Common sense philosophy was one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most original intellectual products. The nine specially written essays in this volume explore the philosophical and historical significance of this school of thought, recovering the ways in which it developed during the long eighteenth century.

SummaryThe College of New Jersey (which later became Princeton University) provides an example of how Scottish philosophy influenced American higher education in an institutional context during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This article compares the administrations of John Witherspoon (served from 1768 to 1794), Samuel Stanhope Smith (served from 1795 to 1812) and James McCosh (served from 1868 to 1888) at Princeton and examines their use of Scottish philosophy in restructuring the curriculum and reforming its institutional purpose. While presiding (...) over Princeton during its most significant transitional moments, these philosophers of the Scottish School of Common Sense instituted different versions of moral education. Meanwhile, Witherspoon's legacy of balancing the interests of Evangelicalism and Scottish philosophy as Princeton's driving purpose influenced the creation and reception of nineteenth-century programmes of moral education. The broader question this article addresses is: how did the interconnecting points among Scottish philosophy, Calvinism and moral education inform notions of didactic Enlightenment at Princeton across a century? (shrink)

In this article, I discuss how Samuel Stanhope Smith advanced Reidian themes in his moral philosophy and examine their reception by Presbyterian revivalists Ashbel Green, Samuel Miller, and Archibald Alexander. Smith, seventh president and moral philosophy professor of the College of New Jersey (1779–1812), has received marginal scholarly attention regarding his moral philosophy and rational theology, in comparison to his predecessor John Witherspoon. As an early American philosopher who drew on the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment including Common Sense philosophy, (...) Smith faced heightened scrutiny from American revivalists regarding the danger his epistemology presented to the institution of religion. The Scottish School of Common Sense was widely praised and applied in nineteenth-century American moral philosophy, but before the more general American acceptance of Common Sense, Smith already appealed to Reidian themes in his methodology and treatment of external sensations, internal sensations, intellectual powers, and active powers of the human mind. In this paper, I argue that Smith's use of Reidian themes for grooming his student's morality conflicted with the educational expectations from revivalists on Princeton's board of trustees who demanded more attention on orthodox theology. I identify Smith's notions of causation, liberty, and the moral faculty as primary reasons for this tension over Princeton's educational purpose during the first decade of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

This article critically examines the different ways in which American Enlightenment thinkers confronted the future of being white in the early republic as political economists, natural historians, physicians, and anatomists of the mind. Just as philosophes experimented on the nature of blackness in Bordeaux's Royal Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society supported novel approaches to the racial classification of whiteness. An appeal to Scottish Enlightenment racial theories connected the diverging thought of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Stanhope Smith, and (...) Benjamin Rush as prominent members of this society between 1743 and 1826. In doing so, Franklin industrialised the political economy of a ‘purely white’ nation. Jefferson naturalised the language of whiteness. Smith universalised the intellectual and moral cultivation of whiteness. And Rush medicalised an architype of a healthy mind and body as white. This article argues that Scottish philosophy informed radically different ideas about how to become white in the early American republic. (shrink)

SummaryThe Introduction contextualises the development of Thomas Reid's Common Sense philosophy as the foundation for what would be known as the Scottish School of Common Sense. This introductory discussion of Reid's philosophical system bridges his thought in the Scottish Enlightenment with the special issue's focus of Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World.

(2013). The Science of Applied Ethics at Edinburgh University: Dugald Stewart on Moral Education and the Auxiliary Principles of the Moral Faculty. Intellectual History Review: Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 207-224. doi: 10.1080/17496977.2012.725554.

Are Confucian and Buddhist ethical views closer to Kantian, Consequentialist, or Virtue Ethical ones? And how can such comparisons shed light on the unique aspects of Confucian and Buddhist views? This essay (i) provides a historically grounded framework for distinguishing western views, (ii) identifies a series of questions that we can ask in order to clarify the philosophic accounts of ethical motivation embedded in the Buddhist and Confucian traditions, and (iii) then critiques Lee Ming-huei’s claim that Confucianism is closer to (...) Kantianism than virtue ethics and Charles Goodman’s claim that Buddhism is closer to Consequentialism than virtue ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 277-278 [Access article in PDF] John Hedley Brooke, Margaret J. Osler, and Jitse M. van der Meer, editors. Science in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Journals Division, 2001. Pp. xiii + 376. Cloth, $39.00. Paper, $25.00. Some twenty years ago, when I submitted a dissertation proposal to explore connections between theologies of creation and views of scientific (...) knowledge in the seventeenth century, my doctoral committee was not initially enthusiastic—my idea might make a good dissertation in religion, but was it really history of science? I doubt I would have a similar experience today. Not only has the "warfare" thesis of science and religion been laid permanently to rest, historians have begun seriously to question whether it makes sense even to treat "religion" and "science" in an essentialist manner as separate ways of thinking that do not ordinarily interact. Many detailed case studies demonstrating a variety of fascinating, often important connections between science and religion have appeared from leading scholars in the past two decades. This trend continues in the latest volume of Osiris, which contains sixteen essays documenting various ways in which religious beliefs have influenced the actual content and presentation of science.The volume opens with two companion essays laying out the terrain. First, Brooke engages the new methodological and conceptual problems that confront historians following the demise of the "warfare" thesis. Then Stephen Wykstra offers criteria for sorting out the various roles for metaphysical and religious beliefs (which he distinguishes) in shaping scientific knowledge. The case studies begin with E. Jamil Ragep's essay on medieval Islamic astronomy, arguing that religion sometimes had a constructive role—a rather novel claim for Islamic science, he points out. Noah J. Efron and Menachem Fisch show how early modern Jewish exegetical practices influenced David b. Solomon Gans's interpretations of astronomical texts, and quite possibly his interpretation of nature also. A Christian astronomer is next, as Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein detail how Johannes Kepler's theology contributed directly to the discovery of scientific laws. Maurice A. Finnocchiaro then reviews various accounts of the Galileo affair, finding far more conflict in the subsequent historiography of the events than in the trial itself.Moving from astronomy to natural philosophy, Margaret G. Cook's essay on Robert Boyle examines the web of connections between theology, the mechanical philosophy, and [End Page 277] "the Aristotelian philosophy that he sought to replace." She demonstrates that Boyle used the classical art/nature distinction "to interpret the biblical account of the Creation and to argue that chemical techniques offered experimental confirmation that the world, created by art, worked by the same mechanical principles as artificial objects, not by the inherent agency of Aristotelian nature" (136). Margaret J. Osler also writes about Boyle. Contrary to the traditional view that final causes were expunged from science by the mechanical philosophy—a view that originated in the "positivism and scientific optimism" of the postwar period (168)—she proves that final causality remained central to the thought of Boyle and Pierre Gassendi. The essay by Stephen D. Snobelen presents substantial evidence that the famous General Scholium, appended to the second edition of Isaac Newton's Principia, was a carefully worded declaration of Newton's heterodox theology. "A Trinitarian," Snobelen concludes, "could not have written the General Scholium" (186). He also shows the degree to which Newton's theology shaped his overall natural philosophy, decisively debunking the late Richard S. Westfall's view that such influences could not be found.The final seven essays are mainly devoted to nineteenth-century science. Michael J. Crowe documents several ways in which Christian beliefs about divine goodness and the Incarnation affected astronomy. Martin Fichman shows how Alfred Russel Wallace's theism—not merely a vague spiritualism, as traditional accounts claim—"shaped the cognitive content of his mature evolutionary synthesis, which included a theoretical reconceptualization of the scope of natural selection" (227). In a revisionist account of Charles Darwin's philosophy of "nature," Phillip R. Sloan challenges the received view that... (shrink)

This is a presentation on Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic philosophy, and the ay that it functions in his conception of epistemology.

This excellent collection of essays on Scottish common sense philosophy arose from the 2014 annual conference for the British Society for the History of Philosophy at The University of Edinburgh. It explores how common sense philosophy emerged during the eighteenth century in response to the ‘Ideal Theory.’ The selected chapters are complementary, offering insight into the philosophical and historical importance of common sense philosophy as well as underlining the breadth of research in the history of Scottish Philosophy.The collection begins and (...) ends with essays that consider under-researched aspects of Scottish Philosophy. It is widely perceived that Reid developed common sense via his reaction to Hume’s... (shrink)

For the large public, the only enduring legacy of Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) is the choragic monument on Calton Hill commissioned by the Royal Society of Edinburgh soon after his death, in 1828, an...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ralegh and the Punic WarsCharles G. Salas“For he doth not feign, that rehearseth probabilities as bare conjectures....”Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the WorldThe Secret HistoryIn 1603 Sir Walter Ralegh was judged guilty of treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London to await execution. The wait was a long one —execution did not take place until 1618—giving this artful courtier, warrior, poet, and poseur time to script new (...) roles for himself. The most memorable of these was historian, and the stage on which he performed was the entire world. Universal history had been a time-honored genre in England, but never had there been so remarkable a performance by a native son as Ralegh’s The History of the World (1614). In five books Ralegh offered to king and country his interpretation of events from Creation to 168 bc. Book V, last and lengthiest of the entire work, deals in large part with the struggle between Rome and Carthage. The story of that struggle is Ralegh’s most mature historical writing and the most revealing of himself, for when he gave up his plan to carry his history into modern times, the Punic Wars became the context for things about the present that he was loath to leave unsaid.Despite its length (about a million words) and premature ending, the History was an enormous success with a public eager to possess the meaning of it all. Oliver Cromwell particularly liked the way it followed “the strange windings and turnings of Providence”; 1 no doubt he found Ralegh’s emphasis upon the Providential control of events reassuring. For Ralegh claimed to show how “kings and kingdoms have flourished and fallen, and for what virtue and piety God made prosperous, and for what vice and deformity he made wretched both the one and the other.” 2 In fact what Ralegh showcased [End Page 195] were the acts of a vengeful, Old Testament God more concerned with punishing monarchical sins than with making monarchs prosperous, and the History was temporarily suppressed by James for being “too saucy in censoring princes.” 3If the king did not like what he saw in the History, the king’s critics did; and Ralegh, never a friend to Puritan or republican in his lifetime, became a hero to both as a pious author and victim of Stuart tyranny. Those sympathetic to the Stuarts, like Alexander Ross, Chaplain to Charles I, saw Ralegh rather differently; but the popularity of the man and his History could not be denied. Ross himself profited from that popularity by doing both an abridgment and a continuation of the History as well as Som Animadversions and Observations upon Sir Walter Raleigh’s Historie of the World. Wherein his mistakes are noted, and som doubtful passages cleered (1653). Many of these animadversions were directed at Ralegh’s treatment of the Punic Wars. Ross recognized that “mistakes” and “doubtful passages” there formed a pattern: “Sir Walter cannot look upon the Roman Glorie with but a squint eye”(8), he complained. But did he also recognize the reason for that squint eye, that Ralegh kept one eye on the past and the other on the present? That many of those “doubtful passages” were in fact strategic elements in a campaign (based on parallels) against Rome, against James, and against James’s ministry? Had this been obvious to Ross, he still would not have said so. Writing under Cromwell, he could no more afford to complain explicitly about abuse of James than Ralegh, writing under James, could afford to make the abuse explicit.Parallels—implicit or imagined—are part and parcel of Ralegh’s providentialism. In brief: God controls events, God does not change, events do not change. This is not to say that Ralegh believed that God’s control was transparent, that God couldn’t change, or that free will did not exist. Ralegh did not solve the great problems of theology. 4 What he is sure about is that the same sins continue to be punished just as they have always been: “So also hath God punished the same and the like sins in all after-times, and... (shrink)

Perhaps more than any other major historical phenomena, we tend to look through revolutions as much as we look at them, and ascribe to them meanings that have little to do with the intentions and e...

Since structural descriptions rather than ostensive ones are required by the logic of the cultural sciences, the Platonic eidos as a regulative idea continues to play a creative role in establishing the formal unity of historical concepts. Paul Natorp, Troeltsch’s neo-Kantian contemporary and early proponent of the logicist thesis in Germany, first construed mathematical logic as a Platonistic search for the unconditioned in the form of absolutely foundational concepts or categories of thought. The hidden Platonism expressed in Troeltsch’s formal logic (...) of history is rather close to Natorp’s reading of the Platonic ideas as functions of knowledge, as methods, unities, and pure postulates of thought whose cognitive role is to be comprehensive, heuristic, and revelatory. Moreover, such characteristic 19th-century Hegelian histories of philosophical concepts as those of Adolf Trendelenburg and Gustav Teichmüller, or F. C. Bauer’s dialectical historical methodology of congruence and manifestation in ecclesiastical historicity, were Platonically oriented in that development meant fulfillment as abstract pristination [[sic]] or as the progressively emergent pure logic of historical ideas. The same climate of thought is expressed in F. H. Bradley’s version of the Identity of Indiscernibles and a Platonic-Hegelian ascent of concepts is present even later in Nicolai Hartmann’s neo-idealist treatment of the realization of concepts as "living spirit" in the progressive movement of research itself. (shrink)

"In Getting Even, Charles Barton contends that revenge can be a form of justice that is constructive and healing for our society. Our current judiciary system, he explains, denies both victims and the accused an active role in the legal proceedings and resolution of their cases, reducing them to bystanders in what is essentially their own conflict. Barton does not argue for an individual's right to take the law into his own hands, but does show that the courts should (...) recognize the revenge motive as legitimate and rational within the rules of justice."--pub. desc. (shrink)

Let us now consider the third class of statements, those completely nonrestrictive. For example, "Something exists." Since this is the pure contradictory of the wholly restrictive, "Nothing exists," which we have found reason to regard as impossible, and since the contradictory of an impossible statement is necessary, we should expect "Something exists" to be necessarily true, a statement valid a priori. And we see that it excludes nothing from existence, except bare "nothing" itself. But the existence of bare nothing is (...) no existence. Further, "Something exists" is in no conceivable circumstances falsifiable, since the falsifying experience would have to exist, and it would also have to be the experience of something existing--at least if, as I should maintain, experience is essentially a relative term, requiring that to which it is relative, or of which it is the experience. But though "Something exists" is unfalsifiable, it is verified every moment. Could the verifiable but in any conceivable world absolutely unfalsifiable be false? I hold that the necessarily true must be knowable as true and only as true, and that, conversely, whatever is in principle verifiable though not falsifiable is thereby shown to be necessarily true. (shrink)

In the 18th century, the pre-modern Judeo-Greco-Christian problem of freedom and determinism is transformed by Kant into the modern problem of the freedom of human agency in the natural and cultural worlds of deterministic structures; it is this version of the freedom and determinism issue which centres the Science and Humanism debates, and thus marks the history of the social sciences. Anthony Giddens is credited with providing the new vocabulary of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in order to formulate the problem of (...) freedom and determinism in those terms, thus making this formulation fruitful. In this book, Charles R. Varela proposes that Kant originally formulated this problem, and makes a series of wide-ranging and groundbreaking observations based on Kant's metaphysics of realism which enables Varela to propose a solution to the structure/agency problem. Subjects revisited in this book include: · "Giddens’ Call" · The stalemate of the social and psychological sciences · The determinist tradition of modern science · Postmodernism This breadth of themes, drawn together by Varela with his work on Kant, fully realizes Giddens’ principle that human agency is a real causal force. It is Kant's conception of causal power that is the causal force Giddens' has called for. _Science For Humanism: The Recovery of Human Agency_ will be of particular interest to students of humanism and therefore realism, Kant and Giddens. (shrink)

Esquisse d'une classification systematique des doctrines philosophiques. Tome 1 / par Ch. RenouvierDate de l'edition originale: 1885-1886Sujet de l'ouvrage: Philosophie -- HistoireCe livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection (...) ont ete numerisees par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k6128233j. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mechanisms of Violent Retribution in Chinese Hell Narratives Charles D. Orzech University ofNorth Carolina Greensboro Ai! The criminals in this hell have all had their eyes dug out and the fresh blood flows [from them], and each of them cries out, their two hands pressing their bloody eye-sockets—truly pitiful! To the left a middle-aged person is just having an eye pulled out by one of the shades; he (...) struggles unceasingly, screaming; his left eye has already been extracted... (56b) Ai-yah!... Each of the criminals is bound to a an iron pillar and the ox-headed demons are in the process of administering punishment—using iron or copper blades they peel the skin of the person's face, just as a butcher kills a pig and then flays it. Each of the criminal ghosts screams in pain... (59b) The criminal ghost's hands are bound about an iron pillar which is entirely red [with heat] and the criminal ghost's two hands are entirely cooked and it is unbearable... (126a) Record ofA Journey to Hell These passages are found, not in some medieval description of hell, nor in a work for sadists, but in a modern and quite popular Chinese "good book" (shan-shu) titled Record ofA Journey to Hell (Ti-yu yu-chi). Record ofA Journey to Hell is the most recent work of a genre which emerged in tenthcentury China and which may be found throughout Asia from Vietnam to Japan. This persistent fascination with gruesome scenes of torture stands in striking contrast to Michel Foucault's observations that by the first quarter of the nineteenth century "punishment had gradually ceased to be a spectacle" in Europe (9). In Record ofA Journey to Hell we are not faced with a seachange in the discourse and practice of a society. Rather, we must come to 112Charles D. Orzech grips with and seek to understand the persistence of images oftorture as well as actual torture and public execution in some modern Chinese societies. The Chinese hells—more properly purgatories, as punishment there is not eternal—are a product of cultural adaptation and interaction. Before the first century of our era we have evidence of only the most attenuated notions of the underworld, a "yellow springs" (huang-yiian) where "all, good and bad, huddled together in darkness being guarded jealously by the god of the Soil who ended by devouring them" (Thompson 29). The ruling elite avoided this fate through elaborate ancestral ritual indexed by the possession of a surname. Social status was, from the earliest times, "inscribed" on tablets which gave visible form to both social and cosmological hierarchies (Li 247-54). However, the rise of the Taoist Celestial Masters movement (T'ien-shih tao, second century) with its heavenly and infernal bureaucracies soon coupled with newly imported Indian Buddhist descriptions of the workings of karma and the hells. The result of this amalgam is the popular Chinese vision of the underworld as a vast bureaucracy centered on ten "courts," and headed by Yama, the South Asian lord of the dead (Seidel). At death the soul is summoned before the lords of hell who administer punishments appropriate to the misdeeds of the soul. After almost interminable periods of suffering, often in all of the hells in succession, the soul is reborn as a human, an animal, or even an insect, to start the whole process again. By the tenth century this distinctly Chinese version ofthe underworld had found wide dissemination and was the framework for worship and ritual directed to the recently dead.18 Unlike the South Asian prototypes, Chinese hells appear to be modeled on the imperial bureaucracy and administered by a hellish staff. The "court" layout often major and numerous subsidiary hells mimics Chinese palace and temple architecture and is quite distinct from the mandala-like layout found in "orthodox" Buddhist prototypes. Taoist priests, Buddhist monks and nuns, and a variety of folk practitioners and mediums act as intermediaries between this world and the other. They grease the wheels of the bureaucracy with their ritual knowledge and with community offerings to obtain release for imprisoned souls. Knowledge of the workings of the underworld is, according... (shrink)

Originally published in 1910, this is a volume of philosophy by an author who found his main calling in the creation of novels, Charles Francis Keary. Unusual in its relatively personal exploration of ideas, together with its accessible, literary style, the text nonetheless maintains an academically rigorous approach to its exploration of the boundaries of reason. The fundamental premise is that mental processes generally thought to be based on intuition can, more accurately, be seen to find their basis in (...) reasoning; this premise, in turn, forms the basis for an exposition of Keary's philosophy of life and religion. This is a highly readable, and critically underrated, book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy and theology. (shrink)

This three-volume history of England from before the Roman conquest through to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was originally serialised in Charles Dickens' magazine Household Words between 1851 and 1853. The text was published in book form in the same period, although each volume was post-dated to the following year. Dickens dedicated the work to his own children, intending it to be a stepping stone to more substantial histories. The volumes were popular with readers for decades, and were used (...) in British schools well into the twentieth century. Dickens employs his signature style to bring events and personalities to life, making use of vivid similes, unabashedly partisan language and direct speech, as well as the occasional moral lesson. Volume 1 covers the period up to 1216. Volume 2 continues from Henry III to Richard III. Volume 3 traces events from Henry VII's accession to James II's fall. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article we call for a paradigm change in relation to the way we tend to look at how markets and morals are entwined in the writings of Jonathan Swift (1667–1745). We argue that it would be wrong to apply contemporary notions of economics retrospectively and somewhat a-historically to a thinker of an axial time in which economics as a separate sphere did not exist, and morals and markets and the way they relate to each other were about (...) to be reconceptualised. We argue that it is thus no accident that Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith took to Swift. They admired more than the expressive or rhetorical skills in Swift; in the first instance, they read Swift as somebody who managed to express moral sentiments (and even outrage) in an appealing, that is mostly satirical way, thereby not only criticizing the cruel conditions in Ireland at the time but also identifying the gap between rhetoric and reality and thus taking issue with the hypocrisy and double standards of the time. We will use two famous examples of Swift's work to illustrate our case, A Modest Proposal (1729) and Directions to Servants (1745). (shrink)