We are confronted by the clash of contradictory ideologies and a crisis of universal knowledge. Two major causes of this crisis are the erosion of common sense and a relativistic view of doctrinal development. Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange foresaw today's crisis and wrote keenly in defense of the classical Thomistic synthesis. His critiques of modern philosophy and theology, we are now able to see, were prophetic. This first-time English translation of his Le sens commun: La philosophie de l'être et (...) les formules dogmatiques addresss the relationship between common sense and both philosophy and faith; the proper defense for philosophical realism; the subordination and coordination of philosophical first principles; our natural capacity for knowing God's existence; and, at length, the problem of dogmatic development. (shrink)

This text is an exploration of the metaphysical principle, "Every agent acts for an end." It is split into two parts, the first being primarily pedagogical and general, the second topical. In the first part, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange sets forth the basics of the Aristotelian metaphysics of teleology, defending its place as a central point of metaphysics. After defending its per se nota character, he summarizes a number of main corollaries to the principle, primarily within the perspective established by (...) traditional Thomistic accounts of metaphysics, doing so in a way that is pedagogically sensitive yet speculatively profound. In the second half, he gathers together a number of articles which he had written, each having some connection with themes concerning teleology. Thematically, the texts consider the finality and teleology of the human intellect and will, along with the way that the principle of finality sheds light on certain problems associated with the distinction between faith and reason. Finally, the text ends with an important essay on the principle of the mutual interdependence of causes, causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere. (shrink)

The Dominican Garrigou-Lagrange contested the definition of truth proposed by Maurice Blondel as relativistic and modernistic. That definition (adaequatio realis mentis et vitae) influenced a lot of theologians of Nouvelle Théologie, stressing an existential sense of truth.

"Nous voudrions ici souligner quelques principes qui sont d'une importance capitale dans la philosophie traditionnelle, spécialement dans la synthèse thomiste. Sans eux elle est absolument inintelligible, et sous leur lumière toutes les parties de cette synthèse s'éclairent."--Résumé de l'éditeur.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NAMING GOD: MOSES MAIMONIDES AND THOMAS AQUINAS NEIL A. 8TUBBENS The Methodist Ohurch Barnsley Oircuit, South Yorkshire MOSES MAIMONIDES (1135-U04) and Thomas Aquinas (c. U~5-1274), two of the greatest theologians of the Jewish and Christian faiths, had much in oommon.1 Like other Ohristian.writers, Aquinas made several criticisms of Maimonides' views on divine predication. In this article l will discuss these criticisms and evaluate them by means of a detailed (...) e:iq>0sition of Maimonides' position. I will ithen offer an account of Aquinas's justification of analogical predication and make some suggestions ais to the :role of causality in naming God. 1. Introduetion Moses Maimonides was the middle-man in the interaction of the three monotheistic faiths with Aristotelian philosophy. He was a great admirer of the ancient philosopher, claiming that Aristotle':s intellect reached the highest perfection attainable hy humanity-e:reept by the prophets and they WeTe divinely inspired. Maimonides :firrst work, the short Treatise on Logic, clewly reflects ihis own interest in logic and language and shows the influence of Afistotle mediated through the Ambs.2 It was The Guide or the Perplexed, his last major work, that introduced the mostly Christian West to the thought of the Islamic philosophers Alf.arabi, Avicenna, and 1 On some matters Aquinas refers to Maimonides as a:ii. authority, e.g., De potentia, q.7, a.4, c; Summa theologiae (ST), I, q.68, a.2 ad 1. 2 Treatise on Logic, translated by I. Efros, Proceedmgs of the American Academy for Jewish Research 8 (1938): 1-65. 230 NEIL A. STUBBENS Avermes.3 The Guide, however, is not so much a philosophical work as a iphilosoprucal interpretation of the Bible. Like the thinkers of the Christian monastic anrd later cathedral schools of the eleventh and rbwelfth centuries, Maimonides began his reflections with the wo;vds of Scripture. Soon after its publication in 1190, two Hebrew triansla:tions of the Guide were produced from,the original Arabic by Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Jehudah al-Harizi; Aquinas wo:rked with_ a Latin translation of the Harizi version.4 Feldman has complained that some of the scholastics misinterpreted Maimonides, foisting upon him views which were clearly not his own. According :to Feldman, Giles of Rome.(c. 1247-1316), in his ErrofJ'es Philosophorum, misformulates Maimonides' theory of negative ·attributes and suggests that he employs attributes ".by wa.y of causality." 5 Duns Scotus (c. 1264-1308) cites Maimonides and Avicenna ws ·advocating attributes of efficient causality. Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), in his Summa theologiae, moorrrectly construes actions as relations : "Indeed", writes Feldman, "he characterises them as ruttributes 'hy way of causality.'" Aquinas's translators and interp:veters come in d)or as much criticism from Feldman as :Aquinas himself, e.g., R. Garrigou-Lagrange,6 M. Penido,7 and R. Mulligan:8 all mistakenly say that a.ooording to Maimonides "God is good" means "God is the ca;use of good things.'' a See S. Pines, "Translator's Introduction: the Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplwed," in The Guide of the Perplewed, trans. S. Pines (Chicago, 1963). 4 The chapters of the Harizi and Latin versions are enumerated one less than those of the Ibn Tibbon version. I shall use the latter scheme as is common practice. 5.S. Feldman, " A Scholastic Misinterpretation of Maimonides' Doctrine of Divine Attributes," in Studies in, Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Dienstag (New York, 1975), pp. 58-59. 6 See The One God, (St. Louis, 1944), p. 404. 1 See "Le role d'analogie en theologie dogmatique," Bibliotheque Thomiste 15 (1931) : 149 and 169. s See his translation of De veritate, q.2, a.I, in The Disputed Question on Truth (Chicago, 1952). MAIMONIDES AND AQUINAS 2. Aquinas's Criticism of Maimonides There are five points of disagreement between Aquinas and Maimonides. First, Aquinas argues that if expressions such as " God is wise " and " God is angry " are used to indicate only a likeness of effect, i.e., we say " God is wise" or " God is angry " because in his effoots he acts lilre a wise or angry person, there would he no difference in the... (shrink)

This essay shows why Karl Rahner’s “Chalcedon: End or Beginning?,” also titled “Current Problems in Christology” (1954), stands as a breakthrough in contemporary Catholic Christology. After describing the Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism of the early twentieth century, it examines one instance of this body of thought: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s “Christ the Savior” (1946). Then, the essay reviews the argument of “Chalcedon: End or Beginning?” Finally, it contrasts Garrigou-Lagrange’s literal Thomism and Rahner’s transcendental Thomism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Efficacious Grace and Free Will:Taking Aquinas at His WordSteven A. LongProfessor Steven Jensen, in his Nova et Vetera article "Efficacious Grace and Free Will: Six Inadequate Arguments," identifies arguments that he argues to be insufficient to show the compatibility of efficacious grace with free will.1 With respect to his analysis, I wish here to address only four conspicuous points: (1) whether in the discussion of efficacious grace "everyone" agrees (...) that the will is not determined by efficacious grace; (2) whether the fact that non-rational creatures are also contingent agents makes the specific contingency of choice that flows from the relation of the finite objects of the will to the intellectually specified formal object of the will (universal good) to be insufficient to constitute the nature of rational free choice; (3) whether Thomas's texts regarding the infallibility of divine premotion are "equivocal"; (4) whether the arguments being considered are properly identified principally as those of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Taylor O'Neill, and Steven Long or are not better first identified in historico-doctrinal terms as the teaching of Aquinas, and second, of several centuries of renowned theologians and philosophers prior in time and in dignity to the aforementioned authors—so that principally identifying these arguments with them, is rather like crediting them with the real distinction of essence and existence?2 [End Page 1105]I. "Everyone" Agrees That the Will Is Not Determined by Efficacious Grace?As to the nature of Thomas's teaching—or even of the account identified historically by the Holy See as "Thomist" with respect to the Congregatio de Auxiliis and held since by a very great many Thomistic authors—Prof. Jensen seems somewhat to miscast the nature of the propositions under consideration.3 He argues on 119 that, "In any case, everyone involved seems to be in agreement that the will should not be determined by efficacious grace." But this is not the case. What there is agreement about is that the will is not determined by efficacious grace in such a way that it is not also and simultaneously freely determined by the will itself. Manifestly this is a contradiction in terms if we define freedom as including a liberty of indetermination with respect to divine providential causality. But Thomas does not do this, and there is no good reason why one should.4 Thus Thomas in De malo, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4: [End Page 1106]Now it is manifest that when something moves something else, it is not from the fact that it is moving said to be the first mover; wherefore it is not excluded that it be moved by another, from which likewise it has this very thing, that it moves. In the same way, when something moves itself, it is not excluded from being moved by another, from which it has this very thing that it moves itself: and thus it is not inconsistent with freedom that God is the cause of the act of free will.5 [End Page 1107]In the Oesterle translation of De malo—a wonderful translation—nonetheless this passage is erroneously rendered (betimes even Homer nods) as "hence it is not precluded that it is moved by another and from that other has the very ability to move."6 But the passage refers to God as cause of the very act of free will, not merely of the "ability": "et sic non repugnat libertati quod Deus est causa actus liberi arbitrii." When something moves itself, this does not imply that the thing is not moved by another "from which it has this very thing that it moves itself." And "thus it is not inconsistent with freedom that God is the cause of the act of free will." That is, God causes the free self-determination of the human will (even at the level of nature, prior to the consideration of grace), by moving the will from potency to act with respect to its own self-motion. Whether at the level of nature or at the level of grace, God moves the will with respect to its own self-determination in freedom, and this motion is not "indeterminate... (shrink)

Vite oubliée au lendemain du concile Vatican II, la contribution du P. Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964) au débat de l’entre-deux-guerres sur l’ascétique et la mystique a pourtant été essentielle, et Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, le grand livre qu’il publie en 1923 et qui rassemble des articles déjà parus dans La Vie spirituelle, mérite sans contredit d’être tenu pour un classique de la théologie française du xx e siècle. L’ouvrage se place à un carrefour polémique crucial en même temps qu’il conserve (...) d’importantes traces du dialogue théorique entre le P. Garrigou-Lagrange et le philosophe Jacques Maritain. Au terme de quatre années de combat polémique acharné, depuis la parution du premier numéro de La Vie spirituelle jusqu’à la publication de Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, le P. Garrigou-Lagrange est parvenu à asseoir sur la scène théologique une école de spiritualité dominicaine aisément identifiable. (shrink)

Publié de 1899 à 1950, le Dictionnaire de théologie catholique a longtemps été considéré comme l’incarnation de positions doctrinales conservatrices. À parcourir les articles qui traitent en son sein des domaines et des méthodes de la théologie, comme les articles Fondamentale ou générale (théologie) du chanoine Albert Michel, Lieux théologiques d’Ambroise Gardeil, Salamanque (théologiens de) de Thomas Deman, Thomisme de Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange ou encore Théologie d’Yves Congar, force est de constater que le Dictionnaire de théologie catholique a en (...) réalité activement participé aux grands débats épistémologiques qui ont contribué à renouveler profondément le champ de la théologie catholique contemporaine. (shrink)

Désormais accessible du fait de l’ouverture des archives vaticanes pour le pontificat de Pie XII, le dossier de la Congrégation du Saint-Office sur le Père Congar fait toute la lumière sur les trois passages du théologien devant elle. Le premier, en janvier 1939, concerne Chrétiens désunis qui s’en tire avec un avertissement bénin, mais suffisant pour que la seconde version du livre ne soit jamais publiée. Le second, en 1951-1952, concerne Vraie et fausse réforme dans l’Église qui est interdit de (...) réédition et de traduction. Alors que les deux premiers se sont déroulés en l’absence du Père Congar et à son insu, le troisième voit sa comparution au Saint-Office, en décembre 1954, pour un interrogatoire sur l’ensemble de son œuvre. Deux dominicains français, les Pères Garrigou-Lagrange et Gagnebet ont été mêlés de près à ces différentes procédures. En octobre 1955, le théologien est assigné à Cambridge par le maître général des dominicains, avec soumission à la censure romaine du moindre de ses écrits. Son exil ne finira qu’en décembre 1956 avec son assignation au couvent de Strasbourg. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Báñez with Love:A Response to a Response by Taylor Patrick O'NeillJames Dominic Rooney O.P.From where I stand, the traditional options of Molinism and Báñezianism seem logically exhaustive possible accounts of the way in which God can cause people to love him, under the influence of grace, while at the same time being able to affirm that those people remain free. Either God's giving efficacious grace to an individual (...) is such as to cause that individual to act a certain way, merely in virtue of giving that grace to that individual, or it is not. If that grace is not intrinsically efficacious, then you need to explain the way in which God can cause an action by giving grace which does not require grace to be intrinsically efficacious. On the latter front, Molinists aim to affirm that human beings are free even while acting under the influence of God's grace, and hold that God's grace is not such as to make it that one could not have done otherwise. They explain this by appeal to counterfactual truths about what human beings would do, metaphysically prior to and independent of God's subsequent decisions to give or withhold grace. These "counterfactuals of freedom" are central to Molinist accounts of freedom, since the truth of these counterfactuals alone secures the fact that human beings are acting freely even when God gives them grace and causes them to perform certain actions. Those human beings could have acted otherwise. Conversely, since God knows these truths, he can use them in order to give grace to an individual at those times when he knows it will be efficacious.To me, the Molinist view is a non-starter. What these truths consist in, what grounds them, how God uses them—I find the critiques compelling [End Page 675] and Molinist answers to these questions metaphysically problematic.1 I am committed to finding a Báñezian solution, therefore, to the riddle. From my perspective, the mystery of predestination invites confusion ultimately because the issue is a subtle philosophical, not a theological, problem. The resolution to the riddle of grace and free will can come only through an adequate account of the nature of human freedom. And I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the "grounding problem" for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick O'Neill.In short, Garrigou-Lagrange appears to accept that there need to be alternative possibilities if human action is to be free. He gives an accounting of those possibilities as follows. On one side, when I sin, Garrigou-Lagrange argues that God's denial of efficacious grace, even though this denial occurs prior to anything I do or could have done, does not necessitate my sin because I performed the sin by means of my normally operating volitional and intellectual capacities (which God merely refrained from interfering in), and I had alternative possibilities provided by the possibility of God providing efficacious grace. Then, on the other, when I do good, he appeals at many points to non-culpable "defects" regarding my intellectual or volitional capacities as grounding those alternative possibilities that I could have sinned even when acting under efficacious grace. In both cases, my acts are still metaphysically contingent. However, neither case provides a sufficient grounding for alternative possibilities (I argued), because I had no relevant control over God's decision to deny efficacious grace, nor were those "defects" in light of which I could have sinned under my control. Instead, I argued that Garrigou-Lagrange's account of humans having alternative possibilities for action would be successful only if there were facts about what I would have done under sufficient grace, truths prior to and independent of God's decision to give efficacious... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Báñezian Grounding for Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom:A Response to James Dominic Rooney, O.P.Taylor Patrick O'NeillIntroductionIn a recently published article, James Rooney, O.P., critiques a fundamental aspect of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange's articulation of the relation between divine causality and creaturely freedom, which I also defended in my recent book.1 Specifically, Rooney argues that at least some of what Garrigou-Lagrange holds is rooted in a Molinist rather (...) than Báñezian understanding of human freedom and divine causality. The aim of this paper is to articulate the basic objections raised by Rooney and to show why the objections fail. We shall not provide an exegetical or textual analysis of Báñez himself, but rather will establish a speculative grounding and agreement between basic principles of Báñezianism and Garrigou-Lagrange's articulation, ultimately affirming the necessity of positing creaturely counterfactuals for Báñezianism.Rooney makes two distinct (but related) objections to Garrigou-Lagrange's treatment. First, he claims that Báñezianism as a system rejects the notion of "alternative possibilities" when considering the creaturely will and its relation to divine causality, especially in regard to physical premotion. I shall argue that this is incorrect, and indeed misses one of the constitutive elements of Báñezianism—in fact the very grounding for its claim that infallibly moved actions remain free. Second, Rooney claims that Garrigou-Lagrange posits [End Page 651] a circular argument regarding the reality of sin. Garrigou-Lagrange's argument would be circular if it corresponded to a single order of causality or if counterfactuals of creaturely freedom were incompatible with Báñezianism. But we shall argue that they are not. As such, the argument is not only not circular, but rather elucidates a constitutive element of the Báñezian system, thereby refuting the objection. In short, Garrigou-Lagrange's articulation of Báñezian premotion admits of counterfactuals without relying upon divine passivity, and it remains internally coherent.Rooney's Critique of the So-called "Garrigou Manoeuvre"Rooney begins the essay by outlining a few of the major differences between a Molinist and Báñezian view of human freedom. Rooney's argument is that there is a potential "grounding problem" for Báñezianism, or at least for Báñezianism as articulated by Garrigou-Lagrange. As Rooney notes, Báñezianism posits that God's efficacious grace is ontologically antecedent to our good actions (and his permission of sin is ontologically antecedent to our sin). But how does this position retain free choice, if divine causation or permission is infallibly determinative and antecedent to creaturely choice? Rooney says:The Banezians need to account for how it is possible that a creature can do otherwise in the special case when God moves the creature to act through grace. Specifically, what grounds the truth of the claim that, even when God determines human free choices from eternity such that a human being has only one course of action open to them, those human beings are morally responsible for their actions? If the Banezian view entails that human beings, acting under grace, strictly lack any ability to do otherwise, then the view is incoherent.2As such, we can see that "the ability to do otherwise" is an essential, grounding element for defending Báñezianism against radically compatibilist or double-predestinarian views of human freedom, which have been condemned by the Church at Trent and in subsequent condemnations of Jansenism.3 Of course, the phrase "ability to do otherwise" is metaphysically [End Page 652] ambiguous, which Rooney admits. Various articulations of a more metaphysically precise grounding for the preservation of free choice under the influence of efficacious grace (or while efficacious grace is withheld) have been put forth, and Rooney focuses on a particular "strategy" which he associates with Garrigou-Lagrange and myself.4 He terms this strategy the "Garrigou Manoeuvre."Rooney notes that "Garrigou-Lagrange claims that there is something in virtue of which God denies someone efficacious grace, and that this is in the control of the sinner."5 He quotes Garrigou-Lagrange as saying that a person "is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace.... [Therefore,] God... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Patricia Kelly, Ressourcement Theology:A Review EssayMatthew K. MinerdIntroductionAlthough now over seventy years in the past, the theological and ecclesiastical events of the 1940s, most often styled under some banner akin to "the crisis over the nouvelle théologie," leading up to the promulgation of the encyclical Humani Generis, retain a currency and interest to this very day. No doubt, the later influence of many of the so-called nouveaux théologiens leading (...) up to, during, and following the Second Vatican Council has contributed to the continued currency of their thought and the debates connected to it. Numerous monographs continue to be written concerning themes of "ressourcement," theological reform, and engagement with the world, all of which were dear to many of those who were embroiled in the philosophical and theological controversies of the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, increased interest in certain long-buried conservative Thomist thinkers from this same era has led to renewed consideration regarding the concerns that they expressed at the time. In fact, it would seem that today, in 2022, the evaluation expressed in Nineteenth Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method by Fr. Gerald McCool (from a perspective rather different from my own) remains true, as the Church continues to live in the midst of an ongoing crisis of modernity that places us in tight continuity with so much of the past several centuries of European Christian intellectual history:In contemporary Catholic theology, the relationship between apologetics, or fundamental theology, and speculative theology is as much [End Page 353] an issue as it was in the nineteenth century.... And in contemporary Catholic theology, the relation between positive theology and speculative theology still remains a problem whose solution demands the use of a coherent system of epistemology and metaphysics.... The contemporary debate over theological method is simply another phase in the dialectical movement of Catholic theology's response to post-Enlightenment thought from the beginning of the nineteenth century through Vatican I, Aeterni Patris, the modernist crisis, between-the-wars Thomism, the New Theology controversy, and Vatican II up to the present.1The great crisis of the 1940s—whether we name it nouvelle théologie, after the reform-advocates of the era, or dialogue theologique, in honor of the Toulouse Dominicans' attempt to present a Scholastic position between, on the one hand, Fr. Chenu's and Congar's view of what the Saulchoir should be, and, on the other hand, the more-conservative Thomism of Frs. Garrigou-Lagrange, Gagnebet, and Gillon in Rome2—was and remains, in the words of Etienne Fouilloux, "the only theological debate of real [quelque] importance, at least in France, from the condemnation of Modernism to the time of the Second Vatican Council."3 And like any truly great event or crisis in intellectual-spiritual culture, it remains with us today in its fruits, both resolved and unresolved.Thus, when a new work is published dedicated to these events and the figures involved therein, the Catholic intellectual world should take heed, for our own self-understanding—whatever sui iuris Church in which we are ascribed—is at stake. Hence, the arrival of the collection of translations by Dr. Patricia Kelly of the University of St. Andrews is an event to be welcomed, even if elements of its publication also give rise to concern. This volume, Ressourcement Theology: A Sourcebook,4 gathering together essays by various parties involved on both sides of the specifically Francophone debates over theological method and truth that came to a head in the 1940s, provides the reading public with a dual "service": it presents in English a [End Page 354] number of texts not heretofore available, while also, unfortunately, bearing witness to the academic prejudices lingering against the authors writing from Rome and Toulouse concerning certain veins of thought in theological methodology during the inter-war and immediate post-war era. Although my review will be somewhat negative on certain points—both for technical textual reasons and because of the slanted narrative presented by Dr. Kelly—I wish only the best to her and her work, hoping that the concerns that I voice can serve as a springboard to dialogue, not retrenchment... (shrink)

I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the “grounding problem” for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by (...) Taylor Patrick O’Neill. O’Neill responds in this present journal issue to that paper, arguing that I failed to be attentive to distinctions drawn by Garrigou-Lagrange which would resolve the dilemma. However, I fear that O’Neill’s presentation of both the dilemma and his own resolution is conceptually confused. I will try to illustrate that O’Neill’s own responses are at many points either a concession to a certain fork of the dilemma that I posed in the original paper, or change the subject and fail to address my concerns except superficially. However, since at many points O’Neill implies that I reject Báñezianism, despite my explicit qualification in the paper that I do not, I will end by proposing what would constitute a sufficient response to the dilemma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN OBSERVATION ON ROBERT LAUDER'S REVIEW OF G. A. McCOOL, S.J.1 RoMANus CEssARro, O.P. Dominican House of Studies Washington, District of Columbia BECAUSE OF HIS scholarly commentary on the development of Roman Catholic theology in the 19th and 20th centuries, students interested in the history of this period owe a debt of gratitude to Fr. Gerald McCool, S.J. In a recent issue of this journal, Robert Lauder presented a (...) clear and sympathetic account of two major works, in which McCool identifies and evaluates the figures and currents that he considers of central importance for a proper understanding of Roman Catholic intellectual life from before the First Vatican Council (1869-70) to after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).2 On Lauder's account, McCool records in these books " the movement within Thomism from its reliance on the commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas and the strong influence of hard-line Dominican Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange to the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan" (p. 308). In his most recent study, From Uniity to Pluralism, McCool concentrates on the work of Joseph Marechal, Pierre Rousselot, Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson. Lauder believes that " McCool correctly cites these four thinkers as the key to Thomism's movement towards a greater openness to other thought patterns" (p. 308), but regrets that McCool failed to go further and provide " a detailed 1 See Robert E. Lauder, "On Being or not Being a Thomist," The Thomist 55 (1991): 301-319. 2 Gerald A. McCool, S.J., Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method and From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989). The first volume was originally published as Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Centur31 (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977). 701 702 ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P. discussion of the presence of St. Thomas's insights in the thought of Rahner and Lonergan... the two most influential Catholic thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century" (p. 318). Apart from this reservation, which even Lauder considers " a backhanded compliment " (p. 318), I observe no point either at which Lauder takes issue with how McCool narrates the history of Catholic theology from roughly the middle of the 19th-century to the present or where he suggests alternative approaches for interpreting the significance of the individuals and events that figure prominently in McCool's narrative. In his Foreword to T. M. Schoof's A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970, Fr. Edward Schillebeeckx warned its readers against making the book " a kind of ' theological canonisation ' of the theologians mentioned to the exclusion of others." 3 I would like to sound a similar note of caution with respect to McCool's version of the history of Thomism. For while I share Lauder's appreciation of McCool's careful scholarship, I am not at all convinced that McCool has uncovered the whole story, nor that his interpretation of the events which he chronicles warrants the lavish praise that Lauder bestows on it. In particular, I suggest that Lauder uncritically adopts McCool's attitude towards certain Dominican theologians who, even though they remain little known in the English-speaking world, still contributed to the upbuilding of theological culture entre les deux guerres. For example, in From Unity to Pluralism, McCool describes the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as a "conservative " Thomist (p. 212), which, in the context of the narrative as McCool relates it, sounds more like ideological pigeonholing, than an honest attempt to describe adequately what a philosopher such as Kenneth Schmitz recently referred to as the "structured" Thomism of Garrigou-Lagrange.4 In the same s T. M. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970, Foreword by Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Paulist Newman Press, 1970), p. 4. 4 In the first lecture, " In the Beginning : New Paths for Ancient Teachings " of the 1991 McGivney Lecture Series entitled "At the Center of the Human Drama: The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II." The four lectures will be published by The Catholic University of America Press. ROBERT LAUDER'S REVIEW OF G. A. MCCOOL, S.J. 703 manner, McCool talks about... (shrink)

This book discusses Thomistic commentary on the topics of physical premotion, grace, and the permission of sin, especially as these relate to the mysteries of predestination and reprobation. The author examines the fundamental tenets of the classical Thomistic account, and on this basis critiques the 20th century revisionist theories of Domingo Banez, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Francisco Marin-Sola, Jacques Maritain, Bernard Lonergan, and Jean-Herve Nicolas. In conclusion, the implications of the traditional view are considered in light of the spiritual life.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:146 BOOK REVIEWS the years passed since Father Garrigou-Lagrange last published his De Revelatione would have allowed Thomistic scholars to retrieve and de· velop Aquinas's theological insights in their fullness. The danger of apologetics is that it can lead one to develop a teaching only along the lines set by those challenging the traditional teaching of the Church. In this particular instance, the Catholic apologists of the (...) antimodernist period were led to overstress the epistemological dimension of the theology of Revelation, leaving unstated that for Saint Thomas the primary term of analysis in this question is the knowledge of God. The need of Revelation for Saint Thomas stems from the call to man to share in the beatific vision. A paper on the relation of finality between faith and the beatific vision would have underlined the originality and true significance of the Thomistic tradition in theology. Saint John's Priory Laredo, Texas JOSEPH D'AMECOURT, F.J. The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries. Edited by J. B. M. WISSINK. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, edited by A. ZIMMERMAN, vol. 27. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. Pp. viii+ 100. $28.75 (paper). This volume contains six short studies by five different scholars from the Netherlands on a topic accurately indicated by its title. These studies are a product of a symposium held by the Thomas Aquinas Workgroup, a scholarly association dedicated to investigating the thesis " that Aquinas first of all has to be understood as a theologian " and to " a rediscovery of the original Aquinas and his authentic thought" (p. vii). The topic chosen for these studies is a suitable one for the aims of the Workgroup, for it is one that requires a clear dis· tinction to be made between the realms of philosophy and theology, and it is one that has generated much interest and dispute-in the Middle Ages no less than today. This small collection of studies makes a con· tribution to scholarship, although there are weaknesses in some of the studies, as I shall note. F. J. A. de Grijs (pp. 1-8) argues that Thomas's purpose in writing the De aeternitate mundi was theological rather than philosophical in that Thomas provides a meditation on the meaning of eternity. This meditation, so de Grijs argues, is not only about the temporal eternity of the world but is even more about God's eternity. It shows us how BOOK REVIEWS 147 little we grasp of God's duration, or how we do not understand it rather than how we do understand it. J. A. Aertsen (pp. 9-19) ·responds to de Grijs by arguing that the work has a philosophical character. First, Aertsen explains, the fact that Thomas begins the De aeternitate mundi with the supposition on faith that the world had a temporal beginning in the past does not of itself (as de Grijs had thought) mean that the work is theological. Rather, it simply means that all believers agree that in fact the world had a temporal beginning, but the question at issue remains a philosophical one: could the world possibly have existed eternally in the past? Second, Aertsen points out that the reasoning in the De aeternitate mundi is much like that of Thomas's Disputed Question De potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 14, which has an explicitly philosophical character. Third, Thomas has already made it clear in his Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, that the doctrine of creation, excluding the part of the doctrine that the world had a temporal beginning, is philosophically knowable in principle and known to philosophers in fact. Since the fact of creation is philosophically knowable and can he demonstrated without prejudice to the question of eternity, it cannot he said that an eternal past existence is incompatible with creation. Hence, the question of the compatibility of being eternal and being created-the very question for the De aeternitate mundi-is regarded by Thomas as philosophical rather than as theological. Aertsen's criticisms of de Grijs are sound, yet de Grijs's central point can he saved. De Grijs... (shrink)

Dans cet article, l'A. nous propose une solution à un vexant problème théologique, à savoir la façon dont la vision béatifique complète la nature humaine tout en demeurant un don au delà du don divin qui est notre être naturel. En se penchant sur l'oeuvre de Thomas d'Aquin, Ryan encadre d'abord le problème. Ensuite il étudie l'émergence de la théorie dite de «pure nature» comme réponse à Baius, lequel affirmait qu'avant la chute d'Adam la vision béatifique n'était que le complément, (...) dû nécessairement à la nature humaine. L'auteur nous présente également la défense offerte par Garrigou-Lagrange de la théorie de «pure nature», ainsi que la critique offerte par de Lubac. Nous remarquons effectivement que la prise de position des partisans de «pure nature» et celle adoptée par de Lubac se réfutent mutuellement. Ensuite nous étudions la position de Rahner. Selon Ryan, l'apport de Rahner est important; cependant une solution basée sur «l'existentiel surnaturel» rahnerien reste intenable. En fin de compte, l'auteur nous propose une solution qui tire profit de ces points de vue divergents, tout en évitant les pièges qui les accompagnent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil by Camille de BelloyThomas M. Osborne Jr.Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil. By Camille de Belloy, O.P. Paris: Vrin, 2014. Pp. 297. €32.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-2-7116-2605-2.This book is a discussion of La Structure de l’âme et l’expérience mystique (1927) by Ambroise Gardeil (...) (1859–1931). In this two-volume work of mystical theology, Gardeil explains the material cause of the experiential knowledge that comes from the gift of wisdom, which is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. La Structure is the third book in a trilogy that focuses on the supernatural knowledge of God, beginning with apologetics in La Crédibilité et l’apologétique (1st ed. 1908), and continuing with the nature of revelation in Le Donné révélé et la théologie (1st ed. 1910). In La Structure, Gardeil develops the thesis that there is an analogy between experiential self-knowledge and the mystical experiential knowledge of God. In the course of his inquiry, Gardeil touches upon philosophical and theological problems concerning self-knowledge, intentionality, the structure of the mind (mens), God’s indwelling in the souls of the just, and the relationship between faith and the gift of wisdom. De Belloy’s new volume is on Gardeil’s presentation of this analogy and its reception by his contemporaries.De Belloy considers largely the issues that surround self-knowledge, the structure of the soul, and mystical experience. He draws together material from Gardeil’s own sources, Gardeil’s contemporaries, and subsequent Thomistic scholarship. He sheds light on the issues themselves, the historical context, and different hermeneutical strategies in Thomism. According to De Belloy, this twentieth-century Thomistic and largely Dominican discussion is important for contemporary philosophers and theologians. To shed light on the context, De Belloy considers a lengthy three-part “Examen de conscience” in Revue Thomiste (1928–29), in which Gardeil responded to published and unpublished comments by his fellow Dominicans Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (a former student), Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin (Le Saulchoir), and Albino González Menéndez-Reigada, as well as a young student, Jean Daujat. De Belloy remarks that Maritain’s discussion of Gardeil in The Degrees of Knowledge to some extent attempts to harmonize the substance of Gardeil’s work with Garrigou-Lagrange’s critical comments. De Belloy emphasizes the interaction between Gardeil and Roland-Gosselin, and at the end of his volume, includes their previously unpublished correspondence.Although De Belloy often notes the difficulty of reading Gardeil’s neo-Scholastic prose, it seems to me that the non-native French reader will find Gardeil more accessible than De Belloy, especially when the latter draws on writers such as Henri Bergson and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Moreover, De Belloy’s discussion is easier to follow if one has already read and is familiar with the four parts of Gardeil’s La Structure. In part 1, Gardeil addresses the structure of mind or spirit (mens), and in particular considers Augustine’s [End Page 472] three main, threefold divisions of the soul in De Trinitate (mens, notitia, amor; memoria [sui], intelligentia, voluntas; memoria [Dei], intelligentia, amor) and Aquinas’s own interpretation and appropriation of these divisions. In part 2, Gardeil describes the way in which sanctifying grace, a created quality that is distinct from the infused virtues, causes the soul’s conformity to God’s essence. In part 3, he discusses God’s presence within the souls of the just and agrees with previous Thomists that God is especially present to the just as an object of faith and love. In part 4, he applies the previous discussion to the structure of mystical knowledge. This last part is the culmination of the entire work, as it addresses the analogy between self-knowledge and the knowledge of God that was defended by earlier Dominican Thomists such as John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) and Thomas de Vallgornera (c. 1595–1665).Part... (shrink)

While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. (...) Even if it were true that freedom does not require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, & the Moral Life ed. by Reinhold Hütter and Matthew LeveringMatthew ShadleRessourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, & the Moral Life Edited by Reinhold Hütter and Matthew Levering Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010. 409 pp. $64.95This edited volume is a festschrift in honor of Romanus Cessario, OP, but, as its title suggests, it also has the larger goal of (...) showing that “ressourcement does not dispense with, but in fact requires, Thomism” (3). The contributors’ efforts to bring to light the insights of Aquinas are organized into three sections: theological method, sacramental theology, and moral theology.Readers of this journal will be most interested in the latter section. Highlights include Craig Steven Titus’s response to Jean Porter’s criticism of Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of the virtues, in which Titus claims that Aquinas has a more developed awareness of moral struggle and development, even among the virtuous, than Porter allows, and that therefore Aquinas is not averse to the idea of a “flawed saint” (331). Steven A. Long distinguishes between acts that are necessary for the completion of a given end and those that are not, arguing that for the former the end defines the species of the act whereas the latter possess their own end and species independent of further intentions. Long’s purpose is to refute Martin Rhonheimer’s contention that condoms can be used by married couples to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS by showing that the use of condoms is not necessary for this purpose (since abstinence is also available), and therefore that such use must be considered an act of contraception regardless of any other good intentions involved. Joseph W. Koterski provides an excellent overview of the classical roots of the natural law theory and its modern exponents that could be useful in undergraduate and graduate courses, although the essay seems mismatched for the volume since the likely reader will probably find little new in it.An evaluation of the overall project of the volume requires a reading of the essays in the first section on theological method. Thomas Joseph White points to the Dominican theologians Marie-Dominique Chenu and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as two extremes in the debate over historicity in theology: “in one we find history without sufficient recourse to dogma, while in the other we have dogma without sufficient recourse to history” (96). White insists that [End Page 218] theologians must find the proper balance between the two. It is not entirely apparent that those loosely identified with ressourcement Thomism have found this balance, if “recourse to history” includes sensitivity to the questions and concerns of one’s own age. In many of the essays in this volume it is unclear whose questions the authors’ exegeses of Aquinas are meant to answer, although other essays are quite engaging. Of course historical exegesis is necessary, but those involved in the mid-twentieth-century patristic ressourcement understood that the recovery of the sources was necessary precisely as an answer to the burning questions of the contemporary world. This is not accommodation, since the Christian tradition proposes something new to the world, but it proposes it with the confidence that human questioning is rooted in the innate desire for the triune God. The advocates of the earlier ressourcement saw the Thomism of their day as an obstacle to this dialogue between the Christian tradition and the contemporary world. The project of ressourcement Thomism will succeed to the extent that it shows how the teachings of Thomas Aquinas can contribute to this dialogue. [End Page 219]Matthew ShadleLoras CollegeCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The “Aristotelian” conception of human agency and responsibility locates agency and responsibility in the exercise of practical reason in deliberation. A characteristic of such deliberation is that it must pertain to matters that can be decided either one way or the other. Some of Aristotle’s texts suggest an interpretation of deliberation that appears to yield the paradoxical result that agents are most responsible for (or act most freely with respect to) choices that are least determined, to the exclusion of other (...) possible choices, by the practical reasoning issuing in those choices. This essay explores this strand of thought in Aristotle. It then proceeds to examine the response to the “paradox” in a middle-Platonist work, the De fato of Pseudo-Plutarch, and in the thought of the eminenttwentieth-century neo-Thomist, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Love of God above SelfJordan OlverIS THERE ANY LOVE that is not ultimately a form of self-love? Anders Nygren famously maintained that for Thomas Aquinas there is not. Nygren was led to this conclusion in large part by Aquinas’s claims that love is an act of the will and that the ultimate end of the will is happiness: if every act of love is on account of happiness as (...) an ultimate end, it seems to follow that all love of others is motivated by, and reducible to, love of self.1 Others have drawn this conclusion for similar reasons. Scott MacDonald, for example, interprets Aquinas as proposing “egoistic rationalism”; he believes that this ethical position follows from Aquinas’s claim that human beings, like all creatures, seek their perfection.2Texts, however, can be produced to show that Aquinas himself believes that nonegoistic love is possible.3 If he is an [End Page 97] egoist, he is not so intentionally; he can only be so in the sense that his principles, despite his wishes, necessitate such a position. While Nygren interpreted Aquinas as an unwilling egoist of this sort,4 most modern scholars of Aquinas’s thought on love have held that his principles do not necessitate egoism, and they have endeavored to explain how nonegoistic love is possible on Thomistic grounds. Modern attempts to solve the “problem of love in Thomas Aquinas” normally look back to Pierre Rousselot’s 1908 work Pour l’histoire du problème de l’amour au moyen âge.5 Rousselot identified the “problem of love” as whether a love that is not egoistic is possible and, if it is, what the relation might be between this love and the love of self which appears to be the foundation of natural tendencies.6 Rousselot believed that in the Middle Ages this problem was primarily dealt with through the consideration of the more particular problem of whether it is possible to love God above self apart from grace. This approach, he thought, offered significant advantages: it was simultaneously concrete and profound, and the object of love was both the last end and the author of all natural appetites.7 If genuine love for another is possible, that possibility would be discoverable in this case and through analysis of love of God above self it would seem that one could [End Page 98] arrive at the principles needed to make sense of other nonegoistic loves.8 Accordingly, when Rousselot presented Aquinas’s solution to the problem of love, he did so exclusively through an explanation of Aquinas’s teaching on love of God above self.9 The most notable feature of this account was its appeal to the part-whole relation: Rousselot proposed that for Aquinas our love for God above self is due to the fact that we relate to God as a part to a whole.Rousselot’s work inspired a scholarly discussion that has persisted now for over a century. This discussion may be roughly divided into three stages: the early twentieth century, the mid-twentieth century, and the late-twentieth century to the present. General agreement with Rousselot characterizes early twentieth-century scholarship. Scholars of this period, such as Charles-Vincent Héris, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and H.-D. Simonin, may claim that Rousselot neglects or overemphasizes something, but they do not assert that he is substantially wrong.10 By contrast, rejection or neglect of the “part-whole” approach to love of God above self characterizes the scholarship of the mid-twentieth century. Étienne Gilson, in his 1932 work L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, vigorously objects to Rousselot’s account, arguing that the part-whole relationship, as it functions in Aquinas’s arguments for love of God above self, should not be understood in “a distressingly literal way,” but simply as “a metaphor, the first moment in a manuductio.”11 [End Page 99] Louis-Bertrand Geiger also emphatically rejects Rousselot’s account, arguing that the real explanation of disinterested love is to be found in the will’s special, “objective” inclination to the “good in itself” as opposed to the “good for me”; we love God... (shrink)

According to the ‘Power of Prayer’ objection to Molinism, the insights of the Church's great saints and spiritual directors regarding how best to grow in the spiritual life conflict with Molinism: spiritual growth is best achieved by praying from a Thomistic attitude towards Providence. Thomas Flint has recently replied to this objection as it was raised by Fr. Reginald Garrigou‐Lagrange. In this paper, I respond on behalf of Garrigou‐Lagrange.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Efficacious Grace and Free Will:Six Inadequate ArgumentsSteven J. JensenDuring the de auxiliis controversies, the idea of efficacious grace was used extensively as an attempt to explain the manner in which God infallibly achieves his will at the level of supernatural grace. One meaning of efficacious grace has often been considered inconsistent with the idea of free will. The inconsistency—if there is any—depends upon a particular meaning, according to which (...) efficacious grace has three important characteristics: it is an infallible physical pre-motion. (1) Efficacious grace is "physical" because it moves after the manner of an efficient cause rather than after the manner of a final cause (which would be called a "moral" motion).1 (2) The motion is prior (or a pre-motion) because it causally precedes the act of the will to which it gives rise. Finally, (3) the motion is infallible because that toward which it moves the will in every case must be achieved.Suppose, for instance, that God gives Jerry an efficacious grace to help Jane, who is in need. The grace is not merely the enticement of some good (a moral movement), but is the movement of an efficient cause, after the manner by which fire heats water. Furthermore, the grace is efficacious prior to Jerry's actual choice and does not depend upon his will for its efficacy. Finally, once Jerry is moved by this grace, he will of necessity (or infallibly) choose to help Jane.In what follows, references to efficacious grace will refer to this particular [End Page 115] understanding, with these three characteristics. Other conceptions of efficacious grace, such as that given by Jacques Maritain, are not relevant to this paper.2The combination of these three characteristics is sometimes thought to be inconsistent with a particular understanding of free will, according to which the will is the only created cause that determines itself to its final action. Since efficacious grace is a created cause (and not the divine will), since it is an efficient cause, since it is causally antecedent to the final act of the will, and since it determines the will to act, it is inconsistent with free will. Or so the argument goes, at any rate. Whatever the details of this argument, most people will concede that there is, at the very least, an intuitive inconsistency between free will and efficacious grace. To be moved infallibly by an efficient cause seems incompatible with the movement of the will, the agency of which is free, and which therefore is not moved determinately to some effect.3Those who wish to defend efficacious grace have advanced a contrary claim—that efficacious grace is consistent with human free will—which might be called the Consistency Thesis. Apparent inconsistencies are nothing more than apparent. In defense of the Consistency Thesis, a multiplicity of Thomistic arguments are offered by authors such as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Steven Long, and Taylor O'Neill.This paper is concerned to show neither the truth nor the falsity of the Consistency Thesis. Rather, it considers six of the arguments defending the thesis and finds all of them wanting. Whatever their merits for other purposes (and often their merits are great), these arguments are inadequate to the task of defending the Consistency Thesis. They are often not bad arguments; they are simply insufficient. They are not enough to show a consistency between efficacious grace and free will. This goal, although modest, is significant, for when confronted with the six arguments readers can be left with the impression that the question is settled. [End Page 116]The Problem ClarifiedThe enemies of efficacious grace suggest the following implication: if the will is moved to act by an infallible physical pre-motion, then the will is determined. The Consistency Thesis may be defended by denying the implication. Even when moved by an infallible physical pre-motion such as efficacious grace (so the defense will argue), the will can remain undetermined. All the arguments discussed below (if they are indeed arguments in defense of the Consistency Thesis) take this approach, although the fourth argument does so only in a very indirect manner.The first argument claims... (shrink)

Mark Jordan’s recent book, Rewritten Theology, challenges the way in which the achievement of Thomas Aquinas has been both received and reformulated, often in order to serve particular theological and philosophical ends. It helps to unmask the often hidden presuppositions behind efforts to “police” Thomism, efforts which frequently require a revision and a rewriting of the texts of Aquinas themselves. At a time when it appears that there is a repristinization of the Thomistic “synthesis” reminiscent of Garrigou-Lagrange, this (...) book is an auspicious reminder that such “synthesis” often comes at the cost of fidelity to the Master in whose name it is fashioned. (shrink)