One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge (...) which does not invoke causation at all. Michael Pauen has argued extensively (this volume of Journal of Consciousness Studies), however, that this line of defence doesn't work because it presupposes the existence of psychophysical laws connecting qualia with physical phenomena which cannot be established under epiphenomenalist presuppositions. It is argued that Pauen's arguments lead to sceptical consequences which threaten not only interactionist alternatives to epiphenomenalism but finally his own account. (shrink)

Unter phänomenalem Bewusstsein versteht man in der Philosophie Empfindungen wie Schmerz und Lust, aber auch unsere bewussten Wahrnehmungserlebnisse. Wie es ist, solch ein Bewusstsein zu haben, weiß jeder nur aus eigener Erfahrung. Der Autor bezieht kritisch Stellung gegen den Anspruch vieler Philosophen, phänomenales Bewusstsein im Rahmen der Naturwissenschaften angemessen verstehen und erklären zu können.