Saunders & van Brakel argue, inter alia, that there is for the claim that there are four unique hues (red, green, blue, and yellow), and that there are two corresponding opponent processes. We argue that this is quite mistaken.

Berlin & Kay hue-related basic color categories are compared with the ISCC-NBS system of object color categorization. Though independently derived, categories of the former form a small subset of the latter. A conjecture is proposed that explains the absence of yellow-green and blue-green basic hue categories and the potential for a violet category as the result of constraints on primitive hue category formation due to considerable variation in stimuli selected by color-normal observers as representing for them unique hues.

In this Handbook entry, I review how colour similarity spaces are constructed, first for physical sources of colour and secondly for colour as it is perceptually experienced. The unique hues are features of one of the latter constructions, due initially to Hering and formalized in the Swedish Natural Colour System. I review the evidence for a physiological basis for the unique hues. Finally, I argue that Tye's realist approach to the unique hues is a (...) mistake. (shrink)

The paper examines the notion, widespread in the contemporary color science, that there are certain hues, specifically focal red, yellow, green and blue, that are unique or privileged in human prelinguistic color perception, all other chromatic hues being perceptually composed of these. I successively consider and reject all motivations that have been provided for this opinion; namely the linguistic, “phenomenological”, and some minor or historical motivations. I conclude that, contrary to the standard opinion, there is no solid (...) reason to claim that the RYGB hues are unique among colors in a sense that would allow for direct neurophysiological explanation. The notion also has no relevance for the construction of perceptual color spaces and is not defensible as an explanatory principle with respect to the existing crosslinguistic patterns of color categorization. (shrink)

Hardin’s empirically-grounded argument for color eliminativism has defined the color realism debate for the last 30 years. By Hardin’s own estimation, phenomenal structure—the unique/binary hue distinction in particular—poses the greatest problem for color realism. Examination of relevant empirical findings shows that claims about the unique hues which play a central role in the argument from phenomenal structure should be rejected. Chiefly, contrary to widespread belief amongst philosophers and scientists, the unique hues do not play a (...) fundamental role in determining all color appearances. Among the consequences of this result is that greater attention should be paid to certain proposals for putting the structure of phenomenal color into principled correspondence with surface reflectance properties. While color realism is not fully vindicated, it has much greater empirical plausibility than previously thought. (shrink)

There exist two widely used notions concerning the structure of phenomenal color space. The first is the notion of unique/binary hue structure, which maintains that there are four unique hues from which all other hues are composed. The second notion is the similarity structure of hues, which describes the interrelations between the hues and hence does not divide hues into two types as the first notion does. Philosophers have considered the existence of the (...) unique/binary hue structure to be empirically and phenomenally well-grounded, and the structure has been considered to be primary because this can account for the similarity structure. Consequently, the unique/binary hue structure has played a central role in color philosophy. This calls for the assessment of the justification for its existence carried out in this paper. It is concluded that, despite the prevalent view among philosophers, none of their reasons for endorsing the existence of the unique/binary hue structure are justified. Since the notion of the unique/binary hue structure appears intuitively plausible for many, however, a sketch explaining this intuition is outlined at the end. (shrink)

The degree to which physiology and culture have affected the formation of primitive color categories continues to be a matter of discussion. In this paper the degree of agreement between the ranges of individual color term foci for the four hue-based color categories yellow, green, blue, and red and individual choices of Munsell samples representing for the observers Hering's four unique hues is investigated. The color term focus range data are extracted from the survey results of the 110 (...) unwritten languages of the World Color Survey, also in terms of the Munsell color order system. Agreement of approximately 90% between the two has been found, indicating the likelihood of a strong color vision system related physiological component in the formation of these four primitive hue categories. (shrink)

Contrary to argument that unique hues are undemonstrated, the World Color Survey shows that speakers of more than 100 minor and tribal languages focus color categories predominantly on 4 of the 40 hue columns of the ethnographic Munsell array. The pattern is not conditioned by saturation levels or other arbitrary structures among the color chips, nor is Western influence likely to be the cause. Moreover, all evidence suggests that color cognition is autonomous despite the connotations and polysemies of (...) color terms. (shrink)

Variations in colour perception have featured prominently in recent attempts to argue against the view that colours are objective mind-independent properties of the perceptual environment. My aim in this paper is to defend the view that colours are mind-independent properties in response to worries arising from one type of empirically documented case of perceptual variation: variation in the perception of the «unique hues». §1 sets out the challenge raised by variation in the perception of the unique (...) class='Hi'>hues. I argue in §2 that the empirical findings are less dramatic than they might initially appear, and in §3 that accounting for the inter-personal differences is consistent with the view that colours are mind-independent properties that normal subjects veridically perceive, at least roughly speaking. (shrink)

Where are we to look for the unique hues? Out in the world? In the eye? In more central processing? 1. There are difficulties looking for the structure of the unique hues in simple combinations of cone-response functions like ( L − M ) and ( S − ( L + M )): such functions may fit pretty well the early physiological processing, but they don’t correspond to the structure of unique hues. It may (...) seem more promising to look to, e.g., Hurvich & Jameson’s ‘chromatic response functions’; but these report on psychophysical behaviour, not on underlying physiology. So ‘opponent processing’ isn’t any particular help on the unique hues—and even physiology in general seems not to have come up with any good correlate or explanation. 2. Wright ( Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 1–17, 2011 ) looks in a different place: to (a) magnitude of total visual response that a stimulus light provokes, the maxima and minima of which, he thinks, give us the boundaries of the main hue categories (Wright connects these with Thornton’s ‘prime’ and ‘antiprime’ colours in an illuminant: Journal of the Optical Society of America 61 ( 1971 ): 1155–1163); and (b) the ratio of chromatic to achromatic response, the maxima and minima of which, he suggests, give us the focal points of the unique hues. The suggestions are extremely interesting; but the desired correspondences have some counterexamples; and where they hold, one could wonder how much they depend upon the particular choice of functions to measure (a) and (b); and one could hope for more of an explanatory linkage between the sets of items in question. 3. Could the unique hues come from, so to speak, the external world? White and black can easily be defined as particular kinds of reflectance. What of the standard four unique hues? Variation in kinds of sunlight and skylight coincides well with variation along a line from unique yellow to unique blue (cf. Shepard 1992 , Mollon 2006 ). If we wanted something to calibrate our standards for unique yellow and blue as the lens of the eye changes with age, and despite interpersonal cone differences, this would be a good basis—and there are several ways this can be extended to surface colours. But is there any essential connection between these things: is there any rationale why the light of the sun and the sky should be counted as unique hued ? An answer may be: because in our environment, these illuminants are as close to white (or the natural illuminant colour) as you can get—to see things tinged with sunlight or skylight should be to see them minimally tinged with any alien colour. Whereas other hues in an illuminant would be treated as tinging with a more alien colour the thing seen. (shrink)

Saunders and van Brakel question whether the special status of red, green, yellow, and blue in our perceptual organization is anything more than a shadow cast by the English language. I suggest that it is more than this. We can hardly imagine treating lime, purple, orange, and teal as unique hues, and the reason does not lie in special training. To settle the issue, I suggest some lines for psychological experiment and anthropological investigation.

The logic of the basic taste concept is discussed in relation to the physiology and psychophysics of color vision. An alternative version of the basic taste model, analogous to opponent-process theory is introduced. The logic of quality naming experiments is clarified.

Saunders & van Brakel's analysis of the phenomenal categorization and subsequent experimental research in unique hues fails to include contemporary methodological improvements. Alternative strategies are offered from the author's research that rely less on language and world knowledge and provide strong evidence for the general theoretical constructs of elemental hue, nonbasic, and basic color terms.

Zone theories of color vision transform cone sensitivities to channel sensitivities before transmitting these signals to the brain. The concepts of and are fundamental to an understanding of this transformation. Saunders & van Brakel question the objectivity of these concepts. Statements in their target article indicate that the reason for this questioning stems from a failure to appreciate the constraints inherent in the definitions of these concepts.

The terms red, green, yellow, and blue are both necessary and sufficient to describe our chromatic experience. Their uniqueness and opponent nature is supported by evidence obtained under supra-threshold conditions, especially hue cancellation. These constraints are nontrivial. How some electrophysiologically identified mechanisms contribute to colour appearance is not known, but their complexities do not refute our experience of elemental hues.

This paper argues that the distinctiveness of the Hering primary hues – red, green, blue, and yellow – is already evident at the retina. Basic features of spectral sensitivity provide a foundation for the development of unique hue perceptions and the hue categories of which they are focal examples. Of particular importance are locations in color space at which points of minimal and maximal spectral sensitivity and extreme ratios of chromatic to achromatic response occur. This account builds on (...) Jameson & D’Andrade’s (1997) insight about the relationship between the Hering primaries and chromatic/achromatic ratios, Romney & Chiao’s (2009) color appearance model, and Thornton’s (1971; 1999) research on artificial lighting. (shrink)

This paper responds to Justin Broackes’ reply to my paper, “On the retinal origins of the Hering primaries.” This paper aims to clarify and further develop the ideas presented in that article. I take up several of the points Broackes raises regarding the connection between my work and that of William Thornton (Journal of the Optical Society of America 61:1155–1163, 1971 ) and (Color Research and Application 24:139–156, 1999 ) on the “prime” and “anti-prime” colors of the human visual system, (...) the connection between those prime and anti-prime colors and hue category boundaries, and my attempt to link facts about low-level processing to the unique hues. Ultimately, while Broackes brings up several interesting issues and usefully illustrates the limits of my approach, I see no reason to retreat from the main claims I made about human spectral sensitivity and the hues. (shrink)

A single protein molecule with one or more cysteine residues can occupy a plurality of unique residue and oxidation‐chemotype specified proteoforms that I term oxiforms. In binary reduced or oxidised terms, one molecule with three cysteines will adopt one of eight unique oxiforms. Residue‐defined sulfur chemistry endows specific oxiforms with distinct functionally‐relevant biophysical properties (e.g., steric effects). Their emergent complexity means a functionally‐relevant effect may only manifest when multiple cysteines are oxidised. Like how mixing colours makes new shades, (...) combining discrete redox chemistries—colours—can create a kaleidoscope of oxiform hues. The sheer diversity of oxiforms co‐existing within the human body provides a biological basis for redox heterogeneity. Of evolutionary significance, oxiforms may enable individual cells to mount a broad spectrum of responses to the same stimulus. Their biological significance, however plausible, is speculative because protein‐specific oxiforms remain essentially unexplored. Excitingly, pioneering new techniques can push the field into uncharted territory by quantifying oxiforms. The oxiform concept can advance our understanding of redox‐regulation in health and disease. (shrink)

In this target article the following hypotheses are discussed: (1) Colour is autonomous: a perceptuolinguistic and behavioural universal. (2) It is completely described by three independent attributes: hue, brightness, and saturation: (3) Phenomenologically and psychophysically there are four unique hues: red, green, blue, and yellow; (4) The unique hues are underpinned by two opponent psychophysical and/or neuronal channels: red/green, blue/yellow. The relevant literature is reviewed. We conclude: (i) Psychophysics and neurophysiology fail to set nontrivial constraints on (...) colour categorization. (ii) Linguistic evidence provides no grounds for the universality of basic colour categories. (iii) Neither the opponent hues red/green, blue/yellow nor hue, brightness, and saturation are intrinsic to a universal concept of colour. (iv) Colour is not autonomous. (shrink)

An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues Noûs 50: 3–40),. (...) In ), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation. (shrink)

Reflectance and spectral power functions are poor predictors of color experiences. Only in completely relativized conditions (single observer, non-metameric set of stimuli, and single set of viewing conditions) is the relationship close. Variation in reflectance of Munsell chips experienced by color-normal observers as having a unique green hue encompasses approximately sixty percent of the complete range of hues falling under the category “green”; and in recent determinations of unique hues, ranges of yellow and green as well (...) as green and blue unique hues overlap. (shrink)

Probably colour is the best worked-out example of allegedly neurophysiologically innate response categories determining percepts and percepts determining concepts, and hence biology fixing the basic categories implicit in the use of language. In this paper I argue against this view and I take C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers [1988] as my main target. I start by undermining the view that four unique hues stand apart from all other colour shades (Section 2) and the confidence that the solar (...) spectrum is naturally divided into four categories (Section 3). For such categories to be truly universal, they have to be true for all peoples and in Section 4 I show that Berlin and Kay's [1969] widely quoted theory of basic colour categories is not sufficiently supported to lend it any credibility.Having disposed of the view that inspection of language or ‘pure’ perception unveils the universal colour categories. I turn to neurophysiological and psychophysical theories of colour vision to see whether they provide a more solid basis for deciding what the innate response categories are. In Section 5 I show that Hardin's account of the opponent-process theory neither supports his view that ‘colour-coding’takes place early in the visual neural pathway, nor his view that knowledge of colour vision science will help us solve many philosophical mysteries about colour.In Section 6 I give a more detailed review of what is known today about the neurophysiology of colour vision and I show that there's nothing in the brain which could be called a colour module, let alone a module with homunculi for particular basic colour categories. In Section 7 I show that psychophysical models do not support such rigid constraints on category formation either. Hence (Section 8), at least in the case of colour, current science supports a plasticity in the formation of categories that goes far beyond the requirements of those naturalistic philosophers who would like to ground primitive concepts in biology. (shrink)

This study examines the cross‐cultural generality of Hering's (1878/1964) color‐opponent theory of color appearance. English‐speaking and Somali‐speaking observers performed variants of two paradigms classically used to study color‐opponency. First, both groups identified similar red, green, blue, and yellow unique hues. Second, 25 English‐speaking and 34 Somali‐speaking observers decomposed the colors present in 135 Munsell color samples into their component Hering elemental sensations—red,green,blue, yellow, white, and black—or else responded “no term.” Both groups responded no term for many samples, notably (...) purples. Somali terms for yellow were often used to name colors all around the color circle, including colors that are bluish according to Hering's theory. Four Somali Grue speakers named both green and blue elicitation samples by their term for green. However, that term did not name the union of all samples called blue or green by English speakers. A similar pattern was found among three Somali Achromatic speakers, who called the blue elicitation sample black or white. Thus, color decomposition by these Somali‐speaking observers suggests a lexically influenced re‐dimensionalization of color appearance space, rather than a simple reduction of the one proposed by Hering. Even some Somali Green‐Blue speakers, whose data were otherwise similar to English, showed similar trends in yellow and blue usage. World Color Survey data mirror these results. These within‐ and cross‐cultural violations of Hering's theory do not challenge the long‐standing view that universal sensory processes mediate color appearance. However, they do demonstrate an important contribution of language in the human understanding of color. (shrink)

It has been suggested that difficult-to-quantify differences in visual processing may prevent researchers from equating the color experience of different observers. However, spectral locations of unique hues are remarkably invariant with respect to everything other than gross differences in preretinal and photoreceptor absorptions. This suggests a stereotyping of neural color processing and leads us to posit that minor differences in observer neurophysiology may be irrelevant to color experience.

: According to a consensus of psycho-physiological and philosophical theories, color sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral "space" fed from photon-photoreceptor interaction (producing "metamers") in the retina of the eye. The resulting "space" has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or "purity"), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark "colors"—usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been (...) proposed that there are eleven semantic universals—labeling the previous six plus the "intermediaries" of orange, pink, brown, purple, and gray. There are many versions of this consensus, but they all aim to provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the brute fact of the reality of color ordained by Nature (evolution). In contrast to this consensus, we have argued that "seeing color" is not a matter of light waves impacting on our eyes, producing sensations to be categorized and labeled in the "color space" in the brain. While electrochemical events may unproblematically be regarded as the causal precondition for seeing color, the reception of sensations in "the color space" as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, is a "just so" story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. In contrast we consider that the authority of this consensus might better be regarded not as the result of the truth-tracking of nature, but as the sociohistorical outcome of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their feed forward into the lifeworld. The question we shall therefore explore is whether, or to what extent, we ourselves are changed, as the conditions of production of color science change. Thus we are doing a kind of anthropology at two levels: of color science itself (and its effect on our own lifeworld), and of those studied by the "anthropology of color". As befits this stance we are agnostic about the theoretical entities of color science (cf. van Fraassen 2001), and within this new context, we propose to cross-cut object-and-subject, organism-and-environment (the bedrock of color science) in socio-historical ways. Our approach is in part inspired by, but not the same as, that of Gibson, in that we wish to pursue the notion of "social affordances" (Burmudez 1995). We suggest that color has become a naturalization through science-based technologies, which, through praxes and materializations, have become the perceptual and cultural entities that structure experience and understanding in the lifeworld. It is this naturalization that we shall refer to and characterize as "the historically inflected exosomatic organ". Consequently we shall explore the historical ontology of "color" without assuming an underlying biological constant (Dupré 2001). In part 1 we show the flimsiness of the evidence for the three dimensions of color, borrowed from physics, and fine-tuned to a "standard observer" (a "spectral creature" with a phenomenal "color space"). In part 2 we address the structuring of hue through the development of color circles and color spaces. This is followed by a review of the evidence for unique hues. Again the evidence is shown to be flimsy. We then show that an isolated domain of color is a particular kind of model, not a "natural given". In part 3, after reviewing what is referred to as "the isomorphy thesis," we discuss the exemplary case study of Berlin and Kay (1969). This illustrates the pull of stadial models presupposed by their evolutionary theory of color language. The Berlin and Kay paradigm proposes that American English color terms are incorrigible and can provide the universal metalanguage. We conclude by presenting an alternative account, namely that we ourselves are changed as the conditions of production of color science change. We argue that it is better to regard "seeing-color" as a historically inflected exosomatic organ that provides social affordances for those trained to grasp them. (shrink)

In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the (...) relative magnitude of inter-subject variability in the matching experiment is for both tested colors larger than that in the naming experiment, thus invalidating their claims. In addition, we point out several serious shortcomings in the experiment. (shrink)

This paper argues that the distinctiveness of the Hering primary hues—red, green, blue, and yellow—is already evident at the retina. Basic features of spectral sensitivity provide a foundation for the development of unique hue perceptions and the hue categories of which they are focal examples. Of particular importance are locations in color space at which points of minimal and maximal spectral sensitivity and extreme ratios of chromatic to achromatic response occur. This account builds on Jameson and D’Andrade’s (1997) (...) insight about the relationship between the Hering primaries and chromatic/achromatic ratios, Romney and Chiao’s (2009) color appearance model, and Thornton’s (1971, 1999) research on artificial lighting. (shrink)

There is no natural and pretheoretical classification of colour appearances into hue, saturation, brightness, unique hues, and so on. Rather, our theoretical insights into the coding of colour have reciprocally shaped the way we talk about colour appearances. Opponency is only one of many fundamental aspects of colour coding, and we are hardly justified in ascribing some theoretical prominance to it.

Externalism about colour phenomenology claims that the phenomenal character of colour experiences is determined by mind-independent properties of perceptual objects. The structural mismatch argument shows that physical properties of perceived mind-independent things are not similar in ways that correlate with the ways in which the phenomenal character of colour experiences are similar. Structural mismatch has thus been perceived by some to demonstrate that correlative externalism (which takes mind-independent physical properties to correlate systematically with colour phenomenology) is false. This argument is (...) defused if there are broad physical properties that can bear similarity relations that do correlate with those held by the phenomenal character of colour experiences. I defend the view that disjunctive properties can perform this role by showing that disjunctive properties can account for metamerism, the unique and binary hue distinction, and differences in perceived colours between subjects. Finally, I argue that correlative externalism is better placed than other views to explain why the physical properties identified by the physical sciences correlate with colour experiences with the particular phenomenal character they have. (shrink)

Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aestheticism and SpiritualismA Narrative Study of the Exploration of Self through the Practice of Chinese CalligraphyMing-Tak Hue (bio)IntroductionCalligraphy has been used to preserve significant writings and texts in a beautiful form and to make the different styles of writing enjoyable. It is not only the art of beautiful handwriting but also a cultural heritage and tradition that reflects the culture and history of a society, a race, a nation, (...) and a country. Hence, it has very great educational value. In China calligraphy is done with a brush, which was a common writing implement in ancient times. In addition to its utilitarian function, calligraphy is the most fundamental element in other types of art, such as painting and seal-carving, and is closely connected to many subject disciplines, such as literature, history, and philosophy. Brush calligraphy is still popular in Chinese society and is frequently used in different forms of publication, such as banners and newspapers; however, it is becoming more popular for these publications to be created mechanically or in electronic form with computers rather than by hand. In the context of schooling, a similar phenomenon can be seen. Many teachers in Hong Kong, as elsewhere, are concerned that fewer and fewer students have the chance to write with a pen and enjoy the beauty of writing, as the use of computers and different types of electronic devices for writing become more popular with the general public.The aim of this article is to examine the meaning of the practice of Chinese calligraphy from a cultural perspective and to draw school practitioners' attention to the importance of calligraphy education in the promotion of the whole-person growth of students and of multicultural education. Relevant literature on Western and Chinese calligraphy will be reviewed. Then an explanation will be given on how a narrative approach to the personal experience method and textual analysis were adopted for the data analysis. The article argues that calligraphy serves more than a utilitarian function. It [End Page 18] has also been used as an aesthetic practice and spiritual discipline. Hence, it is suggested that the calligraphy of brushwork is not only delightful to the eye but also an inspiration to the spirit. It is a practice of mindfulness for promoting self-reflection and self-cultivation, which leads calligraphy practitioners to reflect in their mind and heart, and so brings them into a harmonious relationship with others and the natural world.Literature ReviewIn Western societies for the last one hundred years, calligraphy has been rediscovered and relearned.1 Knight pointed out that the heritage and traditions of calligraphy have not been properly addressed and inherited in Western societies. Uyehara further suggested that calligraphy had been basically restudied and relearned in Europe and the United States up until the end of World War II. Edward Johnston (1872-1944) could be the most influential scholar who attempted to rediscover the art of Western calligraphy, lettering, and illuminating. In his study of ancient inscriptions and old manuscripts, three essential qualities of calligraphy were identified: "legibility," "beauty," and "character."2 When creating a piece of artwork, calligraphers have to ensure the legibility of the letter forms, the mastery of the skills of creating beautiful writing, and the readability of their works. As he explained,To make good letters and to arrange them well. To make good letters is not necessarily to "design" them—they have been designed long ago—but it is to take the best letters we can find, and to acquire them and make them our own. To arrange letters well requires no great art, but it requires a working knowledge of letter-forms and of the reasonable methods of grouping these forms to suit every circumstance.3Similarly, Knight highlighted the essential qualities of "legibility" and "beauty." Further, he stressed that the "creativity" of calligraphy should be imposed upon the tradition and cultural heritage of ancient manuscripts. As he said,[M]any of the conventions we use today in letter design and typography were established during the manuscript age. To know the classic work of this period is to know more about the ground we stand upon. If we grasp the... (shrink)

School Counselling in a Chinese Context discusses research in school counselling in the Chinese context of Hong Kong schools and various educational settings, and provides a contextualized understanding of counselling issues. This book highlights key contextual conditions for counselling in Hong Kong a Chinese society. The sub themes addressed in the book include school practices and teacher perspectives on guidance, counselling, behaviour support and school discipline; whole-school guidance program for identity construction; school counselling for ethnic minority students; contextual influence of (...) the use of play therapy; school counselling for students with minority sexual orientation; Chinese cultural influence on counselling, etc. The book also develops new theoretical orientations to understanding various issues of counselling as arisen in the Chinese society of Hong Kong and helps school practitioners to develop culturally responsive approaches to school counselling for personal growth, spiritual and emotional education. The themes addressed in the book include: School practices and teacher perspectives on guidance, counselling, behavior support and school discipline School counselling for ethnic minority students Contextual and cultural influence of the use of play therapy School counselling for students with minority sexual orientation Chinese culture influence on parental participation in counselling School Counselling in a Chinese Context will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers in the field of Counselling, school psychology, child development and Chinese studies. ". (shrink)

In Enjoy your Symptom, Slavoj Žižek’s notion of “trauma” is critical to understanding the scope and meaning of the “symptom.” This “symptom,” conceptually, is construed through the manner in which identity, authority, and phallophany come to bear psychologically on the meaning of being. Because of this, the definition of “symptom,” when viewed in a Heideggerian way, becomes an ontical representation of that which is oriented primordially. The symptom, as we experience it, is more than just at the level of its (...) ontics, but, instead, has a primordially to it, which is only revealed through the presence of trauma. (shrink)

Michel Hue et Olivier Pelon, La salle à piliers du palais de Malia et ses antécédents. P, 1-36 La salle à piliers ou «salle hypostyle» du palais de Malia présente une architecture que l'on a parfois rapprochée de prototypes égyptiens. Dans le cadre des recherches menées depuis 1964 sur l'architecture et la chronologie du palais, cette salle a été réétudiée en 1990. La fouille a révélé la présence dans une couche de destruction MR IA de fragments de stucs peints à (...) motifs, un fait exceptionnel au palais. Manifestement venue de l'étage, cette fresque confirme l'analyse de J. W. Graham qui voyait dans la salle de l'étage une salle d'apparat, probablement une salle de banquets. Par ailleurs une série de bases trouvées sous le niveau du sol dans l'alignement des piliers de la salle actuelle établit que, dès l'époque protopalatiale (MM IA-MM II), le schéma de la salle à piliers existait déjà sur le même emplacement. Les origines de cette architecture sont donc à rechercher en Crète même bien plutôt qu'à l'extérieur. (shrink)

At the intersection of “the theological” and “the political,” the situatedness of the sovereign dictates the task and method of political theology. It is the sovereign, in particular, positioned between “the theological” and “the political,” that is responsible for existentializing what is theologized and what is politicized through the power of sovereignty. Through this sovereignty, the sovereign creates, defines, and oversees all the existential dimensions of a theological-political environment, especially with respect to exclusiveness and inclusiveness, marginalization and belongingness, and what (...) is accomplished by the state of exception. To understand the nuances of what a sovereign is and how sovereignty operates, as the one that develops the state of exception through an act of exception, this essay will examine the explicit and implicit political theologies articulated by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, in an effort to construct Slavoj Žižek’s political theology from Schmitt’s sentiment about “the one who decides on the exception” and Agamben’s conceptualization of “ zoē ” and “ bios. ” From Schmitt and Agamben, Žižek’s political theology makes use of the dialectic and references to notions of symptom and trauma, which ultimately culminates in a religious-oriented understanding of the sovereign's act of exception as the “theologico-political suspension of the ethical.”. (shrink)

Plusieurs sagesses démotiques de l’Égypte ancienne rédigées entre le ve et le ier siècle avant notre ère déconseillent à leur lecteur d’entretenir des relations sexuelles avec des femmes mariées. Si la perception négative de l’adultère est évidente dans les extraits étudiés, qu’en est-il du consentement des femmes? Est-il possible d’établir si ces relations étaient consenties ou non? L’analyse de la terminologie et du contexte des occurrences ainsi que la comparaison avec d’autres textes issus de la littérature démotique permettent à l’auteure (...) de souligner qu’en réalité, ce n’est pas le consentement des partenaires qui doit être interrogé mais la prise en compte de ce consentement par les auteurs des textes. Ces documents nous renseignent ainsi sur la perception de la sexualité féminine dans la société égyptienne aux époques tardives. (shrink)

At a certain point in his in In Defense of Lost Causes, Slavoj Žižek suggests that, particularly with respect to Martin Heidegger's relationship with Nazism, Heidegger took "the right step." Not only does such a proposition provide a means to explain the direction Heidegger took in 1933 as it has been infamously pinpointed in his Rector's Address as the newly-inaugurated president of Freiburg, but it also becomes a means to explore Heidegger's turn towards Nietzsche by Winter 1936/1937 in a series (...) of lectures and seminar delivered up to Winter 1944/1945. This turn presents a direction that, as Žižek describes, points to a "domestication of Nietzsche," which arises as Heidegger begins to distance himself from his active involvement with National Socialism. What his turn towards Nietzsche demonstrates, if employing Žižek's proposition, is Heidegger's desire to move in a "right direction.". (shrink)

In this paper the author revisits selected scenes of love and war from the Old French Partonopeus de Blois. He focuses on the rhetoric of these passages and by a close textual reading highlights the dynamics of the romance and the game of echoes between the two spheres. He underlines the symmetry of the discourse of love and war and the constant dialogue which is established by the anonymous author. Epic and courtly motifs are knowingly intertwined to create meaning and (...) to renew the art of writing. He concludes that in this story, love is the way to redeem not only the knight but also the narrator of the romance. (shrink)

Many Hong Kong schools are concerned about the growing number of ethnic minority students. How they are supported and how the diversity of their pastoral needs is fulfilled become critical. This article examines teachers?, students? and parents? narratives of the cross?cultural experience of ethnic minority students from India, Pakistan, Philippines, Nepal and Thailand, and the diversity of those students? pastoral needs. The qualitative data were collected from interviews, through which the constructs of 32 teachers and 32 students from three secondary (...) schools were explored. Four groups of focus?group interviews were conducted, in which 15 parents were involved. This article argues that to implement the ethos of caring, it is not only necessary for the school to promote the intercultural sensitivity of all practitioners, but equally important to develop a connected school system where ethnic minority students and parents can be consistently supported in the subsystems of classroom, school and home. (shrink)

Douglas Rushkoff’s Program or Be Programmed presents a set of rules about how to navigate the contemporary, digital world, when considering the sentiments in the book’s subtitle “Ten Commands for a Digital Age.” To be sure, through how he outlines his understanding of the contemporary, digital world, Rushkoff proposes a hermeneutical exercise, dictating an understanding of the human situation. Similarly, Slavoj Žižek’s A Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, as a film, aims to confront what is occurring in the world situationally that (...) might not be understood in the human situation itself. (shrink)

The predictors of attitudes regarding academic plagiarism were investigated in Hong Kong secondary school students. The participants were 257 Grade 10 and 11 students who were taking liberal studies. Quantitative analysis showed that the students were unfamiliar with what actions constituted plagiarism. The best predictor of attitudes was the perceived descriptive norm regarding plagiarism. We explain this finding by applying the cultural-self perspective and present our recommendations for teachers.

This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides 132a1-b2. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number ofinterpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy (...) of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false. Besides, in this article I will point out that in putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, his device of the Third Man Argument in Parmenides 132a1-b2 should be considered as a warning against the materialistic interpretation of the relation between Forms and particulars: if we interpret the conception of“participation” in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the Largeness Regress. (shrink)