Going back at least to Duhem, there is a tradition of thinking that crucial experiments are impossible in science. I analyse Duhem's arguments and show that they are based on the excessively strong assumption that only deductive reasoning is permissible in experimental science. This opens the possibility that some principle of inductive inference could provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses on the basis of an appropriately controlled experiment. To be sure, there are analogues to (...) Duhem's problems that pertain to inductive inference. Using a famous experiment from the history of molecular biology as an example, I show that an experimentalist version of inference to the best explanation (IBE) does a better job in handling these problems than other accounts of scientific inference. Furthermore, I introduce a concept of experimental mechanism and show that it can guide inferences from data within an IBE-based framework for induction. 1. Introduction2. Duhem on the Logic of Crucial Experiments3. ‘The Most Beautiful Experiment in Biology’4. Why Not Simple Elimination?5. Severe Testing6. An Experimentalist Version of IBE 6.1. Physiological and experimental mechanisms6.2. Explaining the data6.3. IBE and the problem of untested auxiliaries6.4. IBE-turtles all the way down7. Van Fraassen's ‘Bad Lot’ Argument8. IBE and Bayesianism9. Conclusions. (shrink)

uenena magnum fas nefasque, non ualent conuertere humanam uicem. In his article entitled ‘Two Horatian Problems’ Dr. Guiseppe Giangrande argues persuasively on palaeographical and other grounds for the reading miscent in place of magnum. ‘In conclusion,’ he summarizes, ‘the emendation proposed here solves all the difficulties which have puzzled scholars so far and at the same time is capable of a palaeographical explanation’.

ZusammenfassungDer Text versucht in Auseinandersetzung mit den Ansätzen von Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz und Odo Marquard und im Anschluss an lutherische Theologie zu einer Verhältnisbestimmung von Theodizeefrage und Kreuzestheologie zu gelangen. Dabei wird Luthers Einsicht fruchtbar gemacht, dass Gott verborgen im Leiden wirkt, das Leiden aber nicht zu seiner Wesenseigenschaft wird. Vielmehr eröffnet sich in der Klage des leidenden Menschen die Möglichkeit, das Leiden an Gott zu beenden und gegen Gott zu Gott zu fliehen. Von Luthers Kreuzestheologie her ist (...) eine gegenseitige Durchdringung von Theodizeefrage, Hamartiologie, Kreuzestheologie und Eschatologie anzumahnen. Gleichzeitig verhelfen Klage und Anklage dazu, sich aufgrund von erfahrenen Leiden nicht in sich selbst zu verschließen, sondern kontrafaktisch an Gott festzuhalten.SummaryDiscussing the thoughts of J. Moltmann, J. B. Metz and O. Marquard the essay attempts – whilst following Martin Luther's theologia crucis – to find a relation between the theodicy-question and the theology of the cross. For this concern it refers to the aspect that God acts in suffering in a hidden way but does not posses suffering as an intrinsic characteristic. Rather, the lament of suffering people address to God, as we find it in the Psalms, gives the opportunity of bringing suffering from God's hiddenness to an end and to “flee from God to God”. Returning to Luther's theologia crucis should lead to further reflections on theodicy, sin, theology of the cross and eschatology. At the same time, lamentation as bringing human suffering before God provides an aid for suffering people not to lock their suffering in themselves, but to maintain the relationship to God – even against the supposedly factual evidence of the experience of suffering. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Penelope Polutropos:The Crux at Odyssey 23.218–24Hardy C. FredricksmeyerFor my father, dear friend, and mentor,E. A. FredricksmeyerSince Aristarchus, scholars have considered Penelope's comparison of herself with Helen and apparent exoneration of her for adultery, at Odyssey 23.218–24, both illogical and inappropriate. Consequently, most previous scholarship has either rejected these lines, or emended them, or explained them in terms of psychological realism.1 I believe that a better understanding can be (...) gained by focusing on the unifying theme of knowledge throughout Penelope's speech, rather than on adultery, as scholars have previously done, and by taking into consideration the typically Homeric concept of "double motivation."2 By this approach Penelope's self–comparison with Helen appears entirely logical. At the [End Page 487] same time, previous scholars are right that Penelope's self–comparison with the world's most notorious adulteress retains a tone of inappropriateness. I account for this apparent inconcinnity, however, by distinguishing between two different levels in Penelope's speech, in accordance with modern narratological approaches.3 On one level Penelope's speech serves her own rhetorical goals, on another those of Homer. Together these two levels suggest for Penelope alternate and mutually exclusive scenarios of loyalty and adultery. Previous scholars have misinterpreted Penelope's speech in part, I believe, because they have failed to appreciate the interplay between these two narrative levels.After treating Penelope's self–comparison with Helen in its immediate context, as outlined above, I consider how it echoes the themes of Odyssey 4.235–89, which also work on two narrative levels and offer for Penelope conflicting scenarios of behavior by linking her with Helen. Both passages, in turn, fit into a larger pattern in the Odyssey which marks Penelope's potential to behave negatively toward Odysseus. This pattern most likely alludes to an Arcadian tradition which makes Penelope and Helen cognate mythological types. Yet in the end Homer confirms that in actuality Penelope remains loyal. I suggest that the poet thus alludes to and denies an epichoric tradition that blames Penelope above all in order to stress that she had real alternatives.Penelope's SpeechPenelope's homecoming speech to Odysseus, in which she explains to him why she did not immediately welcome him, and why she tricked him into revealing intimate knowledge of their bedroom, can be divided into three sections. In the first (23.209–17), Penelope asks Odysseus not to be angry at her delay in welcoming him, "for always I feared that some mortal would come and deceive me with words" (215–17).4 The term "always" (), at the beginning of this statement, is then picked up not by Penelope's self–comparison with Helen in the middle section (218–24), but rather by the terms at 225, which introduce the third and concluding section of Penelope's speech (225–30): "But [End Page 488] now, since you have indicated to me the clear signs of our bed... you have convinced my mind, though it is unbending." The first and third sections of Penelope's speech thus address Penelope's insistence on correct knowledge: 215–17 concern a fear of deception which induces her to have particularly rigorous standards of proof—her "unbending mind"—standards that are satisfied by the conditions outlined in 225–30.It is between these grammatically coordinated statements concerning her fear of deception () and her certainty about Odysseus' identity () that Penelope says:"Not even Zeus' daughter, Helen of Argos,would have made love with a stranger,had she known that the warlike sons of the Achaeanswere going to bring her home again to her dear fatherland."(Od. 23.218–21)Scholars have objected to these lines above all because Helen was not deceived into betraying her husband, as Penelope feared that she herself would be. But insofar as knowledge is central to the first and third sections of this speech, the contrast between Penelope and Helen becomes the very point of her illustration rather than an inconsistency. The point of comparison is that the fidelity or infidelity of both women depends on their possession of an essential knowledge, that of Odysseus' true identity in... (shrink)

At the beginning of the Poetics Aristotle has these words: έποιìα δn` καì τσ τραγωιδίασ ποίησισ τι δ κωμωιδία καì διθυραμβοποιητικ καì τσ αλητικσ πλίστη καì κιθαριστικσ πσαι τυγχάνουσιν οσαι μιμήσισ τò σνολον. διαøρουσι δ άλλήλων τρισίν. ρ τι ' ν τέροισ μιμίσθαι τι τρα τι τέρωσ καì μ τòν ατòν τρόπον. Then, expounding ν τέροισ: ᾰπασαι μν ποιονται τν μίμησιν ν p'υθμι καì λόγωι καì ρμονίαι, τοτοισ ' η χωρìσ μμιγμένοισ οον ρμονίαι μν καì p'υθμι χρμναι μόνον τ αλητικ (...) καì κιθαριστική … ατι δ τ'υθμι χωρìσ ρμονίασ τν ρχηστν. Here I omit the crucial sentence; he proceeds: οδν γρ ν χοιμν νομάσαι κοινòν τ σ σøρονος καì Ξνάρχον μίμουσ καì τοσ σωκρατικοσ λόσουσ, οδ τισ δι τριμέτρων λγiων τν λλων τινν τν τοιοτων ποιοτο τν μiμησιπλν ο νθρωποi γσυνπτοντσ τι μτρωι τò ποιν λγιοποιοσ τοσ δ ποποιοσ νομζουσιν. He develops this point about the use of the word ποιητσ to denote all writers who write in verse and finally, before ending his exposition of ν τροισ, says: ισ δ τινσ ο πσι χρνται τοσ ρημνοισ, λγω δ οον p'υθμι κα μλι καi μτρωι, ὢσπρ τ τν διθυραμβικν ποiησισ κα τν νჲμων κα τ τραγωιδiα κα κωμωιδiα. (shrink)

I defend the view that single experiments can provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses against the widely held belief that “crucial experiments” are impossible. My argument is based on the examination of a historical case from molecular biology, namely the Meselson-Stahl experiment. “The most beautiful experiment in biology”, as it is known, provided the first experimental evidence for the operation of a semi-conservative mechanism of DNA replication, as predicted by Watson and Crick in 1953. (...) I use a mechanistic account of explanation to show that this case is best construed as an inference to the best explanation (IBE). Furthermore, I show how such an account can deal with Duhem's well-known arguments against crucial experiments as well as Van Fraassen's “bad lot” argument against IBE. (shrink)

Hull et al. make a direct connection between selection and replication. My view is that selection, at its causal crux, is not inherently connected to replication. I make plain the causal crux of selection, distinguishing it from replication. I discuss implications of my results for Hull et al.'s critique of Darden and Cain (1989).

Mercy is the defining characteristic of Pope Francis’s leadership. Francis’s words and actions have made visible a discipline of mercy, which does more than illuminate God’s character and purpose; it offers an expansive imaginative framework to spark new possibilities for moral agency and growth. Before Francis, mercy received limited attention in the canon of Catholic social thought. Francis’s signature message of mercy retrieves a central moral duty in Scripture, provides a focal lens for Catholic social thought, and aims to inspire (...) a “revolution of tenderness” capable of inspiring personal conversion and social change. This essay moves forward in three steps. It first unpacks the rich and diverse meaning of the word mercy and explores its undervalued role in CST; it then analyzes how mercy functions as the crux of Francis’s moral imagination; and finally, it explores how mercy expands possibilities for living the principles of Catholic social thought. (shrink)

The argumentum of contr. 2. 4 reads as follows : Abdicavit quidam filium. Abdicatus se contulit ad meretricem. Ex ilia sustulit filium. Aeger ad patrem misit; cum venisset, commendavit ei filium suum et decessit. Adoptavit puerum . Ab altero [pater] filio accusatur dementiae.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.4 (2001) 527-531 [Access article in PDF] A Virgilian Crux: Aeneid 8.342-43 Neil Adkin When Evander conducts Aeneas around the future site of Rome, the objects of interest he points out to his guest include the following: "hinc lucum ingentem, quem Romulus acer asylum / rettulit, et gelida monstrat sub rupe Lupercal" (8.342-43). John Conington (1883, 119) complained that rettulit had "not been satisfactorily (...) explained." A century later, Gerhard Binder (1971, 118 with n. 27) repeated the complaint: "Über Vergils rettulit ist viel gerätselt worden." Binder's study was then followed by the unprecedented appearance of three different commentaries on this book of the Aeneid in three successive years. 1 None of them was however able to offer a satisfactory explanation of rettulit: the latest discussion of this passage is obliged to reiterate Conington's original complaint. 2 The purpose of the present article is to suggest a possible solution to this vexatious and long-standing crux.Servius Danielis was himself perplexed by this Virgilian passage, for which he felt the need to offer two alternative explanations: "retulit aut restituit aut nominavit" (Aen. 8.342). The second of these was accepted by Heyne (1833, 221: "retulit est appellavit"); however Conington rightly objected that there is no evidence for such a meaning of referre. The first exegesis proposed by Servius has on the other hand found widespread support. 3 It must however be pointed out that those who accept the equation of referre with restituere appear to have forgotten that the object of rettulit is not asylum, but lucum: while the "re-establishment" of an asylum makes excellent sense, the same can hardly be said of "re-establishing" a grove of trees. Servius himself detected an allusion to the asylum founded at Athens by the Heraclidae: "ideo ergo ait 'quod Romulus acer asylum retulit,' hoc est fecit ad imitationem [End Page 527] Atheniensis asyli" (Aen. 8.342). This interpretation of referre as signifying "to reproduce from a model" has similarly been widely accepted. 4 Such a construe is however open to the same objection that can be raised against restituere: while this rendering would have been admirably suited to asylum as direct object, the notion of "reproducing" a grove "from a model" is likewise far less satisfactory. 5 In support of both these explications it has been customary to adduce Aeneid 5.596-98: "hunc morem cursus atque haec certamina primus / Ascanius, Longam muris cum cingeret Albam, / rettulit." The supposed parallel is however illusory, since here referre simply governs a direct object, whereas in book 8 the same verb is instead employed in conjunction with the predicative apposition asylum. K. W. Gransden's commentary on this latter book (1976, 129) accordingly proposed the novel rendering "instituted as," which was however rejected by P. T. Eden's postscript (1986, 439) to his own commentary as "emphatically not a meaning of refero." Eden's commentary itself had taken rettulit as equivalent to reddidit. 6 This view that referre is here being used in the sense of "to render" had already been tentatively advanced by Conington himself; it too has received a certain measure of support. 7 In his latest contribution to the debate, however, Eden (1986, 440) changes his mind and instead adopts the unsatisfactory notion of Fordyce's commentary that rettulit signifies "reproduced from a model." Eden's reason for this volte-face is the following: "even if... the construction here of referre with a double accusative is an analogical imitation of reddere with the same construction, it cannot therefore also be presumed to share its meaning." Perhaps it is nonetheless possible to indicate how this objection of Eden's can be circumvented by a novel hypothesis which would at last appear to provide a key to this troublesomely enigmatic text. [End Page 528]Quintilian (Inst. 8.6.37) illustrates the rhetorical figure of metalempsis or transumptio with a reference to Odyssey 15.299 where thoos ("quick") is employed in the sense of oxus ("sharp"). Heinrich Lausberg (1990, 295) explains the figure as follows: "Die... (shrink)

The Critical Process unleashed by the Enlightenment and endlessly resharpening itself to this day has mortally wounded the God of Deism, maybe also of theism, even of Christianity. A temptation of Christian theology is to retreat in denial into an updated version of Deism, seemingly granting full license to modern science but only so long as it does not impugn God's love. The alternative here proposed is to ride out The Critical Process, in fact to encourage it, all the way (...) into modernity's crux: How can a design that is not benign still be divine? The Christian reply is: through a real death of God and of ourselves as well, and through resurrections beginning now, thus freeing The Critical Process from the illusion of insuring our survival and, instead, for the honest Enlightenment task of merely telling the truth. (shrink)

The non-identity argument at Phaedo 74b–c is among the most studied and disputed arguments in Plato’s dialogues. In the passage, equality is distinguished from perceptible equals insofar as the latter sometimes appear (phainetai) unequal. A long-standing crux is whether the distinction concerns perceptible equals’ merely appearing unequal or actually being so. A fresh approach to the construal of the verb phainomai is taken here and shown to favor the latter view, thereby securing a stronger argument for non-identity.

A stream of conscious experience is extremely contextual; it is impacted by sensory stimuli, drives and emotions, and the web of associations that link, directly or indirectly, the subject of experience to other elements of the individual's worldview. The contextuality of one's conscious experience both enhances and constrains the contextuality of one's behavior. Since we cannot know first-hand the conscious experience of another, it is by way of behavioral contextuality that we make judgements about whether or not, and to what (...) extent, a system is conscious. Thus we believe that a deep understanding of contextuality is vital to the study of consciousness. Methods have been developed for handling contextuality in the microworld of quantum particles. Our goal has been to investigate the extent to which these methods can be used to analyze contextuality in conscious experience. (shrink)

A question opens up a space between self and other in the very act of expecting a response. As such, it can be a form of world-building. Posing a question might reveal what is or it might push interlocutors to revise what is. Levinas counsels us to question the first attitude toward questioning in order to open ourselves up to the second. Using questions and answers from a trial of a former child soldier at the International Criminal Court, this paper (...) explores the ethical ramifications of the choices we make when we pose and respond to questions. (shrink)

Jacobi held a position of unparalleled importance in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectual history. This includes his role in bringing about the close of the Enlightenment, his central part in shaping the reception of Kant's philosophy and German idealism, and his influence on the development of Romanticism and existentialism.

In Giorgio Agamben’s eyes, Immanuel Kant’s work is the modern philosophical harbinger of the catastrophic ‘state of exception’. By focusing on the latter’s ‘author/subject corrective’, I make the connection between Agamben and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason more apparent. In doing so, I show how Kant’s corrective instrumentalises autonomy in such a way that it compromises the validity it seeks to rationalise; it does so by separating the individual from actuality, by ostracising law from political challenge, and by conflating individual (...) and state interests. Taken together, these three undercurrents are defining features of Agamben’s ‘Homo Sacer’ series. (shrink)

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. (...) The distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

The crux of this book is expressed in one short sentence from the Preface: 'Unity is a fundamental part of our experience, something that is crucial to its phenomenology' [p.xii], and the crux of this sentence is that the unity of consciousness is not a matter of phenomenal relations existing between distinct experiences – the received view [p.17], but the existence of relations between the contents of experiences – the one experience view [p.25ff]. In its simplest form Tye's (...) claim is that: all our conscious states, whether visual, auditory, olfactory, tactual or gustatory, whether imagistic or emotional are experienced concurrently; they 'are phenomenologically unified ... [and] ... Phenomenological unity is a relation between qualities represented in experience, not between qualities of experiences. [p.36]. (shrink)

A crux of Plato’s Symposium is how beauty relates to the good. Diotima distinguishes beauty from the good, I show, to explain how erotic pursuits are characteristically ambivalent and opaque. Human beings pursue beauty without knowing why or thinking it good; yet they are rational, if aiming at happiness. Central to this reconstruction is a passage widely taken to show that beauty either coincides with the good or demands disinterested admiration. It shows rather that what one loves as beautiful (...) does not appear good, a proposal with ramifications for ethical psychology. (shrink)