The Critique of Pure Reason—Kant’s First Critique—is one of the most studied texts in intellectual history, but as Alfredo Ferrarin points out in this radically original book, most of that study has focused only on very select parts. Likewise, Kant’s oeuvre as a whole has been compartmentalized, the three Critiques held in rigid isolation from one another. Working against the standard reading of Kant that such compartmentalization has produced, The Powers of Pure Reason explores forgotten parts of the First (...) Critique in order to find an exciting, new, and ultimately central set of concerns by which to read all of Kant’s works. Ferrarin blows the dust off of two egregiously overlooked sections of the First Critique—the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. There he discovers what he argues is the Critique’s greatest achievement: a conception of the unity of reason and an exploration of the powers it has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. With this in mind, Ferrarin dismantles the common vision of Kant as a philosopher writing separately on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics and natural teleology, showing that the three Critiques are united by this underlying theme: the autonomy and teleology of reason, its power and ends. The result is a refreshing new view of Kant, and of reason itself. (shrink)

This text is an interview given by Prof. Dr. Alfredo Pereira Jr. to Leonardo Ferreira Almada, on the occasion of the call for publication of interviews with different Brazilian philosophers. In response to the goal of the Trans/Form/Ação journal call, we sought to carry out an interview in which a PhD professor with an established career presents some elements of his personal and academic stories, as well as clarifies important points of his research, some of his theses and vision (...) of the world based on questions asked by another professor, a historical research partner, and in-depth knowledge of the interviewee’s career. (shrink)

Introduzione Il problema filosofico centrale di Lexical Competence (Marconi 1997 — i riferimenti che faremo sono relativi all’edizione italiana apparsa due anni dopo) è che cosa distingue la comprensione del linguaggio da parte di un agente umano da quella che potrebbe essere attribuita a un sistema artificiale. Nel rispondere a questa domanda Marconi (d’ora in poi, M.) offre una teoria della conoscenza del significato, descrive cioè in che cosa consiste conoscere il significato delle parole...

Building on the affectivism approach, we expand on Binz et al.'s meta-learning research program by highlighting that emotion and other affective phenomena should be key to the modeling of human learning. We illustrate the added value of affective processes for models of learning across multiple domains with a focus on reinforcement learning, knowledge acquisition, and social learning.

El artículo parte de la preocupación de saber cómo se está desarrollando la formación de investigadores en las universidades brasileñas. Una primera dificultad que se coloca es el predominio de un abordaje segmentado de la investigación científica. Eso lleva a un cuestionamiento sobre si particularmente las asignaturas de metodologías sirven para formar investigadores. Entre diversas dificultades, se incluyen desde aspectos epistemológicos hasta los impactos de las asignaturas metodológicas sobre la formación de los investigadores. Se cuestionan las estructuras de las disciplinas, (...) su relación con las metodologías, y las relaciones entre enseñanza metodológica y prácticas de investigación. Lo que está en juego es la formación de científicos sociales críticos en que se cuestionen diferentes separaciones extremamente rígidas de los procesos de formación.The present article focuses on the concern to know how the process of preparing investigators at Brazilian universities is being developed. One of the first difficulties being dealt with involves the predominant of segmented approach of the scientific investigation. This leads to the questioning of methodologies used to prepare these investigators. Among other several difficulties, the epistemological aspects up to the methodological ideas on the preparation of investigators are included. The structures of the subjects, their relation to the methodologies and the relations between methodological teaching and investigation practices are questioned. The preparation of critical social scientists in which extremely rigid different separations from the preparation processes is at stake here. (shrink)

A method for the recursive identification of physiological models of the cardiovascular baroreflex is proposed and applied to the time-varying analysis of vagal and sympathetic activities. The proposed method was evaluated with data from five newborn lambs, which were acquired during injection of vasodilator and vasoconstrictors and the results show a close match between experimental and simulated signals. The model-based estimation of vagal and sympathetic contributions were consistent with physiological knowledge and the obtained estimators of vagal and sympathetic activities were (...) compared to traditional markers associated with baroreflex sensitivity. High correlations were observed between traditional markers and model-based indices. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up (...) to the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 4, Page 1014-1039, October 2022.

This article aims to present the Coimbra Commentaries as a critical source of the Cartesian Meditations. The Cursus Conimbricensis played an important role in shaping the philosophical pedagogy of the seventeenth century, and many modern scholars were formed through the pages of these volumes. Although we do not know for sure whether the Coimbra Commentaries were used as textbooks in La Flèche, there are solid reasons for believing that, when Descartes refers to the possibility of divine deception in the first (...) meditation, he is using some examples taken from the Commentary on Physics written by Manuel de Góis. (shrink)

Para entrever el futuro de la bioética lo primero que tenemos que pensar es la propia noción de futuro y nuestra relación práctica con el mismo. Expongo aquí a la crítica la idea de un futuro que esté ya de algún modo presente y a la vista. Es esta una idea que desposee al futuro de toda futureidad, una idea, por lo tanto, incoherente. Propongo, a cambio, pensar el futuro como tarea, como agenda, como aquello que no está y ha (...) de ser libremente hecho. En este sentido, resulta inútil tratar de vislumbrar o adivinar el futuro de la bioética, y en cambio es preciso proponernos como tarea la creación de la bioética futura. Vistas así las cosas, la función principal de la bioética no será ya la de deliberar y elegir entre las opciones que se nos presentan, sino la de crear nuevos cursos de acción que protejan y favorezcan mejor la vida en general y la vida humana en particular. Abogo, pues, en este texto, por una bioética de la creatividad y de la laboriosidad, superadora de la bioética de dilemas. (shrink)

: According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of (...) the language of mental states ascriptions. I will argue that: although Crane’s specific argument against Wittgenstein is not conclusive, Wittgenstein’s linguistic strategy does not work; and yet we should not be committed to a robust realist account of intentionality. Keywords : Intentionality; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Mark of the Mental; Ontological Commitment; Realism/Anti-realism. L’intenzionalità è sufficientemente reale? Riassunto : Il concetto di intenzionalità è l’autentico cuore della filosofia di Tim Crane, secondo il quale l’intenzionalità è niente di meno che il marchio del mentale. Nondimeno, vi sono diversi noti problemi sollevati da questo concetto. In questo articolo-commento discuto il concetto di intenzionalità nelle sue linee generali cercando, da un lato, di determinarne lo statuto ontologico e, dall’altro, di valutarne la dispensabilità esplicativa. Mi concentro in particolare sull’argomento, discusso da Crane, con cui Wittgenstein elimina l’intenzionalità, caratterizzandola come una finzione grammaticale, una pseudo-entità creata della grammatica del linguaggio con cui attribuiamo stati mentali. Sosterrò che: sebbene lo specifico argomento di Crane non sia conclusivo, la strategia “linguistica” di Wittgenstein non funziona e tuttavia non dovremmo indulgere a una concezione realista “robusta” dell’intenzionalità. Parole chiave : Intentionalità; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Marchio del mentale; Impegno ontologico; Realismo/Anti-realismo. (shrink)

According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea that, since cognitive scientists describe computations (in explanations and theories) in semantic terms, computations are individuated semantically. Although commonly invoked in the computational literature, the argument from the cognitive science practice has never been discussed (...) in detail. In this paper, we shall provide a critical reconstruction of this argument and an extensive analysis of its prospects, taking into account some ways of defending it that have never been explored so far. We shall argue that explanatory considerations support at best a weak version of the argument from the cognitive science practice, according to which semantic properties concur with formal syntactic properties in individuating computations in cognitive science, but not a strong version, according to which computation individuation in cognitive science is semantic as opposed to formal syntactic. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant Yearbook Jahrgang: 8 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-16.

Hegel is, arguably, the most difficult of all philosophers. To find a way into his thought interpreters have usually approached him as though he were developing Kantian and Fichtean themes. This book demonstrates in a systematic way that it makes much more sense to view Hegel's idealism in relation to the metaphysical and epistemological tradition stemming from Aristotle. The book offers an account of Hegel's idealism in light of his interpretation, discussion, assimilation and critique of Aristotle's philosophy. There are explorations (...) of Hegelian and Aristotelian views of system and history; being, metaphysics, logic, and truth; nature and subjectivity; spirit, knowledge, and self-knowledge; ethics and politics. No serious student of Hegel can afford to ignore this major interpretation. It will also be of interest in such fields as political science and the history of ideas. (shrink)

The modern world was in part born as a reaction against Aristotelianism. However, the image of Aristotle to which modern philosophers reacted was partial, to say the least. Paradoxical though it may seem, today, more than twenty-three centuries on, we may now be in the most advantageous position for understanding the Stagirite's philosophy and applying it to contemporary problems. The present book contributes to the forming of an idea of Post-modern reason inspired by a constellation of Aristotelian concepts, such as (...) prudence (phronesis), practical truth (aletheia praktike), science in act (episteme en energeiai), metaphor (metaphora), similarity (homoiosis) and the imitation-creation pair (mimesis-poiesis). They all form an interconnected network and together they make up an idea of reason that may prove suitable for the present. These concepts offer the most promising basis for undertaking a series of urgent reconciliations: of facts and values, of means and ends, of theoretical and practical reason, of intelligence and emotion. Aristotle's notions could help solve many dualisms of modern times. He offers a third way between identity and difference in ontology and politics, between algorithm and anarchism in methodology, between naïve realism and plain relativism in epistemology, between equivocity and univocity in language, between Enlightenment and Romanticism in culture... On the way, this shift facilitates the relationships between science, arts and ethics - the three parts of the sphere of culture which Modernity had separated - as well as the integration of the sphere of culture itself with the world of life. (shrink)

En este trabajo, analizaremos algunos temas que evidencian la preocupación que Gabriela Mistral tenía por la formación de las mujeres de su tiempo; especialmente, en el hecho de que ellas no podían tener una educación más científica (al contrario de lo que sucedía con los hombres), en la formación de las mujeres obreras (quienes eran prácticamente ignoradas) y en el estímulo de la lectura femenina (como una oportunidad para elevar su cultura). En concreto, veremos las ideas relevantes de tres escritos (...) en tres momentos de su vida: un texto publicado en el diario regional _La voz de Elqui_: “La instrucción de la mujer” (1906), cuando tenía 17 años, vivía aún en Coquimbo y trabajaba como ayudante de preceptora; el segundo, publicado en el diario _El Magallanes_, “Educación popular” (1918), a los 29 años, ya como experimentada directora de un liceo en Punta Arenas y conocida en Chile y en muchos países de la región. Finalmente, en _Lectura para mujeres_ (1923), a los 34 años, radicada en México, invitada por el ministro de Instrucción Pública, José de Vasconcelos, para colaborar con la reforma educacional de ese país. En esta obra, Mistral muestra su absoluta resolución de ofrecer una oportunidad para que la mujer de entonces adquiriera una fina cultura. En síntesis, se busca presentar el deseo que Mistral tenía de mostrar a la sociedad de entonces lo importante que era reconocer la igualdad de la mujer frente al hombre, en los procesos que cada uno experimentaba durante su educación. (shrink)

La concepción instrumental de la “palabra” tiene como marco de referencia lametafísica de la subjetividad moderna, de la cual surgen en una u otra medida lafilosofía y la ciencia del lenguaje. Tomando como punto de partida de su método fenomenológico el “ir de camino en pos de la experiencia del lenguaje” –másallá de los presupuestos básicos establecidos por la tradición filosófica– Heideggerlogra superar el reduccionismo lingüístico de Occidente. La pregunta por laesencia del lenguaje –que corresponde finalmente a los interrogantes: ¿Qué (...) esel lenguaje? y ¿cuál es su fundamento?– es superada por la pregunta ¿cómoacontece el lenguaje como tal? Teniendo en cuenta estos presupuestos, haceruna experiencia con el lenguaje significa “dejarse abordar por la interpelaciónde la ‘palabra’ en una actitud de espera sin objeto que representar”. Libre de lasataduras de la representación, el lenguaje es concebido en su sentido ontológicocomo apertura a la posibilidad. (shrink)

Work and its consequences in enterprise is studied. Family as an institution is the basical example of division of work, which is the situation where human being perfecionates himself. Perfection takes place working, as an integrating technique which has no limits.

The notion of productive imagination is not only of crucial importance for Kant’s idea of pure reason, and for the unity of our theoretical experience, it is also stunningly seminal for post-Kantian philosophy: think, for instance, of Fichte, Schelling, the German Romantics, and of Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen. For the historian of philosophy, in particular, it is a very intriguing notion. Yet, however fundamental the notion of productive imagination is, it is not easy to determine its precise role in the (...) Critique of Pure Reason; the question of its historical genealogy is even more obscure. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)

In recent years, we have witnessed a renewed interest in phenomenological approaches to the study of the mind. Since neuroscience must still rely on phenomenological reports to tackle the problem of consciousness, the phenomenological approaches are introduced as a methodological remedy in the study of the mind. Two principles underlie such approaches: to exploit the heuristic value of phenomenological descriptions, and the need for mutual constraints between such descriptions and scientific evidence in theory construction. To fulfill this project, a central (...) question is to understand how phenomenology can be naturalized. According to some researchers, the naturalization of phenomenology could only be achieved by means of a mathematization of the phenomenological descriptions. However, in this study it will be shown that mathematization is a form of theory reduction that is unable to adequately account for the two principles underlying the phenomenological approaches. In contrast with mathematization, we put forward an alternative framework for naturalizing phenomenology based on interfield theories: a non-reductionist model of interfield integration. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to provide insight into culinary systems. Each culture expresses its own identity through the way in which it transforms food into an elaborated cuisine. The phases of a cooking process start with the choice of ingredients, their preparation, their processing, how they are served, and how they are eaten. Each of these phases makes it possible to understand the semiotic and social behavior of a human group in the moment they choose to prepare and (...) eat a particular food. Therefore, this article contains a contrastive analysis of how Mexican, Texan, and Italian cuisines show how spicy and hot food is interpreted depending on the values that ​​are given to it in regards to being considered a dish, a spice or a vegetable. It bases its analysis on the mechanisms built around the meaning of chile in order to express cultural characteristics and differences. The recipes and their narrative processes, in addition to the use of color, allow the identification of parameters to describe the various cuisines through recipes books. (shrink)