Immanuel Kant's work changed the course of modern philosophy; Karl Ameriks examines how. He compares the philosophical system set out in Kant's Critiques with the work of the major philosophers before and after Kant. Individual essays provide case studies in support of Ameriks's thesis that late 18th-century reactions to Kant initiated an "historical turn," after which historical and systematic considerations became joined in a way that fundamentally distinguishes philosophy from science and art.

Karl Ameriks here collects his most important essays to provide a uniquely detailed and up-to-date analysis of Kant's main arguments in all three major areas of his work: theoretical philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason), practical philosophy (Critique of Practical Reason), and aesthetics (Critique of Judgment). Guiding the volume is Ameriks's belief that one cannot properly understand any one of these Critiques except in the context of the other two. The essays can be read individually, but read together (...) they offer a comprehensive guide to the main themes of the most influential of all modern philosophical systems. (shrink)

Argues, first, that there is a common ground in a methodological sense in the similarity of structure in Kant’s three Critiques. Also contends that central to Kant’s metaphysics and argumentative strategy is the assumption that there is an ontological common ground uniting subjects and objects, and that this is consistent with the regressive form of Kant’s transcendental deductions and his doctrine of transcendental idealism. In addition, argues that Kant’s philosophy as a whole seeks to show how there can be a (...) common ground of agreement between the truths of common sense, philosophy, modern science, and rational morality. While providing an overview of the book, the Introduction also discusses the special interpretative difficulties of Kant’s Critical philosophy. (shrink)

Recently, much discussion of Hegel has focused on the nature of his idealism, and especially on its relation to Kant’s transcendental idealism—a doctrine whose meaning is itself still much in dispute. It is clear enough that Hegel calls himself an “absolute idealist,” and that he is a major figure in the “German idealist” tradition, but the precise meaning and value of falling under the idealist label is not so clear. Moreover, some recent interpretations have suggested ways in which Hegel can (...) be termed a realist, and for all interpreters it is conceded that there is a peculiarly “objective” nature to Hegel’s idealism that serves to set it apart from most other versions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMatthen usefully distinguishes between mere ‘r-pleasures’ and ‘f-pleasures’: ‘facilitating’ pleasures that are valuable in drawing out the ‘self-reinforcing’ characteristic of good art. But there are reasons, especially from a Kantian Critical perspective with which Matthen sympathizes, to worry about any such ‘hedonistic’ approach to aesthetics, however valuable its general account of pleasure may be. Especially deserving of emphasis are the role of objectivity and the significance of aesthetic goals other than pleasure.

volume 1. Philosophy and natural science / edited by Karl Ameriks -- volume 2. Historical, social, and political thought / edited by John Walker -- volume 3. Aesthetics and literature / edited by Christoph Jamme and Ian D. Cooper -- volume 4. Religion / edited by Nicholas Adams.

It has been argued that Kant's all-consuming efforts to place autonomy at the center of philosophy have had, in the long-run, the unintended effect of leading to the widespread discrediting of philosophy and of undermining the notion of autonomy itself. The result of this 'Copernican revolution' has seemed to many commentators the de-centring, if not the self-destruction, of the autonomous self. In this major reinterpretation of Kant and the post-Kantian response to his critical philosophy, Karl Ameriks argues that (...) such a view of Kant rests on a series of misconceptions. By providing the first systematic study of the underlying structure of the reaction to Kant's critical philosophy in the writings of Reinhold, Fichte and Hegel, Karl Ameriks challenges the presumptions that dominate popular approaches to the concept of freedom, and to the interpretation of the relation between the Enlightenment, Kant and post-Kantian thought. (shrink)

This seminal contribution to Kant studies, originally published in 1982, was the first to present a thorough survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. Ameriks focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings. Ameriks demonstrates that Kant developed a theory of mind that is much more rationalistic and defensible than most interpreters have allowed.

This paper sets Kant in the broader context of modern philosophy as a whole by suggesting that Kant not be understood primarily as attempting to i) defeat skepticism, ii) promote “scientism”, or iii) develop a radically new ontology. It suggests that Kant’s philosophy aims to take the claims of common sense at face value and then attempts to mediate between such claims and the apparently conflicting claims of science. Accordingly, philosophy is a systematic articulation of the sphere of conceptual frameworks (...) that mediate between the extremely informal and the highly formal levels of judgment within our complex objective picture of the world. Thus, for Kant, philosophy lies in between common sense and science by attempting to mediate between them. (shrink)

Roderick Chisholm has recently developed a view that can be regarded as in large part a modern version of the rational psychology attacked by Kant in his critique of the “paralogisms of pure reason.” Chisholm argues that the self is a substance, that it is not “annexed to” or “placed in” any other being, that it has a certain numerical identity, and that it is directly known in itself—four claims that map fairly easily onto the main themes of Kant’s Paralogisms. (...) At various points Chisholm directs himself against what he takes to be skeptical Kantian considerations against these claims. I happen to believe most of these claims are true and that even Kant was ultimately committed to them, but what I shall advance here is simply the interpretive thesis that Chisholm’s arguments for these claims are weak and their weakness is well exposed precisely by considerations encouraged by Kant’s discussion of the paralogisms. In other words, there is still more work to be done if one desires a contemporary defense of rational psychology. (shrink)

Major recent interpretations of Kant's first "critique" (wolff, Strawson, Bennett) have taken his transcendental deduction to be an argument from the fact of consciousness to the existence of an objective world. I argue that it is unclear such an argument can succeed and there are overwhelming reasons to believe kant understood his deduction as having a very different form, namely as moving from the premise that there is empirical knowledge to the conclusion that there are universally valid pure categories. Detailed (...) support for this contention is offered in an analysis of the second edition version of the deduction. (shrink)

Kants Ethik zeigt das typische Profil einer klassischen Theorie: Sie präsentiert im Kontext jeder Zeit neue und überraschende Perspektiven. 200 Jahre nach dem Tod Kants ist die AuseinanderSetzung mit seiner Ethik keineswegs auf das philologische oder philosophiehistorische Interesse beschränkt. Vielmehr ist sie eine der wenigen Beispiele für den Sachverhalt, dass mit dem zeitlichen Abstand der Entstehung eines Werks die systematische Bedeutung immer noch zunehmen kann. Heute werden die großen ethischen Themen der Gegenwart, von den Menschenrechten bis zur Bioethik, nicht ohne (...) ausdrücklichen Bezug auf Kants Ethik behandelt. In diesem Band werden Beiträge vorgelegt, die durchgehend ein systematisches Interesse verfolgen. Sie rekonstruieren ausgehend von einem exegetisch gesicherten Ort im Werk Kants die Erträge für die gegenwärtige Philosophie. Mit Kant wird gleichsam über den ursprünglichen Horizont seines Denkens hinausgegangen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die kantische Ethik nicht nur auf den ihr vertrauten Gebieten von Gerechtigkeit, Autonomie, Verbindlichkeit und Recht Bedeutendes leistet, sondern auch zum Problem der Motivation Lösungsvorschläge bereithält - einem Bereich, der lange Zeit als ihr Schwachpunkt angesehen worden ist. (shrink)

The purpose of the Cambridge Edition is to offer translations of the best modern German edition of Kant's work in a uniform format suitable for Kant scholars. When complete the edition will include all of Kant's published writings and a generous selection from the unpublished writings such as the Opus postumum, handschriftliche Nachlass, lectures, and correspondence. This volume contains the first translation into English of notes from Kant's lectures on metaphysics. These lectures, dating from the 1760s to the 1790s, touch (...) on all the major topics and phases of Kant's philosophy. Most of these notes have appeared only recently in the German Academy Edition; this translation offers many corrections of that edition. As is standard with the volumes in the Cambridge Edition there is an extensive editorial apparatus, including extensive linguistic and explanatory notes, a detailed subject index, and glossaries of key terms. (shrink)

This paper analyzes hegel's critique of kant's theoretical philosophy in terms of three specific objections to kant's transcendental deduction (concerning the representation of the i, The necessity of the categories, And the problem of a preliminary epistemology) and three specific objections to kant's transcendental idealism (concerning the thing in itself, The antinomies, And other specific problems of the transcendental dialectic).

This book explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later critical works provide a plausible defense of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and (...) lectures and several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work. The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of the Amerik's 'moderate' interpretation of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Problems from Kant is distinctive in the way that it combines the crisp and often extremely critical style of argumentation found in Jonathan Bennett’s work with a very helpful grasp of the much more metaphysical character of the leading trends in current systematic philosophy. Although the book defends a phenomenalist reading of Kant's transcendental idealism that is not far from Bennett's empiricist interpretation, it also stresses many points that derive mostly from a philosophical and interpretative sympathy for the rationalist tradition (...) and a revival of modal considerations in the spirit of David Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. Since there is not enough room here to go into the many points on which I very much agree with the rationalist side of Van Cleve’s reading, I will take this occasion to play the role of critic and concentrate on one of the few areas in which it appears we have some serious disagreements. These disagreements are worthy of special attention because they arise in the chapter that overlaps the least with Van Cleve’s earlier publications, and they concern a topic that all would agree is at the very center of the Critique, namely Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories. (shrink)

Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Stephen Houlgate's severe critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant's Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant's idealism and his general Critical procedure, I defend Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also give an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of (...) difficult passages in Kant's first Critique. (shrink)

The first study of its kind, The Impact of Idealism assesses the impact of classical German philosophy on science, religion and culture. This volume explores German Idealism's impact on philosophy and scientific thought. Fourteen essays, by leading authorities in their respective fields, each focus on the legacy of a particular idea that emerged around 1800, when the underlying concepts of modern philosophy were being formed, challenged and criticised, leaving a legacy that extends to all physical areas and all topics in (...) the philosophical world. From British Idealism to phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism and French postmodernism, the story of German Idealism's impact on philosophy is here interwoven with man's scientific journey of self-discovery in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – from Darwin to Nietzsche to Freud and beyond. Spanning the analytical and Continental divide, this first volume examines Idealism's impact on contemporary philosophical discussions. (shrink)

Is a defence of the reading offered in the earlier chapters against another set of objections, including some recently articulated by Paul Guyer. It elaborates ways in which the objective nature of Kantian taste is also connected with another feature that is often denied of it, namely, a fundamentally conceptual character. To say that Kant’s argument presumes that taste is objective and conceptual does not mean that this is to take it to be all objective and all conceptual. Since it (...) is rooted in human perception, taste must involve sensation and feeling, and in this sense it is obviously subjective and intuitive as well – but this does not mean that we should think that Kant means to deny a sense in which it also needs to remain both objective and conceptual, as these terms are commonly understood now. The general structure of Kant’s discussion here fits in well with my overall interpretation of him as a ‘moderate’ philosopher regressively seeking universal features of particular kinds of presumed experience. (shrink)

In this volume, Karl Ameriks explores 'Kantian subjects' in three senses. In Part I, he first clarifies the most distinctive features-such as freedom and autonomy-of Kant's notion of what it is for us to be a subject. Other chapters then consider related 'subjects' that are basic topics in other parts of Kant's philosophy, such as his notions of necessity and history. Part II examines the ways in which many of us, as 'late modern,' have been highly influenced by (...) Kant's philosophy and its indirect effect on our self-conception through successive generations of post-Kantians, such as Hegel and Schelling, and early Romantic writers such as Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis, thus making us 'Kantian subjects' in a new historical sense. By defending the fundamentals of Kant's ethics in reaction to some of the latest scholarship in the opening chapters, Ameriks offers an extensive argument that Hölderlin expresses a valuable philosophical position that is much closer to Kant than has generally been recognized. He also argues that it was necessary for Kant's position to be supplemented by the new conception, introduced by the post-Kantians, of philosophy as fundamentally historical, and that this conception has had a growing influence on the most interesting strands of Anglophone as well as Continental philosophy. -/- . (shrink)