Wearing black make-up to impersonate black individuals has become highly controversial in many countries, even when it is part of long-standing cultural traditions. Prominent examples of such traditions include Saint Nicolas celebrations in the Netherlands (which feature a black character known as “Black Pete” who hands out candy to children), Epiphany parades in Spain (which feature impersonations of the biblical king Balthasar who is traditionally portrayed as black) and the annual Zulu parade in New Orleans (which features impersonations of South (...) African Zulu warriors). In this article, I challenge the widely held view that black make-up traditions are categorically wrong. Specifically, I argue that these traditions can be morally vindicated if (i) the large majority of individuals who help to maintain them do not believe that they denigrate black people; (ii) the relevant traditions do not depict black people in denigrating ways; and (iii) the relevant traditions are not gratuitously offensive. While the Dutch Saint Nicholas tradition fails to satisfy these conditions, the New Orleans Zulu tradition is found to satisfy them, as is the Spanish Epiphany tradition in certain cases. I end by identifying another set of conditions under which black make-up traditions might be morally justified. (shrink)

A significant proportion of states grants constitutional recognition to a single religion, leaving various other religions within society constitutionally unrecognised. Many philosophers believe that this is problematic even when such recognition is (almost) wholly symbolic. The four most common and prima facie plausible objections to what I call ‘mono-recognition’ are that it alienates citizens who do not adhere to the constitutionally recognised religion; that it symbolically subordinates these individuals; that it reinforces oppressive social hierarchies; and that it violates principles of (...) justificatory neutrality. This article shows that none of these objections establish that mono-recognition is wrong within contemporary societies—or even merely pro tanto wrong. However, it goes on to propose a novel argument that does suggest that this type of religious establishment is pro tanto wrong within most societies, if not all. According to this argument, which I refer to as the ‘desire-based objection’, mono-recognition is pro tanto wrong when it fails to accommodate at least some citizens (a) who desire constitutional recognition of their unrecognised religion on morally reasonable, or simply not unreasonable, grounds or who would do so if they were to independently ponder the possibility of receiving such recognition without having to fear any social backlash that receiving it might cause and (b) whose religion is entitled to constitutional recognition based on the size of its population within society; the societal contributions of its members; and any injustices that its members have suffered at the hands of the state or the wider society. As I show, even when one particular religion has the strongest claim to constitutional recognition, this does not normally justify granting sole recognition to it given that the weaker claims of other religions could be accommodated under a system whereby state religions are rotated and recognised for different durations depending on the strength of their claims. (shrink)

While several scholars have argued that the rise of the internet has allowed an autistic culture to emerge over the past two decades, the question of whether people with autism or, as some members of this group refer to themselves, ‘autists’, are legally entitled to their own cultural rights has not been investigated. This article fills part of this lacuna by considering whether such entitlements exist from the perspective of human rights law. I start by showing that, insofar as autists (...) have their own culture, they are likely to be entitled to cultural rights under existing human rights treaties, before arguing that the absence of evidence that their beliefs, values, and behaviors are significantly shaped by distinct social norms renders it unclear whether they do in fact have their own culture. However, I end by arguing that, in terms of autists’ entitlements from a human rights perspective, little seems to depend on this. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that many, if not most, adult children have moral duties to visit their parents when they can do so at reasonable cost. However, whether such duties persist when the parents lose the ability to recognise their children, usually due to dementia, is more controversial. Over 40% of respondents in a public survey from the British Alzheimer’s Society said that it was “pointless” to keep up contact at this stage. Insofar as one cannot be morally required to (...) do pointless things, this would suggest that children are relieved of any duties to visit their parents. In what appears to be the only scholarly treatment of this issue, Claudia Mills has defended this view, arguing that our duties to visit our parents require a type of relationship that is lost when parents no longer remember who their children are. This article challenges Mills’ argument. Not only can children be duty-bound to visit parents who have lost the ability to recognise them, I argue that many children do in fact have such duties. As I show, these duties are grounded in any special interests that their parents have in their company; the fact that visiting their parents might allow them to comply with generic duties of sociability; and/or the fact that such visits allow them to express any gratitude that they owe their parents. (shrink)

Many political theorists are multiculturalists. They believe that states ought to support and accommodate minority cultures, even if they disagree about when such support and accommodations are due and what forms they should take. In this contribution, I argue that multiculturalists have failed to notice an important objection against a wide range of multiculturalism policies. This objection is predicated on the notion that when states support and accommodate minority cultures, they should support and accommodate many subcultures and individualistic conceptions of (...) the good as well. However, since a significant proportion of multiculturalism policies imposes financial costs on society, it will often be prohibitively expensive for states to support and accommodate citizens’ subcultures and individualistic conceptions of the good on an equal basis. The result is that implementing such policies is likely to end up discriminating against certain groups, which might include e.g. fervent football fans, globe-trotters, mountain climbers, motor bikers, Hippies, and artists. I conclude by considering six reasons for giving preferential treatment to minority cultures that would allow multiculturalists to avoid this implication, which invoke, inter alia, the depth, duration, and involuntariness of cultural commitments; the role of culture in allowing people to live autonomously; and cultural rights to political self-determination. None are found to be convincing. (shrink)

Many higher-income countries are struggling to make decent and affordable care available to their older populations. In response, some Germans are sending their ageing relatives to relatively high-end care homes within Eastern Europe and South-East Asia where the care tends to be more comprehensive and a lot cheaper. At the same time, this practice has caused much controversy within Germany, with some commentators calling it “inhumane” and “shameful.” The aim of this article is to show that such criticisms are exaggerated. (...) Whereas sending people to care homes in lower-income countries can be immoral, I argue that the most promising objections against it do not always apply and, to the extent that they do, do not always provide decisive reasons against sending people abroad. These objections maintain that such expatriations harm three different groups of individuals, namely the emigrants themselves; their friends and relatives; and vulnerable members of the receiving societies. (shrink)

Many people want to live in liberal democracies because they are liberal and democratic. Yet it would be mistaken, indeed naive, to assume that this applies to all would-be residents. Just as some inhabitants of liberal democracies oppose one or more fundamental liberal-democratic values and principles, so there are foreign would-be residents who do so, who might include individuals with e.g. Jihadist, Neo-Nazi, and radical anarchist views. Proceeding on the assumption that there exists no unconditional moral right to immigrate, this (...) article asks whether it is ever morally permissible for liberal democracies to deny residence to nonnationals based on evidence that theypersonallyhold extremist views. I argue that this is sometimes the case. Specifically, my contention is that even if we adopt a cosmopolitan perspective on which states are not allowed to prioritise the interests of their own citizens and residents over those of foreign nonresidents, there are two conditions under which such exclusions are justified even when refugees are being refused admission. (shrink)

In more than 20% of countries, a single religion is recognized in the constitution. This article argues that there are good reasons for opposing such ‘mono-recognition’ as it fails to show due concern to members of constitutionally unrecognized religions. Yet rather than opting for disestablishment as Sweden did in 2000, I show that there may be a better alternative in many cases: To constitutionally recognize a variety of religions. After distinguishing synchronic forms of plural recognition whereby multiple religions are constitutionally (...) recognized simultaneously from diachronic forms whereby state religions are rotated, I defend the latter option. On this approach, a multi-religious state might have Catholicism as the state religion during the first part of the year, then Islam, then Judaism, and so on, whereby I argue that there ought to be differences in the amount of time that religions are recognized depending on differences in the strength of their claims to constitutional recognition. Besides being fairer than mono-recognition and synchronic plural recognition, I show that when some religious groups are marginalized, diachronic plural recognition has significant advantages over non-recognition of any religion as constitutionally recognizing these groups’ religions sends valuable signals that their members belong to society. (shrink)

Many liberal democracies have legal restrictions on nudism. This article argues that when public nudity does not pose a health threat, such restrictions are unjust. To vindicate this claim, I start by showing that there are two weighty interests served by the freedom to be naked in public. First, it promotes individual well-being; not only can nudist activities have great recreational value, recent studies have found that exposure to non-idealised naked bodies has a positive impact on body image, and, ultimately, (...) on life satisfaction. Second, public nudity has expressive value; apart from being a constitutive element of various spiritual and religious worldviews, public nudity is frequently used to protest social and political evils. As I go on to argue, the reasons for abolishing current anti-nudist laws that stem from these interests are not overridden, let alone cancelled, by the offence that public nudity might cause. Indeed, whereas my principal aim is to defend the freedom to be publicly naked when this poses no health threat, I will contend that states should recognise this liberty as a distinct legal right rather than try to subsume it under existing rights or secure it simply by excluding non-sexual, non-exhibitionist public nudity from existing laws against public indecency, sexual exhibition, and disorderly conduct. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that swearing is morally innocent insofar as it is non‐abusive and vulgarities are being used, such as when people exclaim “s**t!” or “f**k!” This article shows this view to be mistaken. I start by arguing that taking offense at non‐abusive vulgar swearing is not irrational, before arguing that, even if it were, such swearing would still not always be justified. The fact that many of us find it hard to overcome profanity‐induced offense, along with the fact that (...) its existence is necessary for swearing to be possible, is sufficient to render even non‐abusive vulgar swearing sometimes wrong. I go on to assess the opposite view, according to which swearing, including non‐abusive vulgar swearing, is never justified, whereby two objections to this activity are addressed. According to the instrumentalization objection, the fact that swearing is possible only if at least some people are sometimes offended by the words that are used means that swearers treat those who are offended by their profanity as mere means. And according to the Ersatz objection, the fact that we can use inoffensive words to raise the emotional content of our speech renders swearing gratuitously offensive. Neither objection is found to be convincing. (shrink)

In recent years, several theorists have defended a form of neutrality that seeks to equalise the benefits that state policies bestow upon citizens’ conceptions of the good life. For example, when state policies confer special benefits upon a conception that revolves around a particular culture, religion or type of sports, other cultures, religions or types of sports might be due compensation. This article argues that this kind of neutrality – which I refer to as ‘hands-on neutrality’ – cannot be vindicated, (...) whether it takes a resourcist form or welfarist form. After explaining why states cannot simply avoid bestowing unequal advantages upon citizens’ conceptions of the good life, I identify several versions of hands-on neutrality and show that all of them fail to respect the moral equality of citizens. (In so doing, however, I do find that a different form of neutrality is appropriately applied under a more limited set of conditions, which is lottery-based.) I conclude by showing that in cases where theories of hands-on neutrality have intuitive force, more plausible rival principles can account for our intuitions. (shrink)

Over the past decade, countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Latvia, and Bulgaria have banned face-coverings from public spaces. These bans are popularly known as ‘burqa bans’ as they seem to have been drafted with the aim of preventing people from wearing burqas and niqabs specifically. The scholarly response to these bans has been overwhelmingly negative, with several lawyers and philosophers arguing that they violate the human right to freedom of religion. While this article shares some of the concerns (...) that have been raised, it argues that banning face-coverings in public is morally justified under certain conditions with the exception of facemasks that are necessary for the containment of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19. The reason for this is that those who publicly cover their face make it very difficult for other members of society to socially interact with them, especially for those who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, which is problematic in an age where many people are chronically lonely or at risk of becoming chronically lonely. As such, this article can be understood as a more elaborate, and arguably more sophisticated, defence of the justification that France offered for its face-covering ban before the European Court of Human Rights, namely that covering one’s face undermines the conditions for ‘living together’. (shrink)

Many people move house at some point during their childhood and not rarely more than once. While relocations are not always harmful for under-aged children, they can, and frequently do, cause great disruption to their lives by severing their social ties as well as any attachments that they might have to their neighbourhood, town, or wider geographical region, with long-lasting psychological effects in some cases. Since it is increasingly recognised within normative philosophy as well as within Western societies that older (...) minors should have the final say over certain issues that significantly affect their lives (think, for instance, of custody disputes, decisions about whether to get specific vaccinations or use contraceptives), this raises the question: Can it be morally incumbent upon parents to give their minor children a veto over family relocation? This article argues that the answer is affirmative. Specifically, it suggests that such duties exist if and only if (i) parents are not morally required to either relocate their families or stay put, (ii) the stakes of the decision about a family relocation are fairly low, and (iii) the children have the competence to make these decisions, as many older minors do. (shrink)

One consequence of the lockdowns that many countries have introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is that people have become more vulnerable to loneliness. In this contribution, I argue that even if this does not render lockdowns unjustified, it is morally incumbent upon states to make reasonable efforts to protect their residents from loneliness for as long as their social confinement measures remain in place. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive list of ways in which this might be done, (...) I identify four broad measures that I believe many, if not most, states ought to take. These require states to (i) help ensure that people have affordable access to the internet, as well as opportunities for learning how to use this medium so as that they can digitally connect to others; (ii) help people to have harmonious and rewarding intimate relationships; and try to make (iii) non-human companionship as well as (iv) various non-social solutions to loneliness widely available. (shrink)

As people grow old, many risk becoming chronically lonely which is associated with e.g. depression, dementia, and increased mortality. Whoever else should help to protect them from this risk, various philosophers have argued that any children that they might have will often be among them. Proceeding on this assumption, this article considers what filial duties to protect ageing parents from loneliness consist of, or might consist of. I develop my answer by showing that a view that may be intuitively plausible, (...) namely that they simply require children to visit their ageing parents regularly when they can do so at reasonable cost and call, text, and/or email them from time to time, is defective in three respects. First, it ignores children’s potential responsibilities to encourage and/or facilitate social interaction between their parents and third parties. Second, it ignores their potential responsibilities to help provide their parents with non-human companionship. Third, it elides over their duties to coordinate their efforts to offer loneliness protection with others. What I end up proposing instead, then, is an approach for protecting ageing parents from loneliness that is multi-faceted. (shrink)

In recent years, a proportion of older Germans has been sent to relatively high‐end care homes within lower‐income countries where the care tends to be cheaper and more extensive than that in German care homes. Destination countries are found predominantly within Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), but to a lesser extent also within South‐East Asia (e.g. Thailand). At the same time, these expatriations have caused much controversy, with some German commentators calling them ‘inhumane’ and ‘shameful’. In this article, (...) I argue that such criticisms are overdrawn. Although sending an older individual to a care home within a lower‐income country can be morally impermissible, I find that there are at least three sets of conditions under which it is not. (shrink)

In a bid to boost their below-replacement fertility levels, some countries, such as China, India, Iran, and Japan, have launched state-sponsored dating apps, with more potentially following. However, the use of dating apps as tools for social engineering has been largely neglected by political theorists and public policy experts. This article fills this gap. While acknowledging the risks and historical baggage of social engineering, the article provides a qualified defense of using these apps for three purposes: raising below-replacement birth rates, (...) increasing social cohesion, and preventing certain genetic diseases. (shrink)

Unemployment rates among autistic people are high even among those with low-support needs. While a variety of measures is needed to address this problem, this article defends one that has not been defended in detail and that has profound implications for contemporary hiring practices. Building on empirical research showing that job interviews are a major contributor to autistic unemployment, it argues that such interviews should be abolished in many cases for autistic and non-autistic people alike.

Many individuals on the autism spectrum are hypersensitive to certain sensory stimuli. For this group, as well as for non-autistic individuals with sensory processing disorders, being exposed to e.g. fluorescent lights, perfume odours, and various sounds and noises can be real torment. In this article, I consider the normative implications of such offence for the design of office spaces, which is a topic that has not received any attention from philosophers. After identifying different ways in which the senses of hypersensitive (...) workers might be protected within these spaces, I show that many of such accommodations can be made at reasonable cost, before arguing that doing so ought to be a legal requirement. (shrink)

Recent developments in the domain of communication Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) technology have raised questions about the ability for communication BCIs to read minds. How those questions are answered depends on how we theorize the mind and mindreading in the first place. Thus, in this paper, I ask (1) what does it mean to read minds? (2) can a communication BCI do this? (3) what does this mean for potential users of this technology? and (4) what is at stake morally in (...) light of this? I show that current answers to these questions are conceptually unclear and committed to a Cartesian picture of the mind and its relation to the brain, questionably informing how debates about BCIs as mindreading devices are framed. I offer an alternative perspective on these questions by turning to an enactive perspective on mindedness. I argue that this perspective can offer conceptual as well as ethical clarification about what is at stake in the domain of communication BCIs. From this perspective, the concerns raised about BCIs as mindreading machines are demystified. Instead, concerns are raised about BCIs as enabling users to flourish as authentic communicators. (shrink)

Politicotainment and democratainment are concepts used to identify the relevance of popular culture for citizenship. Among the most prominent examples of these concepts are political fiction series. Merging political facts with fictional narratives, such series provide a unique opportunity to engage the audience with political matters in an entertaining way. But can these series also affect the agenda of the public and the news media? Based on aggregate-level data of Google search queries and news-media content, the current study examines the (...) agenda-setting effects of the political fiction series Borgen. Time-series analyses show that only a few Borgen episodes affected the public agenda and even fewer the news media agenda. Evidence is also found for negative patterns. Thus, we should be careful not to overestimate the impact of political fiction in terms of agenda-setting effects: It occasionally has agenda-setting effects but more often not. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint? The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is fundamentally committed to the protection (...) of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met: Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations. The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children. To realise condition, which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible. My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to live in accordance with one’s conception of the good. (shrink)

The end of a long-term romantic relationship ranks among the most stressful and momentous events in life. Thus, the decision of whether to break up with someone whom one has been with for many years should generally be made very carefully. Unfortunately, decision theory is often thought to be unable to provide rational guidance in such high-stake life choices due to the outcomes’ presumed transformative character. The present paper shows how agents can rationally decide whether to leave their romantic partner (...) even if the decision is transformative. It does so by using a novel five-level account of transformative decision-making, which can also be used for other key life choices, and which is the first to integrate in a systematic way several approaches for making (certain types of) transformative decisions that have been proposed in recent years. (shrink)

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Love, sex, and physical intimacy are some of the most desired goods in life and they are increasingly being sought on dating apps such as Tinder, Bumble, and Badoo. For those who want a leg up in the chase for other people’s attention, almost all of these apps now offer the option of paying a fee to boost one’s visibility for a certain amount of time, which may range from 30 min to a few hours. In this article, I argue (...) that there are strong moral grounds and, in countries with laws against unconscionable contracts, legal ones for thinking that the sale of such visibility boosts should be regulated, if not banned altogether. To do so, I raise two objections against their unfettered sale, namely that it exploits the impaired autonomy of certain users and that it creates socio-economic injustices. (shrink)

Over the past decade, many politicians and celebrities in North America have found themselves embroiled in scandals that involved them having worn black make-up and in at least one incident white make-up. In most of these cases, the used make-up was part of a costume for Halloween, Purim, Carnival, or a themed party. This article challenges the view that wearing cross-racial make-up on such occasions as part of personal costumes—as opposed to costumes that are integral to specific cultural traditions, such (...) as the New Orleans Zulu parade—is always wrong. To do so, it assesses the five most promising objections to this practice. Although some of these objections count against certain uses of cross-racial make-up, I show that in several high-profile cases where such make-up was worn, none of them had force, whether because the objections themselves were implausible and/or because they did not apply. (shrink)

Over the past decade, many philosophers have argued that to respect the moral equality of their citizens, states should be neutral toward certain forms of diversity among their populations. Areas in which the state neutrality has been advocated include, but are not limited to, citizens’ different religions; languages; and sexual orientations. However, there remains an important area where its normative (ir)relevance has not been discussed: That of neurodiversity. After identifying several ways in which contemporary states disfavor the interests of neurodivergent (...) groups relative to the neurotypical majority, including those of autistic people; dyslectic people; and people with ADHD, the most promising would be-justifications for such unequal treatment are considered. They maintain respectively that states only have to be neutral toward differences that feature in people’s conceptions of the good life; that addressing the discussed neuro-inequalities is too costly, whether financially or otherwise; that doing so raises intolerable risks of a public backlash; and that a commitment to neuro-neutrality leads to overinclusion. None are found to be convincing across the board, which leads me to conclude that states should become significantly more neuro-neutral than they are today. (shrink)

Strong longtermism maintains that how we should act morally is determined almost entirely by the expected effects on the welfare of our descendants existing thousands if not millions of years into the future, who might include both other humans and any artificial agents with a comparable or higher moral status that we end up creating. It is based on three key assumptions: (i) that our descendants will have a moral status that is at least as high as ours and therefore (...) should not have their welfare discounted by us; (ii) that there is a good chance that these individuals will vastly outnumber us; and (iii) that we can do things here and now that can be expected to positively shape the long-term trajectory of humanity. The aim of this contribution is to suggest that authors such as Will MacAskill and Hilary Greaves have been too optimistic about all these assumptions as a result of having ignored evidence that the populations of postindustrial countries are becoming less intelligent due mostly to the negative relationship that has emerged within these societies between intelligence and fertility and to the proclivity of intelligent people to delay parenthood. (shrink)

Although 43 countries have a monarch as their head of state, the question of whether monarchies can be morally justified has been neglected by contemporary philosophers. In this article, I argue that it is doubtful whether any existing monarchies can be morally justified. As I show, they all suffer from one or more of the following defects: they flout democratic principles; they are non-meritocratic; and/or they fail to provide at least some royals with an adequate range of lifestyle options. However, (...) I go on to identify a novel type of elective monarchy that escapes these problems, and which, I submit, can be vindicated as long as it serves legitimate public objectives (e.g. by promoting social cohesion among citizens and/or by fostering international trade). (shrink)

A large share of countries is struggling to provide adequate care to their older populations. To deal with this challenge, philosopher Ingrid Robeyns has advocated legislation that requires (most) citizens to spend 1 year of their life providing dependency care. My aim of this contribution is to strengthen the case for this proposal, which I will refer to as a ‘universal care conscription’. I do so by defending this type of conscription against various alternative ways of addressing care-deficits that have (...) been proposed. As I show, not only is it doubtful whether pursuing these alternatives will always, or even generally, suffice to prevent and/or alleviate care-deficits at reasonable financial and moral cost, a universal care conscription has significant civic benefits in an age of polarization that count strongly in its favour. (shrink)

Recent developments in the domain of bi-directional Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology are directed at generating naturalistic sensory perceptual experiences for disabled people. I argue that conceptualizing and operationalizing “naturalness” in this context has profound impact on disabled people and their experiences. I ask (1) what does it mean to have a “natural” perceptual experience and (2) should the bi-directional BCI-community strive for naturalness in this context? Inspired by phenomenological and 4E-cognition approaches to perception, I argue that the terms “natural” and (...) “naturalness” should not be used in this context because of (1) polysemicity and (2) an implicit bias favoring able-bodied perception over disabled perception. I offer the phenomenological concept of transparency as a positive alternative to denote the underlying goal of embodiment and effortless use. I cash out methodological ramifications of my argument for research in bi-directional BCIs and plea for a transdisciplinary dialogue between end-users, phenomenologists and neuroscientists. (shrink)

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

In a bid to boost fertility levels, Iran and Japan have recently launched their own dating apps, with more countries likely to follow. The aim of this article is to consider whether state-run dating apps are morally desirable, which is a question that has not received any scholarly attention. It finds that such apps have at least two benefits that collectively, if not individually, render their introduction to be welcomed provided certain conditions are met. These benefits are that they are (...) better placed than commercial dating apps such as Tinder, Bumble, and Badoo to (i) help people find lasting love and to (ii) protect individuals from spending too much money and/or time on online dating. Several objections are discussed and shown to be unconvincing as arguments against state-run dating apps tout court, including the objection that for states to offer their own dating apps is unduly expensive; the objection that it gives them too much power; and the objection that they should invest in creating offline opportunities for meeting potential partners instead. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this (...) programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of cognition that will ground the systematic unified framework needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018; cf. Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should (...) not ameliorate for the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies—at least, not primarily. (shrink)

Giving money to others feels good. In the past years, this claim has received strong empirical support from psychology and neuroscience. It is now standard to use the label ‘warm glow feelings’ to refer to the pleasure people take from giving, and many explanations of apparently altruistic behavior appeal to these internal rewards. But what exactly are warm glow feelings? Why do people experience them? In order to further our understanding of the phenomenon, we ran two studies: a recall task (...) in which participants were asked to remember a donation they made, and a donation task in which participants were given the opportunity to make a donation before reporting their affective states. In both studies, correlational and experimental evidence converge towards the conclusion that, if the nature of the warm glow is straightforward, its source is multifaceted. Regarding the nature of ‘warm glow’, the pleasure people took in giving was mainly predicted by one particular positive emotion (‘joyful feelings’) and was indeed described by participants as a ‘warm’ sensation. Regarding the underlying psychological mechanisms, ‘warm glow’ feelings were elicited both by positive appraisals regarding the donor’s moral character and positive appraisals regarding the actual impact of the donor’s donation on the welfare of others. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of positive emotions in explaining why people give. (shrink)

If money is used in a market setting, and if it fulfils its three traditional functions well, this creates normative problems. Arguably, the two most pressing problems linked to markets – inequality and corruption – are partly caused by the prevailing monetary design. Given the history of suggested monetary reforms, one might reasonably hope that, by consciously re-designing the functions of a currency, one might overcome these issues. This essay argues that there are clear moral limits to this. Because of (...) the way inequality and corruption are intertwined via money’s functions, we cannot simultaneously overcome both problems. This also means that even though these problems have monetary causes, they do not have purely monetary solutions, but need to be addressed relying on fiscal or market reform as well. (shrink)

Being the victim of a microaggression, that is, a relatively minor act of hostility that targets someone's (marginalized) social identity, can be distressing, but so can merely being in doubt over whether one has been the victim of such aggression. To address this last problem, Regina Rini has proposed a novel understanding of microaggressions that is meant to eliminate such doubts. On her “Ambiguous Experience Account,” whenever members of marginalized groups believe they might have been subjected to a microaggression, a (...) microaggression will have been committed even if the would‐be perpetrator was not motivated by prejudiced aggression. This article challenges this account on grounds of being incompatible with people's lived experiences, including those of the would‐be victims, and argues that we should instead accept the conventional account on which microaggressive acts must be consciously or unconsciously motivated by prejudiced aggression. At the same time, it shows that those falsely suspected of having committed microaggressions will still merit blame sometimes for having failed to signal that their behavior was respectful of others, which lessens the concerns that Rini's conceptual engineering seeks to address. I conclude by drawing out some implications for the debate on microaggressions and attributional ambiguity. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

What kind of activity are non-human animals capable of? A venerable tradition insists that lack of language confines them to ‘mere behaviour’. This article engages with this ‘lingualism’ by developing a positive, bottom-up case for the possibility of animal agency. Higher animals cannot just act, they can act intelligently, rationally, intentionally and for reasons. In developing this case I draw on the interplay of behaviour, cognition and conation, the unduly neglected notion of intelligence and its connection to rationality, the need (...) to recognize that reasons are objective conditions, and the difference between the ability to act for reasons and the capacity to reflect on reasons. (shrink)