It is often thought that acquiring a phenomenal concept requires having the relevant sort of experience. In "Extending Phenomenal Concepts", Andreas Elpidorou defends this position from an objection raised by Michael Tye (in "Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts"). Here, I argue that Elpidorou fails to attend to important supporting materials introduced by Tye.

Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...) of S’s action. Joshua Knobe (2003a) presents intriguing data that may be taken to support the second view.1 Knobe’s data show an asymmetry in folk judgements. People are more inclined to judge that S did A intentionally, even when not intended, if A was perceived as causing a harm (e.g. harming the environment). There is an asymmetry because people are not inclined to see S’s action as intentional, when not intended, if A is perceived as causing a benefit (e.g. helping the environment). In this paper we will discuss Knobe’s results in detail. We will raise the question of whether his ordinary language surveys of folk judgments have accessed core concepts of intentional action. We suspect that instead Knobe’s surveys are tapping into pragmatic aspects of intentional language and its role in moral praise and blame. We will suggest alternative surveys that we plan to conduct to get at this difference, and we will attempt to explain the pragmatic usage of intentional language. (shrink)

In this book Mark Wynn argues that the landscape of philosophical theology looks rather different from the perspective of a re-conceived theory of emotion. In matters of religion, we do not need to opt for objective content over emotional form or vice versa. On the contrary, these strategies are mistaken at root, since form and content are not properly separable here - because 'inwardness' may contribute to 'thought-content', or because emotional feelings can themselves constitute thoughts; or because, to put the (...) point a further way, in religious contexts, perception and conception are often infused by feeling. Wynn uses this perspective to forge a distinctive approach to a range of established topics in philosophy of religion, notably: religious experience; the problem of evil; the relationship of religion and ethics, and religion and art; and in general, the connection of 'feeling' to doctrine and tradition. (shrink)

This research works within the framework of constructivist learning (based on constructivist epistemology) and examines learning as an activity of construction, and it posits that knowledge acquisition (and learning) are transformative through self-involvement in some subject matter. Thus it leads, through this constructivism to a pedagogical theory of learning. I will mainly focus on conceptual and epistemological analysis of humans’ conceptualisations based on their own mental objects (schemata). Subsequently, I will propose an analytical specification of humans’ conceptualisations and understandings over (...) their mental structures in the framework of constructivism, and I will clarify my logical [and semantic] conceptions of humans’ concept understandings. This research focuses on the philosophy of education and on logics of human learning. It connects with the topics ‘Cognition in Education’ and ‘Mental Models’. (shrink)

Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is (...) unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding. (shrink)

The issue of the nature of concepts and the problem of understanding conceptual change have become increasingly important in methodological discussions of the study of the history of political thought as well as in substantive research. The treatment of these matters, however, remains inadequate. This is in part a consequence of metatheoretical agendas that have diverted attention away from a theoretical analysis of concepts and apposite issues such as the relationship between mental predicates, words and concepts. (...) But the failure to confront these matters has also been the result of the pervasive emphasis on contextual analysis in historical interpretation. One of the methodological implications of a more thorough theoretical account of concepts is a greater concern with internal history and conceptual genealogy. (shrink)

Key Concepts for Understanding Curriculum is an invaluable guide for all involved in curriculum matters. Originally published in 1992, and then re-released as two volumes, the third edition returns to a single volume and includes 21 key topics in the field. The topics comprise the latest trends and issues written in Marsh's clear and accessible style, and are an important source of material for an international readership at every level. The book is divided into six sections including: curriculum (...) planning and development; curriculum management; teaching perspectives; collaborative involvement in curriculum; and curriculum ideology. In this third edition many of the latest curriculum trends and issues are included such as standards-based frameworks, using technology in teaching and learning modes, standards based reforms, and politics of decision-making. (shrink)

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the (...) existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts. (shrink)

“It is a noble task to try to understand others, and to have them understand you but it is never an easy one”, says Everett. This paper argues that a basic prerequisite for understanding others is to have some shared concepts on which this understanding can build. If speakers of different languages didn’t share some concepts to begin with then cross-cultural understanding would not be possible even with the best of will on all sides. Current (...) Anthropology For example, Everett claims that Pirahã has no word for “mother”, no words for “before’ and “after”, no words for “one”, “two” and “all” and no words comparable to ‘think” and “want”. These claims are based, I believe, on faulty semantic analysis, and in particular, on a determination not to recognize polysemy under any circumstances. As I see it, at many points this stance makes nonsense of Everett’s own data and distorts the conceptual world of the Pirahã. Since he does not want to recognize the existence of any shared concepts, Everett is also not prepared to address the question of a culture-neutral metalanguage in which Pirahã and English conceptual categories could be compared. This often leads him to imposing cultural categories of English on the conceptual world of the Pirahã. The result is a combination of exoticism and Anglocentrism which doesn’t do justice to Everett’s long and intimate engagement with the Pirahã people and their language. Sadly, it blinds him to what Franz Boas called “the psychic unity of mankind”, reflected in the common semantic features of human languages and fully compatible with the cultural shaping of their lexicons and grammars. (shrink)

As words, images, and concepts are the media through which hermeneutic understanding takes place, reflection on their nature is central to any appreciation of how hermeneutics operates. The joy of coming to recognition entails the knowing of something again that we already know as if for the first time. In the image, what we already know (pre‐reflectively) emerges as if illuminated, from all the contingent and variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its essence. It is (...) known as something”. The speculative dimension of language elucidates the capacity of an image to be future orientated. Words, images, and concepts have actual and potential satellite meanings able to upset and transform their core meanings. Indeterminacy of meaning is central. Reading, writing, and attentive looking are practices which because of the speculative dimensions of word, image, and concept disturb and disrupt what we think we know with certainty. (shrink)

A case in point is Frank Jackson’s talk of “conceptual possibility” and “conceptual necessity.” He writes as if the issue between us is the relative methodological priority for philosophy of conceptual modalities and metaphysical modalities. In addition to the uncritical reliance on conceptual modality, another fallacy is surfacing. Paul Boghossian developed an epistemology of logic based on understanding‐assent links corresponding to fundamental rules of logic. His paradigm was modus ponens: a necessary condition for understanding “if” was supposed to (...) be willingness to assent to inferences by modus ponens involving “if.” Boghossian objects that Simon’s tolerance of assent to gappy statements undermines the presumption that he is assenting to them as true. In Nenad Miscevic paper, such competencies are postulated for the linguistic, spatial‐geometric, mathematical, metaphysical, epistemological, and moral domains. Thus Miscevic auxiliary modularity‐independent characterization offers little help in demarcating a useful category of intuition. (shrink)

Democracy is a political system that has some universal appeal, and, this seems to invest it with some kind of legitimacy over other systems of government. But this in no way suggests that it is homogenously conceived or practiced across the world—particularly in Western and African countries. Yet there is some supposition that some cultures have (almost) perfected their practice of democracy while others are learning its rudiments. This tends to arouse the philosopher's interest in the conceptual and practical bases (...) for the supposition. In African philosophy, the notion of consensus has often been touted as a kernel and mēnsūra for evidence of democracy in traditional African thought. This paper examines the propriety of this move, taking into account the specific positions of the Ghanaian philosophers, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. It explores the political dynamics of contemporary Africa and brings out the challenges and prospects for the sort of democracy that is being practiced—or, at least, is said to be practiced—in Africa. It is often debated in African political thought whether consensus or majoritarian rule (characterized by such activities as voting and multipartism) defines democracy, but the paper argues that neither of them really brings about democracy. It then highlights the humanistic end of democracy. Using the Ghanaian experience especially, the paper proposes ways of improving the understanding and practice of democracy in Africa. (shrink)

An increase in Academic Integrity (AI) breaches has resulted in higher education institutions implementing solutions to improve AI competence. It has been argued that to improve students’ AI understanding, concepts and skills should be taught at the classroom level and contextual factors should be considered. This article presents an investigation on how AI is taught at the classroom level across a range of disciplines, how contextual factors inform approaches to AI education, and how the approaches align with evidence-based (...) recommendations. Purposeful sampling procedures were employed to select units of study from disciplines at two Australian universities. Qualitative data collection methods were used to capture ways AI education was approached and the collected data were analysed through grounded theory methods. The findings show that AI was primarily taught through explicit instruction and personal storytelling and assessed through summative assessment. Such approaches appear to be influenced by personal philosophies, institutional mandates and student backgrounds. While the approaches align with the notion that best practice includes an educative approach, other facets of best practice that have been promoted to combat the rise in AI breaches such as collusion, assessment outsourcing and cheating in exams were not evident. (shrink)

Non-racialism is examined in relation to the concepts of race, generic humanism and universalism in order to establish conditions under which non-racialism can be implemented as an emancipatory concept. Denial of the salience or even the existence of the concept 'race' and also tendencies to organise on the basis of race essentialism are examined. It is accepted that race does not exist at an ontological level, in that it is not required for the constitution of the human subject. But (...) race does exist historically and socially. To ignore its existence in addressing the question of non-racialism would be to deny the validity of the experience of racial inequality. At the same time, organisation on the basis of race, while sometimes motivated by strategic considerations, carries the danger of slippage and a permanent racialised identity. The post-1994 period is seen as opening the road to universalism and thus removing the basis for strategic essentialism. (shrink)

by no means unusual that a thinker develops a theory, the full purport and significance of which is still hidden to himself.” Cassirer was echoing no less a personage than Kant himself. Kant had written long before: “… it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not (...) sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.”2 May we take our lead from Kant here? May we understand Dooyeweerd better than he understood himself, even to the point of attributing to him a view or views that would appear to be “in opposition to his own intention”? It may sound a little strange, but something of this sort seems to have been underway among Dooyeweerd interpreters for quite some time. Many have started from the assumption that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven held to essentially the same position. Now, since there were some widely acknowledged differences, something would have to yield, and what often yielded was Dooyeweerd. It was thought that in essence Dooyeweerd was saying what Vollenhoven had also been saying. One could therefore allow for an error in Dooyeweerd here or there — perhaps even a “contradiction” — while continuing to hold him in high esteem. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Dual Process Theories of cognition offer a useful framework to understand the nature and role of concepts in cognitive science and intuitions in epistemology.

Political Philosophy: Theories, Thinkers, and Concepts is an important reference that provides the essentials needed for understanding how philosophies have shaped political systems, opinions, and behaviors. Offering a collection of 100 articles and written by eminent scholars, Political Philosophy explains the timeless importance of ancient and modern political philosophers and philosophies that remain vital today. Political Philosophy: Theories, Thinkers, and Concepts is organized into three sections: The first section has more than 40 articles on fundamental political philosophies, (...) including Communism, Egalitarianism, Feminism, Pragmatism, and Rational Choice Theory. Section Two, with over 20 articles, provides critical biographical information on the essential philosophers like Aristotle, Burke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft. More than 30 articles conclude the volume's exploration of philosophical concepts and issues. Important topics like bureaucracy, citizenship, justice, leadership, and popular sovereignty are explained. (shrink)

Within this 1963 text, Professor Watson writes as a physicist seeking to understand how it is that physics goes on at an ever increasing pace to reveal new ...

Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments, but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such; rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions. Using examples from the natural and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features are either true answers to relevant questions or (...) a means thereof. (shrink)

Externalist readings of Ockham are currently most prominent in the literature. For instance, an externalist interpretation with respect both to mental content and the meaning of expressions is advocated by prominent scholars. In this paper, I want to argue that although this externalist picture is certainly not incorrect, it is nonetheless incomplete. As I show, Ockham distinguishes between two ways of acquiring concepts: one of them can be accounted for in wholly externalist terms while the other involves the (...) class='Hi'>understanding of linguistic expressions. According to the reading of Ockham I suggest here, it turns out that we can have two kinds of concepts pertaining to the same kind of things. But only one of the two is completely determined by external relations. Thus I conclude that the externalist picture of Ockham calls for some additions. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that education should involve the development of understanding, critical thinking, imagination, and emotions. However, this book, first published in 1990, argues that our views to these key concepts are confused and inaccurate, and therefore what we do in schools is generally inappropriate to our ideal. This book will be of interest to students of education and philosophy.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Argument for Methodological Unity The Argument against Methodological Unity Understanding Others The Ontological Turn and the New Causalist Consensus References.

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

Responsibility is important for readers to understand early in childhood. This title explains the concept with clear descriptions and simple, everyday examples of responsibility in action. QR Codes in the books give readers access to book-specific resources to further their learning. Aligned to Common Core Standards and correlated to state standards.

In an earlier paper (Biggs, 2007) I argue that those attributing mental states sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). In this paper I argue that such phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some third-person mental state attributions. More specifically, I identity three important roles that phenomenal simulation could play in third-person mental state attributions: phenomenal simulation could cause attributions, facilitate attributions, or deepen simulators' understanding of targets. I then argue (...) that phenomenal simulation sometimes deepens simulators' understanding of targets, regardless of whether it causes or facilitates any attributions. Accordingly, I conclude that phenomenal simulation plays an important role some third-person mental state attributions. I close by briefly considering how this conclusion relates to the theory-theory versus simulation-theory debate. (shrink)

abstract Trusting agents characteristically anticipate beneficial outcomes, under conditions of uncertainty, in their engagement with others. However, debates about trust incorporate different interpretations of risk, uncertainty, calculation, affect, morality and motivation in explaining when trust is appropriate and how it operates. This article argues that discussions about trust have produced a concept without coherent boundaries and with little operational value. Two paradigms are identified, which distinguish the characteristics of trust and confidence. It is argued that a reliance on confidence in (...) human affairs makes trust redundant and that this has undesirable moral consequences. Discussion is illustrated by the UK Government's ‘modernisation’ policy in health and social care, which privileges confidence in systems over trust in moral agents. (shrink)