Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

_Anarchy, State, and Utopia: An Advanced Guide_ presents a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the ideas expressed in Robert Nozick’s highly influential 1974 work on free-market libertarianism—considered one of the most important and influential works of political philosophy published in the latter half of the 20th-century. Makes accessible all the major ideas and arguments presented in Nozick’s complex masterpiece Explains, as well as critiques, Robert Nozick’s theory of free market libertarianism Enables a new generation of readers to draw their own (...) conclusions about the wealth of timely ideas on individualism and libertarian philosophy Indicates where Nozick’s theory has explanatory power, where it is implausible, and where there are loose ends with further work to be done. (shrink)

Cette contribution cherche à déterminer les rapports entre anarchie et démocratie chez Proudhon en partant de la place qu’il accorde au conflit. La première partie revient sur la prise en compte de ce que Proudhon nomme antagonisme ou antinomie et sur les différents types de conflits qu’il range sous cette rubrique, qui est au centre de son projet d’ontologie sociale. La deuxième partie s’intéresse à un cas d’antinomie, à la fois limite et fondamental : celui de la différence sexuelle, qui (...) est désignée comme une antinomie tout en se voyant dénier le statut de rapport conflictuel. La dernière partie montre comment la prise en compte du conflit chez Proudhon conduit à une critique de la démocratie et à un projet positif désigné par le terme de fédéralisme. (shrink)

Private-property anarchy is better than the state in the enhancement of liberty and welfare. Strictly speaking, market exchange is one aspect of private-property anarchy. But I here focus on market-anarchy as that is a main source of confusion and debate. Similarly, pluralism is another aspect of private-property anarchy. I focus on pluralism as an example of a currently popular topic where private-property anarchy is misunderstood. ‘Pluralism’ here means ‘(tolerating) different ways of life’. ‘The market’ means (...) ‘voluntary exchange’. ‘Anarchy’ means ‘no rule’. Both interpersonal liberty and private property are inherently anarchic: no one is ruled to the extent that these exist. They are also naturally pluralist. The state, by contrast, coercively imposes ultimate control and is thus inherently illiberal and naturally Procrustean. Democratic prejudice obscures these facts. (shrink)

Public reason liberals argue that coercive social arrangements must be publicly justified in order to be legitimate. According to one model of public reason liberalism, known as convergence liberalism, this means that every moderately idealized member of the public must have sufficient reason, of her own, to accept the arrangement. A corollary of this Principle of Public Justification is that a coercive social arrangement fails to be legitimate so long as even one member of the public fails to have sufficient (...) reason to endorse the arrangement. This high bar for justification has led many critics, most notably David Enoch, to argue that convergence models are incapable of vindicating liberalism. They argue that in a sufficiently diverse society, there will always be someone for whom an arrangement is not justified, and therefore convergence liberalism leads to anarchy – the view that no law or coercive social arrangement is legitimate. Other critics accept that convergence liberalism could vindicate core liberal institutions but nothing more, and thus argue that the view makes libertarians effective “dictators”. In either case, critics hold that this objection is sufficient to reject convergence liberalism, either in favor of alternative public reason views or as a means of rejecting all public reason views. In this paper I argue that convergence liberalism can overcome this anarchy objection. I show that the objection largely rests on misinterpretations of convergence liberalism, and thus clarify aspects of the theory. However, I also show that internal debate over the scope of public justification – what stands in need of justification – must be resolved in favor of a wide scope, encompassing both State-based and non-State-based coercion, in order to overcome the anarchy objection. Therefore, my response to the anarchy objection has implications for how convergence liberalism should be developed going forward. (shrink)

The Libyan Anarchy: Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period. By Robert K. Rittner. Writings from the Ancient World, vol. 21. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009. Pp. xix + 621. $59.95.

This paper seeks to determine the relationship between anarchy and democracy in Proudhon’s thought, considering the place of the conflict in this autor. The first part exposes what Proudhon names antagonism and antinomy in his social ontology and the different sorts of conflicts this ontology takes into account. The second part focuses on a case of antinomy, that is at the same time a basic and a borderline case : sexual difference, that Proudhon considers as an antinomy, but not (...) as a conflict. The last part shows how this theory of conflictuality leads to a criticism of democracy and to a positive federalist project. (shrink)

Après que le stalinisme nous a dépouillés de quelques utopies et que le capitalisme, dégagé de toute entrave, a définitivement montré son caractère inhumain, l'anarchisme s'avère attrayant, en ce qu'il tente de combiner les ...

(1999). Ontological anarchy, the temporary autonomous zone, and the politics of cyberculture a critique of hakim bey. Angelaki: Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 115-128.

The category of anarchy is conventionally associated with the emergence of an autonomous discipline of International Relations. Recently, Donnelly has argued that anarchy has never been central to IR. His criticism targets not just concepts of anarchy but theories of anarchy and thereby expresses an anti-theory ethos tacitly accepted in the discipline. As a form of conceptual atomism, this ethos is hostile to structuralist and normative theories. This article aims to reinstate theoretical holism against conceptual atomism (...) and to defend the enduring relevance of theories of international anarchy for IR. This is done by revisiting two classic, structuralist accounts of international anarchy articulated in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics and Hedley Bull’s Anarchical Society. It will be shown that both represent coherent theoretical ‘wholes’ which reveal a more complex relationship between anarchy and hierar... (shrink)

When people talk about anarchism, what they have in mind is typically political anarchism, that is, the view that there should be no state. As the philosopher and anarchism scholar David Miller observes, however, anarchism itself is a more general view, namely the view that there should be no rulers. Miller writes that “although the state is the most distinctive object of anarchist attack, it is by no means the only object. Any institution which, like the state, appears to anarchists (...) coercive, punitive, exploitative or destructive is condemned in the same way”—including, for example, religious institutions, schools, or economic systems (Miller 1984: 8). In this sense, one can be an anarchist about different things. Relationship anarchy is anarchism about personal relationships. -/- Several thinkers in the anarchist tradition have held views on personal relationships (e.g., Godwin 1793; Bakunin 1866; Goldman 1910). In what follows, however, our focus is not on the general issue of anarchist views on relationships, but on the ideas of the contemporary movement of self-identifying relationship anarchists. -/- The ideas of relationship anarchy in this sense—hereafter RA—have been developed in queer and countercultural communities over the last two decades. Rather than focusing primarily on mechanisms of political power, RA theorists have been concerned with understanding and challenging the power dynamics at play in close personal relationships. Andie Nordgren, the movement’s central, founding theorist, describes RA as a radical commitment “to avoid defining relationships by attempts to exercise power over each other” (Nordgren 2018). -/- Our aim is to give a concise presentation and defense of RA. We will approach RA as a theory in applied ethics—in particular, as a theory in sexual ethics and relationship ethics—and relate it to ongoing debates in these areas. We, the authors, are both queer men with a background in countercultures where RA is widely practiced and discussed. One of us is an activist working on trans- and sex workers’ rights (Sørlie), the other is a philosophy professor (Moen). Although we make several claims about the scope, content, and justification of RA, we do not claim to speak with any special authority on the issue. Moreover, many of the points that we make here, while not attributable to a specific source, are not original to us, but are the result of several years of fruitful discussion with others in the RA community. -/- We start by considering the cases where, from an RA perspective, current mainstream relationship norms are too restrictive. Then we turn to the cases where current norms are too permissive. Our views on what counts as “mainstream” relationship norms are, no doubt, influenced by the fact that we are writing from a Scandinavian perspective. -/- We then proceed to consider the relationship between RA and polyamory. We argue that RA is compatible with some, but not all, forms of polyamorous practice. We also argue that, from an RA perspective, the increasingly popular term “consensual non-monogamy” is a misleading term that should be avoided. In the conclusion, we explain how RA, as a position in applied ethics, can be justified within consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethical frameworks alike. -/- We have restricted our scope, in what follows, to chosen relationships between adults. Thus, we are not dealing with, for example, kinship relationships into which one is born, nor relationships between adults and minors. Although many issues and arguments deserve to be explored in greater depth than we can do here, we hope, nevertheless, to be able to convey the main nature and thrust of RA. (shrink)

Soucieuse d’articuler le concret phénoménologique de la vie et la rigueur éthique de l’altérité, la pensée de Levinas passe de l’extériorité impérative du Visage (TI) à son inscription obsessionnelle dans une subjectivité tout entière à l’accusatif (AE). Ne pouvant échapper sans équivoque au règne de l’archè, elle s’engage dans des dédits critiques sans fin : entre la précédence du fini et la préséance de l’infini, le discours philosophique se tient ici résolument dans la douleur et l’ambiguïté inévitables de l’expression.

What is infrapolitics? How is infrapolitics related to the question of anarchy? And, finally, what makes this approach relevant, or even urgent? This work looks at the relationship between anarchy and philosophy based on the recent contributions by Catherine Malabou, before returning to the existential problematic posited by Martin Heidegger and revisited by Reiner Schürmann, to interrogate our present; that is, to consider a world that seems to be increasingly subordinated to the logic of automation and standardization, in (...) the face of which the usual political responses appear inadequate. Finally, based on a reading of Benjamín Labatut’s novels, we try to show the closure of this world, facilitated by a growing expropriation of the decision of existence, which is now monopolized by a decisionist vanguard of experts who have the power to execute an irreversible annihilation. It is in this context that we maintain that infrapolitical anarchy represents a non-determinative relationship with the world; that is, that implies a new love for the world in which the very possibility of existence is at stake. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

This paper investigates the themes of transcendental anarchy and the practical a priori in Reiner Schürmann’s reading of Heidegger. After elucidating these concepts, as well as showing how they are operative in Heidegger’s own texts, I raise questions regarding the stability of the dependency-claim of the practical a priori once transcendental anarchy has unsettled the very distinction between theory and practice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENCE, ANARCHY, AND SCRIPTURE: JACQUES ELLUL AND RENÉ GIRARD Matthew Patullo Princeton Theological Seminary This essay will examine the personal and social consequences ofsin, Biblically defined, and will contend that Christian faith necessitates a rejection of the secular political order. Exploring and contrasting the thought of René Girard and Jacques Ellul, we will demonstrate that Girard's mimetic theory supplies crucial theoretical underpinnings for Ellul's theology. Ellul, in turn, (...) sequencing the Biblical narrative somewhat differently, provides Girard the more biblically consistent content of the life of faith. The ethical content ofthe life of faith is a continuation ofthe salvation narrative inaugurated in Genesis 1-2, incarnated and perpetuated in Israel and later, the Church, the universalized community of the Abrahamic blessing. The historical content of this faith demonstrates the incompatibility of political power with freedom in Christ. The Church's ill-fated attempts to maintain an authentic practice of faith while legitimizing the secular order are exposed by the Biblical critique of power. While the growth of the global state has made a total withdrawal from the political order inconceivable, it is precisely its utter domination today that makes critical continued defiance by the Body of Christ. Original Sin Girard observes that when the snake first appears in the Genesis account of the Fall, it is already in conflict with God, opposing him as a jealous rival. Eve is enticed by it to covet divinity, to covet what belongs to God—the knowledge of good and evil—and to herself become God's rival (Girard 1 965, 1 82). Her imitation ofthe serpent's covetousness forms "an alliance of two against one" (Girard 2000, 171-185), and God is 26Matthew Patullo expelled from the relationship. The contagion of metaphysical desire, or mimesis, soon claims Adam and what began as a relationship ofobedience without conflict between God and human beings is forever changed. An acquisitive mimesis turns antagonistic and rivalrous (Girard 1978a, 95). When called to account for her disobedience, Eve blames the snake. Adam in turn blames Eve, implying that God is himselfat least partially culpable: "The woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me ofthe tree, and I ate" (Gen 3:12, emphasis mine). In the Biblical account of human origins then, rivalry with God produces rivalry between people. Girard argues that although conflict must inevitably lead to violence, here "God takes the violence upon himselfand founds humanity by driving Adam and Eve far away from him" (Girard 1978a, 142). God's banishment of the first humans only mirrors the expulsion implied by human collusion with the snake. "Now we know that covetousness is the crux ofthe whole affair," Ellul writes, "since sin always depends on it. 'You shall not covet' (Ex 20: 1 7) is the last of the commandments because it summarizes everything—all the other sins" (Ellul 1985, 101; see also Girard 1999, 7-12). Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve are not required to choose between good and evil. "AU that counted was the relation to God and its expression in action" (Ellul 1976, 51). Here Ellul understands freedom as obedience to God's commandments within the context ofa relationship with God. Independence from God is mere slavery: "Adam seeks to liberate himself from the limits which God has set for him and in so doing he enters into rivalry with other forces and becomes subject to sin" (Ellul 1976, 49). The knowledge that Adam and Eve covet and usurp from God is "the power to decide on one's own what is gooáanawhat is evil" (Ellul 1985,96?, emphasis Ellul's). Consequently, human morality is ofthe order ofthe Fall, and Girard concurs: the ethical always derives from victimary unanimity (Girard 1978a, 236), in this case the rejection of God. For Ellul "covetousness is equivalent to the spirit of power or domination" (Ellul 1985, 101)' and "no society is possible among people 1 "Sin is a break with God and all that this entails. When I say that people are not good, I am not adopting a Christian or a moral standpoint. I am saying that theirtwo great characteristics, no matterwhattheir society or education, are covetousness and the desire... (shrink)

Anarchy and utopia have traditionally had a contentious relationship throughout the history of political thought. Although some anarchic thinkers have occasionally verged on the utopian genre – for instance, French anarchists Joseph Déjacque and Jean Grave, or anarcho-syndicalists Émile Pataud and Émile Pouget – the anarchic mindset has generally shown a deeply-rooted mistrust towards any representation of systematically planned ideal societies, often seen as intellectualist and fundamentally authoritarian projects.

In this paper, I will argue that a number of well-known health interventions or initiatives could be considered anarchist, or at the very least are consistent with anarchist thinking and principles. In doing this I have two aims: First, anarchism is a misunderstood term—by way of example, I hope to first sketch out what anarchist solutions in health and healthcare could look like; second, I hope to show how anarchist thought could stand as a means to improve the health of (...) many, remedying health inequalities acting as a buffer for the many harms that threaten health and well-being. On this second point, I will argue that there are a number of theoretical and instrumental reasons why greater engagement with anarchism and anarchist thinking is needed, along with how this could contribute to health and in addressing broader injustices that create and perpetuate poor health. (shrink)

Adler and Barnett demonstrate how changes occurring in international politics create the nostalgia of security communities, a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago.

This article argues anarchy is undertheorized in International Relations, and that the undertheorization of the concept of anarchy in International Relations is rooted in Waltz’s original discussion of the concept as equal to the invisibility of structure, where the lack of exogenous authority is not just a feature of the international political system but the salient feature. This article recognizes the international system as anarchical but looks to theorize its contours—to see the invisible structures that are overlaid within (...) international anarchy, and then to consider what those structures mean for theorizing anarchy itself. It uses as an example the various ways that gender orders global political relations to suggest that anarchy in the international arena is a place of multiple orders rather than of disorder. It therefore begins by theorizing anarchy with orders in global politics, rather than anarchy as necessarily substantively lacking orders. It then argues that gender orders global... (shrink)

Mettre en faisceau, dans un même argument, anarchie, gnose et sagesse pourra sembler peu académique. On trouvera ici des raisons de penser qu'il n'en est rien: une communauté de vues s'atteste non seulement historiquement, mais aussi conceptuellement. En un mot, elle se nomme volonté d'authenticité, qui est exigence d'autonomie. Il faut donc faire prévaloir l'autorité sur le pouvoir, la connaissance sur la foi, et la vie sur la mort."--Page 4 of cover.

L'expression d'"anarchie des valeurs" prête à confusion. Elle peut en effet laisser entendre que dans la réflexion et la vie morale actuelles ne règne plus que confusion, chaos, donc anarchie entendue comme absence de principes organisateurs et structurants de la vie sociale et politique; elle peut aussi suggérer que notre situation éthique ne connaît plus elle-même de "moralité des mœurs"; elle pourrait également ouvrir la voie aux lamentations bien connues sur les malheurs des temps, la décadence morale et spirituelle, ritournelle (...) à peu près constante dans l'histoire de l'humanité, depuis la plus haute antiquité, comme de nombreux témoignages pourraient en fournir la preuve. Aussi dois-je préciser le but de cette conférence: il s'agit de proposer une réflexion philosophique sur les conséquences pour la morale, dans la théorie comme dans la pratique, de la vie dans des sociétés démocratiques pluralistes, ou encore de s'interroger sur la morale elle-même, affectée qu'elle est par la modernité, si l'on veut utiliser ce terme large et parfois flou pour désigner la situation culturelle originale que nous connaissons désormais dans notre histoire. En quoi la spécificité de nos sociétés affecte-t-elle la manière de comprendre et de vivre la morale ? en effet celle-ci ne reste pas au-dessus des évolutions sociales, économiques, politiques et culturelles, impassible et pérenne. Puisque la morale vise à contribuer à la vie bonne des hommes réellement existants, il lui faut bien les rejoindre dans leurs existences concrètes, et du coup elle est affectée par la question de savoir comment on peut mener une vie bonne, ici et maintenant, donc dans une situation neuve et très différente des moments historiques antérieures. Je vais donc tenter d'abord de caractériser notre situation en donnant un contenu à l'idée d'anarchie des valeurs, puis je m'interrogerai sur la place de la liberté morale en ce contexte, enfin j'indiquerai quelques conditions pour la vie morale ici et maintenant. (shrink)

Dans la pensée philosophique d'Emmanuel Levinas, le mot « Dieu » n'est pas inaudible. Il peut venir à l'idée. Il peut tomber sous le sens – en deçà de tout sens thématisé, à revers des prétentions souveraines de la conscience. À la condition toutefois que parvienne à être décrite l'intrigue anarchique que ce mot noue dans l'idée de l'Infini, dans le Visage, dans la Kénose du sujet, dans le Dire du verset ou l'Emphase de la métaphore.Les articles recueillis dans cet (...) ouvrage tentent, sous ces divers aspects, de décrire l'inouïe Transcendance de ce mot « Dieu » désormais arraché à toute archê – à tout fondement onto-théo-logique. Ils se hasardent aussi à suggérer les résonnances théologiques et bibliques de cet « autrement dire Dieu » préservant l'anarchie du Transcendant. C'est par le Haut que se noue tout vrai dialogue entre le philosophique et le théologique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Disaster Anarchy: Mutual Aid and Radical Action by Rhiannon FirthJohn-Erik HanssonRhiannon Firth. Disaster Anarchy: Mutual Aid and Radical Action. London: Pluto Press, 2022. Paperback, 243 pp. ISBN 9780745340463The COVID-19 pandemic and the unfolding climate crisis, with the multiplication of unprecedented weather events, have shown how urgent it is to reflect on our responses to disaster. Following up on themes she first broached in Coronavirus, Class, and (...) Mutual Aid in the United Kingdom, Rhiannon Firth throws a fresh, anarchist, and utopian light on disaster relief in Disaster Anarchy.1 In this work, Firth seeks to “consider how [anarchist] social movements’ impressive efforts in mutual aid might contribute to a radical and revolutionary reconceptualisation of disasters and the processes of relief and recovery efforts” (19). To do so, she begins by surveying the dominant approaches to disaster relief (chapters 2 and 3) before offering a comprehensive anarchist theoretical critique of these perspectives (chapter 4). Firth then fleshes out her anarchist theory of disaster and community response through two empirical case studies of grassroots relief efforts. In chapter 5 she looks into the Occupy Sandy movement, a New York area community-based response to the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy’s passage in October 2012 in the United States. The final chapter is then dedicated to the COVID-19 Mutual Aid Groups that emerged in the United Kingdom during the pandemic.In building her argument, Firth mobilizes anarchist (and more broadly radical) theory and interviews with participants in both movements. She engages with how activists motivated and understood their participation in mutual aid groups, perceived disaster and relief organizing, sought to solve practical and political problems, and reflected on their experiences. The empirical sections of Disaster Anarchy are thus reminiscent of investigations into the anarchist connections and orientations of contemporary social movements, such as Occupy Wall Street.2 However, Firth’s is a work [End Page 606] of political theory. Her interviews were not conducted simply to describe and analyze the anarchist components of disaster relief social movements. Echoing Uri Gordon, she proposes to take the “worldviews of activists seriously as sources of theoretical knowledge,” leading us to rethink both anarchism and the politics of disaster as a whole (16).3 There lies a key part of the originality of Firth’s contribution to both anarchist theory and to the study of disaster relief. The utopian core of Disaster Anarchy also shines through this movement-based theoretical elaboration of an anarchist challenge to the dominant theories and practices of disaster relief. By examining mutual aid groups in critical dialogue with anarchist theory, Firth raises the possibility of more egalitarian and democratic “utopian alternatives to the status quo,” though, as she reminds us, they always run the risk of being co-opted (20).To set the scene for the desirability of anarchist approaches to disaster relief, Disaster Anarchy opens with Firth’s dissatisfaction with what she identifies as the two main sets of approaches to disaster studies. The first represents “the dominant neoliberal paradigm of disaster politics” and falls under the umbrella of “Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)” (21). Firth contends that, despite some internal variety, all DRR approaches share the three same basic assumptions. First, DRR considers disasters to be “ruptures in the normal functioning of society.” They become a “management problem” that must be dealt with using the tools of political governance to restore order and ensure “systemic stability” (39–40). This can be done both directly through state institutions, and through civil society-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that cooperate with state institutions. DRR then evaluates responses using the categories of “efficiency and cost-effectiveness,” leaving aside “the affects and human impacts of disasters” (40). Second, DRR tends to flatten out differences between disasters, and in the ways in which individuals and groups respond to them. Disaster becomes abstract, and authorities can design sets of responses taken to be effective regardless of local contexts and demands. DRR approaches are therefore particularly congenial to the growth of large governmental “specialised agencies like DHS [Department of Homeland Security] and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency]” that produce knowledge and practices linked to the vertical “management of disaster” (41). Finally... (shrink)

In this introduction to the Special Issue, we undertake a little ground clearing in order to make room in International Relations for thinking differently about anarchy and world politics. Anarchy’s roots in, and association with, social contract theory and the state of nature has unduly narrowed how we might understand the concept and its potential in International Relations. Indeed, such is the consensus in this regard that anarchy is remarkably uncontested, considering its centrality to the field. Looking (...) around, both inside and outside International Relations, for alternative accounts, we find ample materials for helping us think anew about the nature of and possibilities for politics in anarchy. In the second part of the introduction, we show how our contributors develop and expand on these resources and what we hope the Special Issue brings to International Relations. (shrink)

Imagination is important for many things in science: solving problems, interpreting data, designing studies, etc. Philosophers of imagination typically account for the productive role played by imagination in science by focusing on how imagination is constrained, e.g., by using self-imposed rules to infer logically, or model events accurately. But the constraints offered by these philosophers either constrain too much, or not enough, and they can never account for uses of imagination that are needed to break today’s constraints in order to (...) make progress tomorrow. Thus, epistemology of imagination needs to make room for an element of epistemological anarchy. (shrink)

This Master of Arts thesis is in two parts: a novel, An Anarchy of Man, and an exegesis which places the novel in relation to philosophical concerns about the self and the way those concerns are portrayed in selected works of Western literature. The novel is set in Canberra and Sydney and tells the story of the relationship between two characters: Joe and Gin. It explores the way we in the modern Western world think about ourselves and those around (...) us. Chapter One considers the view of the self in the work of the philosopher Rene Descartes and explores how this view is portrayed in three contemporary Australia novels, and in An Anarchy of Man. Chapter Two examines post-Cartesian views of the self, especially those in the work of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, and then considers the way the self is portrayed in Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, and in my own An Anarchy of Man. Chapter Three examines postmodern conceptions of the self and considers how these conceptions are portrayed in the work of the contemporary American novelist Don DeLillo and in my own An Anarchy of Man. (shrink)

This forum contribution addresses two major themes in de Goede’s original essay on ‘Financial security’: (1) the relationship between stable markets and the proverbial ‘security dilemma’; and (2) the development of new decision-technologies to address risk in the post-World War II period. Its argument is that the confluence of these two themes through rational choice theory represents a fundamental re-evaluation of the security dilemma and its relationship to the rule of law governing market relations, ushering in an era of perpetual (...) physical and financial insecurity. (shrink)

« L’anarchie », comme en témoigne l’omniprésence du qualificatif « anarchique » dans De l’absurdité sur des échasses, est essentielle pour comprendre le chemin argumentatif développé dans la critique benthamienne des droits de l’homme. C’est seulement à partir d’elle qu’apparaissent clairement les différents pans de cette critique, mais surtout son ordre et son sens déterminés par ce qui vaut comme le fondement de toute la critique, la théorie des fictions. Une fois reconnue l’importance de ce fondement, alors la continuité et (...) la systématicité de la critique comme la propension dévastatrice de cette argumentation se déploient entièrement, et devient cette « machine de guerre » contre les droits de l’homme. « L’anarchie » est bien le fil directeur de la critique, en tant qu’elle est le moyen et la fin même de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme pour Bentham. (shrink)

Laying foundations -- Rejecting aggression -- Safeguarding cooperation -- Enforcing law -- Rectifying injury -- Liberating society -- Situating liberation.

'The men of culture are the true apostles of equality.' Matthew Arnold's famous series of essays, which were first published in book form under the title Culture and Anarchy in 1869, debate important questions about the nature of culture and society that are as relevant now as they have ever been. Arnold seeks to find out 'what culture really is, what good it can do, what is our own special need of it' in an age of rapid social change (...) and increasing mechanization. He contrasts culture, 'the study of perfection', with anarchy, the mood of unrest and uncertainty that pervaded mid-Victorian England. How can individuals be educated, not indoctrinated, and what is the role of the state in disseminating 'sweetness and light'? This edition reproduces the original book version and enables readers to appreciate its immediate historical context as well as the reasons for its continued importance today, in the face of the challenges of multi-culturalism and post-modernism. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

In Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” there is a philosophical and interpretive puzzle surrounding the translation of a key concept: Gewalt. Should we translate it as “force,” “power,” or “violence”? This raises both general questions in Kant’s legal-political philosophy as well as puzzles regarding Kant’s definitions of “barbarism,” “anarchy,” “despotism,” and “republic” as the four possible political conditions. First, I argue that we have good textual reasons for translating Gewalt as “violence”—a translation which has the advantage that it answers these (...) questions and puzzles convincingly. Translating Gewalt as “violence” has two further, somewhat surprising advantages. It allows us to explain how human beings can be caught in situations with no morally good ways out, and it gives us an ideal Kantian refutation of the death penalty. I then explore Kant’s account of the establishment of public authorities by means of an analogy between the birth and development of a natural person (a human being) and an artificial one (a state). This analogy helps to clarify the difference between the necessary coercive element involved in ideally establishing a state and the likely violence involved in actually establishing one. The third and final section uses the ideas of barbarism, anarchy, despotism, and republic to identify four different types of political forces operating at any given time in actual historical societies. Once we use Kant’s theory to improve our understanding of the various challenges our historical societies present, we also realize the importance and usefulness of philosophical precision when we translate Gewalt as “violence” and correctly define barbarism, anarchy, despotism, and republic. (shrink)

Modern International Relations theory has consistently underestimated the depth of the problem of anarchy in world politics. Contemporary theories of globalisation bring this into bold relief. From this perspective, the complexity of transboundary networks and hierarchies, economic sectors, ethnic and religious ties, civil and cross-border wars, and internally disaggregated and transnationally connected state actors, leads to a complex and multidimensional restructuring of the global, the local and the uneven connections in between. We ought to abandon the idea of ‘high’ (...) and ‘low’ politics, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ once and for all. This does not remove the problem of anarchy but rather deepens it, involving multidimensional tensions and contradictions variously described as ‘functional differentiation’, ‘multiscalarity’, ‘fragmegration’, disparate ‘landscapes’, the ‘new security dilemma’ and ‘neomedievalism’. Approaching anarchy from the perspective of plural competing claims to authority and power forces... (shrink)

It is only in the early decades of the twentieth century that the “Hobbesian state of nature” and the “discourse of anarchy” came to be seen as virtually synonymous. In examining Hobbes’ international state of nature, this article rejects two common views. In one, International Relations is seen as a warlike “Hobbesian” anarchy, and in the other, Hobbes is regarded as the progenitor of Realism. Far from defending anarchy of states, Hobbes in fact constructs a largely ameliorative (...) international arena. (shrink)

The women of Sons of Anarchy have pivotal, powerful roles in the drama, despite not being official members of the MC. Here we have three images of motherhood: the bad mother (few things are considered worse in our society) who endangers her child, the powerful matriarch who comes to the child's rescue, and the mothering healer who is responsible for keeping Abel alive. While the Mothers of Anarchy, on the surface, have no control, in reality they use their (...) power in the private sphere to influence the public sphere and effect great change, albeit with little public recognition for their efforts. While the traditional masculine and feminine spheres are firmly in place within SAMCRO, with the men making all the decisions about the club's future behind the closed chapel doors, the power this mother (Gemma) wields is monumental. (shrink)

Private-property anarchism is a political philosophy and set of economic and legal arguments that maintains that markets and contracts should provide law and that the rule of law itself can only be understood as a private institution. This book presents the essays that explain, debate, and examine historical examples of stateless orders.