Arthur Schopenhauer’s Mirror: the Will, the Suffering, the Compassion as Philosophical Challenges. In philosophy, the celebration of Arthur Schopenhauer has already ended. Only the last year was anniversary (of his birth and of the publication of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation), but the importance of this non-conformist creator is never superfluous to highlight. In this article, there is, certainly, a very limited/selective focus on the thinking of Schopenhauer, and no biographical approach: the goal is only (...) to stress two aspects of his philosophy in their logic. Schopenhauer was an enthusiastic Kantian: first of all, by taking over his maestro’s seminal paradigm, the constructivism (that does not pertain only to the theory of knowledge, but marks the entire existence analysed at different philosophical levels). Secondly, by the ethical focus and accent, continuing Kant’s exceptional emphasis of the ultimate reason of the tableau of the world, the human reason and its power to treat the others in a moral manner. And certainly, Schopenhauer was not an epigone, but a creator, using and at the same time giving other content to the Kantian form of ethical revolution. Schopenhauer had, obviously, contradictory ideas – as that between his constructivism and his metaphysical treatment of the will, i. e. as the only principle explaining the world – and also with disputable significance, including for the actual life and thinking. But he had a bad publicity from the dominant philosophy – namely, some of his ideas (as that of the moral of compassion) were, and still are, absolutely ignored, while other ones were simplified or transformed in the conception of Schopenhauer, reducing this one to some ideas out of context – and even nowadays this tradition is dominant. And it’s pity, because Schopenhauer’s philosophy was and represented a dramatic moment in the history of the 19th century thinking and culture: as it is a strange mirror for the present much graver situation. In order to critique the present it’s not necessary to do it from Schopenhauer’s perspective. However, just his contradictory ideas and pathetic accent on compassion show better than ever that neither philosophy – as theoretical position – nor the urging for moral activism are more than vox clamantis in deserto: if the historical facts, which include this urging and the spring of thinking but are not confined to them, are missing. (shrink)

This paper is written in the continental tradition – facing the analytic one – and advocates the knowledge first thesis, reviewing the entailment thesis (where believing is knowing, because to know entails to believe). It starts from the ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion and develops criteria for distinguishing knowledge, opinion and belief. The demonstration necessarily arrives to the kinds of beliefs and thus, to the relationships between knowledge and these kinds. While the distinction of kinds of beliefs leads to (...) the understanding of why the knowledge belief problem did appear in epistemology, the analysis with this distinction is not rigid and can be approached dialectically. This standpoint is aiming at contributing to the debate of knowledge belief problem and to warmer relations between the continental and the analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The problem sketched here in a non-conformist phenomenological manner concerns the transition from the theory of the self-sufficient individual to the theories of the social character of human being, and to the theoretical possibility to control the social asymmetries opposing to its fulfilment.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle has given a tableau of the desirable virtues and their infringement through the surpassing of their limits. Thus, every virtue is framed or delimited by vices that represent either its excess or its deficiency. However, this type of defining is related to deep, metaphysical reasons: since every being, especially the living one, has its telos. Man’s telos is to practise and fulfil his human specificity, i.e. reason, and reason is the measure/quality of virtue as such; (...) the excess or deficiency in his behaviour perverts and even stops the realisation of the humanity of man. And this humanity is, in turn, in accordance to the telos of nature, the good in and for the preservation of all things. If, hypothetically, persons would not be virtuous at all, this accordance would not be realised and man would be an accident in the logic of nature: and accidents are removed, sooner or later. The criterion of the “quantitative” moral evaluation is thus qualitative: a quality, the good aimed at by mindfulness applied to the concrete particular moral relations and learned from experience. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} The analysis aims at showing that the position of philosophy in society depends upon two factors: the real spirit of reform born from philosophy and the appetence of society for reform. The first part of the present study provides a short historical illustration of the genuine character of philosophy as (...) a bearer of reform, while the second part of the work mentions different attitudes toward reform, as well as the problems generated by the intersection of these attitudes with the reforms promoted by philosophy. In addition, the paper intends to contribute to the understanding of the present-day status of philosophy within the Romanian educational system. In this respect, the dialogue of philosophy and religion is considered relevant to the topic. Besides this aspect, the work also mentions the dogmatic imprint of philosophy during the Stalinist epoch and the dogmatic inertia after 1990 – manifested in different and apparently opposed forms. Moreover, the study suggests that the improvement of the prestige of philosophy depends not only upon the self-criticism that Romanian philosophy has to develop but also upon the influence that this spirit of self-criticism could have on decision-makers. Philosophical self-criticism is a precondition and, at the same time, a part of the reform that philosophy initiates in the field of knowledge. Thus, the paper is to underline the importance of philosophy in giving direction and in providing the framework for social reform. From this point of view, the dialogue between philosophy and religion is difficult but possible at university level and in the field of research. (shrink)

Starting from the counter-position of the traditional model of labour and the traditional aim and ideal of a good life, the paper emphasises that philosophy had to solve the problem of the possibility to generalise the model of a creative and pleasant life. Therefore the goal of the paper is two-fold. The one is to question thenecessity of labour from the standpoint of the rebel thinking transfigured in the literature of laziness as alternative to the ancient tradition of hard labouring. (...) The other is to mention some present philosophical theories about the cognitive labour. By asserting the fundamental changes in the regime of work opened up by the new industrial revolution begun more than thirty years ago, a mere conclusion would be that the present philosophy still has a big duty toward this crucial and obviously open problem. (shrink)

I mention the main, technophile and technophobe, positions towards technology in the Western 18th century, as the criterion of this paper. Then I show that, however unexpected would this be, the concept of technics – opening the problem of technics – was explicitly present within the transcendental philosophy. From its multiple meanings outlined in the logic of this philosophy, I focus on the technical instruments of science. Kant considered them optimistically, but insisted that they are only means subordinated to the (...) capability of reason that alone is able to give knowledge. And the vault key of knowledge is the moral law (the moral telos) given by the human reason. Thus, answering to Rousseau, Kant indicates that the progress of knowledge is ultimately determined by this moral, and not by the enrichment of cognisance as a result of technical instruments. If we consider them as a model for the treatment of the technical objects in the broad sense of this term, Kant introduced the criticism of the technophile reductionism, while creating the frame of the positivist science and the humanistic philosophy of the 19th century. Keywords: Kant, technical instruments of science, technic/technology, technophilia and technophobia, moral law. (shrink)

Although the concept of human nature may seem problematic, its a-historical essentialism can be used to show the fall of modern European philosophy into the historical pit of unsolvable contradictions. This paper explores the problems of logical contradictions between the modern and universalistic concept of human nature and the discriminative model of inferior-superior humans, mainly illustrated by racism. First, this paper shows that the concept of human nature is valid beyond the arguments related to evolution and social contexts, although the (...) human nature is modelled by them, and that the concept is not opposed to the specific cultural peculiarities of different human communities. Furthermore, common elements of racism both at the moment of its creation and nowadays suggest a radical possibility for resolving the antagonisms between the thesis of universality in the human being and the thesis of the particularity of unique cultures. (shrink)