems. Some of these problems take us down an entirely new discursive path; others down a new discursive path branching off from an old one. (shrink)

The risks associated with the techniques of medically assisted procreation (MAP) rapidly became well-known, and in such a short space of time that no biomedical domain remained untouched by the great deal of thinking and the expression of a multitude of opinions it provoked. MAP is evolving between two poles: quality/misuse (even violation) and evidence/fantasy. The ethics will be evoked in the clinical reality from which they spring and where their justification lies. The three objects common to these ethics, (...) the oocyte, the embryo and the child, are illustrated in this context. MAP has as its corollary access to the oocyte, the fertilization of which will take place in vitro. Access to the embryo, on the other hand, enables the clinician, for the purposes of diagnosis [preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), predictive medicine], or even soon for therapeutic purposes (gene therapy) to draw close to a boundary, to trespass beyond which may be seen by humanity to threaten its very origins and integrity: the alienation of the human genome. For the infertile couple, the missing child may take on a dimension of which they would have been unaware, had they not been forced to express their desire. The burden of the imaginary child may, in this way, become a heavier load to bear when, after such desire, he comes into being. MAP puts the goal of normalisation within reach and, in doing so, accentuates the risk of the burden of the attributed representation of the child. On the one hand, MAP offers a tremendous diagnostic and therapeutic potential, while on the other it opens the door to excess and delirium. In this melting pot, ethics, catalysed by this new source of problematics, has discovered a favourite area in which to define and redefine itself. We propose the intervention of ethics on three different levels. Before the elaboration of the law: on first reflection, ethics may influence the responsibilities of the legislator, by taking care that the law does not obscure the biomedical and socioeconomic contexts of MAP and, thereby, also include other related and complementary aspects dealing with the same subject. The secondary discussion of ethics should influence the application of legal protection, by taking into account the rapid technological and social development of MAP, there too, by discussing the whole, rather than the details which will obscure the object. The ethical reflection of the clinician, who is aware of these difficulties, is guided by elements that are specific to his position as a doctor. The cohesion of the team around the clinician and the ethics specialist enables us to develop consensual clinical ethics that are transmissible and therefore teachable. This complex role can, in our view, only be acted out directly in the clinical situation, where the constant, direct relationship with the object of the reflection and the treatment allows ethics to take into account the contingencies of medical practice: we invite the ethics specialist to take part in our clinical activity on a daily basis. (shrink)

After a chapter which is an introduction to and summary of the rest of the book, chapter 2 begins by criticizing various attempts to do away with theories, such as the Reichenbach-Salmon conception of theoretical truth in terms of observational consequences, and the Ramsey strategy of replacing first-order theoretical sentences by second-order nontheoretical ones; it then argues against hypothetico-deductivist theories of confirmation on the grounds that they are unable to handle the relevance of evidence to theory, whether or not (...) other formal constraints or even nonformal ones such as simplicity and explanatory power are added to those theories; it ends with an exposition of the Reichenbach-Carnap conventionalist thesis that the confirmation of hypotheses with evidence presupposes analytic principles connecting hypothetical and empirical concepts. Chapter 3 criticizes Bayesian theories of confirmation on such grounds as that the a priori arguments for Bayesian restrictions on beliefs are insufficient; that the Bayesian explanations of notions like variety of evidence, ad hocness, and simplicity are inadequate; and that they cannot account, without drastic revisions, for the relevance of evidence to theory, especially old evidence to new theory. Chapter 4 is an unsympathetic account of historically oriented philosophies of science; Lakatos’s notion of progressive research programs and Laudan’s theory of problem-solving effectiveness are found to be insufficiently precise and dubbed examples of "new fuzziness", while the Sneed-Stegmüller dynamics of theories is regarded as "a paradigm of misplaced rigor" ; and all three are criticized as unable to explicate the concept of evidential relevance. Chapter 5 is a formal and informal elaboration of the basic idea in Glymour’s account of theory and evidence, namely that confirmation or support is a three-term relation among evidence, hypothesis, and theory, so that evidence confirms an hypothesis only relative to a theory, and such that evidence e confirms hypothesis h relative to T if T with e implies, but T without e does not imply, an instance of h, and T with e does not imply a comparable hypothesis h’ different from h; the most interesting part of this chapter is a series of discussions showing how such an idea makes sense of the "methodological truisms" that it is possible selectively to test certain parts of a theory but not others, that a theory is supported better by a greater variety of evidence, that redundant or physically meaningless quantities are an undesirable feature of theories, that there are no inviolable rules, that a "white shoe" does not confirm "all ravens are black," that a theory is more useful and better supported than the set of its observational consequences, and that the hypothetico-deductive method often works. Since Glymour claims no originality for the conception of this general account, but only for its description, he plausibly thinks it necessary to apply it to some important historical cases of actual science; he does so in the next chapter by discussing at some length the structure and merits of Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy, of Newton’s universal gravitation, of nineteenth century atomism, of Freud’s Rat Man, and of general relativity. For example, he argues convincingly that Copernicanism was better supported by the evidence available even before the telescope because it alone, and not the Ptolemaic theory, can determine some planetary properties which are presupposed by both theories, can test and confirm some common hypotheses, and can be confirmed in an essential rather than incidental manner; and though Glymour admits that the Copernicans tended to argue in terms of explanatory rather than confirmatory superiority, he sketches an interesting account of the relation between explanation and confirmation which strengthens his case. He also analyzes the text at the beginning of book 3 of Newton’s Principia and compiles a reconstruction of the intricate details of the inferential structure of the argument to universal gravitation; his impressive reconstruction clearly shows that Newton’s method is neither the inductivist one he himself thought he was following, nor the one attributed to him by Pierre Duhem, but rather one in accordance with Glymour’s so-called "bootstrap strategy" of repeatedly using the evidence from Kepler’s second and third laws, from lunar data, and from falling bodies, together with the theory consisting of the second and third laws of motion, to arrive at increasingly general instances of the principle of universal gravitation. Glymour’s account of arguments for and against the atomic theory from Thomson to Cannizzaro is his longest historical example, but he himself admits that this illustration of the bootstrap strategy is "certainly not the neatest", and rather "diffuse, and perhaps disconnected". Chapter 7 is a detailed application of the same principles to the technique known among social scientists as "causal modeling"; since such "causal models" are essentially systems of algebraic equations, Glymour’s account shows indirectly that the bootstrap strategy is applicable to any scientific theory presented as a set of algebraic equations; this, of course is not surprising, since the formal considerations with which Glymour begins the exposition of his theory in chapter 5 involve systems of algebraic equations. Chapter 8 is an attempt to apply Glymour’s theory of evidence to the very common scientific practice of curve-fitting, where one measures values of two or more quantities and then infers a functional relationship; Glymour argues that simpler polynomials are preferred because they are tested more frequently and more severely by the data and because they are more informative; but then he criticizes his own explanation and concludes that "the bootstrap procedures of chapter 5 do not seem to help the problem much more than a whit" ; this is admirably honest, but if one wants an additional logical or methodological rationale, then one would perhaps have to go to the meta-level and say that Glymour is here testing his own theory, and he is more interested in a further illustration of the bootstrap methodology even with a failed test, than he is to claim universal or exclusive validity for it. In chapter 9 Glymour uses his bootstrap theory of confirmation to criticize geometrical conventionalism; he considers the alternative theories of space or space-time proposed by conventionalists to show the radical undetermination of geometries by evidence, for example, a non-Euclidean geometry with no universal force instead of Newtonian gravitation with Euclidean geometry; he argues that such alternatives are simply not as well tested as the originals and that their equivalence to the originals is questionable. The last chapter is a brief discussion of further problems worthy of future investigation. (shrink)

However little that various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences might seem to have in common, they share certain interests in methodological problems relating to evidence, inference, and interpretation. By pursuing these shared interests across divergent topics and fields, the contributors to this book advance our understanding of how such truth-seeking, proof-finding methods work, and of what it means to prove something in a range of contexts. Coedited by William Twining, one of the world's outstanding evidence scholars, and (...) Lain HempsherMonk, a leading political theorist, the volume considers intriguing questions from different realms--Assyriology, theatre iconography, musicology, criminology, the history of ideas and colonial history--as it reveals how particular concepts, lines of questioning, and techniques of reasoning and analysis developed in one context can be fruitfully applied in others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend (...) these essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

Howard S. Becker is a master of his discipline. His reputation as a teacher, as well as a sociologist, is supported by his best-selling quartet of sociological guidebooks: Writing for Social Scientists, Tricks of the Trade, Telling About Society, and What About Mozart? What About Murder? It turns out that the master sociologist has yet one more trick up his sleeve—a fifth guidebook, Evidence. Becker has for seventy years been mulling over the problem of evidence. He argues that social scientists (...) don’t take questions about the usefulness of their data as evidence for their ideas seriously enough. For example, researchers have long used the occupation of a person’s father as evidence of the family’s social class, but studies have shown this to be a flawed measure—for one thing, a lot of people answer that question too vaguely to make the reasoning plausible. The book is filled with examples like this, and Becker uses them to expose a series of errors, suggesting ways to avoid them, or even to turn them into research topics in their own right. He argues strongly that because no data-gathering method produces totally reliable information, a big part of the research job consists of getting rid of error. Readers will find Becker’s newest guidebook a valuable tool, useful for social scientists of every variety. (shrink)

This paper argues that our current best cosmological theories, according to which cosmos is very big are compatible with all possible evidence. The problem is unrelated to the Quine-Duhem underdetermination thesis. The compatibility to which this paper draws attention is much more radical: it appears as if all of our best cosmological theories are perfectly probabilistically compatible with all possible evidence and that no empirical discovery could give us any reason whatever to favor one such theory over another. (...) This consequence is absurd. In order to create an evidential link between cosmological theory and observation, a new methodological principle is needed. A candidate for such a principle is proposed, using a Bayesian framework that takes account of observation selection effects. Various applications in other scientific fields are considered. (shrink)

Previous behavioral studies have identified the significant role of subliminal cues in creative problem solving. However, neural mechanisms of such unconscious processing remain poorly understood. Here we utilized an event-related potential approach and sandwich mask technique to investigate cerebral activities underlying the unconscious processing of cues in creative problem solving. College students were instructed to solve divergent problems under three different conditions . Our data showed that creative problem solving can benefit from unconscious cues, although not as much as (...) from conscious cues. More importantly, we found that there are crucial ERP components associated with unconscious processing of cues in solving divergent problems. Similar to the processing of conscious cues, processing unconscious cues in problem solving involves the semantic activation of unconscious cues in the right inferior parietal lobule , new association formation in the right parahippocampal gyrus , and mental representation transformation in the right superior temporal gyrus . The present results suggest that creative problem solving can be modulated by unconscious processing of enlightening information that is weakly diffused in the semantic network beyond our conscious awareness. (shrink)

There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. (...) The puzzle is not, however, merely a legal one. Our unwillingness to base beliefs on statistical evidence is by no means limited to the courtroom, and is at odds with almost every general principle that epistemologists have proposed as to how we ought to manage our beliefs. (shrink)

Sexual Violation in Islamic Law: Substance, Evidence, and Procedure. By Hina Azam. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xi + 270. $95.

Designing and manufacturing medical devices for specific patients is becoming increasingly feasible with developments in 3D printing and 3D imaging software. This raises the question of how patient-specific devices can be evaluated, since our ‘gold standard’ method for evaluation, the randomised controlled trial, requires that an intervention is standardised across a number of individuals in an experimental group. I distinguish several senses of patient-specific device, and focus the discussion on understanding the problem of variations between instances of an intervention (...) for RCT evaluation. I argue that, despite initial appearances, it is theoretically possible to use RCTs to evaluate some patient-specific medical devices. However, the argument reveals significant difficulties for ensuring the validity of such trials, with implications for how we should think about methods of evidence gathering and regulatory approaches for these technologies. (shrink)

This paper considers a special case of belief updating—when an agent learns testimonial data, or in other words, the beliefs of others on some issue. The interest in this case is twofold: (1) the linear averaging method for updating on testimony is somewhat popular in epistemology circles, and it is important to assess its normative acceptability, and (2) this facilitates a more general investigation of what it means/requires for an updating method to have a suitable Bayesian representation (taken here as (...) the normative standard). The paper initially defends linear averaging against Bayesian-compatibility concerns raised by Bradley (Soc Choice Welf 29:609-632, 2007), as well as problems associated with multiple testimony updates. The resolution of these issues, however, requires an extremely nuanced interpretation of the parameters of the linear averaging model—the so-called weights of respect. We go on to propose a role that the parameters of any 'shortcut' updating function should play, by way of minimal interpretation of these parameters. The class of updating functions that is consistent with this role, however, excludes linear averaging, at least in its standard form. (shrink)

Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to (...) act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases. (shrink)

We report on an experiment examining whether individuals can solve a simple signal extraction problem of the type found in models with imperfect information. In one treatment, subjects must form point predictions based on observing both public and private signals, while in another they receive the same information but must decide on the weight to attach to each signal, which then determines their point prediction. We find that, at the aggregate level, signal extraction provides a good characterization of subjects’ (...) behavior in both treatments, but at the individual level, there is considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ ability to perform signal extraction. (shrink)

Solving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite (...) greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided pre­liminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making. (shrink)

This book presents strategies for using systemic theory and evidence-based practice in schools to support students, the adults in their lives, and their wider communities. Beginning by introducing and explaining the Advocating Students-within-Environments (ASE) theory, each chapter then addresses a specific school-based issue, such as academic achievement, crisis, trauma, and resiliency, from a systemic and environmental lens. Practical and accessible, the chapters are filled with case examples, evidence-base interventions, and helpful tools to show how counselors can incorporate the approach (...) into their practice. Extending beyond school and student problems, this text also explores greater system functioning, such as community outreach and state level intervention, discussing advocacy and political issues. This book is essential for school-based professionals who are looking for new ways to work with students, families, and their communities. It will also be of interest to mental health professionals who work systemically, such as marriage and family therapists and community counselors. (shrink)

The “Evidentialist Dictum” says we must believe what our evidence supports, and the “Fallibility Norm” says we must take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs. This paper presents a problem for the Evidentialist Dictum based in the Fallibility Norm and a particular conception of evidential support. It then addresses two novel Evidentialist responses to this problem. The first response solves the problem by claiming that fallibility information causes “evidence-loss.” In addition to solving the problem, this response appears to (...) explain what’s wrong with certain illegitimate dismissals of misleading evidence. However, this explanation opens it up to objections. Next, I consider and pose challenges to an Evidentialist strategy that attempts to solve the problem by converting accounts of fallibility’s epistemic significance for rational belief into principles of evidential support. I conclude by sketching a solution that allows us to capture what’s true in the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm. (shrink)

Strategies for protecting historically disadvantaged groups have been extensively debated in the context of genetic variation research, making this a useful starting point in examining the protection of social groups from harm resulting from biomedical research. We analyze research practices developed in response to concerns about the involvement of indigenous communities in studies of genetic variation and consider their potential application in other contexts. We highlight several conceptual ambiguities and practical challenges associated with the protection of group interests and (...) argue that protectionist strategies developed in the context of genetic research will not be easily adapted to other types of research in which social groups are placed at risk. We suggest that it is this set of conceptual and practical issues that philosophers, ethicists, and others should focus on in their efforts to protect identifiable social groups from harm resulting from biomedical research. (shrink)

Multiple theories of problem-solving hypothesize that there are distinct qualitative phases exhibited during effective problem-solving. However, limited research has attempted to identify when transitions between phases occur. We integrate theory on collaborative problem-solving with dynamical systems theory suggesting that when a system is undergoing a phase transition it should exhibit a peak in entropy and that entropy levels should also relate to team performance. Communications from 40 teams that collaborated on a complex problem were coded for occurrence of problem-solving (...) processes. We applied a sliding window entropy technique to each team's communications and specified criteria for identifying data points that qualify as peaks and determining which peaks were robust. We used multilevel modeling, and provide a qualitative example, to evaluate whether phases exhibit distinct distributions of communication processes. We also tested whether there was a relationship between entropy values at transition points and CPS performance. We found that a proportion of entropy peaks was robust and that the relative occurrence of communication codes varied significantly across phases. Peaks in entropy thus corresponded to qualitative shifts in teams’ CPS communications, providing empirical evidence that teams exhibit phase transitions during CPS. Also, lower average levels of entropy at the phase transition points predicted better CPS performance. We specify future directions to improve understanding of phase transitions during CPS, and collaborative cognition, more broadly. (shrink)

According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony, testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider what I (...) take to be the two best motivations for the IVT and argue that they both fail. The overarching lesson, then, is that the IVT is unmotivated and false; we should think of testimonial justification as being evidential in nature. (shrink)

An introduction to the seven principles for practicing critical hope.

Though Stcherbatsky was eager to present Buddhist logic as broadly consistent with an early twentieth‐century European vision of philosophical research as critical reason unbridled by the presuppositions of religion, this was certainly not the sole source of the tension found in his words. There were at least three major trends in relation to this problematic that can be identified within Buddhist textual traditions. This chapter explores somewhat the elaboration of these alternatives, both in traditional Buddhist and in contemporary academic (...) writings. Against those who have held, however, that the available evidence does not permit us to conclude that there was any interesting relationship between the Buddhist pramāna tradition and those Buddhist intellectual practices that we might characterize as “spiritual exercise,” the author would argue that the very presence of contestation about this within the tradition itself sufficiently demonstrates that the possibilities of such a relationship were well understood. (shrink)

Our age is shaped by the influence of the informational world. Although developments in information technologies bring positive innovations to our lives, these innovations bring with them a number of problems and controversial issues. One of these controversial issues is about the effects of AI, which is a member of the world of Information technology. In the study, an interview is held with contemporary epistemologist Professor Robert Audi about AI and epistemology.

Recent work in artificial intelligence has increasingly turned to argumentation as a rich, interdisciplinary area of research that can provide new methods related to evidence and reasoning in the area of law. Douglas Walton provides an introduction to basic concepts, tools and methods in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence as applied to the analysis and evaluation of witness testimony. He shows how witness testimony is by its nature inherently fallible and sometimes subject to disastrous failures. At the same time such (...) testimony can provide evidence that is not only necessary but inherently reasonable for logically guiding legal experts to accept or reject a claim. Walton shows how to overcome the traditional disdain for witness testimony as a type of evidence shown by logical positivists, and the views of trial sceptics who doubt that trial rules deal with witness testimony in a way that yields a rational decision-making process. (shrink)

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs, it is less clear how (...) and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the truth of theirs contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life. But it has also become clear that higher-order evidence plays a central role in many epistemological debates, spanning from traditional discussions of internalism/externalism about epistemic justification to more recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. This volume brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a range of issues about higher-order evidence. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the external world. (...) Because it seems that the principle of armchair access is supported by widely shared intuitions about epistemic rationality, it seems we ought to embrace an internalist conception of evidence. I shall argue that this response is mistaken. Because externalism about evidence can accommodate the relevant intuitions about epistemic rationality, the principle of armchair access is unmotivated. We also have independent reasons for preferring externalism about evidence to the principle of armchair access. (shrink)

A fundamental question in reasoning about change is, what information does a reasoning agent infer about later times from earlier times? I will argue that reasoning about change by an agent is to be modeled in terms of the persistence of the agent''s beliefs over time rather than the persistence of truth and that such persistence is explained by pragmatic factors about how agents acquire information from other agents rather than by general principles of persistence about states of the world. (...) AI accounts of persistence have focused on closed world examples of change, in which the agent believes that the truth of a proposition is unaltered so long as he or she has no evidence that it has been changed. AI principles of persistence seem plausible in a closed world where one assumes the agent knows everything that is happening. If one drops the assumption of omniscience, however, the analysis of persistence is implausible. To get a good account of persistence and reasoning about change, I argue we should examine open world examples of change, in which the agent is ignorant of some of the changes occurring in the world. In open world examples of change, persistence must be formulated, I argue, as a pragmatic principle about the persistence of beliefs. After elaborating my criticisms of current accounts of persistence, I examine how such pragmatic principles fare with the notorious examples of reasoning about action that have collectively characterized the so-called frame problem. (shrink)

This, the 55th volume of Current Legal Problems explores a wide range of subjects, both novel, and more conventional. There are essays on private and public international law, on European Community law, and on an 'English' constitution. The concept of freedom is analysed. There is an examination of the current state of evidence teaching and research, and of remedies in company law and in workplace harassment. Current Legal Issues is the sister volume to Current Legal problems. Based upon (...) an international, inter-disciplinary colloquium, it has thus far explored the links between law and science, law and literature, law and medicine, law and religion, and law and geography. Forthcoming volumes will cover law and history, law and popular culture, law and sociology, law and philosophy, and law and psychiatry. (shrink)

Pragmatic encroachment theories have a problem with evidence. On the one hand, the arguments that knowledge is interest-relative look like they will generalise to show that evidence too is interest-relative. On the other hand, our best story of how interests affect knowledge presupposes an interest-invariant notion of evidence. -/- The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of evidence that is interest-relative, but which allows that ‘best story’ to go through with minimal changes. The core idea (...) is that the evidence someone has is just what evidence a radical interpreter says they have. And a radical interpreter is playing a kind of game with the person they are interpreting. The cases that pose problems for pragmatic encroachment theorists generate fascinating games between the interpreter and the interpretee. They are games with multiple equilibria. To resolve them we need to detour into the theory of equilibrium selection. I’ll argue that the theory we need is the theory of risk-dominant equilibria. That theory will tell us how the interpreter will play the game, which in turn will tell us what evidence the person has. The evidence will be interest-relative, because what the equilibrium of the game is will be interest-relative. But it will not undermine the story we tell about how interests usually affect knowledge. (shrink)

A. N. Prior very much admired the logic and philosophy of C.S. Peirce. In the spring of 1962 Prior went to Chicago to study Peirce's ideas. One of the topics that caught his attention was Peirce's existential graphs. This interest continued when he returned to England. In this paper Prior's grappling with the existential graphs will be discussed.

This year's volume of collected papers in the Current Legal Problems series provides in-depth analyses some important developments which have taken place in recent months. Public law has witnessed much activity both in the courts and in Parliament during the last twelve months and this is reflected in three essays which examine different aspects of human rights, equality, and the right to privacy. In the wake of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, two lengthy essays deal with evidence (...) in police investigations and the concept of due process and pre-trial criminal justice. (shrink)