In the field of health technology assessment, there are several approaches that can be used for ethical analysis. However, there is a scarcity of literature that critically evaluates and compares the strength and weaknesses of these approaches when they are applied in practice. In this paper, we analyse the applicability of some selected approaches for addressing ethical issues in HTA in the field of complex health interventions. Complex health interventions have been the focus of methodological attention in HTA. However, the (...) potential methodological challenges for ethical analysis are as yet unknown.Six of the most frequently described and applied ethical approaches in HTA were critically assessed against a set of five characteristics of complex health interventions: multiple and changing perspectives, indeterminate phenomena, uncertain causality, unpredictable outcomes, and ethical complexity. The assessments are based on literature and the authors’ experiences of developing, applying and assessing the approaches.The Interactive, participatory HTA approach is by its nature and flexibility, applicable across most complexity characteristics. Wide Reflective Equilibrium is also flexible and its openness to different perspectives makes it better suited for complex health interventions than more rigid conventional approaches, such as Principlism and Casuistry. Approaches developed for HTA purposes are fairly applicable for complex health interventions, which one could expect because they include various ethical perspectives, such as the HTA Core Model® and the Socratic approach.This study shows how the applicability for addressing ethical issues in HTA of complex health interventions differs between the selected ethical approaches. Knowledge about these differences may be helpful when choosing and applying an approach for ethical analyses in HTA. We believe that the study contributes to increasing awareness and interest of the ethical aspects of complex health interventions in general. (shrink)

Diese Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem Status von empirischen Naturgesetzen in Immanuel Kants kritischer Philosophie. Insbesondere geht es um die Beantwortung der Frage, welche argumentativen Ressourcen Kant im Rahmen seines Ansatzes bereitstellt, um empirischen Naturgesetzen den Status der Notwendigkeit zuzusprechen. Außerdem wird geklärt, welche Art Notwendigkeit dabei erfüllt wird.

No detailed description available for "Emergence or Reduction?".

In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s account of causality as developed in the Science of Logic can be described as a ‘manipulationist’ account of causality. First, some conceptual clarifications will help set our sights on the goal of the paper. What is a theory of causality comprised of? And what is a manipulationist account of causality? Next, I sketch the development of those concepts in the SL that are relevant to the present topic (e.g., causality, objectivity, and the idea). (...) Here, Hegel moves from developing the concept of causality to unfolding a set of objective causal relations. The latter is then understood as a theory and hence as a product of the self-conscious mind that filters for relevancy and usability. I argue that Hegel’s account of causality does meet the criteria for being understood as an example of a MAC. (shrink)

Der franzosische Sozialwissenschaftler und Kulturtheoretiker Pierre Bourdieu hat uber die Grenzen seines Faches hinaus breite Aufmerksamkeit gefunden. Der Band rezipiert sein Denken fur eine zeitgenossische Theologie. Dabei scheint insbesondere Bourdieus Konzept "sozialer Distinktion" theologisch einschlagig, mit dem er soziale Auf- und Abwertungen, Positions- und Statuskampfe, gesellschaftliche Ein- und Ausschlusse zu analysieren sucht, die auch im religiosen Feld stattfinden. Die Autoren, die unterschiedlichen theologischen Fachern und nationalen Kontexten entstammen, loten hierbei die Inspirationen und Irritationen aus, die Bourdieus Werk fur das theologische (...) Denken bedeutet. (shrink)

This is the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the state of the art in philosophy of mind, a flourishing area of research. An outstanding team of contributors offer 45 new critical surveys of a wide range of topics.

ZusammenfassungDie Schaffung optimaler Rahmenbedingungen für eine möglichst individualisierte Athletenentwicklung stellt Leistungssportorganisationen vor vielschichtige Herausforderungen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag begründen wir das Design eines Organisationsentwicklungsprogramms zur Förderung der individualisierten Athletenentwicklung, welches derzeit im Netzwerk aus dem Olympiastützpunkt und Bundesstützpunkten der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar implementiert, evaluiert und optimiert wird. Im Rahmen theoretischer Überlegungen wird zunächst gezeigt, dass Athletenentwicklung ein komplexer biopsychosozialer Prozess ist, der neben der Förderung sportmotorischer Höchstleistung auch die nachhaltige Gesunderhaltung und konstruktive Bewältigung alltäglicher Lebensaufgaben beinhaltet. Vor diesem Hintergrund konzipieren wir individualisierte (...) Athletenentwicklung als Managementaufgabe in Stützpunktnetzwerken des Leistungssports, die einen angemessenen Umgang mit Heterogenität, Interdisziplinarität und Flexibilität erfordert. Zudem wird die praktische Relevanz von partizipativen Ansätzen aus dem Bereich der Organisationsentwicklung verdeutlicht. Auf dieser Basis stellen wir die Konzeption der PRIO-Intervention vor, die im Kern aus drei vernetzten Phasen und einem prozessbegleitenden multi-stakeholder Koordinierungsteam besteht. Dieser Ansatz soll insbesondere den Athletinnen und Athleten die Möglichkeit geben, sich aktiv an der Entwicklung von Lösungen zur Optimierung ihres Stützpunktnetzwerks zu beteiligen. Durch die Evaluierung des Implementierungsprozesses lassen sich zudem neue Erkenntnisse über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen partizipationsbasierter Interventionen der Organisationsentwicklung im Leistungssport gewinnen. (shrink)

This paper sheds new light on Putnam's hypothesis that watching television, particularly entertainment programs, contributes to an erosion of social trust. Previous studies have been unable to reach convincing evidence regarding this claim. It is argued that this is a consequence of the neglect of indirect, interpersonally mediated TV effects which supplement the influence of direct exposure, and extend even to those who do not watch television. Using data from the 2002 and 2004 waves of the European Social Survey in (...) combination with aggregate data from telemetric audience research, we conduct a multilevel analysis of TV's impact on social trust. Investigating this macro-micro relationship, we find that patterns of general TV use in 25 European societies exert substantial effects on individual social trust that by far exceed those of individual TV use. In line with Putnam's hypothesis, there is a negative impact of total TV time; however, high market shares of public TV increase social trust. (shrink)

At the start of the 20th century the question of whether life could be explained in purely me- chanical terms was as hotly debated as the mind-body problem is today. Two factions opposed each other: Biological mechanists claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms could be ex- plained mechanistically, in the way the behavior of a clock can be explained by the properties and the arrangement of its cogs, springs, and weights. Substantial vitalists, on the other hand, maintained that (...) the explanation envisaged by the mechanists was impossible and that one had to postulate a special nonphysical substance in order to explain life. (shrink)

Ansgar Lyssy,Christian Leduc | : Le principe de moindre action fut découvert dans le domaine de l’optique et dans celui de la mathématisation du corps en mouvement à l’intérieur d’une structure de forces. Aussi bien Euler que Maupertuis prennent appui sur une compréhension métaphysique de la nature pour justifier l’extension de ce principe à un principe général de physique. Dans le présent article, je soutiens que les deux croient que la nature elle-même ne saurait employer de moyens inutiles pour (...) ses fins, et est donc économique. Le principe de moindre action peut être compris comme une tentative d’intégrer l’idée métaphysique d’une « économie de la nature » à l’intérieur du domaine de la science. | : The principle of least action was discovered in the realm of optics and in the mathematical properties of a body moving within a framework of forces. Both Euler and Maupertuis rely on a metaphysical understanding of nature to justify the expansion of this principle into a general principle of physics. In this paper, I argue that both believe that nature itself uses no unnecessary means for its ends, thus is economical. The principle of least action can be understood as the attempt to integrate this metaphysical idea of an “economy of nature” into the realm of science. (shrink)

Gustav Theodor Fechner was one of the main proponents of inductive metaphysics in the 19th century. The idea of inductive metaphysics is to use empirical sources and inductive forms of inference in metaphysics. Although this sounds like a research program which might well appeal to scientifically minded philosophers, some of Fechner’s metaphysical conclusions look very suspicious from a scientific viewpoint. For example, Fechner famously argues that the planets and stars are animated by a soul and that the same holds for (...) the whole universe. In the present article it is shown that Fechner’s mystical cosmological views are based on a principle of analogy which is too permissive and that as a result of that his central argument to the conclusion that the earth is animated by a soul is not correct. As the article argues, the principle Fechner bases his inference on has to be supplemented by a causal condition along the lines of Mary Hesse’s account of analogical inferences, a condition Fechner at least implicitly recognizes but fails to meet. (shrink)

In his 1912 book _The Problems of Philosophy_, Bertrand Russell advocates an indirect realism with regard to physical objects. Only two years later, in his book _Our Knowledge of the External World_ and the paper “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, he changes his method in philosophy. Instead of inferring the existence of physical objects, he now sets out to construct them out of sense-data. As I will argue in this article, the main argument from _The Problems of Philosophy_ can (...) be rationally reconstructed as an inference to the best explanation which infers to unobservable objects. The main motivation for the new approach in _Our Knowledge of the External World_, on the other hand, is to establish a more direct variant of realism, in particular because Russell became skeptical with regard to inferences to unobservable objects. As I will argue, the resulting theory of the physical world loses so much in simplicity that it becomes an unattractive alternative to his earlier position, and Russell’s reason for rejecting simplicity as a criterion of theory choice turns out to be inconsequential. (shrink)

One of the key factors that hinders integration of distributed, heterogeneous information systems is the lack of a formal basis for modeling the complex, structured knowledge that is to be exchange...

Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.² In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. (...) In the course of this paper I will therefore do two things: At the start, I will try to sketch the logical topography of the „solution space“ of the problem Kim is concerned with. As a second step, I shall then comment on the concepts of identity, realization and reduction and attempt to show that Kim’s concept of realization is too narrow, because he is still very much in the grip of the traditional view with regard to what it means to show that a property _F _is identical with, or realized by, another property _G_. (shrink)

In this paper the author tries to disentangle some of the problems tied up in John Searle's famous Chinese-room-argument. In a first step to answer the question what it would be for a system to have not only syntax, but also semantics the author gives a brief account of the functioning of the language understanding systems (LUS) so far developed in the framework of AI research thereby making clear that systems like Winograd's SHRDLU are indeed doing little more than mere (...) number crunching. But things would be entirely different, the author argues, if the database of a LUS were built up by the system itself via some perceptual component-at least, if this perceptual component had the capacity to distinguish objects having a certain property F from objects which do not. For in this case the system could store an internal representation of the fact that the object has the property F in its database if and only if the object in fact has that property. And this would be a good basis for calling such a system a genuine LUS. But Searle has objected to a very similar account of J. Fodor that nothing could be further from true language understanding. The reason for this complaint seems to be that Searle holds the view that a true LUS must e.g., know that the word hamburgers refers to hamburgers and that he moreover claims that this knowledge must be explicit or that the system must be aware of the reference of hamburgers to hamburgers. The author argues that this is asking too much. For it seems plausible to say that a system is able to understand e.g., the word hamburger even if it has only implicit knowledge of the fact that hamburger refers to hamburgers in the sense that it has the capacity to tell hamburgers from non hamburgers and the capacity to bring the word hamburger together just with objects of the former kind. (shrink)

c) Wenn der Determinismus wahr ist, dann sind unsere Handlungen durch die Naturgesetze und längst vergangene Ereignisse bestimmt. Längst vergangene Ereignisse hängen nicht von uns ab. Die Naturgesetze hängen nicht von uns ab. Also: Unsere gegenwärtigen Handlungen hängen nicht von..

In der Philosophie ist man sich heute weitgehend einig, daß das, was man gemeinhin unter dem Stichwort ‘Bewußtsein’ zusammenfaßt, eine Reihe sehr unterschiedlicher Aspekte beinhaltet. Bewußtsein hat zunächst einmal etwas mit Selbstwissen zu tun, d.h. mit der Fähigkeit mancher Wesen, nicht nur ihre Um- welt, sondern auch sich selbst, ihre eigenen Zustände und Handlungen zu reprä- sentieren. Die hier einschlägigen Stichworte heißen deshalb ‘Metarepräsenta- tion’2 und ‘Selbstmodell’. Dabei ist das zweite Stichwort letztlich treffender, da die Repräsentationen der Umwelt und der (...) eigenen Zustände und Handlungen nicht unverbunden nebeneinander stehen, sondern so miteinander verknüpft sein sollten, daß eine Repräsentation des Wesens selbst in seiner Umwelt ent- steht. Nur auf diese Weise kann der Zweck dieser Art von Repräsentationen erreicht werden: die Überwachung und Steuerung der eigenen Handlungen (‘self-monitoring’). (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die Rekrutierung von guten Trainern ist eine der zentralen Herausforderungen für Vereine, Verbände und Olympiastützpunkte. Über die strukturellen Bedingungen der Trainerrekrutierung im Spitzensport liegen bislang jedoch nur wenige Erkenntnisse vor. Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es, den Prozess der Trainerrekrutierung im deutschen Spitzensport und die zugrunde liegenden organisationsstrukturellen Bedingungen zu analysieren. Die Analyse zeigt, dass für die Trainerrekrutierung im Spitzensport insbesondere Netzwerke funktional sind. Deren Nachteil liegt darin, dass sie formale Vorgaben aushebeln können und persönlichen Präferenzen ein zum Teil (...) unangemessenes Gewicht verschaffen. Formalisierte Rekrutierungsmittel haben vor diesem Hintergrund vor allem die symbolische Funktion, eine Gerechtigkeitsillusion im Hinblick auf bereits getroffene Entscheidungen zu erzeugen. (shrink)

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant’s practical philosophy was formalistic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant’s wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant’s practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, pedagogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is (...) how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main ‘manifestations’ or ‘dimensions’ of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a crucial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source, and their applicability in the face of changing circumstances. (shrink)