Soul on the Couch is premised on the belief that discourse about the soul and discourse from the couch can inform, and not simply ignore, one another.

Building on the success and importance of three previous volumes, _Relational Psychoanalysis_ continues to expand and develop the relational turn. Under the keen editorship of Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris, and comprised of the contributions of many of the leading voices in the relational world, _Volume 4_ carries on the legacy of this rich and diversified psychoanalytic approach by taking a fresh look at recent developments in relational theory. Included here are chapters on sexuality and gender, race and class, identity (...) and self, thirdness, the transitional subject, the body, and more. Thoughtful, capacious, and integrative, this new volume places the leading edge of relational thought close at hand, and pushes the boundaries of the relational turn that much closer to the horizon. Contributors: Neil Altman, Jessica Benjamin, Emanuel Berman, Jeanne Wolff Bernstein, Susan Coates, Ken Corbett, Muriel Dimen, Martin Stephen Frommer, Jill Gentile, Samuel Gerson, Virginia Goldner, Sue Grand, Hazel Ipp, Kimberlyn Leary, Jonathan Slavin, Malcolm Owen Slavin, Charles Spezzano, Ruth Stein, Melanie Suchet. (shrink)

Patrick Stokes has argued that although many conspiracy theories are true, we should reject the policy of particularism (that is, the policy of investigating conspiracy theories if they are plausible and believing them if that is what the evidence suggests) and should instead adopt a policy of principled skepticism, subjecting conspiracy theories – or at least the kinds of theories that are generally derided as such – to much higher epistemic standards than their non-conspiratorial rivals, and believing them only if (...) they are proven up to the hilt. The reason is that although some conspiracy theories are true (or otherwise epistemically kosher) there is a widespread practice of conspiracy theorizing which leads to the social acceptance of conspiracy theories which (much like Lord Byron) are mad, bad and dangerous to ‘know’, leading to radically false beliefs about the natural and political worlds (for instance to Trump’s claim that Global Warming is a ‘Chinese Hoax’). Thus Stokes is a defender of the epistemic status quo in which the punditocracy routinely dismisses and sneers at ‘conspiracy theories’, simply because they are conspiracy theories, whilst admitting sotto voce that once in a blue moon there are some conspiracy theories that are true. It is just the he would prefer the epistemic policy of the punditocracy to be the policy of the populace at large. Stokes seems to be suggesting that although particularism looks like a sensible epistemic policy (and might indeed be the correct policy in an ideal world), if it were put into practice at the level of public debate it would give a specious air of plausibility to many false and dangerous conspiracy theories with pernicious social effects. I reply that the actual moral costs of conspiracy ‘skepticism’ (as it is currently practiced) exceed the likely costs of particularism, especially if it is informed by some sensible heuristics, ruling out some conspiracy theories as crazy and ruling in others as relatively sane. For the conspiracy ‘skepticism’ as currently practiced is highly selective, pouring scorn and contempt on conspiracy theories which threaten current elites whilst giving the conspiratorial concoctions of those elites something close to a free pass. (shrink)

This cogent essay explores a hitherto unstudied aspect of Renaissance intellectual history and refines our understanding of the impact of Greek philosophy on Western thought. It is generally recognized that Aristotle was a touchstone for the learned world in the Middle Ages. Charles Schmitt shows here that what happened in the following centuries was not a mere continuation of the medieval tradition but a vital new development, influenced by the ideas of this era of ferment. He samples the response (...) to Aristotle during the Renaissance, viewing the writings of Catholics and Protestants, humanists, scholastics, and scientists; he surveys the different kinds of works from which Renaissance readers learned their Aristotle; and he looks at the extent to which Aristotelians assimilated other modes of thought in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries. Schmitt's analysis offers intellectual historians a corrected picture of this important period. (shrink)

The guiding question in this essay is, how might we speak of silence—interpret silence—without objectifying it and losing a sense of it in the way we speak of it. That means that prioritizing the value of direct linguistic language, comprehension, interpreting what other hermeneuts say about silence, or attempting to make it visible is not a viable option. The myths of Hermes and Metis, however, might be integral to the lineages of speaking and knowing that are more suited to speaking (...) of silence than the lineages that arise out of biblical exegesis and modern/contemporary philosophy and theology. In the process of shifting to the value of those myths, the bonding of truth and goodness with stability and moral decency is displaced by the value of uncertainty and indirection. Throughout, the essay accepts the distinction between silences and silence and prioritizes awareness of silence in the silence accompanying awareness. (shrink)

The myth of the homeland -- The Nietzschean self-assertion of the German University -- The geo-politics of Heidegger's Mitteleuropa -- Heidegger's Greeks and the myth of autochthony -- Heidegger's "Nietzsche".

Of laws in general -- Of laws directly derived from the nature of government -- Of the principles of the three kinds of government -- That the laws of education ought to be relative to the principles of government -- That the laws given by the legislator ought to be relative to the nature of government -- Consquences of the principles of different governments, with respect to the simplicity of civil and criminal laws, the form of judgements, and inflicting of (...) punishments -- Consquences of the different principles of the three governments, with respect to sumptuary laws, luxury, and the condition of women -- Of the corruption of the principles of the three governments -- Of the laws in the relation they bear to defensive force -- Of laws, in the relation they bear to offensive force. (shrink)

This article compares treatments of the Stern–Gerlach experiment across different physical theories, building up to a novel analysis of electron spin measurement in the context of classical Dirac field theory. Modeling the electron as a classical rigid body or point particle, we can explain why the entire electron is always found at just one location on the detector but we cannot explain why there are only two locations where the electron is ever found. Using non-relativistic or relativistic quantum mechanics, we (...) can explain both uniqueness and discreteness. Moving to more fundamental physics, both features can be explained within a quantum theory of the Dirac field. In a classical theory of the Dirac field, the rotating charge of the electron can split into two pieces that each hit the detector at a different location. In this classical context, we can explain a feature of electron spin that is often described as distinctively quantum but we cannot explain another feature that could be explained within any of the other theories. (shrink)

Empiricism is a claim about the contents of the mind: its classic slogan is nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, ‘there is nothing in the mind (intellect, understanding) which is not first in the senses’. As such, it is not a claim about the fundamental nature of the world as material. I focus here on in an instance of what one might term the materialist appropriation of empiricism. One major component in the transition from a purely epistemological (...) claim about the mind and its contents, to an ontological claim about the nature of the world, is the new focus on brain-mind relations in the eighteenth century. Here I examine a Lockean trajectory as exemplified in Joseph Priestley’s 1777 Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. But Locke explicitly ruled out that his inquiry into the logic of ideas amounted to a ‘physical consideration of the mind’. What does it mean, then, for Priestley to present himself as continuing a Lockean tradition, while presenting mental processes as tightly identified with ‘an organical structure such as that of the brain’ (although he was not making a strict identity claim as we might understand it, post-Smart and Armstrong)? One issue here is that of Priestley's source of ‘empirical data’ regarding the correlation and indeed identification of mental and cerebral processes. David Hartley’s theory in his 1749 Observations on Man was, as is well known, republished in abridged form by Priestley, but he discards Hartley's 'vibratory neurophysiology' while retaining the associationist framework, although not because he disagreed with the former. Yet Hartley was at the very least, strongly agnostic about metaphysical issues (and it is difficult to study these authors while bracketing off religious considerations). One could see Locke and Hartley as articulating programs for the study of the mind which were more or less naturalistic (more strongly so in Hartley’s case) while avoiding ‘materialism’ per se; in contrast, Priestley bit the (materialist) bullet. In this paper I examine Priestley’s appropriation and reconstruction of this ‘micro-tradition’, while emphasizing its problems. (shrink)

This book is comprised of essays previously published in Philosophy & Public Affairs and also an extended excerpt from Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars.

" Nous avons en nous un principe divin, et c'est ce principe qui constitue essentiellement l'homme. N'écoutons donc pas ceux qui veulent que l'homme ne vive que pour les choses mortelles. Nous devons, au contraire, vivre par ce qu'il y a de sublime en nous, par le principe divin qui fait notre grandeur et notre dignité. " (Charles Werner) L'ouvrage marque l'enchaînement des différents systèmes avec une telle netteté que nul n'en retirera l'impression fausse de théories disparates se succédant (...) au hasard. C'est au contraire une véritable histoire qui se déroule sous nos yeux, celle d'une pensée vivante émergeant peu à peu des cosmogonies primitives, et aboutissant aux spéculations complexes et raffinées de Platon et Aristote, pour fléchir ensuite et se relever une dernière fois avec Plotin. (shrink)

Population ethics contains several principles that avoid the repugnant conclusion. These rules rank all possible alternatives, leaving no room for moral ambiguity. Building on a suggestion of Parfit, this paper characterizes principles that provide incomplete but ethically attractive rankings of alternatives with different population sizes. All of them rank same-number alternatives with generalized utilitarianism.

Although primary source work is a major component of undergraduate history degrees in many countries, the topic of how best to support this work has been relatively unexplored. This article addresses the pedagogical support of primary source work by reviewing relevant literature to identify the challenges undergraduates face in interpreting sources, and examining how in two courses carefully articulated course design and supportive teaching activities assisted students to meet these challenges. This fine-grained examination of the courses is framed within a (...) socio-cultural account of learning. The findings show how a skilful drawing of students into the interpretive/discursive practices of source analysis was associated with an epistemological reframing of historical knowledge and dialogical forms of teaching that helped the students to take forward a dialectical engagement with sources. The benefits of an ‘integrated’ approach to source work that fosters students’ affective and intellectual engagement with historical interpretive practices are highlighted. (shrink)

The notion that there is a category mistake or some other conceptual confusion in regarding seeing, hearing, and other forms of perception as events, states, or processes is incorrect. Ryle's analysis of "seeing" as an achievement word does not rule out our regarding seeing as an event, but in fact suggests that we do so when we carry the analysis beyond the point where Ryle leaves it. Furthermore there are uses of "see" not noticed by Ryle which justify our saying (...) that within certain contexts seeing is a state and within other contexts a process. The question of what these events, states, and processes are cannot be met without recognizing a fundamental duality of aspect that characterizes perception. This duality can be formulated in terms of the way perception is known. One who observes a perceiver knows the perceiver's perception in a categorically different way than the perceiver knows it. From this it can be seen that perceptual events, states, and processes have both a physical aspect and an epistemological aspect. Any attempt to reduce one of these aspects to the other would involve a category mistake. (shrink)

The papers gathered in this volume offer precise investigations of the historical and philosophical grounds for the first medieval commentaries on the ...

In October 1984, Bruno Huisman stated with regards to Jean Cavaillès, ‘Let us be honest, or at least realistic: today, one can be a professor of philosophy without ever having read a single line of Cavaillès. Often invoked, sometimes quoted, the oeuvre of Cavaillès is little attended for itself’ (Huisman 1984). As for Albert Lautman, it would seem that the situation is even more extreme. In 1994, the publisher Hermann, under the impetus of Bruno Huisman and George Canguilhem, collected almost (...) the totality of the Jean Cavaillès papers in one volume (Oeuvres complètes de philosophie des sciences (Cavaillès 1994)). But, the Essai sur l’unité des mathématiques et divers écrits (Lautman 1977), published by the Union générale d’Éditions in 1977, had all but disappeared by the early 1980s and yet was never republished! This will remain one of the great indignities of French publishing, for as Jean Petitot rightly affirms: ‘Regarded as too speculative, in spite of his exceptional mathematical scholarship and his close connection with Hilbertian axiomatic structuralism, his mathematical philosophy has, until now, been devoid of any particular attention …. We would like to state clearly from the start, Albert Lautman represents, in our view, without exaggeration, one of the most inspired philosophers of this century’ (Petitot 1987, 79-80). (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The theme of this paper is that positivism, whether old or new, is a version of the doctrine of Protagoras, that man is the measure of things. Certain limitations of the human mind are mistaken for characteristics of the universe. I am not primarily concerned with the particular views of actual positivists, but with a general alternative of thought. If no one is in all respects a positivist in the sense criticized in this article, it is certainly true that there (...) are many who would not accept what I suggest is the only satisfactory alternative to positivism; so that existent positivisms will, if my reasoning is correct, consist in more or less arbitrary compromises between the unmitigated form, and the real overcoming, of that anthropomorphic narrowness which all positivism involves. (shrink)

Foucault’s invitation to the subject is to become free of themselves by learning to think differently. Such a project has as its goal the mastery of the self, and can be understood as a Foucaultian ‘politics of ourselves’. Foucault’s ethical turn is an invitation for subjectivity to undertake its own radical education. Whilst this invitation has characteristics unique to Foucault’s philosophical discipline, I argue that it sheds light upon a diversity of practices of subjectivity from the psychotherapeutic and mystic traditions. (...) By seeing these currently available technologies of self in the Foucaultian lens we are given the opportunity to appreciate their work on subjectivity as necessarily political and social, a radical education not limited to the realm of individualistic aspiration and narcissistic temptations. The paper concludes by drawing attention to some implications for education, and for a teacher education that embraces the ‘radical reflexivity’ of some psycho-spiritual practices. (shrink)

Examining the sapir-Whorf hypothesis, The author addresses the questions whether language affects perception and whether grammatical categories affect conceptual categories. He argues that advocates of linguistic relativity have attributed to language an unjustified degree of causal efficacy and that linguistic idealism is contradicted by the results of experimental psychology. Then, Considering the claimed correlation between grammatical and conceptual categories, He argues that grammar has no metaphysics and does not influence thought. The author concludes that language in use embodies a point (...) of view only in the weak sense that relations and distinctions implicit in necessary concepts constitute a philosophical theory about reality. (staff). (shrink)

Most of the sciences of social behavior arose initially out of social ethics. The question asked is whether social ethics can revive itself as a central occupation of social thought. Such a revival faces the challenge of rethinking the normative foundations of late modern, global conditions which themselves are seen as inhospitable to the classic terms of philosophical and social ethic reflection. Though the privileged doubt it, the world is in fact inclining towards stark conditions of economic and natural instability, (...) to say nothing of social discord—towards a triage, or latter-day Malthusian, state. These conditions require a social ethics able to sustain itself, in the absence of global cultural accords, against a world in which social ideals of the good are uncertain, if not impossible. (shrink)

This paper is written in opposition of various antecedent discussions of Moore’s paradox. It concludes that one cannot make an honest and primary truth-claim by producing ‘p, but I believe not-p’.

In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault criticizes modern historiography for presupposing a factitious theory of the subject. Foucault rejects this presupposition and pursues an alternative style of historiography, organized by the analysis of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). Aiming his criticism solely at its theory of the purified subject, Foucault overlooks the deeper structural incoherence of modern historiography. This oversight leads Foucault to an uncritical embrace of a style of historiography that enacts its own form of purification. (...) In the reading developed here, Foucault systematically purges the history of class struggle from the analysis of self-care. This essay introduces the outlines of a Marxian approach to ancient practices of care of the self that is nonreductive and nondeterminist in and through a reading of Foucault. In this approach, the organization of classes and the practices of care of the self that materialize within a society are to be understood historically as constantly shaping and influencing one another. (shrink)

A founder in 1830 of the National Colonization Society, Charles Tennant advocated government support for emigration to Britain's colonies as a means of alleviating poverty at home and boosting the workforce overseas. Briefly representing St Albans in Parliament, he later wrote treatises on contemporary political and financial questions, notably arguing for the abolition of income tax in The People's Blue Book. Also published anonymously, the present work, which appeared in 1864, offers a critique of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism. Tennant (...) argues that happiness does not consist in utility, but rather in conformity to divine will as described by the Christian faith. Nevertheless, Tennant says, we ought to promote utility, as this is likely to be conducive to happiness. He then applies this view in detail to contemporary problems of government, domestic policy, taxation, colonies, dependencies, and foreign policy. (shrink)