This paper outlines the methodology and experiments associated with the reshaping of human intentions based on robot movements within Human-Robot Interactions. Although studies on estimating human intentions are well studied in the literature, reshaping intentions through robot-initiated interactions is a new significant branching in the field of HRI. In this paper, we analyze how estimated human intentions can intentionally change through cooperation with mobile robots in real Human-Robot environments. This paper proposes an intention-reshaping system that includes either the Observable Operator (...) Models or Hidden Markov Models to estimate human intention and decide which moves a robot should perform to reshape previously estimated human intentions into desired ones. At the low level, the system needs to track the locations of all mobile agents using cameras. We test our system on videos taken in a real HRI environment that has been developed as our experimental setup. The results show that OOMs are faster than HMMs and both models give correct decisions for testing sequences. (shrink)

Bu makale Fahreddin el-Râzî’nin metafizik yakîn anlayışını te’vîl teorisi açısından incelerken, onun metafizik yakîne ulaşma hususundaki optimistik tutumunu da ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Kuşkucuların lideri (şeyhü’l-müşekkikîn) olarak da bilinen Râzî’nin, kendisinden önceki felsefe ve kelam geleneklerini etraflıca kritik ederken yeni ve özgün bir anlayış ortaya koyup koymadığı tartışılmış, eleştirel düşüncesi kendisinden sonraki düşünürlerce tenkit edilmiş ve bu vesile ile Râzî hakkında çeşitli okuma biçimleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu okuma biçimleri arasında Râzî’yi, aklın kelamî bilgide yakîne ulaşamayacağı şeklinde bir metafizik bilinmezci olarak değerlendirenler de (...) olmuştur. Bu çalışma, Râzî’nin metafizik yakîn anlayışını te’vîl teorisi ile birlikte serimlemeye çalışmaktadır. Makalenin ilk ana bölümü metafizik yakîn ve te’vîl ilişkisi ekseninde -başka bir deyişle kelâmî bilgide akıl-nakil tartışmaları açısından- Râzî öncesi düşünceye dair -ipuçları niteliğinde- tarihsel bağlam vermektedir. İkinci ana kısım ise Râzî’nin metafizik bilgide akıl anlayışındaki ilkelerini istivâ’ kavramının te’vîli üzerinden belirginleştirmektedir. Bu makale, Râzî’nin te’vîl anlayışını bütünüyle ortaya koymayı amaçlamamaktadır. Ancak, te’vîl teorisinin temel bileşenlerinden birisi olan akliyyâtın nasıl metafizik yakîniyyâta dönüştüğünü analiz etmektedir. Muʻtezile, akliyyât üzerinden dönüştürdüğü metafizik yakîniyyâti, dini anlama ve yorumlamada kıstas haline getirmiştir. Öte yandan metafizik yakîniyyât anlayışlarındaki iddiaları, farklı din yorumlarına karşı müsamahasız bir tavra dönüşmüş, siyasi erkle birlikte baskıcı hale gelmiş ve Muʻtezile dışı kelam düşüncelerini akılcılık -daha radikal bir ifade ile rasyonelizm- karşısında eleştirel-tepkisel olmaya sevk etmiştir. Doğal bir sonuç olarak diğer doktrinlerin rasyonel gelişimi Muʻtezilî etki yüzünden yavaşlamıştır. Makalenin birinci kısmı, Râzî öncesi Eşʻarî düşünceyi, metafizik yakîniyyât ve nass yorumu açısından değerlendirirken, yorum ve akliyyât ilişkisine dair anlayışlarındaki dakikleşmeyi Muʻtezile’nin tarihsel varlığına ters orantılı olarak ele almaktadır. Ancak Râzî’ye kadar kararsız bir şekilde gerçekleşen dakikleşme süreci, Râzî ile birlikte nihayi formuna ulaşmaktadır. Râzî’nin te’vîl teorisinin temel prensiplerinden ilki, aklın nakle esas (el-ʿakl aṣlu’l-nakl) teşkil etmesidir. Akıl, naklin yalnız ispatı ve anlaşılması bakımından değil, aynı zamanda yorumlanması (te’vîl) açısından da temel belirleyici bir unsura dönüşmektedir. Bu makale, Râzî’nin ilmi hayatının sonlarına doğru, metafizik yakîniyyâta ulaşma noktasında pesimizme düşerek, metafizik bilinmezciliğe doğru yöneldiği şeklindeki anlama biçimlerine karşı, en son eserleri arasında olan ve tamamlanmamış Tefsîr’i üzerinden cevaplar aramaktadır. Râzî, değişik zamanlarda ele aldığı eserlerinde, “naklin zanniliği” hususundaki ısrarlı duruşunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu makale Râzî’nin naklin zanniliği noktasındaki ısrarlı duruşunun, “aklın asıllığı” ilkesindeki kararlılığı ile zorunlu bir paralellik gösterdiğininin altını çizerken, metafizik yakîniyyât açısından da hala optimistik olduğunu savunmaktadır. (shrink)

Bu makale, İslamofobik söylemin Amerikan siyasetinin ayrılmaz bir parçası haline nasıl geldiğini, İslam ve Müslümanlar hakkındaki Amerikan siyasi söyleminin, özellikle 11 Eylül terör saldırılarından sonra İslamofobinin artışını nasıl etkilediğini ve İslamofobinin Amerikalıların desteğini toplamak ve Amerikan askeri işgalleri de dahil olmak üzere Amerikan emperyal emellerini meşrulaştırmak için siyasi bir araç olarak nasıl kullanıldığı incelemektedir. “Batılı” kimliğinin öteki algısındaki İslam karşıtlığı, 11 Eylül olayları ile birlikte yeni bir ivme kazanırken, Amerikan politik söylemi de -parallel bir şekilde- İslamafobi üzerinden doğu batı ayrımını (...) keskinleştirmeye çalışmıştır. 11 Eylül’den sonra Amerikan siyasi söylemi sadece İslamofobiyi bir politika olarak benimsemekle kalmadı, aynı zamanda başkanlar tarafından imzalanan düzenlemeler ve yasalarla Müslamanlar üzerindeki baskının artmasına sebep oldu. Bu Müslamanları hedef alan bu politik düşünce, temel tezlerini Edward Said’in eleştirdiği Şarkiyatçılıktan (Oryantalizm) almaktaydı. Başka bir deyişle, Edward Said’in Oryantalizm teorisinin ana ilkeleri, 11 Eylül’den sonra ortaya çıkan İslamofobik siyasi söylemle paralellik göstermektedir. Bu açıdan makale, 11 Eylül sonrası Müslümanlar ve İslam hakkındaki Amerikan siyasi söyleminin (güç-bilgi-hakimiyet) ve Amerikalılar arasında artan İslamofobinin nasıl birbirine bağlı ve içiçe olduğunu göstermek için Edward Said’in Oryantalizm teorisini kullanmaktadır. Ayrıca, Amerikan politik söyleminin Müslümanları ötekileştirmek için kullandığı anlatım ve kavramların (“terörist”, “aşırılıkçı” ve “düşman” gibi) orientalist ve sömürücü Batı geleneğinin devamı olduğunu göstermek için söylem analizinden bir yöntem olarak yararlanmaktadır. (shrink)

This essay comments on the articles by Loretta M. Kopelman and Anita Silvers. It extends their analyses and concludes that consistency and the total absence of conflict may be unavailable when one interprets and applies the Americans with Disabilities Act.

According to the standard analysis of degree questions, the logical form of a degree question contains a variable that ranges over individual degrees and is bound by the degree question operator how. In contrast with this, we claim that the variable bound by the degree question operator how does not range over individual degrees but over intervals of degrees, by analogy with Schwarzschild and Wilkinson's proposal regarding the semantics of comparative clauses. Not only does the interval-based semantics predict the existence (...) of certain readings that are not predicted under the standard view, it is also able, together with other natural assumptions, to account for the sensitivity of degree questions to negative islands, as well as for the fact, uncovered by Fox and Hackl, that negative islands can be obviated by some properly placed modals. Like Fox and Hackl, we characterize negative island effects as arising from the fact that the relevant question, due to its meaning alone, can never have a maximally informative answer. Contrary to Fox and Hackl, however, we do not need to assume that scales are universally dense, nor that the notion of maximal informativity responsible for negative islands is blind to contextual parameters. (shrink)

We motivate and introduce a new method of abduction, Matrix Abduction, and apply it to modelling the use of non-deductive inferences in the Talmud such as Analogy and the rule of Argumentum A Fortiori. Given a matrix $${\mathbb {A}}$$ with entries in {0, 1}, we allow for one or more blank squares in the matrix, say a i,j =?. The method allows us to decide whether to declare a i,j = 0 or a i,j = 1 or a i,j =? (...) undecided. This algorithmic method is then applied to modelling several legal and practical reasoning situations including the Talmudic rule of Kal-Vachomer. We add an Appendix showing that this new rule of Matrix Abduction, arising from the Talmud, can also be applied to the analysis of paradoxes in voting and judgement aggregation. In fact we have here a general method for executing non-deductive inferences. (shrink)

This paper described a formal theory of type judgments for propositional logic notations of PM; I felt the need of my own automated type checker to check their examples. The type checker I wrote did indeed serve to help me referee the paper, but also took a rather different approach to notation and typing for propositional functions of PM, which proved worth writing up independently in our own paper: Holmes, M. Randall, “Polymorphic type– checking for the ramified theory of types (...) of Principia Mathematica”, in Fairouz Kamareddine, ed., Thirty–five Years of Automating Mathematics, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 173-215. (shrink)

Religions; Islam; relations; Christianity; Judaism; Christianity and other religions; Other (Philosophy); religious aspects; Islam.

‘A is a better X than B’ is to mean the same as ‘If one is choosing an X, then, if one chooses B, one ought to choose A’ (R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 184).

Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging, and several philosophers of science have recently called into question the potential of neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. These skeptical accounts suggest that functional hypotheses are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. I apply Mayo’s error-statistical account to clarify the evidential import of neuroimaging data and the kinds of inferences it can reliably support. Thus, we can answer the question “What can we reliably learn from neuroimaging?” and make sense of how (...) this knowledge can contribute to novel construals of cognition. (shrink)

Over the course of an illustrious career, the late Bernard Diamond established himself as the preeminent forensic psychiatrist of the century. _The Psychiatrist in the Courtroom_ brings together in a single volume Diamond's pivotal contributions to a variety of important issues, including the nature of diminished capacity, the fallacy of the impartial expert, the predictability of dangerousness, and the unacceptability of hypnotically facilitated memory in courtroom proceedings. Ably introduced and edited by Jacques M. Quen, M.D., a close colleague of Diamond's (...) and leading historian of forensic psychiatry, these writings enable experts and neophytes alike to track Diamond's evolving positions while clarifying where current legal and psychiatric opinion converge -- and diverge -- on a host of critical topics. For the forensic specialist, _The Psychiatrist in the Courtroom_ is not only an invaluable reference work but a compassionate reminder of the clinician's obligation to protect patients in legal proceedings. And in an age when clinicians are increasingly called into court, the book will be no less valuable to psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals eager for an introduction to the intricacies of judicial reasoning. Then, too, owing to Diamond's clinical acumen, the book is a compelling human document. With great erudition and deep compassion, Diamond tackles these and other knotty questions, always with an eye to clarifying the legal and clinical implications of the answers. By combining superb clinical gifts with an incisive understanding of legal principle, Diamond produced a seminal corpus whose relevance to discussions of therapeutic ethics and to legal debates will continue well into the next century. (shrink)

The article presents the conceptualization of philosophical education, in the context of which the evolution of the development of society from informational to smart society takes place. The purpose of the article is to reveal the conceptualization of philosophical education in the context of the idea of a smart society and to show that philosophical education does not stand still but develops along with the development of science and technology, which requires the development of a conceptual and categorical apparatus. Research (...) objectives: to show the development of philosophical knowledge, in the context of which new innovative ideas are ripening; to reveal that the concept of a smart society is based on the expectation or belief in the ability of modern smart technologies to positively influence social processes and lead to a new qualitative state of all social life, which is called a smart society; to prove that much in solving all these problems depends on the state of education, including philosophical and ideological, not only developing our cognitive abilities, but also forming a responsible and demanding attitude to goal setting, the choice of basic life values. Analysis of recent research and publications, which presents a solution to this problem. We rely on the works of I.Ardashkin, V.Voronkova, M.Kastels, O.Kivlyuk, K.Korsak, A.Lazarevich, R.Oleksenko, O.Punchenko, which in one way or another reflected the problem of the formation of a smart society. The research methodology is the dialectical, historical, systemic, informational methods, which allowed to penetrate deeply into the evolution of philosophical knowledge that is not in mass, but develops with the development of science, technique and technology. The result of research - based smart society the development of information and computer technologies that lead to breakthrough technologies and innovative development It is noted that the proposed reorganization of the system of social-humanitarian education in the universities of the Republic of Belarus intended to raise to the level of philosophical training of domestic specialists. (shrink)

Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’ problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, (...) decision making on the basis of given propensities can proceed without a subjective-probability supplement to propensities. (shrink)

This book examines all verses of the Quran involving knowledge related concepts. It begins with the argument that an analysis of the Quranic concept of ignorance points to epistemic virtues that can pave our way towards gaining knowledge and/or understanding. It deals with the Quranic concepts of perceptual, rational, and revelatory knowledge as well as understanding and wisdom in the light of recent discussions in Western analytic epistemology. It also argues that the relevant Quranic verses seem to involve concept of (...) an epistemic conscience whose proper exercise can yield knowledge or understanding. While not overlooking the Quranic emphasis on revelation as a source of knowledge, the book draws our attention to a remarkable overlap between some strains of contemporary virtue epistemology and Quranic approach to knowledge. It shows that the Quranic verses suggest a progressive sequence from propositional knowledge to understanding to wisdom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:M. C. Dillon LOVE IN WOMEN IN LOVE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Despite his sexism, his turgid prose, and his antiquated social conscience, Lawrence is on every bookshelf. This is not merely because of the vicarious erotic entertainment to be found in the saga of John Thomas and Lady Jane, but because Lawrence remains a major guru of romance. We take him seriously, look to him for guidance, measure ourselves (...) against Ursula and Birkin. If he is on our shelves—and his thoughts not far from our pillows—then his ideas starid in need of scrutiny. Women in Love is as much a treatise as a novel: we witness more talking about than making of love. The agon of ideas engulfs the agon of flesh. Hence, the book suits the present purpose. It cannot be taken as Lawrence's definitive statement on love—later works, notably Lady Chatterly's Lover, move in different directions—but it is his most philosophical treatment and, I think, most clearly expresses his conceptual framework, the parameters which define and limit his thinking. What he says about love in Women in Love may therefore illumine his depictions of the behavior of lovers in other works. Lawrence is a romantic. In the popular sense of the word he is one who makes of romance or erotic adventure a dominant life value. Lawrence is also a romantic in another sense insofar as he takes the transcendence or unattainability of the other as essential to the project of loving. These two senses are conceptually compatible but existentially in conflict. That is, if one's major undertaking in life is to seek erotic satisfaction, and if one desires only so long as the object is beyond reach, then one has established the groundwork for continual frustration. This, I will try to show, is what Lawrence has done. I Many writers have tried to bring the ideas implicitly present in and constitutive of romantic love to the level of explicit reflective awareness. 190 M.C.Dillon191 The most successful treatment I know is given by a writer who did not know—or at least did not say—that he was writing about romantic love. Sartre purports to reveal the inner structures of love itself—the unqualified, unrestricted essence of love. As I have tried to show elsewhere,1 he fails at this. But he succeeds admirably in unveiling the inner contradictions of romantic love. Our project here is to draw upon Sartre's insights: first, to develop a conception of romantic love, and then to discern the model of Eros which informs Women in Love. The key idea in romantic love is transcendence. Something is transcendent when it is beyond me, when I cannot adequately prehend it conceptually or master it with my will. The role of transcendence in romantic love is demonstrated clearly in Denis de Rougemont's book on Love in the Western World.2 There he shows that Tristan's passion for Iseult is directly proportional to her distance from him: he is increasingly attracted as she becomes further removed. On the other hand, when through various deeds of gallantry and subterfuge, he succeeds in winning her to his side, he loses interest and must create circumstances which put her again beyond his reach. The culmination of romantic love, according to de Rougemont, is death—it sets the other absolutely beyond reach. It also arrests and preserves at their apices the youth and beauty of the lovers and the intensity of the erotic relationship. It is, I believe, this complex of ideas that led Kierkegaard to this cynical reflection on the nature of romantic love: "When two beings fall in love with one another and begin to suspect that they were made for each other, it is time to have the courage to break it off; for by going on they have everything to lose and nothing to gain."3 The same idea, qualified by increased optimism, underlies Stendhal's notion of crystallization in his book On Love.* Love is predicated on the attribution of perfection to the beloved. Just as a plain bough emerges from the salt-saturated waters of the Salzburg mines encrusted with beautiful crystals... (shrink)

In Boethius’s Consolatio Philosophiae one finds a rather unusual argument contending that human beings can lose their natures as the result of immoral or virtuous activity. A number of texts in the work argue that the polarities of beast and god serve as options for those who lead highly immoral or highly virtuous lives. This argument is examined in detail in light of its philosophical ancestry. I argue that those who think the Boethian doctrine is Platonic in origin tend to (...) read the texts about the loss of human nature as metaphorical. I then suggest that if one places the argument in an Aristotelian context one is able to see it as a metaphysical argument, and moreparticularly, as part of Boethian psychology. This paper thus provides a new context for approaching Boethius’s contention that human beings can lose their natures. (shrink)

Technological evaluations have significantly enhanced college students’ fine arts competence development by providing advanced tools and platforms that foster creativity, improve technical skills, and enable innovative artistic expression. In this study 500 college students were mentioned as participators. The variables Technological Tools, Technical Proficiency, Advanced Technologies, Creativity and Innovation, Online Platforms, Skill Development, and Collaborative Competencies are built to evaluate various aspects of technological and creative capabilities in educational and professional settings. Fine arts competitions like the (Artificial Intelligence) AI art (...) contest, digital choreography competition, and speech AI innovation challenge are held for the students to improve their skill development. The questionnaires are taken to measure the student's technological skills development based on before and after competitions. The SPSS software version 28 is used to statistically analyze the data with multiple regression analysis and pearson correlation analysis. The results showed that the integration of technological tools and platforms significantly improved college student's technical proficiency, creativity, and collaborative skills in fine arts. Students exhibited notable enhancements in skill development and engagement with advanced technologies post-competition. Technology significantly enhances fine arts education by improving students' artistic skills and collaboration. Embracing digital tools offers valuable opportunities to enrich curricula and foster innovation. (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Книга предназначена для студентов, преподавателей и научных сотрудников высших учебных заведений, занимающихся вопросами истории мировой культуры.