Thus the enormous value of a philosophy of life that weakens the feeling for our individuality by constantly referring to universal laws, that teaches us to lose our miniscule selves in the context...

The standard account of Kantian moral weakness fails to provide a psychologically realistic account of moral improvement. It assumes that moral strength is simply a matter of volitional resolve and weakness is a lack of resolve. This leaves the path to moral improvement unclear. In this paper, I reconstruct an alternative character-based account of Kantian moral weakness and strength. On this account, moral strength is the possession of sympathy and self-knowledge, key practical-epistemic virtues from Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, and moral (...) weakness is a lack of these virtues. This identifies moral strength with a high degree of development, integrity, or fitness in one’s character, and not merely an ability to somehow try harder. It also resolves an exegetical puzzle concerning the change of heart in Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. (shrink)

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue (...) that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement. (shrink)