According to both contemporary intuitions and scholarly opinion, autonomy is something specifically modern. It is certainly taken to be incompatible with religions like Islam and Judaism, if these are invested with political power. Both religions are seen as centered on a divine Law (sharî'a, viz., torah) which prescribes what we may and may not do, promising reward for obedience and threatening punishment for disobedience. Not we, but God makes the rules. This picture is in important ways misleading. There is, I (...) argue, a substantive intellectual tradition, going back to Plato's Laws, which takes the purpose of a theocracy—a community governed by God through the intermediary of a divine Law—to be promoting rational autonomy, conceived as (1) the ability to rationally determine what is in one's best interest and (2) having the motivation to live accordingly.Among the most important representatives of this intellectual tradition are medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers. (shrink)

Theocratic communities ensconced within liberal democracies ought to be treated differently than they are at present. Liberals have neglected to consider carefully the challenges that theocracy presents, largely because none has undertaken to examine the essence of that way of governing. In this there is a serious problem, however, for existing legal structures impede severely the religious free exercise of theocrats, and no appropriate solution to this injustice has yet been given. ;Theocracy is a distinctive mode of governance (...) involving rigid rule and religious authorities, and promoting a particular value above all others. Understanding the nature of theocracy enables one to see its shortcomings; however, it also serves to show how that way of governing may reasonably be important to the devout. If one properly acknowledges the moral right of persons to revise and pursue their conceptions of the good life, one must allow that theocrats should be permitted to live in their uncommon communities without substantial interference from liberal government. The best way to resolve the problem of theocratic communities living inside liberal democracies could be to provide those groups with quasi-sovereign status, allowing them greater freedom to live as they see fit, within certain morally required parameters. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy. His political theory reaches its climax in the ground-breaking work, Perpetual Peace (1795), which sets out the basic framework for a world federation of states united by a system of international law. What is less well known is that two years earlier, in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), Kant had postulated a very different, explicitly religious path to the politics of peace: he (...) presents the idea of an “ethical community” as a necessary requirement for humanity to become “satisfactory to God”. While many recent scholars have noted the importance of Kant’s concept of the ethical community, few recognize the force of his argument that such a community is possible only if it takes the form of a church; as a result, the precise status of his proposal remains unclear and under-appreciated. He argues in Division One, Section IV, of Religion’s Third Piece that the idea of this community can become a reality only through a “church” that is characterized by four rational requirements: unity, integrity, freedom, and the changeability of all church rules except these four unchangeable marks. Prior to Section IV, Division One portrays this ethical community as having a political form, yet an essentially nonpolitical matter. He compares it with Jewish theocracy, but observes that the latter failed to be an ethical commonwealth because it was explicitly political. Whereas traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature (which conforms to the law, “might makes right”) with an ethical state of nature (which conforms to the law that I call, “should makes good”), or attempts to synthesize them, non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction through a new perspective: it unites humanity in a common vision of a divine legislator whose only law is inward, binding church members together like families, through the law of love. Whereas the legal rights supported by democracy and a system of international law can go a long way to prepare for world peace, Kant’s conviction is that it will be ultimately impossible without support from healthy religion. (shrink)

La théocratie hébraïque est un système unique de croyances, de conduites et de rites, qui a favorisé la cohésion du peuple et le consentement aux règles de la vie commune. Il est vrai que le régime dit théocratique des Hébreux n’est pas une simple illusion rétrospective, propre à tous ceux qui veulent appuyer le pouvoir politique sur l’illusion d’une intervention directe de Dieu dans les affaires de l’État. En effet, la théocratie juive, qui a effectivement existé dans les limites de (...) deux siècles environ, ne déroge pas, dans l’analyse qu’en livre Spinoza, à la thèse que tout pouvoir politique est immanent à la puissance de la multitude, puissance dont il provient et puissance à laquelle il conduit. Le pouvoir qu’a institué Moïse, ni monarchique, ni aristocratique, ni populaire, est une forme faible de démocratie instituée, où le pouvoir, dit appartenir à Dieu, n’appartient de fait à aucun homme. C’est en ce sens que la Loi apparaît comme l’altérité des prescriptions mêmes de la raison, dans des conditions historiques déterminées. (shrink)

Lucas Swaine’s liberalism of conscience is at risk of failing to respect justificatory requirements of political liberalism. His theory ought to be further distinguished from the views of John Locke and John Rawls, respectively, and should be extended to engage extreme secularists as well as theocrats.

Theocratic movements are on the rise. But what does it actually mean for God to rule? This study offers one answer by recovering the theocratic project of medieval Judaism's most important thinker, Moses Maimonides. Theocracy is often thought to quash human agency, evoking an overpowering deity and clerical domination. Yet, by reconsidering Maimonides' debt to the Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī, and challenging Leo Strauss' influential reading, I argue that among Maimonides' aims was to elevate humanity's role in divine rule. In (...) its highest form, reason is identical with revelation, action with providence. God's governance is delegated: Theocracy requires human agency - the imitation of God. Maimonides focuses on philosophical religious leaders. But he also broadens imitatio dei to anyone whose knowledge of God inspires love of God: By emulating God's goodness, we can become agents of divine rule. In this way, Maimonides' ideas suggest ways by which theocracy and democracy might, counterintuitively, be reconciled. (shrink)

I identify the objectionable element in theocracy, not with reliance on God as such, nor with the idea that God might have something to do with morality, but with the anti-human propensity to issue orders without communicating good reasons for them. In medieval discussion prohibitions not based on good reasons attracted the labelmalum quia prohibitum, bad because forbidden and I take this to be the criterion of theocracy in its objectionable form. I examine, in part of the Vatican’s (...) doctrine against contraception, a persistent tendency towards this approach, a tendency incompatible with the tradition of the Church and ultimately incompatible even with the thirteenth century discussion of such issues in the work of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

The modus operandi of this paper is centered on governance and the metaphysical forces in Ogba Land. In other words the main focus of the article is that theocracy is concomitant with Ogba metaphysics. The salient points discussed include Maduabuchi Dukor’s reflection on African cosmic environment as posited in Dukor’s four great works on African philosophy. Others include Jewish theocratic tradition, Islamic theocratic tradition and Ogba theocracy and metaphysics in the light of Dukor’s philosophy. The researcher adopted the (...) literature approach to achieve the aforementioned objectives. (shrink)

Kant’s Religion postulates the idea of an ethical community as a necessary requirement for humanity to become good. Few interpreters acknowledge Kant’s claims that realizing this idea requires building a “church” characterized by unity, integrity, freedom, and unchangeability, and that this new form of community is a non-coercive version of theocracy. Traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature with an ethical state of nature ; non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction, uniting humanity in a common vision of (...) a divine legislator whose legislation is inward: the law of love binds church members together like families. (shrink)

Cet article entreprend d’interroger l’intérêt ambigu de Spinoza pour la théocratie hébraïque. Ambigu, car s’il en récuse la valeur de modèle et en souligne très clairement les limites, il la considère aussi, manifestement, comme une réussite politique. Nous faisons l’hypothèse que cette valorisation de la théocratie hébraïque, peu commune dans ce type de discours, s’explique en partie parce qu’elle lui sert d’exemple et de matériau pour penser un aspect central de sa théorie politique : l’attachement du citoyen à l’État. Il (...) s’agira ainsi de voir comment Spinoza fait usage d’une théocratie mosaïque jugée inadaptable au temps présent, pour dégager les fondements d’un patriotisme non théocratique, adapté aux États modernes. (shrink)

This work, a reworked doctoral thesis written for Roland Bainton at the Yale Divinity School, begins with an announcement of a specific scholarly purpose: "To clarify the relationship between the clergy and the magistracy which grew out of Zwingli's reforming work at Zurich... the main focus of the study is upon the early stages of Zwingli's career at Zurich.... The ensuing study accepts the assumption that Zwingli believed in a Christian society ruled by two God-ordained officers, the magistrate and the (...) pastor, and asks 'What place did Zwingli assign to the magistrate and the clergy in order to realize the rule of God?'" Using as his model the German habilitations schrift, the author exhausts every possible aspect of Zwingli's theological and political thought. All of Zwinglian scholarship is summarized here, and problems in Zwingli's thought are dealt with emphasizing its development and its contradictions. Basically Walton argues that most of the scholarship about Zwingli is wrong because it assumes that Zwingli advocated domination of the government by the clergy. Zwingli was a defender of a theory of government which envisaged a co-operation between the spiritual and secular authority in a Christian society in order to realize the will of God. Walton finds that Zwingli's success in reforming Zurich was based upon the fact that his formulation of a Church-State detente conformed to pre-existing conditions in that city. Zurich was dominated by a corporate form of government which had already permitted the magistracy to take on a semi-sacral character. Zwingli, Walton argues, fit his theory of government to the conditions as they existed at Zurich. This is a book for Zwingli aficionados. It is an example of extremely well-done Continental scholarship: precise, insightful, and dry. No doubt the work has already become a definitive work on Zwingli's notion of theocracy.--W. A. J. (shrink)

A prevalent scholarly view holds that Orthodox Judaism in the twentieth century was opposing or challenging modernity, since it refused to assign religion its appropriate modern place as a distinct sphere of values. The goal of this review essay is to reconsider the connection between Orthodox Judaism and modernity. Based on four recent works on Orthodox Judaism during the first decades of twentieth century, which are devoted to political mobilization, gender, theocracy, and law, the essay explores, first, the modern (...) methods whereby Orthodoxy attempted to gain a foothold in the public sphere and, second, the political philosophy of Orthodoxy, which challenges the separation of religion and state. It argues that Orthodox Judaism is a project of an alternative modernity, which strives to gain power in order to conduct a promethean reconfiguration of its surroundings. (shrink)

The main article is devoted to the historical and philosophical reconstruction of controversy between Vladimir Solovyov and the authors of the “Faith and Reason” - a magazine of the Kharkov Theological Seminary. This controversy took its place in the “theological and journalistic” or the “theocratic” period of Solovyov’s works. Particular attention is paid to the disputes of Solovyov and T. Stoyanov, A.P. Shost'in and the French Orthodox priest Fr. Vladimir Gette on the theory of dogmatic development in the church. In (...) the context of this controversy, the arguments for the “defense” of Solovyov's position, cited in the magazine “Orthodox Review” by a theologian and Konstantin Leontyev's follower Ivan Kristi are also analyzed. The reception of Solovyov's theocratic ideas and reaction to his ecclesiastical views in both the Catholic and Orthodox circles of Russian and Western society is shown. Especially it concerns the criticism of Solovyov’s ideas in the pages of the French magazines “L’Univers”, “L'Union Chrétienne”, “Revue d’Eglise greque-unie”, etc. The evolution of Solovyov's views on the problem of the union of Eastern and Western churches, the renewal of church communication between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, the main result of which was his fundamental but unfinished work “The History and Future of the Theocracy” was demonstrated. A conclusion about the “superficiality” of the judgments of the majority of Vladimir Solovyov's ideological opponents, as well as later interpreters of his legacy, following the French Jesuit Michel d'Erbigny, who tried to present him as a “Russian Newman” who converted from Orthodoxy into the Catholic faith is drawn. It is shown that Solovyov’s projects of the “religion of the Holy Spirit” and the “Universal Church”, created on its basis, should be considered primarily in the context of his own philosophical quest, and not in connection with the confessional and ideological divergences of his time. (shrink)

Democracy as an administrative system is maintained through party representation and election in which everybody is duly represented, and through a constitution which is prepared in the interest of equity, justice and egalitarianism, and through the rule of law which does not permit any form of preferential or partial treatment and judgement. In Nigeria, democracy came into real existence on 29 May 1999. Coincidentally, sharia, which is the theocratic legal system of Islam, was adopted in Zamfara State followed by some (...) other states of the country almost at the same time. This article is aimed at a critical examination of the socio-religious implications of the practice of theocracy in the implementation of the provisions of sharia as state law in the democratic nation, Nigeria. An attempt at interpreting and proffering solutions to the destabilising effects of the adoption of sharia in contradistinction to the legal system provided by the democratic constitution of the country is made. This research adopted a historical approach and was dependent on both primary and secondary sources. The result indicates that the implications of the 'adoption and practice of sharia in some states of Nigeria are manifest in legal duality, religious partiality and social instability.' This article, therefore, recommends for the country a very important aspect of political restructuring, namely, that religion should be separated from politics. (shrink)

Wallace, Max In trying to find an accurate way to describe the relationship between government and religion, I devised the term 'soft theocracy' and defined it as a 'state where church and government purposes coincide to garnishee taxpayers' money and resources, structurally through tax exemptions and functionally through grants and privileges'.

The article consistently reconstructs the history of the creation and publication of one of the most important and least researched treatises by Vladimir Solovyov—Istorija i Budushhnost’ Teokratii (The History and Future of Theocracy). The first printed version of this treatise was published in Zagreb in 1887. The ideological context in which this work was written is shown. The important point of this context was the polemics between Solovyov and almost all representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, both conservative and liberal, (...) as well as the restrictions imposed on the publication of his works in Russia by the clerical censorship and personally by the chief prosecutor of the Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev. The differences and discrepancies between the first edition of this text and the later editions published in three versions of Solovyov’s Collected Works (1904, 1914 and 1966 respectively) are analyzed. The history of the only known manuscript of this treatise, which is currently kept in the Vatican Apostolic Library (Vat. Slav. 64), is presented. (shrink)

이 글에서 나는 스피노자 『신학정치론』의 히브리 신정 분석이 알튀세르의 이데올로기론에 어떻게 활용되는지를 다룬다. 이는 단지 알튀세르의 이데올로기론의 원천이 스피노자임을 밝히기 위해서라기보다, 알튀세르가 이 사례를 부분적으로만 활용하면서 스피노자 분석의 핵심 중 하나를 누락시키기 때문이다. 나는 스피노자의 히브리 신정 분석이 알튀세르의 이데올로기적 국가장치 개념을 예증하는 탁월한 사례라는 것, 그러나 스피노자의 분석에서 호명은 개인보다는 대중에 대해, 그리고 대중의 감정을 통해 이루어지며, 마찬가지로 대중 감정의 메커니즘에 의해 작동을 멈출 수도 있다는 것을 보여준다. 이를 통해 알튀세르가 이 사례를 철저하게 활용했더라면 그의 이데올로기론에 가해지는 주된 비판인 (...) 기능론의 혐의에서 벗어날 수도 있었음을 주장하고자 한다. (shrink)

This article examines the regalist reforming critique and the curial defence of papal temporal dominion in the eighteenth-century Italian peninsula. The discussion examines the little-explored links between the justification for papal supremacy in the Church and the historico-theological defence of its theocratic rule. The refusal of the Curia to grant reform gave rise to a radical reforming movement which produced some astoundingly bitter anti-curial polemics little known outside Italian studies, but of some significance in the history of political thought.

ABSTRACT Liberal theory has failed to provide theocrats who are aggrieved by the sinful practices widespread in liberal societies good reasons to tolerate these sins. Moreover, liberal theory has faltered in identifying grounds on which to impose regulations that violate theocrats? religious doctrines. These challenges must be met if liberalism is to temper religious discord and to maintain its own relevance in a world replete with theocratic conceptions of the good.

Al-Ghazali is a Muslim scientist who masters almost all relevant Islamic scholarly disciplines. His analysis is so trenchant for every phenomenon that appears in society. The results of his thought are mostly applicable in several situations to Muslims. This study aims to uncover Al-Ghazali’s views about the concept of Islamic leadership. This study supports by looking at comments from figures about various forms of Al-Ghazali’s political thought. This study finds that Al-Ghazali’s political thought is theodemocracy, where the people must support (...) the leadership under religion’s demands. Thus, Al-Ghazali did not replace one of the sects: Shi’a or Sunni, related to Islamic leadership, but he took to combine the two of them.Contribution: Al-Ghazali is a scholar who is a reference for Muslims until today, especially Sunnis. Muslims can consider Al-Ghazali’s thoughts on the concept of theo-democratic leadership. It is usable for Muslims who live in countries that adhere to democracy or Islamic countries who want to build a democratic system. (shrink)

The study is devoted to the study of actual state of the archival materials of V.S. Solovyov which are held in different funds of Russia. During the working process was carried out the analysis of Solovyov’s related materials in a number of archives of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the context of this topic, documents from such archive funds as: RGALI, GARF, TsAGM, OR RSL (Moscow), OR RNL, IRLI RAS, RGIA (St. Petersburg) were reviewed. Particular attention was paid to the (...) 1880s as the least researched period of philosopher’s work in his biography due to the insufficient availability of sources and to the restrictions of spiritual censorship in connection with the church-political content of Solovyov’s works of this period (“The Great Debate and Christian Politics”, 1883; “The History and Future of Theocracy”, 1887, etc.). In this regard, special attention was paid to the Solovyov funds in such archives as RGALI (F. 446) and OR RNB (F. 718). In the course of the study, many storage units were identified containing unsorted, draft materials, notebooks and notes of the philosopher, which need to be systematized and studied. The work carried out allows us to establish the scale and determine the priority areas of current research on the creative biography and philosophy of V.S. Solovyov based on the study of primary sources in the archives of Russia. (shrink)

In various countries with a deeply-rooted democratic tradition, there have been serious cases of anxiety about the Islamic theocratic menace. Two questions stand out: if today there is a real confrontation between democracy and theocracy; and if so, what room is there for agreement? This article tackles these two questions at the global, national and local levels, with two methods to regulate possible conflicts of public interest: supervision through vigilance and, where necessary, enforcement by judicial decisions; then, approval of (...) measures directed towards consensus to increase receptivity of the norms and values on which democracy and the Rule of Law rest. Democracy consists of the founding principles of universality and human dignity and values such as liberty, equality, due process and the sanctity of human life. Those principles and values need the dynamic that nourishes and sustains them. Religion must not be considered only as a rival context that can cause theocratic threats, but also as a context that possibly has to be employed in the effort to ensure a sustainable democracy. (shrink)

Our concern in this essay are the roles of religious conviction in what we call a “publicly justified polity” — one in which the laws conform to the Principle of Public Justification, according to which (in a sense that will become clearer) each citizen must have conclusive reason to accept each law as binding. According to “justificatory liberalism,”1 this public justification requirement follows from the core liberal commitment of respect for the freedom and equality of all citizens.2 To respect each (...) as free and equal requires that no one simply be forced to submit to the judgments of others as to what she must do. Laws must be justified to those subject to them — each must accept grounds that justify the law. As Kant indicated, if such a condition is achieved, each is both subject and legislator: each is subject to the law, yet each legislates the law, and so all our free and equal under the law.3 Now it would appear that if we are to justify laws to each and every person, the reasons for these laws must be “accessible to all.”4 Religious reasons, however, are not shared by everyone, and may be inaccessible to some: they would thereby seem inappropriate in public justification. On the face of it, justificatory liberals seem committed to expunging religious-based reasoning from political justification. Not surprisingly, this apparent commitment of justificatory liberalism is adamantly rejected by many citizens of faith who consider themselves liberals. These citizens embrace the traditional liberal freedoms and rights and, moreover, reject any suggestion that a legitimate polity might seek to establish a religion, much less a theocracy. Yet they.. (shrink)

스피노자가 자신의 정치적 관점과 분석을 기술한 『신학정치론』과 『정치론』은 상당한 분량을 여러 형태의 국가형태(군주정, 민주정, 신정, 과두정 등) 간의 비교 및 각 국가형태의 헌정제도에 대한 분석에 할애하고 있지만, 정치제도학자로서 스피노자의 모습은 그간 활발히 논의되지 못하였다. 본 논문은 『신학정치론』에서 스피노자가 수행한 고대 히브리 국가의 신정 제도에 대한 분석을 재구성하면서, 그가 히브리 국가의 제도와 역사에서 민주공화정의 제도에 대한 어떤 교훈을 도출했는지를 탐구한다. 스피노자는 종교와 정치의 분리가 불가능하다고 보며, 종교적 제도들이 오히려 대중의 정치적 역량과 단합을 증진시킬 수 있다고 주장한다. 그러나 이를 위해서는 종교 엘리트의 (...) 권력을 제한하고, 다양한 종교 사이의 조화를 유지하는 정책이 필수적임을 강조한다. 논문은 신정 체제의 안정성이 정치적, 사회경제적 평등과 권력의 분배를 제도화하는데 성공했다는 점에 기인한다고 결론지으며, 스피노자의 히브리 신정 분석이 근대 민주주의에 주는 시사점을 모색한다. (shrink)

Carol Pateman has said that the public/private distinction is what feminism is all about. I tend to be sceptical about categorical pronouncements of this sort, but this book is a work of feminist political philosophy and the public/private distinction is what it is all about. It is motivated by the belief that we lack a philosophical conception of privacy suitable for a democracy; that feminism has exposed this lack; and that by combining feminist analysis with recent developments in political philosophy, (...) we can meet the philosophical and political need for a distinctively democratic conception of privacy. This book then, is an effort to sketch and defend such a conception of privacy. It aims to show that while some conceptions of privacy are inconsistent with democracy, others are not. Indeed, the book asserts, the belief that privacy can be valuable and that it can justify basic legal rights, is implicit in a democratic conception of persons as free and equal beings, and a democratic conception of politics as the self-governing, or regulating, activity of such individuals. Just as we can and should reject undemocratic conceptions of the suffrage in favour of democratic ones, so the book maintains, we can and must reject undemocratic conceptions of privacy in favour of ones that reflect the moral equality of men and women, and a commitment to democratic forms of government. Democracy is often described as government by and for the people. On such a view, democracy is a political regime which can be contrasted with monarchies or aristocracies on the one hand, or with theocracies and despotisms on the other. By contrast with the former, it is a form of government that views individuals as citizens and as equal members of the agency which authorizes the use of political power. By contrast with the latter, it is a form of government whose purposes and aims are established by the common interests of individuals, conceived as free and equal citizens. It is my contention that there is a plausible and attractive conception of privacy implicit in this view of democracy. Hence, I show that individuals have fundamental interests in privacy because privacy enables them to participate in politics freely and as the equal of others and, beyond that, to lead lives that they can each affirm to be reasonable, valuable and right. As I think that the ideal of democratic government is properly associated with this latter and broader goal, as well as with the former one, I call my account of privacy a democratic conception of privacy to signal its connection to a particular ideal of politics, and to the conception of persons that makes this ideal a convincing and inspiring one. As this is a work of political philosophy, however, no effort is made to address the legal merits of competing accounts of the right to privacy, or to resolve legal dispute about the content and justification of particular constitutional rights in the United States. Thus, while I use Supreme Court decisions and works of legal theory to illustrate and support my arguments, my use of these materials is governed by philosophical concerns and my conclusions, therefore, are strictly of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. The book is divided into four chapters, moving from feminist criticisms of privacy to an engagement with the philosophical literature on privacy and an account of the right to privacy in a democratic society. It proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, I examine feminist concerns about privacy, through a close reading of the work of Catherine MacKinnon. I argue that MacKinnon persuasively shows that protection for privacy has frequently licensed the coercion and subjection of women, and that her arguments are supported both by feminist scholarship, key Supreme Court decisions, and by familiar conceptions of privacy and equality. However, I argue, these criticisms do not imply that privacy, like slavery, can never be democratic, because wholly inconsistent with the equality of individuals. Rather, feminist criticisms of privacy suggest that privacy, like the suffrage, can be necessary to the equality of women and can have a legitimate and important place in a democratic society. In Chapter 2, I examine the philosophical literature on privacy in light of the need to distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of its nature and value. This literature, I show, can help us to provide an account of privacy that is sensitive both to its inegalitarian aspects and to its importance for a democratic commitment to the freedom and equality of women. However, I argue, we cannot embrace current philosophical accounts of privacy uncritically, because to a striking extent they are, themselves, indifferent to the ways that privacy has licensed sexual inequality. Thus, in Chapter 2, I set about interpreting privacy as a moral and political value, in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophical literature on privacy. Their strength is that they show that there are many reasons for caring about privacy, or many ways in which we might define it as a democratic value. Their weakness is that they tend to assume that we must choose amongst these different conceptions of privacy, in order to provide a philosophically cogent account of privacy. This, I show, is a mistake and one that can be remedied by remembering that a commitment to the equality of individuals requires us to acknowledge the reasonable differences in value and interest that may characterize their relations in a democracy. When we do so, I show, it is possible to define privacy in terms of its protection for self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality, without having to choose between the three of them. For individuals may legitimately disagree about the differences between privacy and other values, even while holding that privacy is a distinctive and important democratic good; and they may also disagree about the importance of privacy compared to other goods, such as equality, without denying that self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality can be morally and politically desirable in a democracy. In Chapter 2, therefore, I show that we can provide a philosophically adequate account of what privacy is and why it is valuable without supposing that privacy is always sexually egalitarian, or denying that it has a distinctive place in a democratic conception of value. Chapter 3 then extends this account of privacy, by considering the justification for a legal right to privacy. Just as we cannot provide a democratic conception of privacy without attending to the different, though equally valid, concerns that individuals may have so, I show, we cannot provide a democratic account of privacy rights if we forget that individuals can, quite reasonably, differ in the importance that they attach to privacy. The result, I argue, is that we can distinguish two main reasons for protecting privacy by right in a democracy, the one personal and the other political. Whereas the former emphasizes the importance of self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality to the personal freedom and equality of individuals, the latter emphasizes their importance to their prospects for voluntary and equal participation in the processes of collective choice and deliberation that define a democratic government. These two justifications of privacy rights reflect the fact that in a democracy the personal can be political, as feminists have insisted, but need not be in order to merit protection by right. Indeed, I argue, we can distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of the right to privacy in this way: for whilst the former acknowledge the variety of individuals’ interests in personal and collective choice, the latter either collapse the political into the personal, or assume that the legitimate claims of individuals are merely a function of collective needs, interests and values. Neither of these is consistent with familiar assumptions about the nature and justification of democratic institutions and rights, nor can they be reconciled with a commitment to sexual equality. Thus, I conclude, though the fact that there are different justifications for privacy rights in a democracy means that individuals may legitimately disagree over the content and justification of basic rights, it is wrong to confuse democratic debate with moral or conceptual confusion and so, arbitrarily, to truncate our accounts of privacy, equality and democracy. Finally, in Chapter 4, I test and develop these claims by examining the justification for abortion rights in a democracy. I argue that women have legitimate interests in abortion, as well as in bearing children, because they have fundamental, and legitimate, interests in privacy and equality. Although safe and legal abortion is necessary to sexual equality, as feminists claim, I show that we can provide a convincing and democratic account of women’s claims to abortion only if we recognize women’s interests in self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality. This is because women have both personal and political interests in abortion and we will be unable adequately to identify these if we overlook their interests in privacy. Indeed, I show, the difference between democratic and undemocratic solutions to conflict over abortion lies precisely in this: that whereas the former acknowledge the importance of privacy to the personal and political equality of women, the latter overlook or deny this. As a result, the latter license both mandated abortions, although women have legitimate interests in bearing and raising children, and prohibitions on abortion that cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women. That is not to say that abortion is not a politically significant matter, or that we can resolve moral conflict over abortion simply by giving women a legal right to abortion. Neither is the case. However, the chapter shows, in a democracy individuals are entitled to make morally and politically controversial decisions for themselves not simply because this is expedient or useful, but because this is right. To overlook this feature of democracy, I argue, is to make moral and political conflict utterly intractable by democratic means. Thus, while controversy over abortion has been held to show that privacy is an incoherent and undemocratic right, this chapter argues that it shows the reverse: for controversy over abortion makes clear that privacy is essential to democracy, and why this should be so. This overview of the book, I hope, makes clear that its concerns are methodological as well as substantive, and moral as well as political. Thus, its central methodological claim is that we cannot reconcile privacy with the equality of individuals unless we make a deliberate effort to do so. Its central moral and political claims are that privacy is compatible with the equality of individuals, and sufficiently important to the latter that, in a democracy, the privacy of individuals merits legal protection by right. However, this summary of the book also exposes its limitations. Chief amongst these, I fear, is that it provides no sustained discussion of the place of property on a democratic conception of privacy, and that the latter, itself, is rather a broad preliminary sketch than a polished and detailed portrait. I regard these limits on the scope and arguments of the book as limitations, albeit ones that I hope to be able to remedy before too long.However, limited though the book clearly is, I believe that it lays out the essential components of a democratic conception of privacy and that, by analysing and synthesizing several diverse bodies of literature, it may help those who are interested in the relations between privacy, equality and democracy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Pierre Bayle developed an expansive theory of toleration in his Commentaire philosophique by arguing that tolerance is a universal principle of natural law. However, by situating toleration in natural law rather than positive law, Bayle was brought into theoretical conflict with the Old Testament injunction that the state should punish idolatry. To resolve this conflict, Bayle drew upon the work of early modern Hebraists, particularly the Catholic biblical scholar Richard Simon. Bayle adapted Simon’s idea that theocracy uniquely shaped (...) the institutions of ancient Israel to argue that prohibitions against idolatry should be exclusive to the Hebrew republic. Bayle argued that the Mosaic Law did not punish someone for their sincerely held religious beliefs but only prohibited treason, and these circumstantial laws should not be emulated by other states. This allowed Bayle to contend for the moral veracity of the Old Testament and the notion that toleration is an unconditional principle of natural law. Bayle’s use of Simon displayed the revolutionary potential of textual critical scholarship in the early modern period, as he adapted Simon’s critical ideas to his own aims of promoting religious toleration within the ecclesiastical and civic spheres of his own confessional context. (shrink)

The kingdom of God was a central theme in Jesus' vision. Was it meant to be understood as Utopian as Mary Ann Beavis views it, or existential? In 1st century CE Palestine, kingdom of God was a political term meaning theocracy suggesting God's patronage. Jesus used the term metaphorically to construct a new symbolic universe to legitimate a radical new way of living with God in opposition to the temple ideology of exclusivist covenantal nomism. The analogies of father and (...) king served as the root metaphors for this symbolic universe. They are existential root metaphors underpinning the contextual symbolic universe of God's patronage in reaction to the collapse of the patronage system which left peasants destitute. Jesus' paradoxical use of the metaphor kingdom of God had a therapeutic value and gave the concept new meaning. The initial motivation for proclaiming God's patronage originated in Jesus' primary identity formation by Mary as single parent and was reinforced in his secondary identity formation by John the Baptist. From these results can be concluded that kingdom of God was not meant to be understood as utopian, but existential. In order to clarify the meaning of kingdom of God and God's patronage for the 21st century, demythologisation and deconstruction can be helpful especially by highlighting the existential meaning of the kingdom of God. (shrink)

1. The appearance of Islam upon the stage of international politics hasbeen greeted by some commentators as a return to the Middle Ages. Preciselywhat they mean by this is not very clear, to themselves no less than their readers perhaps. In part, no doubt, they refer to the kinds of punishment Islamic law requires, which have a brutality associated in the common mind with medieval Europe. In part too there is the feeling that the phenomena of religion in politics, inquisitions, (...) holy wars, government by clergy, are things of the past and that the undesirability of theocracy is a question long since settled. (shrink)

Civil Religion offers philosophical commentaries on more than twenty thinkers stretching from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. The book examines four important traditions within the history of modern political philosophy and delves into how each of them addresses the problem of religion. Two of these traditions pursue projects of domesticating religion. The civil religion tradition, principally defined by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, seeks to domesticate religion by putting it solidly in the service of politics. The liberal tradition pursues an (...) alternative strategy of domestication by seeking to put as much distance as possible between religion and politics. Modern theocracy is a militant reaction against liberalism, and it reverses the relationship of subordination asserted by civil religion: it puts politics directly in the service of religion. Finally, a fourth tradition is defined by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Aspects of their thought are not just modern, but hyper-modern, yet they manifest an often-hysterical reaction against liberalism that is fundamentally shared with the theocratic tradition. Together, these four traditions compose a vital dialogue that carries us to the heart of political philosophy itself. (shrink)

How can the Biblical God be the Lord and King who, being typically unseen and even self-veiled at times, authoritatively leads people for divine purposes? This article’s main thesis is that the answer is in divine moral leading via human moral experience of God (of a kind to be clarified). The Hebrew Bible speaks of God as ‘king,’ including for a time prior to the Jewish human monarchy. Ancient Judaism, as Martin Buber has observed, acknowledged direct and indirect forms of (...) divine rule and thus of theocracy. This article explores the importance of divine rule as divine direct leading, particularly in moral matters, without reliance on indirect theocracy supervised by humans. It thus considers a role for God as Über-King superior to any human king, maintaining a direct moral theocracy without a need for indirect theocracy. The divine goal, in this perspective, is a universal commonwealth in righteousness, while allowing for variation in political structure. The article identifies the importance in the Hebrew Bible of letting God be God as an Über-King who, although self-veiled at times, leads willing people directly and thereby rules over them uncoercively. It also clarifies a purpose for divine self-veiling neglected by Buber and many others, and it offers a morally sensitive test for unveiled authenticity in divine moral leading. (shrink)

The Iranian government is a theocracy—the only one in the world today. The clergy control all three branches of government. The supreme leader or velayat-e-faqu’ih is also a cleric. In such a political system all legislation and policy making are conducted in accordance with the leaders’ interpretation of Islamic law or Shari’a. In this paper I will examine the extent to which these laws and policies allow the government to intrude into the private sphere of life and intervene in (...) the privacy of individual citizens. I will use specific examples to illustrate my point that since citizens have no control over their government and cannot impact the interpretation of Shari’a, their private sphere is always threatened by government action. (shrink)