At the starting point of the article, the author considers the current process of fragmenting ethics into numerous special ethics as a process of destroying ethics as a philosophical discipline. He relates this to the historical failure of ethics, which due to categorical limitations could not address the challenges of the advanced scientific-technical civilisation, resulting in an “ethical vacuum” (H. Jonas). In response to the ethical vacuum, a number of ethical initiatives have emerged which the author, according to the effects (...) on the rehabilitation of the role of traditional ethics and on the creation of a new orientational framework, classifies on a destructive and a productive line. On the productive line of overcoming the ethical vacuum, bioethics has emerged which, along with other ethical projects, has created a new orientational atmosphere that the author calls “a new ethical culture”. On the destructive line, along with the inflation of special ethics, a special form of destruction has emerged in terms of implanting “applied ethics”, which the author refers to as a nonsensical concept, into the fabric of traditional ethics. Then, the author presents three main problems of applied ethics. The first is of a substantial nature and consists in the fact that applied ethics does not have and in principle cannot have unquestionable norms as an object of application. The second main problem is of a methodological nature and consists in the inappropriateness and non-acceptance of deductivism as a model of applying ethical norms to practice. The third main problem is of a usage nature and consists in developing the myth of the practicality of applied ethics. The author concludes that applied ethics is neither an ethical concept nor an ethical project but a market brand which on the ethical terrain turns out to be nonsense. In the conclusion of the article, the author argues that applied ethics became an institution of ethical absurdity the moment it, as an empty marketing label, took over the vacancy of the object of application and the role of general ethics for an unrelated and undefined conglomerate of special ethics transformed into its branches. (shrink)

Le concept de volonté générale de Rousseau est présenté par l`auteur comme le fondement catégoriel de la compréhension moderne de la démocratie, et sa transposition d`un contexte naturel légal dans un contexte social, ainsi que la légitimation de la vie sociale et politique est prise comme une ligne de partage qui scinde l`histoire de la démocratie en deux époques. Dans la première partie de l`article l`auteur se base sur les explications de Hérode, Platon et Aristote pour reconstruire l`histoire ancienne du (...) concept de démocratie. Il passe ensuite aux changements essentiels dans la conception et le rôle réel de la démocratie qui se sont manifestés au siècle de la Révolution française, il distingue la volonté générale de la volonté commune pour établir la dimension morale de la démocratie, et sous cet aspect il se concentre sur la philosophie politique de Rousseau. En conclusion il se penche sur la partitocratie qui n`est qu`une forme d`aberration de la démocratie tout en se limitant au type transitoire de la partitocratie systématique qui apparaît dans le cadre du phénomène historique du postcommunisme. Dans ce contexte, à la théorie dominante de la transition l`auteur oppose la théorie du chaos postcommuniste qui est envisagée comme une approche théorique alternative de l`explication des événements postcommunistes. (shrink)

The author considers the current process of fragmenting ethics into numerous special ethics at the starting point of the article as a process of destroying ethics as a philosophical discipline. He relates this to the historical failure of ethics which due to categorical limitations could not address the challenges of the advanced scientific-technical civilisation, resulting in an “ethical vacuum”. In response to the ethical vacuum, a number of ethical initiatives have emerged which the author, according to the effects on the (...) rehabilitation of the role of traditional ethics and on the creation of a new orientation framework, classifies on a destructive and productive line. On the productive line of overcoming the ethical vacuum, bioethics has emerged which, along with other ethical projects, has created a new orientation atmosphere that the author calls “a new ethical culture”. On the destructive line, along with the inflation of special ethics, a special form of destruction has emerged in terms of implanting “applied ethics”, which the author refers to as a nonsensical concept, into the fabric of traditional ethics. Then the author presents three main problems of applied ethics. The first is of a substantive nature and consists in the fact that applied ethics does not have and in principle cannot have unquestionable norms as an object of application. The second main problem is of a methodological nature and consists in the inappropriateness and non-acceptance of deductivism as a model of applying ethical norms to practice. The third main problem is of a practical nature and consists in developing the myth of the practicality of applied ethics. The author concludes that applied ethics is neither an ethical concept nor an ethical project but a market brand which on the ethical plane turns out to be nonsense. In the point of the article, the author argues that applied ethics became an institution of ethical absurdity the moment it, as an empty marketing label, took over the vacancy of the object of application and the role of general ethics for an unrelated and undefined conglomerate of special ethics transformed into its branches. (shrink)