By "transparency" with respect to Berkeley's theory of signs, I mean the notion that because of the often close association between signs and what they signify, we mistakenly think we sense what is signified by the sense that accesses the sign. I argue that although this makes sense for some examples, for a variety of reasons it's not really applicable to Berkeley's claim that we mistakenly think we immediately see distance ('outness') when we, in fact, immediately see (...) only light and colors. (shrink)

Berkeley's Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Showing The Immediate Presence and Providence of A Deity, Vindicated And Explained was published in 1733, occasioned by an anonymous letter of the previous year to the London Daily Post Boy . The letter criticized Berkeley's New Theory of Vision , which had been published in 1709, but which had been appended to Berekely's Alciphron , published in 1732. No one has ever identified the author whose criticisms (...) led Berkeley to his Theory of Vision Vindicated . Circumstantial evidence presented here suggests that the author was Catherine Trotter Cockburn. Part of the evidence is the brilliance of her interpretation of Locke, whose position is defended in the letter against Berkeley. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Magic Buffalo" and Berkeley's Theory ofVision: Learning in Society David M. Levy Introduction Berkeley's Theory of Vision contains the remarkable claim that the perception ofdistance is learned by experience. This thesis is rooted in Berkeley's doctrine that the physical basic of optical perception is angular. An impression of angle? impacts upon the optic nerve. The interpretative problem confronting an individual is that of (...) reconstructing two pieces ofinformation, distance d and magnitude m, from one datum T. Let the ratio ofm/d form arctan T. How do we come to distinguish between the pair m1,d1 and the pair m2,d2 when m^d 1 = m2/d2? How do we distinguish big objects at a distance from small objects up close? The evidence Berkeley provides for this thesis is of a funny sort. He gives examples that we do, in fact, distinguish large distant objects from small near objects. Since the arctan of the pair m1, d 1 is by hypothesisthe sameas thatofthepairm2, d2thenrecognizingdistance must be alearned abihty. We cannotextractd and m from? alone. The proper interpretation ofBerkeley's philosophy ofscience is a matter of considerable debate.1 Nonetheless, as a working theorist of visual perception he is afairly simple-minded falsificationist. Here is what he says: find a person born blind who comes by surgery to see. If that person can distinguish at a glance big distant objects from small near objects, 111 amend my theory.2 The literature on Berkeley's Theory ofVision can be fairly said to bifurcate between those who "see" the argument and those who don't. Berkeley's most important eighteenth century disciple, Adam Smith, extended Berkeley's teaching to encompass the remarkable claim that we learn to perceive our economic interest (Levy 1992a, 1992b). The negative reaction to Berkeley's theory starts in 1842 with Samuel Bailey who pronounced himself mystified by the very claim that we learn to perceive distance. The debate between Bailey and John Stuart Mill, a debate which has twentieth century counterparts, has all the characteristics ofpeople talking past each other. Volume XLX Number 1 223 DAVID M. LEVY The missing social dimension The problem, as I see it, with Berkeley's proposed critical test—stipulating his own doctrine—is that a blind person would grow up in a sighted community. Perhaps, if he grew up in a blind community, and most of the community became sighted at the same time he did, all the community might be able to perceive distance. The problem with Berkeley's test is that ifhe himself is correct about the importance ofheuristics in making the visual distinctions, the fate of one individual is somewhat beside the point. One individual surely cannot create the necessary heuristics. This learning requires some evolutionary social process. Thus, while Berkeley's thesis requires some claim about some verybasicsocial epistemology(Fuller 1988), his proposed test, asking about a blind person growing up in a community silently presumed to be sighted, does not take into account the social dimension oflearning. Having said this, it is easy to think ofa better test for Berkeley's theoryofvision. Let us find an entire community where life takes place without the visual perception of great distance. Take any individual from this community and ask Berkeleian questions. Now, we know the answer becausejust such a dialogue was reported thirtyyears ago. One society which fulfils the test criterion is that ofthe BaMbuti people who lived their life in a very dense African forest. The American anthropologist Colin Turnbull took his friend from the BaMbuti, Kenge, to the top of a hill. Here is TurnbuH's famous report: Then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far downbelow. He turned to me and said, "Whatinsects are those?" At first I hardly understood; then I realized that in the forest the range of vision is so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, however, Kenge was looking for the first time Over apparently unending miles of unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any basis for comparison. The same thing happened later on... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary (...) signs for tangible bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently. (shrink)

In the present work Berkeley's theory of vision is considered in its historical origins, in its relation to Berkeley's general philosophical conceptions, and in its early reception. Berkeley's theory replaces an account of vision according to which distance and other spatial properties are deduced from elementary data through an unconscious geometric inference. This account of vision in terms of "natural geometry" was first introduced by Descartes and Malebranche. Among Berkeley's immediate sources (...) of knowledge of the geometric theory of perception, a key role was played by the treatise of dioptrics of William Molyneux, Dioptrica Nova. Berkeley's understanding of "natural geometry" relies closely on Molyneux's description of the mechanism of vision which avoids the complexities of the accounts of Descartes and Malebranche. In the first chapter Berkeley's theory is presented by way of contrast with Molyneux's theory. In the second chapter I consider the relation between the theory of vision and immaterialism. In the final chapter I examine one of the first criticisms of Berkeley's theory, that which is found in William Porterfield's Treatise on the Eye. Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis1997.G72. Source: Masterss International, Volume: 37-01, page: 0076. Adviser: John P. Wright. Thesis --University of Windsor, 1997. (shrink)

\A Mk 5:0" if; A REVIEW BERKELEY'S THEORY OF VISION, DESIGNED TO SHOW THE UNSOUNDNESS OF THAT CELEBRATED SPECULATION. BY SAMUEL BAILEY, AUTHOR OF ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND PUBLICATION OF ...

In Section 38 of the Theory of Vision Vindicated, George Berkeley claims that he had used the method of analysis throughout the Theory of Vision. What does that mean? I first show that "analysis" denoted a fairly well-defined method in the early modern period: it was regularly described as a method of discovery. Then I show that the discussion of distance perception in the Theory of Vision exemplifies the method of analysis and may be (...) seen as a modification of a non-geometrical account of distance vision in Rene Descartes' Optics. (shrink)

I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in (...) the NTV; (ii) that Strong Heterogeneity is the basis of Berkeley's theory; and (iii) that Molyneux-type questions act as illustrations of Strong Heterogeneity. (shrink)

Most of the New Theory of Vision is an argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's question.// re primacy of vision in spatial perception: "most rational philosopher on this topic is Berkeley, whose New Theory of Vision presents in cogent detail the argument" (from Bennett 1966, p. 30, in note cites 41ff.).// Berkeley's criticisms of Locke: "If we really abstract from colour and hardness and all that 'belongs to sensation', so far from being left (...) with 'pure' notions of extension and figure, we are left with nothing but words emptied of meaning" (from Strawson 1966, p. 61). (shrink)

Berkeley desarrolla su teoría de la visión en la obra de juventud Ensayo para una nueva teoría de la visión, que por lo general ha sido leída atendiendo sólo a sus aspectos científicos o perceptuales. En este artículo propongo una lectura distinta, que busca mostrar que el Ensayo no sólo atiende aspectos científicos sino, por el contrario, anticipa el inmaterialismo de obras posteriores. Esto lo hace porque Dios cumple un importante papel en él, lo cual se debe, entre otras cosas, (...) a que la teoría de la visión es desarrollada en función de Dios, pues de Él depende tanto la vista y los objetos visibles como el argumento del lenguaje visual. (shrink)

Berkeley's essay on vision was published in the spring of 1709. It was recognised at once as a book of considerable importance, and there was a second edition within the first year. The author was still only 24. His design, he wrote, was to show the ‘manner we perceive by sight the distance, magnitude and situation of objects’. Hitherto, writers on optics had ‘proceeded on wrong principles’.

The problem of whether perception is direct or if it depends on additional, cognitive contributions made by the perceiving subject, is posed with particular force in an Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. It is evident from the recurrent treatment it receives therein that Berkeley considers it to be one of the central issues concerning perception. Fittingly, the NTV devotes the most attention to it. In this essay, I deal exclusively with Berkeley's treatment of the problem (...) of indirect distance perception, as it is presented in the context of that work. (shrink)

Introduction In 1709 George Berkeley published his first substantial work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. As a contribution to the theory of ...

This volume focuses on Berkeley's doctrine of signs. The 'doctrine of signs' refers to the use that Berkeley makes of a phenomenon that is central to a great deal of everyday discourse: one whereby certain perceivable entities are made to stand in for (as 'signs' of) something else. Things signified might be other perceivable entities or they might also be unperceivable notions - such as the meanings of words. From his earliest published work, A New Theory of (...) class='Hi'>Vision in 1710, to those works written towards the end of life, including Alciphron in 1732, Berkeley is at pains to emphasise the crucial role that sign-usage, particularly (but not only) in language, plays in human life. Berkeley also connects sign-usage to our (human) relationship with God: an issue that was right of the heart of his philosophical project. The contributions in this volume explore the myriad ways that Berkeley built on such insights to better understand a range of philosophical issues - issues of epistemology, language, perception, mental representation, mathematics, science, and theology. The aim of this volume is to establish that the doctrine of signs can be seen as one of the unifying themes of Berkeley's philosophy. What's more, this theme is one which spans his whole philosophical corpus; not just his best-known works like the Principles and the Three Dialogues, but also his works on science, mathematics, and theology. (shrink)

: Berkeley's Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision presents a theory of various aspects of the spatial content of visual experience that attempts to undercut not only the optico-geometric accounts of e.g., Descartes and Malebranche, but also elements of the empiricist account of Locke. My task in this paper is to shed light on some features of Berkeley's account that have not been adequately appreciated. After rehearsing a more detailed Lockean critique of the notion (...) that depth is a proper object of vision, Berkeley directs arguments he takes to be entirely parallel against the notion that vision has two-dimensional planar contents as proper objects. I show that this argument fails due to an illicit slide unnoticed by both Berkeley and his commentators—a slide present but innocuously so in the case of depth. Berkeley's positive account, according to which the apparent spatial content of vision is a matter of associations between, on the one hand, tactile and motor contents, and on the other hand non-spatial visual contents, also fails because of an illicit slide—again, unnoticed by Berkeley and his commentators. I close by discerning the salvageable and correct core of Berkeley's theory of the spatiality of vision. (shrink)

Two theses appear to be central to Reid’s view of the visual field. By sight, we do not originally perceive depth or linear distance from the eye. By sight, we originally perceive the position that points on the surface of objects have with regard to the centre of the eye. In different terms, by sight, we originally perceive the compass direction and degree of elevation of points on the surface of objects with reference to the centre of the eye. I (...) consider various problems about distance perception and perception of position with regard to the centre of the eye raised by Reid’s texts. These questions are relevant to Reid’s description of the geometry of visibles as the “intrinsic” geometry of the surface of the sphere. (shrink)

This is a systematic and critical account of Berkeley’s philosophy of science. Brook’s intention is to evaluate Berkeley’s analysis of significant scientific concepts, his general theories in optics, physics, and mathematics, and finally Berkeley’s own interpretation and criticism of Newton’s principles. That Berkeley’s writings are pervaded with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and misinterpretations of Newton seems to be the conclusion that Brook reaches, although he does distinguish in the writings the areas in which he feels Berkeley is on target. Berkeley conceived the (...) purpose of science to be the practical mastery of nature, and his philosophy is indicative of a phase in the evolution of a "new" science that had its roots as far back as Galileo who envisioned a universe that could be read off in terms of mathematical relationships. This view entailed the overthrow of traditional physics and its concern with substantial forms and qualitative changes. As Brook points out, the object of physics for Berkeley is a phenomenal order that can at best display only uniformities, efficient causality belongs to the realm of metaphysics. Brook does not go into the metaphysical or historical foundations of Berkeley’s philosophy of science, but his first chapter on the theory of signification presents sufficient background for the more detailed and complex chapters that deal with his theory of vision, philosophy of physics and mathematics. This is not an easy book to read, and the chapter on Berkeley’s mathematics may prove to be especially difficult to those who lack an orientation to this field. Yet Brooks could hardly do better than he does considering the obscurities and obfuscatory trappings that are to be found in the primary sources from which he is working. A good bibliography is included that should serve to facilitate a reading of this book. Brook’s study is the only work to date that takes into account Berkeley’s scientific works as a whole and not just some aspects.—K.R.M. (shrink)

Berkeley subscribed to the principle of heterogeneity, that what we see is qualitatively and numerically different from what we touch. He says of this principle that it is “the main part and pillar of [his] theory.” The argument I present here is that the theory to which Berkeley refers is not just his theory of vision, but what that theory was the preparation for, which is nothing less than his idealism. The argument turns on the (...) passivity of perception, which is what is at stake in the principle of heterogeneity. The author targeted by Berkeley's theory is Descartes, who explicitly denies heterogeneity. (shrink)

In the _New Theory of Vision, Berkeley defends the heterogeneity thesis, i.e., the view that the ideas of sight and touch are numerically and specifically distinct. In sections 121-122 of that work, he suggests that the thesis of abstract ideas is somehow closely connected to the heterogeneity thesis, though he does not there fully explain just what the connection is supposed to be. In this paper an interpretation of this connection is proposed and defended. Berkeley needs to reject (...) abstract ideas because, if there were such ideas then the heterogeneity thesis would be false and, in turn, this would lead directly to the falsity of Berkeley's theory of vision. (shrink)

This collection of fourteen interpretative essays on the philosophy of George Berkeley focuses specifically on Berkeley’s theory of the nature and variety of existing things. The collection is notable for containing the first four winners of the Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize. The seven essays in the first part, entitled “Idealism,” attempt to illuminate Berkeley’s notorious thesis that to be is to be perceived, that the _esse_ of sensible things is _percipi._ Most of the essays in this first part (...) are either direct or indirect responses to an influential interpretation of Berkeley’s idealism advanced thirty years ago by Edwin B. Allaire. The second part, “Volition, Action, and Causation,” contains four essays focusing on Berkeley’s volitionism, on his thesis that only the activities of minds are causally efficacious. “Vision and the Perceptual Objects,” the third part of the volume, deals with Berkeley’s theory of vision and his doctrine that all of the objects of perception depend on God’s will for their existence. (shrink)

George Berkeley's first published work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision was prepared simultaneously with his second, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In the New Theory, Berkeley argues that visual objects are in the mind, mind‐dependent ideas, but he appears to leave tactile objects outside the mind in mind‐independent space. The position the New Theory refutes is not the one that Berkeley identifies as causing problems for the Principles. But he (...) still sees the New Theory as contributing an important step in the argument of the Principles. He is frequently said to have employed a language analogy, to have compared vision to language, and indeed he does just that through the New Theory. Berkeley apparently assumed that anyone who read both the New Theory and the Principles would be in a position to appreciate the usefulness of the New Theory for the moral and theological aims of the Principles. (shrink)

Berkeley thinks that we only see the size, shape, location, and orientation of objects in virtue of the correlation between sight and touch. Shadows have all of these spatial properties and yet are intangible. In Seeing Dark Things (2008), Roy Sorensen argues that shadows provide a counterexample to Berkeley's theory of vision and, consequently, to his idealism. This paper shows that Berkeley can accept both that shadows are intangible and that they have spatial properties.

Berkeley's theory of signification is explicated and analyzed. Signification: (1) replaces abstract general ideas in the recognition of similar ideas, (2) replaces causation as the relation between ideas of sense and their external sources, (3) replaces substance in the account of sensible objects. Its supposedly simple character cannot be maintained. There are at least three different kinds of signification: signification within categories, Signification across categories, And ontological signification. Berkeley's immaterialistic metaphysics, Relying heavily upon the theory of (...) signification, Is fantastic but fascinating. It is important as a part of a continuous epistemological inquiry of almost two centuries. (shrink)

In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are (...) immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis. (shrink)

This selection of George Berkeley's most important philosophical works contains--Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision; Principles of Human Knowledge; Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained; De Motu (in translation); Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, 1729-30; and Philosophical Commentaries.

George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 in Ireland, in or near Kilkenny. Berkeley's education began in Kilkenny, at the Duke of Ormonde's school. Berkeley took his BA in 1704 and, while waiting for a fellowship vacancy, worked on some mathematical issues, the results of which he published in 1707 as Arithmetica and Miscellanea Mathematica. In 1709, he published his first significant work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, rapidly followed in 1710 by A (...) Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In 1724, Berkeley published A Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches, in which he laid out his plans for his university, to be situated in Bermuda. There are several important lessons to be learned from Berkeley's continued involvement with The Querist throughout the period of his life at Cloyne. Dying at age 68, Berkeley can be said to have lived out close to his allotted three‐score‐and‐ten years. (shrink)