Akt, a protein kinase hyperactivated in many tumors, plays a major role in both cell survival and resistance to tumor therapy. A recent study,1 along with other evidences, shows interestingly, that Akt is not a single‐function kinase, but may facilitate rather than inhibit cell death under certain conditions. This hitherto undetected function of Akt is accomplished by its ability to increase reactive oxygen species and to suppress antioxidant enzymes. The ability of Akt to down‐regulate antioxidant defenses uncovers a novel Achilles' (...) heel, which could be exploited by oxidant therapies in order to selectively eradicate tumor cells that express high levels of Akt activity. (shrink)

Schon seit ihrer Gründung in den 1970er-Jahren ist die Reihe Germanistische Linguistik (RGL) exponiertes Forum des Faches, dessen Namen sie im Titel führt. Hinsichtlich der thematischen Breite (Sprachebenen, Varietäten, Kommunikationsformen, Epochen), der Forschungsperspektiven (Theorie und Empirie, Grundlagenforschung und Anwendung, Inter- und Transdisziplinarität) und des methodologischen Spektrums ist die Reihe offen angelegt. Das Aufgreifen neuer Trends hat in ihr ebenso Platz wie das Fortführen von Bewährtem. Die Publikationsformen reichen von Monographien und Sammelbänden bis zu Wörterbüchern. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (ab November 2011): Prof. (...) Dr. Karin Donhauser (Berlin) Prof. Dr. Stephan Elspaß (Augsburg) Prof. Dr. Helmuth Feilke (Gießen) Prof. Dr. Jürg Fleischer (Marburg) Prof. Dr. Stephan Habscheid (Siegen) Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Harnisch (Passau). (shrink)

Die Erklärung der Begriffe ›Akt‹ und ›Potenz‹ erfordert es, zunächst den sprachlichen Hintergrund dieser Begriffe zu erörtern. Es handelt sich dabei nämlich um Ausnahmen in Aristoteles’ Philosophie. Während er sich meistens des Wortschatzes der natürlichen Sprache bedient, oder bisweilen termini technici von seinen Vorgängern übernimmt, sind energeia und entelecheia höchstwahrscheinlich neu erfundene Wörter.

In comparison to other epistemic sources (perception, memory and reason) testimony is the only one dealing with the social aspects of gaining and justifying knowledge. One main problem of the current discussion about knowledge by testimony is the concept of testimony itself. It is quite unclear what the correct notion of testimony is supposed to be. In this essay I present a proposal to define the concept of testimony in making a distinction between the conditions which hold in the speaker’s (...) context and the ones necessary and sufficient for the hearer. Furthermore, I will briefly defend the thesis that there is not one general concept of testimony, but that there are different ones connected via a kind of specialisation relation. (shrink)

The Speech act models of Searle and Bach/Hamish mistakenly reconstruct Austin's concept of "illocutionary act". In Austin's view, "illocutionary acts" are not pure acts of communication but social acts achieved by communicative behavior. Following Searle's "Speech Acts" and Strawson's "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" today's speech act theory looks upon illocutionary acts as pure acts of communication, involving "conventionality" (in a certain sense) only as part of speaker's meaning. However, following Austin, to perform an illocutionary act is to bring (...) about conventional consequences which are not adequately dealt with in the speech act models of Searle and Bach/Hamish. (shrink)

Neste artigo o autor procura mostrar por que o princípio de universalização de Habermas não pode ser fundamentado reflexivamente, como o autor da Teoria do agir comunicativo sugere, bem pode ser considerado como um princípio central de uma filosofia moral.

In comparison to other epistemic sources testimony is the only one dealing with the social aspects of gaining and justifying knowledge. One main problem of the current discussion about knowledge by testimony is the concept of testimony itself. It is quite unclear what the correct notion of testimony is supposed to be. In this essay I present a proposal to define the concept of testimony in making a distinction between the conditions which hold in the speaker's context and the ones (...) necessary and sufficient for the hearer. Furthermore, I will briefly defend the thesis that there is not one general concept of testimony, but that there are different ones connected via a kind of specialisation relation. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of (i) the act of belief in Jan Łukasiewicz’s conception and (ii) the act of judging in the view of idiogenic theory of judgment. According to Łukasiewicz, the act of belief is not a propositional entity, which reproduces (correctly or not) the states of affairs to which it is intentional directed. Consequently, the act of belief is not a carrier of truth but rather a feeling of reality of something (...) to what it is directed. If one analyses Łukasiewicz’s remarks about beliefs, he would agree that the act of belief is the same as the act of judging understood within the idiogenic theory of judgment. In turn, in phenomenological terms: Łukasiewicz’s belief and idiogenic act of judging could be defined as “thetical moment” or “moment of capturing the reality” (R. Ingarden) or Setzungsmoment (E. Husserl). (shrink)

The article presents a communication-based analysis of the function of the ‘bez sensu’ [meaningless/ pointless/makes no sense etc.] phraseme. The author discusses the conversational and discursive opportunities for using it. He applies the methodology of communicational grammar, which enables the analysis of communications at the ideational and interactive levels. Within the semantic level, ‘bez sensu’ removes the value of the trivialised semantic standard. In conversations, it is the reaction to scripts which contradict natural logic and the common-sensical cause-and-effect course of (...) things. An important function is the bringing forward of scripts of failure, wastefulness, redundancy, and lack of benefit or expected or actual harm. At the interactive level, the ‘bez sensu’ expression fulfils the function of support for the argumentative power of a communication; it is also a measure of undermining an argumentation – it emphasises the frailty of its premises. In axiological strategies, ‘bez sensu’ is a major component of emotive acts and the building block of the emotional tension between interlocutors. In this instance, it is mostly used to bring forward the experience of a negative emotion. One negative outcome of using the ‘bez sensu’ expression is the introduction distance to interpersonal contact, and in some cases the sense of intellectually debasing the sender of a communication. The article includes several examples of media-based political statements with the ‘bez sensu’ expression, which are used for discrediting political opponents. (shrink)

Illocutionary acts are best looked upon as being communicative acts. Reasons are eiven for this thesis) which is quite contrary to what classical Speech Act Theory (SAT) holds to be true. It is proposed to define illocutionary intentions via (some very special sort of) perlocutionary intentions. This is not to deny the importance of this central SAT- aistmction, to the contrary, it is suggested that this distinction be reconcilable with the basic concepts of a theory of communicative actions.

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of genetic phenomenology while trying to demonstrate that its elaboration leads Husserl to dismiss de facto the main motivation of his idealism—namely the idea that at the basis of constitution is an immanent and formless stuff shaped or animated by subjective acts. Indeed genetic analysis shows that the original stuff of constitution consists of sensuous contents structured according to a material lawfulness grounded on their peculiarity. By affecting the subject, such contents motivate (...) the performing of intentional acts and are the genuine motor of constitution. The genetic ground of apperceptions is thus material content. (shrink)

This study offers a comprehensive survey of the philosophy of language of Thomas Aquinas by analysing the acts of human reason as principles of language and by establishing them as the overarching point of reference for semiotic, epistemological, semantic, pragmatic and scientific considerations.