Many of our ideological, political, moral, religious, aesthetic, scientific beliefs, as well as those concerning everyday life, are controversial; other people do not share them. As a rule, that does not bother us much: we tend to retain our contestable beliefs even if we ascribe no less skill and well-informedness to those who represent other points of view than to ourselves. But is that really reasonable? Shouldn't we often admit that we might be as wrong as others? And if we (...) do, shouldn't this consequently lead us to give up many of our beliefs in favor of agnostic attitudes? Marc Andree Weber argues that in the face of disagreement with equally competent and well-informed interlocutors we should almost always refrain from insisting on our controversial beliefs – with the few exceptions being all the more remarkable. (shrink)

I argue that there are such things as nomological probabilities—probabilities that play a certain explanatory role with respect to stable, long-run relative frequencies. Indeed, I argue, we should be willing to accept nomological probabilities even if they turn out to be metaphysically weird or even wholly sui generis entities. I then give an example of one way in which this argument should shape future work on the metaphysics of chance by describing a challenge to a common group of analyses of (...) objective probability—Humean analyses— understood as analyses of nomological probability. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists both ask questions about what the world is like. How do these fields interact with one another? How should they? Naturalism Beyond the Limits of Science investigates an approach to these questions called methodological naturalism. According to methodological naturalism, when coming up with theories about what the world is like, philosophers should, whenever possible, make use of the same methodology that is deployed by scientists. Although many contemporary philosophers have implicit commitments that lead straightforwardly to methodological naturalism, (...) few have a clear understanding of how widespread and disruptive methodological naturalism promises to be for the field. By way of a series of case studies involving laws of nature, composition, time and modality, and drawing on historical and contemporary scientific developments including the discovery of the neutrino, the introduction of dark energy, and the advent of relativity theory, this book demonstrates the ways in which scientists rely on extra-empirical reasoning and how that very same extra-empirical reasoning can yield surprising results when applied to philosophical debates. Along the way, Nina Emery's investigation illuminates the complex relationship between philosophy and the sciences, and makes the case that philosophers and scientists alike would benefit from a greater understanding of the connections between the two fields. (shrink)

I argue that the way the world appears to be plays an important role in standard scientific practice, and that therefore the way the world appears to be ought to play a similar role in metaphysics as well. I then show how the argument bears on a specific first-order debate in metaphysics – the debate over whether there are composite objects. This debate is often thought to be a paradigm case of a metaphysical debate that is largely insulated from scientific (...) considerations, and is often disparaged or avoided by naturalistically inclined metaphysicians as a result. My argument below shows that this attitude is a mistake. The way in which metaphysical debates can be informed by our best science is more complex and far-reaching than is often acknowledged in the literature. (shrink)

This volume collects essays which are thematically connected through the work of Kent Emery Jr., to whom the volume is dedicated. A main focus lies on the attempts to bridge the gap between mysticism and a systematic approach to medieval philosophical thought.

With their landmark architectures, exhibitions and museums of science and technology partake in the spatial inscription of science in twentieth century landscapes. Unlike other beacons of progress, exhibitions and museums of science and technology double up, inside, as material arrangements of objects, visuals and texts aiming to confer meaning onto the modern world. They both embody and seek to order the spectacle of modernity while often being deployed with the aim of promoting particular visions of social and material progress. An (...) approach sensitive to the material, spatial, and experiential dimensions of displaying science and technology suggests that exhibitions and museums were in the twentieth century crucial sites for reflecting upon and promoting particular futures. (shrink)

“A millennium has gone by since the idea of the relationship of all things, the chain of causes was born. A comparison of the meaning of what we call causes throughout the history of human thinking could give us, no doubt, a conclusive epistemology.”.

As with any proposal for institutional reform, and especially one that has gained so much ground in such a short amount of time, this paper asks whether diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) movement is good for corporations. Are businesses stronger with DEI practices and ideas or weaker? We believe that the DEI movement is asking the right questions: How do we create more just and equitable institutions? The challenge, however, is whether this movement is giving the right answers to such (...) questions. The main premise of our paper is that without deeper principles than DEI itself, these qualities of corporate life will be misunderstood, misused, and disordered in our increasingly fragmented and politicized culture. We propose in this essay that “subsidiarity” serves as one of those deeper principles that can order and enrich our understanding of DEI. It serves as a gift principle that begins to reveal the deepest nature of our work, namely, that our work allows us to exercise our gifts in serving others. (shrink)

Call generalism about children’s and adults’ wellbeing the thesis that the same theory of wellbeing applies to both children and adults. Our goal is to examine whether generalism is true. While this question has not received much attention in the past, it has recently been suggested that generalism is likely to be false and that we need to elaborate different theories of children’s and adults’ wellbeing. In this paper, we defend generalism against the main objections it faces and make a (...) positive case for it. (shrink)

Emery, Lucilius A. Concerning Justice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. vii, 170 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-234-4. Cloth. $60. * This volume reprints the Storrs lectures delivered by Emery [1840-1920] at Yale University in 1914. Emery's profound knowledge of constitutional law and keen interest in philosophy and history are clearly evident here. Beginning with conceptions of justice in Antiquity and in the Judeo-Christian tradition, Emery develops a general theory of rights, (...) and uses it as a basis for his definition of justice. His other lectures deal with the securing of justice. Influenced perhaps by the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Emery asserts that the United States has created the finest system yet for its preservation. "It is most emphatically a book which, once read, is kept on hand for a re-reading." H.W.C. Yale L.J. 24: 263 as cited in Marke, A Catalogue of the Law Collection at New York University (1953) 191. Dictionary of American Biography 144-145. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the relations between objective probabilities in physical theories at different levels. In general philosophy of probability, it is frequently assumed that a fundamental deterministic theory cannot support probabilistic phenomena at any higher level, or more generally that there cannot be non-trivial probabilities in higher-level theories that are not encoded in probabilities at the lower level. These assumptions face significant challenges from some well-understood physical theories – I focus on statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics – where a (...) deterministic description at some lower level gives rise to an effectively probabilistic theory at some higher level; in each case, constraints arising from an objective physical limitation on the acquisition of evidence concerning the lower level plays a crucial role in supporting the higher-level probabilities. (shrink)

I present an argument for the view that laws ground their instances. I then outline two important consequences that follow if we accept the conclusion of this argument. First, the claim that laws ground their instances threatens to undermine a prominent recent attempt to make sense of the explanatory power of Humean laws by distinguishing between metaphysical and scientific explanation. And second, the claim that laws ground their instances gives rise to a novel argument against the view that grounding relations (...) are metaphysically necessary. (shrink)

I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting (...) a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies. (shrink)

Metaphysical emergence has often been used to help understand the relationship between the entities of physics and the entities of the special sciences. What are the prospects of using metaphysical emergence within physics, to help understand the relationship between three-dimensional physical entities, and the non-three-dimensional entities that have been recently posited in certain interpretations of quantum mechanics and quantum gravity? This paper explores Jessica Wilson’s (2021) analysis of certain cases of metaphysical emergence in terms of degrees of freedom and raises (...) several questions that need to be answered in order to better understand whether this analysis can be used to handle cases of metaphysical emergence within physics. (shrink)

Cicero distinguishes between two forms of divination: natural and artificial divination. Most contemporary scholars assume that Cicero presents a Stoic division and some even draw far-reaching conclusions about the scientific status of divination based on this distinction. However, his justification for the division is apparently contradictory and neither fits with Stoic nor Peripatetic claims that are found elsewhere. This paper examines the exact meaning of the division and sheds light on its Stoic and Peripatetic origin. In this way, we will (...) not only be able to better understand the overall argument of Cicero’s De divinatione, but also to assess his real achievement as a philosophical author. (shrink)

In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a metaphysical account of laws that makes sense of their governing role. I agree with the first point but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of scientific theory choice combined with a highly (...) plausible claim about the connection between scientific theory choice and theory choice in metaphysics. I present and defend this argument and then show how the resulting understanding of governance gives rise to an especially strong version of recent explanatory circularity arguments against Humeanism about laws of nature. Finally, I present three options for a further understanding of the governance relation that are compatible with my argument. (shrink)

Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul has received strikingly little attention among Kant scholars, and only very few have regarded it positively. This is not surprising given the numerous problems associated with his argument. However, it is not the only argument for immortality that Kant offers in his critical philosophy. There is also a second argument that differs from the one furnished in the Second Critique and can be found both in the Critique of Pure Reason and later (...) texts from the 1790s. Kant also addresses here many of the problems that interpreters have found with his postulate of immortality in both earlier and later texts. This paper considers the main difficulties associated with the postulate and proposes a coherent interpretation of Kant’s argument. I show that despite the apparent change in his approach to immortality Kant did not in fact substantially alter his position during his critical period. (shrink)

I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting (...) a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies. 1 Introduction2 A Paradigm Case3 The Incompatibilist’s Criterion4 Against the Incompatibilist’s Criterion5 The Explanatory Criterion6 Conclusion. (shrink)

Schiller’s philosophy of history has received comparatively little attention. This is partly because Schiller is perceived as a poor imitation of Kant or the existence of a systematic philosophy of history is simply denied. This chapter aims to remedy this deficit by first showing that Schiller developed a philosophy of history that shaped his understanding of history. The second part will identify important differences between Schiller’s conception of history and that of Kant. It will be shown that essential aspects of (...) Schiller’s philosophy of history can not only be traced back to a period before his first engagement with Kant, but also that it coincides with his overarching aesthetic-philosophical project. (shrink)

Why are humans so clever? This book explores the idea that this cleverness has evolved through the increasing complexity of social groups. It brings together contributions from leaders in the field, examining social intelligence in different animal species and exploring its development, evolution and the brain systems upon which it depends.

In dieser Untersuchung soll gezeigt werden, dass Kant in der Idee einer moralischen Welt, wie sie in der transzendentalen Methodenlehre der Kritik der reinen Vernunft expliziert wird, einen ontologischen Gedankengang aus seinen vorkritischen Schriften aufgreift. Hierbei handelt es sich um einen aposteriorischen Gottesbeweis, den Kant zuerst in seiner Nova dilucidatio formuliert und nahezu unverändert in seine Inauguraldissertation übernommen hat. Auf diese Weise findet der aposteriorische im Gegensatz zu den apriorischen Gottesbeweisen der vorkritischen Schriften Kants in einer kritisch revidierten Form Eingang (...) in sein theoretisches Hauptwerk. This paper wants to show that Kant uses an ontological argument that he formulates in one of his pre-Critical writings in the idea of a moral world as it is demonstrated in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the Critique of pure Reason. For the first time in his Nova dilucidatio Kant furnishes an a posteriori proof of the existence of God by demonstrating that the reality of the world as a community of substances needs a divine intellect as a common cause of their existence. He takes this argument almost unchanged in his Inauguraldissertation that appeared in 1770. In contrast to the a priori arguments of the existence of God, which Kant refutes at least since the mid 1760's, this a posteriori argument finds a way into his major theoretical work in a critically revised form. (shrink)

Already in antiquity the Aristotelian Philosophy was under attack by its philosophical opponents. The Stoics can surely be counted to the most important ones. Furthermore they can be regarded as one of the most influential philosophy schools of the Hellenistic time and in the early Roman Empire and their influenceeven on modern thinkers must not be neglected. It is well known that the Stoics not only advocated a physical monism but can also be described as determinists or, from a modern (...) point of view, even as compatibilists because they were the first who tried to harmonize moral responsibility with the thesis of a causal determinism. Therefore, the stoic concept of causality is of vast importance. In one of Seneca’s books a discussion of the Aristotelian theory of causality has come down to us. Although it is a quite short passage it proves itself to be very illuminating. This paper wants to shed light on the differences between the Aristotelian and the Stoic theory of causality and therefore help to clarify the historical background of the modern concept of causality which is of intense importance for the actual discussion about free will and determinism. (shrink)

The majority of current interpreters of Aristotle’s theory of perception assume that perception must be understood as a passive process. This assumption is mainly justified by systematic considerations. Particularly influential for the ongoing debate on the proper understanding of Aristotle’s theory is the work of Myles Burnyeat, whose interpretation amounts to a devastating critique of the Aristotelian philosophy of perception. This paper wants to shed some light on the kind of activity that is involved in perception. It will be shown (...) that by considering the special kind of activity with which Aristotle identifies perception many of the problems that are seen by Burnyeat and others can be circumvented and a coherent interpretation can be provided, which, in turn, must be considered to be essential in order to judge the systematic relevance of Aristotle’s theory of perception. (shrink)

This paper attempts to furnish a Stoic reply to an accusation addressing the Stoics' ideal of the wise man according to which it is impossible to realize their ideal and therefore their whole system has to face a paradox: How is wisdom possible when all people are fools and it is impossible for them to become good? In addition to this question there is another important problem connected with the ideal of wisdom. The Stoic philosophers deny transcendental ideas. Instead they (...) are well known for their thorough-going materialism. Therefore, even their idea of the wise man must be based on experience. How would it otherwise be possible to form the idea of wisdom by a method of analogy if experience did not provide any example of truthful virtue to us? A possible answer to this problem can be found in the writings of Seneca, a Stoic of the first century A.D. Seneca emphasizes the close relation between wisdom and human mortality owing to which it is at least possible for the philosopher who has made sufficiently progress in his efforts to gain wisdom to find lasting happiness in death. (shrink)