On a very natural conception of sets, every set has an absolute complement. The ordinary cumulative hierarchy dismisses this idea outright. But we can rectify this, whilst retaining classical logic. Indeed, we can develop a boolean algebra of sets arranged in well-ordered levels. I show this by presenting Boolean Level Theory, which fuses ordinary Level Theory (from Part 1) with ideas due to Thomas Forster, Alonzo Church, and Urs Oswald. BLT neatly implement Conway’s games and surreal numbers; and a natural (...) extension of BLT is definitionally equivalent with ZF. (shrink)

We give a new characterization of the cardinal invariant $\mathfrak {d}$ as the minimal cardinality of a family $\mathcal {D}$ of tall summable ideals such that an ultrafilter is rapid if and only if it has non-empty intersection with all the ideals in the family $\mathcal {D}$. On the other hand, we prove that in the Miller model, given any family $\mathcal {D}$ of analytic tall p-ideals such that $\vert \mathcal {D}\vert <\mathfrak {d}$, there is an ultrafilter $\mathcal {U}$ which (...) is an $\mathscr {I}$ -ultrafilter for all ideals $\mathscr {I}\in \mathcal {D}$ at the same time, yet $\mathcal {U}$ is not a rapid ultrafilter. As a corollary, we obtain that in the Miller model, given any analytic tall p-ideal $\mathscr {I}$, $\mathscr {I}$ -ultrafilters are dense in the Rudin–Blass ordering, generalizing a theorem of Bartoszyński and S. Shelah, who proved that in such model, Hausdorff ultrafilters are dense in the Rudin–Blass ordering. This theorem also shows some limitations about possible generalizations of a theorem of C. Laflamme and J. Zhu. (shrink)

We develop an untyped framework for the multiverse of set theory. $\mathsf {ZF}$ is extended with semantically motivated axioms utilizing the new symbols $\mathsf {Uni}(\mathcal {U})$ and $\mathsf {Mod}(\mathcal {U, \sigma })$, expressing that $\mathcal {U}$ is a universe and that $\sigma $ is true in the universe $\mathcal {U}$, respectively. Here $\sigma $ ranges over the augmented language, leading to liar-style phenomena that are analyzed. The framework is both compatible with a broad range of multiverse conceptions and suggests its (...) own philosophically and semantically motivated multiverse principles. In particular, the framework is closely linked with a deductive rule of Necessitation expressing that the multiverse theory can only prove statements that it also proves to hold in all universes. We argue that this may be philosophically thought of as a Copernican principle that the background theory does not hold a privileged position over the theories of its internal universes. Our main mathematical result is a lemma encapsulating a technique for locally interpreting a wide variety of extensions of our basic framework in more familiar theories. We apply this to show, for a range of such semantically motivated extensions, that their consistency strength is at most slightly above that of the base theory $\mathsf {ZF}$, and thus not seriously limiting to the diversity of the set-theoretic multiverse. We end with case studies applying the framework to two multiverse conceptions of set theory: arithmetic absoluteness and Joel D. Hamkins’ multiverse theory. (shrink)

A partition is finitary if all its members are finite. For a set A, $\mathscr {B}(A)$ denotes the set of all finitary partitions of A. It is shown consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ (without the axiom of choice) that there exist an infinite set A and a surjection from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$. On the other hand, we prove in $\mathsf {ZF}$ some theorems concerning $\mathscr {B}(A)$ for infinite sets A, among which are the following: (1) If there is a finitary (...) partition of A without singleton blocks, then there are no surjections from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$ and no finite-to-one functions from $\mathscr {B}(A)$ to A. (2) For all $n\in \omega $, $|A^n|<|\mathscr {B}(A)|$. (3) $|\mathscr {B}(A)|\neq |\mathrm {seq}(A)|$, where $\mathrm {seq}(A)$ is the set of all finite sequences of elements of A. (shrink)

Adding higher types to set theory differs from adding inaccessible cardinals, in that higher type arguments apply to all sets rather than just ordinary ones. Levy's reflection axiom is justified, by considering the principle that we can pretend that the universe is a set, together with methods of Gaifman [8]. We reprove some results of Gaifman, and some facts about Levy's reflection axiom, including the fact that adding higher types yields no new theorems about sets. Some remarks on standard models (...) are made. An obvious strengthening of Levy's axiom to higher types is considered, which implies the existence of indescribable cardinals. Other remarks about larger cardinals are made; some questions of Gloede [9] are settled. Finally we argue that the evidence for V = L is strong, and that CH is certainly true. MSC: 03E30, 03E55. (shrink)

We show that there are universes of sets which contain descending ϵ-sequences of length α for every ordinal α, though they do not contain any ϵ-cycle. It is also shown that there is no set universe containing a descending ϵ-sequence of length On. MSC: 03E30; 03E65.

In this paper we introduce a theory of finite sets FST with a strong negation of the axiom of infinity asserting that every set is provably bijective with a natural number. We study in detail the role of the axioms of Power Set, Choice, Regularity in FST, pointing out the relative dependences or independences among them. FST is shown to be provably equivalent to a fragment of Alternative Set Theory. Furthermore, the introduction of FST is motivated in view of a (...) non-standard development. MSC: 03E30, 03E35. (shrink)

We answer some questions about graphs that are reducts of countable models of Anti-Foundation, obtained by considering the binary relation of double-membership $x\in y\in x$. We show that there are continuum-many such graphs, and study their connected components. We describe their complete theories and prove that each has continuum-many countable models, some of which are not reducts of models of Anti-Foundation.

Let T be Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity extended by the axiom (Beta) plus the schema that claims that every set-bounded Σ-definable monotone operator from the collection of all sets to Pow(a) for some set a has a fixed point. Then T proves that every such operator has a least fixed point. This result is obtained by following the proof of an analogous result for von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory in an earlier work by Sato, with some minor modifications.

We study the notion of non-trivial elementary embeddings under the assumption that V satisfies ZFC without Power Set but with the Collection Scheme. We show that no such embedding can exist under the additional assumption that it is cofinal and either is a set or that the scheme of Dependent Choices of arbitrary length holds. We then study failures of instances of Collection in symmetric submodels of class forcings.

Modal structuralism promises an interpretation of set theory that avoids commitment to abstracta. This article investigates its underlying assumptions. In the first part, I start by highlighting some shortcomings of the standard axiomatisation of modal structuralism, and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). The main theorem is that MSST interprets exactly Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the (...) article, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle, as suggested in Hellman (2015). I show that Hellman’s principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32), and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, we consider several natural axioms in urelement set theory, including the Collection Principle, the Reflection Principle, the Dependent Choice scheme and its generalizations, as well as other axioms specifically concerning urelements. We prove that these axioms form a hierarchy over $\text {ZFCU}_{\text {R}}$ (ZFC with urelements formulated with Replacement) in terms of direct implication. The second part of the paper studies forcing over countable transitive models of $\text {ZFU}_{\text {R}}$. We propose a new (...) definition of ${\mathbb P}$ -names to address an issue with the existing approach. We then prove the fundamental theorem of forcing with urelements regarding axiom preservation. Moreover, we show that forcing can destroy and recover certain axioms within the previously established hierarchy. Finally, we demonstrate how ground model definability may fail when the ground model contains a proper class of urelements. (shrink)

We explore Boolean-valued models of set theory with a class of urelements. In an existing construction, which we call UB, every urelement is its own B-name. We prove the fundamental theorem of UB in the context of ZFUR (i.e., ZF with urelements formulated with Replacement). In particular, UB is shown to preserve Replacement and hence ZFUR. Moreover, UB can both destroy axioms, such as the DCω1-scheme, and recover axioms, such as the Collection Principle. One drawback of UB is that it (...) does not permit mixing names, resulting in a lack of fullness. To address this, we introduce a new construction, UB‾, which is closed under mixtures. We prove that there is an elementary embedding from UB to UB‾. Over ZFUR with the Axiom of Choice, UB‾ is full for every complete Boolean algebra B just in case the Collection Principle holds. (shrink)

On the basis of Poincaré and Weyl’s view of predicativity as invariance, we develop an extensive framework for predicative, type-free first-order set theory in which $\Gamma _0$ and much bigger ordinals can be defined as von Neumann ordinals. This refutes the accepted view of $\Gamma _0$ as the “limit of predicativity”.