Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

The interplay between computability and randomness has been an active area of research in recent years, reflected by ample funding in the USA, numerous workshops, and publications on the subject. The complexity and the randomness aspect of a set of natural numbers are closely related. Traditionally, computability theory is concerned with the complexity aspect. However, computability theoretic tools can also be used to introduce mathematical counterparts for the intuitive notion of randomness of a set. Recent research shows that, conversely, concepts (...) and methods originating from randomness enrich computability theory.The book covers topics such as lowness and highness properties, Kolmogorov complexity, betting strategies and higher computability. Both the basics and recent research results are desribed, providing a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and randomness for graduates and researchers in computability theory, theoretical computer science, and measure theory. (shrink)

It is held by many philosophers that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that speakers are typically semantically blind, that is, typically unaware of the propositions semantically expressed by knowledge attributions. In his ?Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness? (this journal, 2009), Martin Montminy argues that semantic blindness is widespread in language, and not restricted to knowledge attributions, so it should not be considered problematic. I will argue that Montminy might be right about this, but that contextualists still face a (...) serious and related problem: that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that subjects are typically unaware of contents conveyed by knowledge attributions, independently of whether these are semantic or non-semantic contents. Even if semantic blindness is widespread in language, it does not seem that content unawareness of this sort is. (shrink)

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. (...) His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina os temas do desejo, da alteridade e da consciência na filosofia de O ser e nada para circunscrever as questões relativas ao problema do solipsismo e da consciência encarnada no existencialismo sartreano. Neste sentido, o texto situa o estatuto da relação erótica no existencialismo sartriano no contexto geral de sua discussão sobre a alteridade e o lugar destinado às carícias sexuais em suas descrições fenomenológicas. Portanto, o objetivo principal deste artigo é o de apontar um aspecto (...) alternativo para considerar o estado tipicamente conflituoso da relação entre as consciências no existencialismo sartriano. De acordo com nossa hipótese, é possível que as carícias sexuais possam representar um momento, ainda que instável, de reciprocidade carnal na relação entre as consciências na filosofia sartriana de O ser e o nada. (shrink)

Neste artigo discutiremos o conceito de experiência [Erfahrung] em Walter Benjamin a partir de seus ensaios entre 1913 e 1936. Partiremos de seus escritos de militância juvenil a respeito da experiência com a intenção de identificarmos uma oposição entre figuras que reivindicam para si a experiência, a saber, o adulto, o que aconselha o jovem a desistir de si mesmo, e o jovem, que se encontra desorientado em razão dessa cisão entre gerações conflitantes, impossibilitando a continuidade da experiência, mesmo que (...) aqui seja compreendida de forma singular. Em seu ensaio sobre a experiência em Kant e nos neokantianos, a definição de experiência deve ser expandida, não deixando de alcançar o ato de contar histórias e de dar conselhos. Nos escritos de 30, consideraremos a abordagem da decadência da experiência (enquanto coletiva e perpassada por gerações), bem como a ascensão da vivência, que se trata de um vínculo isolado com as coisas em geral, restando formas privadas de lidar com a vida, causando desorientação no indivíduo isolado de sua comunidade real. (shrink)

The book forms a balanced structure in which the three conceptual pillars of Spinoza's natural law theory (individuality, natural laws, and power) are first analyzed from the viewpoint of his ontology and then from the viewpoint of his ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a (...) classical or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Logic; Predicate calculus; Axiomatic systems; Knowledge representation and reasoning; Logic and revisable reasoning; Formal grammars and logic programming; Prolog and logic programming.

During medical training students and residents reconstruct their view of the world. Patients become bodies; both the faults and the virtues of the medical profession become exaggerated. This reconstruction has moral relevance: it is in part a moral blindness. The pain of medical training, together with its narrowness, contributes substantially to these faulty reconstructions. Possible improvements include teaching more social science, selecting chief residents and faculty for their attitudes, helping students acquire communication skills, and helping them deal with their own (...) pain. Most importantly, clearer moral vision requires time and scope for reflection. (shrink)

For many years G. E. Moore asked himself what was wrong with sentences like ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did’, or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’. He discussed the problem in 1912 in his Ethics , and was still discussing it in 1944 in a paper to the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge—an event we know about from a letter of Wittgenstein that I shall quote in (...) a moment. Throughout these years of pondering, Moore retained a remarkably stable vocabulary for setting out his solution. Briefly, he held this: saying ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did’ is absurd, but not self-contradictory. Not self-contradictory, because ‘it may quite well be true’; yet absurd, because the speaker expressly repudiates, in the second part of the sentence, a belief which he implies by uttering the first part. The panoply of distinctions which subtends this doctrine—sentence v. utterance of sentence, saying v. implying, contradiction v. absurdity—was subjected to keen scrutiny a generation or so ago, and much of it has now passed into philosophical lore as a discussion of ‘Moore's Paradox’. (shrink)

We applaud Boyer's attempt to ground the psychology of ownership partly in a cooperative logic. In this commentary, we propose to go further and ground the psychology of ownership solely in a cooperative logic. The predictions of bargaining theory, we argue, completely contradict the actual features of ownership intuitions. Ownership is only about the calculation of mutually beneficial, reciprocal contracts.

This paper intends to deal with Condillacian Linguistics. Although the Condillacian philosophy of mind and analysis of language were the most important in the late eighteenth century, none of them is mentioned in Chomsky's work (1966, Cartesian Linguistics). It would be useful for the history of Western thought if Chomsky's monumental error were generally recognized and if Condillacian Linguistics were at last to find the place it rightly deserves. The main thesis of Condillac's linguistic ideas (language is the first step (...) in the analysis of thought) is briefly presented with reference to its context and consequences. (shrink)

Ontologie, Wahrheit und Kausalitat stellt den Versuch dar, die ontologische Analyse von Kausalitat vor dem Hintergrund der Verteidigung von Ontologie im traditionellen Sinne einer realistischen Kategorientheorie zu fuhren. In einem ersten metaontologischen Teil wird die Moglichkeit von Ontologie als realistische Kategorientheorie verteidigt und es werden methodologische Grundsatze fur ontologische Untersuchungen entwickelt. Im zweiten Teil der Untersuchung werden ontologische Theorien der Kausalitat aus der aktuellen Diskussion vor dem im ersten Teil entwickelten metaontologischen Hintergrund evaluiert. Die Analyse von Kausalitat als ontologische Relation (...) erweist sich dabei als den anderen Vorschlagen uberlegen.". (shrink)

Découvertes en 1940, les grottes de Lascaux et leurs peintures rupestres témoignent d’une volonté d’arrachement du sujet à une condition primaire : les dessins sur les murs sont une façon d’affirmer une forme d’expression différente de celle utilisée jusqu’alors. Une certaine idée de la sensibilité des individus, ou du groupe afférant à ces peintures est mise en lumière. Les grottes de Lascaux sont une marque du temps témoignant d’une temporalité en fuite vers l’arrière : en documentariste d...

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, mais (...) insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Ao analisar parte da tradição filosófica Ocidental e, em particular, contrapor o ensinamento de mestres e gurus do Oriente aos ensinamentos de escolas metafísicas e de ciência política do Ocidente, o presente artigo, poderá ser dito, insere-se na categoria de filosofia das civilizações. Não estando limitada, porém, a nenhuma dessas civilizações, a arte política, enquanto perícia daquele que governa ou leva a vida feliz, pode ser examinada no prolongamento das suas intersecções e enquanto questão filosófica independente. Neste artigo, o autor (...) parte por isso do pressuposto de que a busca do conhecimento do bom governo e vida feliz é comum a ambas as civilizações ou, mais essencialmente, a todo o homem enquanto homem e, observando a ausência de uma correspondência significativa entre ambas no tema da ciência ou arte política, procura examinar possíveis modalidades específicas dessa investigação. Se puder ser dito que, nesse sentido, a filosofia política é uma modalidade mais específica do Ocidente e, do Oriente, a filosofia do sentir intuitivo, o escopo deste artigo é, então, o exame da possibilidade da filosofia do sentir político enquanto questão filosófica independente. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa se propõe a ser uma forma de análise da práxis cristã, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência místico-religiosa. A resposta de Friedrich Schleiermacher ao Iluminismo tem muito a nos beneficiar, principalmente se levarmos em consideração as críticas de Rudolf Otto. A compreensão do “sentimento de dependência” em Schleiermacher, que se torna em Otto “sentimento de criatura”, e a realidade da experiência de Deus que se conecta à práxis, nos fornecem um excelente ponto de partida para compreensão daquilo (...) que move as pessoas a uma vida de renúncia, servidão e comprometimento com valores e princípios do Evangelho de Jesus Cristo. Com base em uma pesquisa de campo, foi possível perceber que existe uma conexão entre a práxis cristã e a experiência religiosa. Quando há experiência religiosa, há ações cristãs executadas com naturalidade, com maior incidência do que quando não existe tal experiência. Podemos ter muito a perder se acaso deixarmos de considerar o aspecto experiencial da fé cristã com o sagrado. Em primeiro lugar, em nossas formulações teológicas, as quais podem, em maior ou menor grau, enfatizar em demasia aspectos antropocêntricos, deixando de lado o aspecto numinoso. Em segundo lugar, perderemos a oportunidade de influenciar a igreja a vivenciar uma prática espiritual real, que considere, com toda a relevância devida, a experiência de fé e não somente aspectos catequéticos. Por fim, perderemos a possibilidade de analisar a vida de fé, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência de Deus, que pode ter sido agente influenciador número um para uma vida de exemplo de práxis cristã genuína. (shrink)

David Bohm and the challenge of a fragmented society.

We describe a strongly minimal theory S in an effective language such that, in the chain of countable models of S, only the second model has a computable presentation. Thus there is a spectrum of an -categorical theory which is neither upward nor downward closed. We also give an upper bound on the complexity of spectra.

O contexto da educação básica brasileira caracteriza-se, de modo geral, na atuação de docentes com descompassos formativos, que ministram aulas de diversas disciplinas, no caso dos anos iniciais do ensino fundamental, ou que lecionam disciplinas diversas de sua área de formação, no caso das séries finais e ensino médio. Nessa linha, diversos estudos apontam para a evidência de lacunas e imprecisões conceituais no planejamento de intervenções didáticas, devido ao precário desenvolvimento profissional. Desse modo, o presente artigo traz uma revisão teórica (...) sistemática sobre o tema relacionado aos conhecimentos profissionais do magistério e busca contribuir com tal debate, trazendo como resultado a proposta de uma visão do processo de construção de saberes docentes com base em modelos do conhecimento pedagógico de conteúdo articulados com os processos de criação vigotskianos. Tal proposta possibilitou possíveis implicações das articulações apresentadas em associação com as pesquisas relacionadas à formação docente, bem como com propostas formativas, que levem em consideração o contexto cultural do professor, especificamente seus esquemas repertoriais, aqui representados pelo espectro criativo. Desse modo, pretende-se que os contextos formativos utilizem e incrementem o repertório professoral, repertório este fundamental para o desenvolvimento de novos Conhecimentos Pedagógicos de Conteúdo em um caráter transformativo, possibilitando práticas que permitam o desenvolvimento profissional docente. (shrink)

The aim of this book is not to impart a substantive knowledge of core psychological theories, or even to analyze critically selected theories. Instead, it is to prepare the reader to analyze and advance the theoretical literature in any tradition. Theoretical psychology stands in the same relation to psychology as theoretical physics does to physics. The traditional way to study theoretical psychology is to take up one approach after another--behavioral, psychoanalytic, cognitive, and so on. The aim of this book is (...) not to impart a substantive knowledge of core psychological theories, or even to analyze critically selected theories. Instead, it is to prepare the reader to analyze and advance the theoretical literature in any tradition. A good theoretician should be able to contribute to the study of psychoanalytic theory as readily as to behavioral theory. The skills required are the same. Instead of covering a sequence of theories, therefore, the book is organized around types of theoretical activities. It is not a work in theoretical psychology; it is a book about theoretical psychology. It also confronts psychologists' underestimation of the variety and the significance of theoretical work. Many theoretical issues do not call for empirical research--they require nothing but thinking. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)