Continental Political Philosophy

Glenn Wallis & John Kendall Hawkins An Interview with Glenn Wallis -/- Glenn Wallis is an independent scholar and founder of Incite Seminars in Philadelphia. He has taught at several universities, including Brown University and the University of Georgia. His most recent books include A Critique of Western Buddhism and How to Fix Education. Wallis blogs at Speculative Non-Buddhism. He holds a Ph.D. in Buddhist studies from Harvard University. He has also recently published An Anarchist’s Manifesto (Warbler, 2021). He is (...) an expert in Emma Goldman’s practical philosophy of anarchy. Here in this interview, he goes into detail about what Goldman espoused and her legacy, while also contrasting her thoughts on anarchy with his own. He addresses how notions of anarchy have changed over time and what its value is today. -/- John Kendall Hawkins is an American ex-pat freelancer based in Australia. He is a former reporter for The New Bedford Standard-Times. (shrink)

Myths—symbolically dense narratives in wide cultural circulation that resist critical scrutiny—are often thought to be counterproductive to political discourse, but they are also ubiquitous in contemporary culture and society. Just two years apart, Jürgen Habermas and Hans Blumenberg developed contrasting visions of how we ought to respond to the myths in our society. By reconstructing their disagreement, this paper uncovers the distinctive challenge of balancing a commitment to political emancipation with the opacity of myths to critical reason. I argue for (...) an alternative approach to myths than those in the theoretical mainstream, taking Blumenberg’s relatively neglected position as a starting point. Blumenberg invites us to pay closer attention to the cognitive needs that necessitate the generation of myths while simultaneously reminding us of our own creative agency to reinvent them. (shrink)

Noology is the technical life of ideology. It works at the formal and technical production of knowledge, rather than focusing on the content displayed by a specific system of thought. There are two reasons why the notion of noology must play a role in today’s critical and political debates. First, the concept of ideology has lost its relevance since its everyday meaning is far removed from the original meaning Karl Marx gave it; today ideology mainly means “political doctrine,” right-wing, left-wing, (...) or the entire spectrum of shades between the two. Expressions such as “an ideology” or “ideologies” are used in critical analysis, while for Marx “ideology” has always come without any pronoun. Ideology now presents itself as an “inversion of causalities producing illusions.”1 The second reason has to do with the changes in the modes of production since the 1970s, and the rise of the post-Fordist economy, or “neoliberalism.” Since the 1970s, the end of ideologies has been proclaimed (epitomised by Daniel Bell). Given this context, noology critique demonstrates that the work of ideology in today’s economy plays out at an infrastructural level, in social organs that materially institutionalise thought and ideas, and not simply at the level of the immaterial culture of political parties and discourses (superstructure). (shrink)

A summary of issues related to symbolic capital, authorial presences, and intellectual property rights, and the necessity of finding a way out of 500-600 years of capitalist exploitation of the knowledge commons.

Provocative and disconcerting, The False Past confronts what many generations hold near and dear about their memorials. What if everything we know about colonial history is wrong? What if history is driven by vanity and unexamined moral claims? What if fabrication and corruption are so integral to history that it must be written anew? These questions, posed by Nietzsche, are answered in this exciting new work. The False Past takes a disturbing escapade through Australia’s colonial past. Using a Nietzschean evaluation (...) of how the eternal recurrence of suffering worked in practice, it announces a fresh vision for frontier history. And in the finest Nietzschean tradition, Price reveals the uncaring absurdity and inconsistency of settlers in the pioneer past as their supreme failing because it produces contemporary trauma. The False Past evaluates claims to colonial nobility, too. Who were the souls aiming beyond humanity who rose up Down Under? Was its Übermensch a dark and moody genius with a taste for conquest, a supreme talent in pastoral profiteering, an Indigenous exemplar, or a cunning bushranger out on a mission? Awkward and confronting, bold and experimental, this book often says the unsayable. The False Past lays siege to nostalgia, piety, vanity and nihilism to explain how unfounded exceptionalism has come to rule our lives. A revisionist assault on settled history, The False Past promises to spark debate among readers for many years to come. (shrink)

This article addresses the chapter in A Thousand Plateaus, “Year Zero: Faciality,” by examining Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal to “dismantle” the abstract machine that is responsible for producing the subject’s collective or group face. After examining the components of the abstract machine, including its relationship to visual perception and emotion from the perspective of American Ego Psychology, a comparison is drawn between faciality and Walter Benjamin’s earlier thesis of the reproducibility of certain kinds of images in a technological or modern (...) media society. The article concludes by outlining the three-step program of “schizoanalysis” that Deleuze and Guattari proposed as the political objective of “dismantling the face.”. (shrink)

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" but (...) always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis). (shrink)

During the last decade a new utopian horizon has emerged from the radical left: that of a future postcapitalist society in which technological progress and renewable energy finally take care of our material needs while robots do most our work for us, making paid employment a thing of the past. Instead, we can focus on fulfilling our desires and dreaming up new ones, leading lives of luxury and ease. This utopia, often called “fully automated luxury communism," could be reached through (...) opportunistically accelerating features of the existing neoliberal capitalist system. -/- However, behind this vision of a bright, sustainable future lurks a worrying political prospect. I show how the post-capitalist’s philosophical prejudice against work comes at a high political cost. By painting productive activity as mere drudgery that machines will emancipate us from, they also end up giving up on work as the root of radical democratic agency. The luxury communist proposal ends up resembling an extreme case of the neoliberal hegemony that it claims to be fighting against, a centrally ruled world completely focused on private enjoyment of luxury and devoid of any shared understanding of human flourishing on which democratic public life could thrive – a political dystopia. (shrink)

It is well-known that Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) are critical of the notion of ideology. However, it is not very clear why they seem to be so dismissive of it. In what follows, I will begin my discussion by showing what Deleuze means by ideology and reconstructing why Deleuze thinks that ideology is a misused concept and that the misuse of the concept warrants its dismissal. In Anti-Oedipus, the insufficiency or inadequacy of the concept of ideology can be understood (...) in light of the opposition between production and representation. Next, I will show that—in A Thousand Plateaus—this very opposition between production and representation is relaxed in favor of the notion of assemblage. By looking at Althusser’s theory of ideology, I will argue that ideology is not merely a cognitive representation in the sense that it can be considered as having its own material existence. If so, the concept of ideology does not have to be too narrowly conceived. Rather, I propose that Deleuze and Guattari offer a different kind of ideology critique through noology and the critical analysis of microfascism. Finally, I will conclude by arguing that Deleuze is still enacting a novel form of ideology critique despite his dismissal of the very terminology. (shrink)

The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and (...) of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”. (shrink)

A central problem of theories of grounded cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts in sensorimotor representations. The paper aims at providing a new basis for a theory of cogni-tive abstraction mechanisms. The focus will be on the notions of causal indexicals and affordances, understood as action related concepts that show different degrees of abstraction. Abstraction mechanisms will be characterized that allow the transformation of such obviously "grounded" concepts into more abstract ones. In this way, the relation between sensorimotor processes (...) and abstract concepts will be described in detail, and general principles of abstraction will be determined. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theory of Weltanschauungen. A judgment belongs to a Weltanschauung if it represents reality simultaneously in three dimensions: the descriptive- cognitive dimension, the ethical-practical dimension, and the esthetic-emotive dimension. It is a crucial anthropological function of Weltanschauungen that they coordinate human perception and action in all these three dimensions. Different Weltanschauungen differ from each other in the weight of importance which they attach to each of these three dimensions. Therefore I suggest to classify Weltanschauungen according (...) to their position within a triangle, the so-called Weltanschauungsdreieck, whose vertices represent these three dimensions. In sections 1-3 my analysis of Weltanschauungen is based on general epistemological and anthropological reections, drawing on the philosophical and scientific literature. My sections 4-6 make use of Robert Musil's impressing novel \The man without qualities", in which Musil explores Weltanschauungen by literary methods: at hand of the major figures of his novel he brings Weltanschauungen into being, lets them develop, reconstructs them, parodises them and finally deconstructs them. In the final section I show how a variety of typical bipolarities of Weltanschauungen can be analyzed within the Weltanschauungsdreieck. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" [6] in an effort to clarify the essential features of attitudes that Strawson believes may be understood as reactive. I propose a definition of the reactive attitudes that outlines the various conditions that must be met in order to give rise to a given reactive attitude. I then expand upon Strawson's work by introducing two additional categories of reactive attitudes: self-reflexive reactive attitudes and second-personal reflexive reactive attitudes. In addition (...) to explaining the new categories of reactive attitudes that I seek to introduce, I also set forth reasons that lead me to accept such attitudes as reactive. Finally, I outline why I believe the self-reflexive reactive attitudes provide the foundation upon which all the other reactive attitudes rest. (shrink)

In Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophyin the Real World, John Searle presents an uncompromising apologia for realism which is distinguished both by its lucidity and by its vigour. His basic strategy is to show that realists have at their disposal the resources needed to refute skeptics who allege that a mind-independent world is unknowable. In this paper, I reconstruct Searle´s principal pro-realist argument, then argue that it is vitiated by its reliance on two unwarranted assumptions. First, however, I summarize the (...) position- “external realism”-Searle defends. (shrink)

I argue that close examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances shows that he is proposing a theory about the development of language over time. According to this theory, a concept is enlarged to a newly discovered object when it is similar to other objects falling under this concept. However, being empirical, theories of language-development cannot be regarded as philosophical positions. I therefore argue that Wittgenstein puts forward this theory only for therapeutical reasons. He thereby wants to bring the metaphysical (...) question “Why do we call all games ‘games’?” back to its everyday use. (shrink)

McTaggart's negative thesis in his proof for the unreality of time, which contends that the A-series is contradictory, is still today upheld as a proof of the unreality of the properties of past, present, and future, and of the `flow of time'. In my paper, I defend the possibility of a complete and consistent description of the A-series, thus refuting McTaggart's negative thesis. I show that the failure to acknowledge the possibility of such a description is due to an ambiguity (...) in natural language. Once this ambiguity is clarified, and in light of the disanalogy between time and space, the usual description of the A-series, `Event e was future, is present, and will be past', is shown to be a successful description of the change in the temporal A-properties. (shrink)

In this article we compare three different semantic theories for a propositional language, namely a valuation-semantic, a truth-set- semantic and a modal-set-semantic theory. We prove step by step that these semantic theories are mutually equivalent.

Technology penetrates into all areas of our everyday and individual life and changes it in a considerable speed. This applies particularly to developments of information and communication technology since this technology shows its effects not only at our workplaces but transforms and sometimes determines the social behavior of people. Unfortunately, development and use of technology certainly doesn't go hand into hand with the acceptance of responsibility for consequences of effects of developing and using technology. Instead, the opposite behavior is quite (...) common. If this process of the rejection of responsibility shall be stopped, the sensibility of developers and users of technology for consequences of their own behavior have to be aroused and strengthened. In the following text at first I will describe some reasons to formulate ethical guidelines. After this, with the example of the ethical guidelines of the German Gesellschaft für Informatik e. V., I will discuss, whether such ethical guidelines are ethical in the strict sense of the word and whether they actually can be a contribution to accomplish the striven aim of assignment of responsibility for the results of developing and using technolog. (shrink)

Language is ruled by conventions. In order to understand how language functions we need to know what conventions are. According to David Lewis conventions are regularities in action or in action and belief, that perpetuate themselves because they serve some common interest. Ruth Millikan has criticized this analysis for being too complex. She claims to offer an analysis in simpler terms that does neither rely on regularities nor rationality. She defines what she calls “natural conventions” as patterns that are reproduced (...) due partly to weight of precedent. After brief outlines of the two proposals it is shown in this article that Millikans argument against Lewis’ analysis is based on a misconception of regularities, that her own analysis does itself rely on regularities and that she cannot do without rationality if she wants to explain the conventionality of language. (shrink)

In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that is (...) better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper. (shrink)

There are two rival theories of time: static and dynamic. The Special Theory of Relativity is one of the strongest arguments for static time. However, the defenders of dynamic time claim that their approach is also possible in a relativistic setting. This debate supported the third theory: the hybrid theory of time. The aim of this paper, however, is to argue that the hybrid theory is against the nature of the Special Theory of Relativity. The argument is motivated by H. (...) Stein’s attempt to separate definite past from indefinite future by timelike and lightlike relations in and on the past pointing light cone. The paper shows that this approach leads to restricted and extremely unintuitive notion of co-presence. This is considered as a serious objection against the animation of static time in a relativistic setting. (shrink)

Individuative Realism is the thesis that reality is individuated intrinsically-that is, that reality is divided up into objects that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of our gerrymandering. One strategy for substantiating the thesis would involve discovering some of reality’s inherent joints by direct observation. This paper critically considers the observational strategy by examining a number of proposals for how reality might be individuated intrinsically, and demonstrating case-by-case that the individuation in question is likely imposed by us, rather (...) than inherent in nature. It is additionally suggested that even if objects with crisply unambiguous boundaries were discovered, it would still not be enough to vindicate Individuative Realism. (shrink)

Are Scientists responsible for the usage of the results of their research? Scientists belong to the most favourite group of people who are declared to be responsible for many various things. On the other hand, there is severe disagreement with regard to the question what it is that scientists are responsible for. According to some people, scientific responsibility essentially covers the correct acquisition, processing and publication of information, whereas others make scientists responsible for almost all consequences of their research, even (...) if they cannot influence them. This disagreement is exemplified by the attitudes towards Otto Hahn’s research on nuclear fission which range from blaming him for the development of the nuclear bomb to acquitting him from any responsibility because of the lack of knowledge on the possible consequences of his research. In order to solve this problem it is necessary to formulate clearly the conditions for ascribing responsibility to someone. By doing so, it is shown in the present paper, that it is indeed possible to ascribe to scientists responsibility for certain consequences of their research, and that, as a matter of fact, it is implausible to make Hahn responsible for the nuclear bomb, but that it isn’t justified either to regard him as a kind of “naive country scientist”, because there is a lot of information he could and should have had as a scientist. (shrink)

To obtain reliable results, some psychological experiments need to involve the deception of human subjects. This contradicts the ethical principle of autonomy and the process of informed consent that is required to ensure the subjects’ autonomy. Some solutions to this dilemma have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks. As solution I propose a procedure that combines proxy consent and prior consent.

Following Axel Honneth, I accept that recognition is integral to individuals’ self-realization and to social justice and that instances of misrecognition are injustices that cause moral injuries. The change in approach to misrecognition that I advocate is to replace a macrosocial top-down picture of misrecognition, such as Honneth’s typology, with a fine-grained phenomenological picture of multiple dimensions in misrecognition behaviors that offers greater explanatory power. This paper explains why a multidimensional view of misrecognition is needed and explores the various ways (...) that engagement with pathological norms or disengagement from individuals lead to injustices of misrecognition and how understanding behaviors in terms of these two dimensions—norms and individuals—illuminates causes of injustice. The multidimensional view of misrecognition replaces Honneth’s binary view of misrecognition as the contrary to recognition without replacing Honneth’s conceptions of the value of recognition. (shrink)

25 years after the publication of Derrida’s Politics of Friendship (Politiques de l’amitié, 1994), this edited collection gathers 23 critical chapters that revisit this underappreciated text. Engaging closely with Derrida’s text, the contributors analyse, extend and critique the work. They reconsider the place this book occupies in Derrida’s political philosophy and its potential for contemporary politics, when the promises and perils of political friendship have reappeared.

El presente artículo presenta una breve discusión en torno al vínculo entre juventud y capitalismo a partir del análisis de un caso particular: la escena hardcore punk estadounidense. Las peculiaridades de esta escena musical-su rebeldía rabiosa, su ímpetu (auto)destructivo, su desborde permanente-así como su contrapunto con los movimientos que la precedieron, nos permiten vislumbrar los mecanismos mediante los cuales el capitalismo ejerce su poder coercitivo, en lo que, con Althusser, denominaríamos los aparatos ideológicos de Estado y el aparato represivo de (...) Estado. Comenzaremos por definir estos conceptos, para luego aplicarlos al recorrido histórico que deriva en el surgimiento del hardcore punk a fines de los setenta. (shrink)

Gregg Lambert examines two facets of the return to religion in the 21st century: the resurgence of overtly religious themes in contemporary philosophy and the global 'post-secular' turn that has been taking place since 9/11. He asks how these two 'returns to religion' can be taking place simultaneously, and explores the relationship between them. Lambert reflects on statements of these returns from contemporary philosophers including Alain Badiou, John D. Caputo, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy. He discovers a unique - and (...) forboding - sense of the term 'religion' that belongs exclusively to our contemporary perspective. (shrink)

Dubilet’s contribution turns to Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” in order to diagnose the collusive interplay between mediation and sovereignty as modes of transcendence that, together, prevent real immanence from irrupting. It does so by recovering the logic of “the general secular contradiction”—the division between the state and civil society that materializes and secularizes the structure of diremption originally articulated in theological form, as the opposition between heaven and earth. In this analysis, the logic of Christianity is shown to be (...) imbricated with the political form of secular modernity itself. Moreover, this account reveals that the modern secular state does not inaugurate the political theology of immanence; rather it constitutes a mechanism of transcendent mediation. The exception that mediates across the two realms renders transcendence livable, but it also reproduces the dirempted life, establishing it as the unsurpassable horizon and foreclosing all operations of dissolution or abolition that could collapse the structure of civil society and the state that governs “the order of the world.” Although immediate transcendence (sovereignty) may be positioned, as it is in the Schmittian paradigm, as radically distinct from its mediational counterpart, in relation to real immanence the two operate as a collusive ensemble. (shrink)

This project retraces activations of Kierkegaard in the development of polit­ical theology. It suggests alternative modes of states of exception than those attributed to him by Schmitt, Taubes and Agamben. Several Kierkegaardian themes open themselves to 'something like pure potential' in Agamben, namely: living death, animality, criminality, auto-constitution, modification, liturgy, love and certain articulations of improbabilities. Attention is drawn to a modal ontology and auto-constitution at work in Kierkegaard's writings, as well as a complicated and indissociable operation between killing and (...) letting-live in legalist exceptionalism, comparable to similar functions found in Foucault regarding the biopowers and necropolitics of territorial and governmental apparatuses. It closes in consideration of Kierkegaard's critique of enumeration, large numbers, and statistical probability alongside contemporary tele-technoscientific social controls via the online datafication of people by surveillance or platform capitalisms. After Kierkegaard, such apparatuses are perhaps suspect as calculated to tranquilize humanity into more docile subhumans as it fools folk into becoming part of its numbers. (*Accompanying file includes only front matter, abstract, and endnotes*). (shrink)

This article reveals three aspects of victimhood in Bataille’s reading of Sade (of the other, of the self, and Sade’s language) and relates them to some of Bataille’s metaphysical and political notions: the impossible, the general and the restricted economy, sovereignty, and transgression. Doing so shows a progressive simplification of possibilities for transgression from the pre-Christian world to that of popular sovereignty, i.e., the sovereignty of the crowd, the latter leaving open one avenue for transgression: Sadean victimhood. The article then (...) applies these aspects to the pamphlet in Sade’s Philosophy in the Boudoir, “Frenchmen, Some More Effort If You Wish to Become Republicans,” in relation to a contemporaneous document of popular sovereignty, the preamble to the Constitution of the Year III, titled “Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Citizen.” Attending to the aspects of Sadean victimhood in “Effort” shows that its system’s very impossibility makes it the Declaration’s logical completion. Finally, that impossibility is revealed as the sovereignty of the masses, distinct from that of the crowd. (shrink)

Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin välienselvittelyyn filosofian esisokraattisen alun, erityisesti Parmenideen ajattelun kanssa. Parmenides ajattelee olemista kaikkia yksittäisiä ilmentymiään, "kuolevaisten" äärellisiä "näkemyksiä" (doksai) yhdistävänä absoluuttisen homogeenisena ja itseidenttisenä ilmeisyytenä (alētheia), todellisuuden puhtaana läsnäolona ajattelulle. Tätä vasten Heidegger ajattelee olemisen nimenomaan yksittäisten ilmentymiensä kontekstuaalisena ainutkertaisuutena, mielekkyystilanteiden ainutkertaistavana kontekstualisoitumisena. Nancy jatkaa ajatusta kuvailemalla olemista "ainutkertaiseksi-monikolliseksi" (singulier pluriel), mutta täydentää Heideggerin ajatteluun tunnetusti jäänyttä aukkoa soveltamalla ajatusta (...) yhteisön ajattelemiseen ainutkertaisuuksien yhdessäolemisena ja keskinäisyytenä. Näin avautuva "ainutkertaisuuden politiikan" teema onkin viime vuosikymmeninä noussut mannermaisen poliittisen ajattelun keskiöön. (shrink)

Artikkeli tarkastelee aluksi Hannah Arendtin analyysiä totalitarismin pohjimmiltaan ideologisesta luonteesta ja ideologisen ”idean” olemuksesta. Tätä analyysiä verrataan Alain Badioun yritykseen herättää henkiin ideologinen ”idean politiikka”. Artikkelin perusväitteen mukaan sekä Arendt että Badiou näkevät politiikan alueena, jolla uutuus ja ihmisen kyky ryhtyä maailmaa muuttaviin hankkeisiin voivat toteutua. He ymmärtävät kuitenkin poliittisen aktiviteetin muodon olennaisesti eri tavoin: Arendtille politiikka on perusluonteeltaan toimintaa, praksista, Badioulle se on pohjimmiltaan idean tuottamista, poiesista. Tällä on keskeisiä seurauksia heidän politiikkakäsityksilleen. Lopuksi osoitetaan, että Badioun ”ideologinen” ymmärrys politiikasta (...) jää alttiiksi Arendtin peruskritiikille, jonka mukaan politiikan välineellinen ymmärtäminen keinojen ja päämäärien viitekehyksessä on viime kädessä kyvytön sulkemaan pois poliittisen terrorin mahdollisuutta. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore and understand the relationships between secularism, pluralism, and the post-secular public sphere in the thought of Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and William Connolly. The three authors develop a thorough critique of secularism which implies a radical break with the dogmatic idea of removing religion from the public sphere. My main objective is to show that this critique is related to a normative understanding of our post-secular situation and requires a rethinking of (...) the boundaries of the public sphere in relation to the predicament of pluralism. Arguing against the post-metaphysical conception of secularism, Taylor develops a critique of Habermas’s “institutional translation proviso”, and Connolly stresses the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere. I take these criticisms into account, while arguing that Taylor and Connolly are unable to provide a sound basis for the legitimacy of our institutional settings. In contrast to Taylor and Connolly, I propose a reading of Habermas’s theory based on the internal relationship between universal justification and the everyday contexts of pre-political solidarity. I conclude with a focus on the need to take into account the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere. (shrink)

In this chapter, Jussi Backman approaches Hannah Arendt’s readings of ancient philosophy by setting out from her perspective on the intellectual, political, and moral crisis characterizing Western societies in the twentieth century, a crisis to which the rise of totalitarianism bears witness. To Arendt, the political catastrophes haunting the twentieth century have roots in a tradition of political philosophy reaching back to the Greek beginnings of philosophy. Two principal features of Arendt’s exchange with the ancients are highlighted. The first is (...) her account, in The Human Condition (1958), of the profound transformation of the Greek perceptions of political life initiated by Plato, the founder of the Western tradition of political philosophy; this transformation, according to Arendt, leads to an instrumentalization of politics as a means toward a higher end. The second feature is Arendt’s distinction, in her unfinished Life of the Mind (1977–8), between three different points of departure for thinking discovered by ancient philosophy—wonder, fear, and conscience—and three different outcomes of thinking—contemplation, willing, and judging. Backman argues that what connects these two interpretations of ancient philosophy is an attempt to rethink and rearticulate the complex relationship between thinking and action, between the reflective vita contemplativa and the world-oriented vita activa. (shrink)

The need for justice for individuals, groups, and society as a whole has perhaps never been more pressing. The presence or absence of social recognition plays a vital role in both social injustices and efforts to overcome and prevent them. Critical theory philosopher Axel Honneth’s influential accounts of recognition and struggles for recognition contain important insights about injustice and social justice movements. Unfortunately, some of Honneth’s concepts are narrow and need expansion for them to be useful in considering social injustices (...) and responses to those injustices. This is especially true if we are to understand and respond to current social justice issues such as Black Lives Matter and the climate crisis. -/- Douglas Giles presents an important corrective and addition to Axel Honneth’s view of recognition that gives the concepts of recognition, misrecognition, and struggles for recognition more explanatory power. He first critiques Honneth’s portrayal of misrecognition as being a simple lack of recognition and provides an alternative view of misrecognition as complex and multidimensional, helping us better understand the causes and effects of injustices. He then engages in a critical examination of Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition—the emancipation from injustice. The American civil rights movement and women’s suffrage movements are archetypal political struggles for recognition, but Honneth, like Charles Taylor and others, sees struggles for recognition only as political struggles, leaving out much of the story of struggles for recognition. In response, Giles presents a more robust picture of struggles for recognition that decentralizes struggles for recognition by including individual experience and agency. -/- This contribution to recognition studies expands the reality of recognition and misrecognition beyond theoretical concepts into the daily lives of individuals. Recognition is essential for affirming one’s identity and one’s place in community and society. Misrecognition is at the heart of many injustices from interpersonal relations to structural socioeconomic inequalities. Struggles for recognition are ubiquitous for everyone because people’s need for recognition extends far beyond political recognition. Giles crafts a view of recognition and misrecognition that identifies some important problems in critical theory’s approach to social justice and offers new conceptualizations to assist future research in various fields of critical social theories. (shrink)

The scholarship on Frantz Fanon’s theorization of violence is crowded with interpretations that follow the Arendtian paradigm of violence. These interpretations often discuss whether violence is instrumental or non-instrumental in Fanon’s work. This reading, I believe, is the result of approaching Fanon through Hannah Arendt’s framing of violence, i.e. through a binary paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence. Even some Fanon scholars who question Arendt’s reading of Fanon, do so by employing a similar binary logic, hence repeating the same either/or (...) paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence. I aim to challenge such interpretations of Fanon by demonstrating that in the context of anticolonial armed struggle in which Fanon writes, the either/or framework of the instrumental/non-instrumental binary of violence cannot fully capture his perspective. Violence can indeed be conceived as having both constructive and instrumental aspects. My argument is supported by Fanon’s corpus, including his 1960 Accra speech, “Why We Use Violence” in Alienation and Freedom. This piece, I suggest, together with Fanon’s other writings, poses a direct challenge to the Arendtian binary of violence. My analysis resists positioning the difference between Arendt and Fanon through the instrumental/non-instrumental binary. By using Judith Butler’s notion of “frame” I complicate their difference and argue Arendt’s framing of violence prevents her from apprehending Fanon and – more importantly – interpretations of Fanon based on this Arendtian frame of violence inevitably lead to misinterpretations. (shrink)

In this article, it is claimed that by considering Rancière’s understanding of politics of aesthetics alongside Stengers’ conception of the ecology of practices, it is possible to think about the autonomy of artistic practices which would be created and sustained politically. Rancière demonstrates that the artistic autonomy was previously subordinated to a variety of historical imperatives, while Stengers warns about an apolitical mission of the great narrative of the Anthropocene. Both philosophers make a case for talking about the autonomy of (...) artistic practices based on political differing, but in Stengers’ philosophy, the political principle of dissensus is supported by an ecological perspective. She argues for a symbiotic consensus, where the political is defined as being both contradictory and attuned to the situational interconnectedness. In the destructive environment of the Anthropocene, Stengers challenges the tradition of critical reflexivity and proposes a way out – the autonomy of practices that is not universally given but needs to be constantly recomposed together. (shrink)

This paper compares two influential but conflicting contemporary models of politics as an activity: those of Hannah Arendt and Alain Badiou. It discovers the fundamental difference between their approaches to politics in their opposing evaluations of the contemporary political significance of the legacy of Plato, Platonism, and the Platonic Idea. Karl Popper’s and Arendt’s analyses of the inherently ideological nature of totalitarianism are contrasted with Badiou’s vindication of an ideological “politics of the Idea.” Arendt and Badiou are shown to share (...) an understanding of politics as a realm for the human deployment of novelty and world-transformation. Their key disagreement concerns the form of activity that accomplishes this deployment. For Arendt, political activity has the basic form of noninstrumental and nonteleological action (praxis), devalued by the Platonic tradition of political philosophy. Badiou, by contrast, follows Plato in regarding politics essentially as a process of production (poiēsis) oriented to an ideal end. (shrink)