The principle of beneficence directs healthcare practitioners to promote patients’ well-being, ensuring that the patients’ best interests guide treatment decisions. Because there are a number of distinct theories of well-being that could lead to different conclusions about the patient’s good, a careful consideration of which account is best suited for use in the medical context is needed. While there has been some discussion of the differences between subjective and objective theories of well-being within the bioethics literature, less attention has been (...) given to the questions of what work a theory of well-being needs to do in bioethics and which standards of success ought to be used in selecting a theory of well-being for use in medicine. In this article, I argue that traditional theories of well-being developed in philosophy are not well suited to meet the needs of the medical context. For the principle of beneficence to be most useful, the underlying account of well-being should satisfy two conditions: first, it needs to lead to a concrete, action-guiding determination of the patient’s good; and, second, any recommendations it offers need to be justifiable to patients. Standard accounts of well-being have difficulty satisfying both conditions. Exploring the limitations of these theories when applied to treatment dilemmas helps point the way toward the development of an account of well-being better suited to healthcare. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, King, and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive Psychology. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn to objective theories. A better understanding of the rationale for objective theories helps us to see what is needed from a theory of well-being. We then argue (...) that a suitably modified subjective theory can provide what is needed and that this is the theory that ought to be favored by psychologists. Keywords: well-being; happiness; hedonism; eudaimonia; subjective well-being; theory; values.. (shrink)

The U.S. health care system is ostensibly market based and therefore at least partially reliant on competition and consumer demand to regulate costs. Yet information about an essential feature of market transactions—costs—is typically obscure to patients until long after treatment. When discussing what must be disclosed for informed consent, the same list of required information is often mentioned regardless of the health care system in question, and information about costs rarely merits a place within this list. However, our assumptions about (...) what a moral principle requires need to be responsive to the realities of the health care system in which the principle is applied.This paper explores the moral foundations of disclosure and informed consent to argue that, in a market‐based system of the sort found in the United States, these same considerations support a requirement to disclose out‐of‐pocket costs before patients receive care. Next, I consider two objections to this view: first, that health care practitioners should focus solely on medical considerations in their encounters with patients and, second, that disclosing out‐of‐pocket costs would be too difficult to be mandated. I argue that medical and financial interests are inseparable within the U.S. health care system. If the difficulties in disclosing costs are deemed insurmountable, then the current system may prove unsustainable, both morally and financially, since we face the same practical impediments to implementing any meaningful consumer‐driven, market‐based health care reform. Finally, I explore some of the consequences of failing to disclose costs. The requirements of disclosing costs can be supported by the principle of respect for autonomy, regardless of the consequences, but in light of the consequences of the decision of whether to disclose, a concern about justice provides further support. (shrink)

Reply to a commentary by Joseph J. Fins on “Financial Side Effects: Why Patients Should Be Informed of Costs.”.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 9, Page 10-11, September 2011.

Proposals for health care cost containment emphasize high-value care as a way to control spending without compromising quality. When used in this context, ‘value’ refers to outcomes in relation to cost. To determine where health spending yields the most value, it is necessary to compare the benefits provided by different treatments. While many studies focus narrowly on health gains in assessing value, the notion of benefit is sometimes broadened to include overall quality of life. This paper explores the implications of (...) using subjective quality of life measures for value assessment. This approach is claimed to be more respectful of patients and better capture the perspectival nature of quality of life. Even if this is correct, though, subjective measurement also raises challenging issues of interpersonal comparability when used to study health outcomes. Because such measures do not readily distinguish benefits due to medical interventions from benefits due to personal or other factors, they are not easily applied to the assessment of treatment value. I argue that when the outcome of interest in value assessment is broadened to include quality of life, the cost side of these measures should also be broadened. I show how one philosophical theory of well-being, Jason Raibley’s “agential flourishing” theory, can be adapted for use in quality of life research to better fit the needs and aims of value assessment in health care. Finally, I briefly note some implications of this argument for debates about fairness in health care allocations. (shrink)

Philosophy and Happiness, an impressive volume edited by Lisa Bortolotti, provides an excellent illustration of how the analysis of happiness requires clear thought about both the relevant questions and their potential solutions. This book, which grew out of the conference Happiness and the Meaning of Life, held at the University of Birmingham in 2007, offers a fresh perspective on a number of classic questions about happiness and also points the way toward new avenues of research.