Descartes est, dans le fait, le vrai fondateur de la philosophie moderne, en tant qu'elle prend la pensée pour principe. L'action de cet homme sur son siècle et sur les temps nouveaux ne sera jamais exagérée. C'est un héros ; il a repris les choses par les commencements, et il a retrouvé de nouveau le vrai sol de la philosophie, auquel elle est revenue après un égarement de mille ans. 1637, c'est la date de la publication du Discours de la (...) méthode, de René Descartes - véritable déclaration des droits et des pouvoirs de la Raison sur un monde qu'elle domine et organise. Toute la pensée moderne est née de cet ouvrage dont la langue, dense mais toujours claire, n'a pas vieilli. (shrink)

Gauge symmetries play a central role, both in the mathematical foundations as well as the conceptual construction of modern (particle) physics theories. However, it is yet unclear whether they form a necessary component of theories, or whether they can be eliminated. It is also unclear whether they are merely an auxiliary tool to simplify (and possibly localize) calculations or whether they contain independent information. Therefore their status, both in physics and philosophy of physics, remains to be fully clarified. In this (...) overview we review the current state of affairs on both the philosophy and the physics side. In particular, we focus on the circumstances in which the restriction of gauge theories to gauge invariant information on an observable level is warranted, using the Brout-Englert-Higgs theory as an example of particular current importance. Finally, we determine a set of yet to be answered questions to clarify the status of gauge symmetries. (shrink)

This article sets down the foundations of a research project on Health and Physical Education (HPE) teachers’ job satisfaction and job embededness. According to the literature, HPE teachers has a weak status inside and outside school which may conduct to professional marginalization. After describing the situation of the teaching profession in the province of Québec, the focus is directed toward HPE as a teaching specialty. A conceptual framework that articulates job satisfaction and job embededness models is then proposed. In conclusion (...) of this theoretical reflexion, considering the actual teacher shortage, school organizations are invited to adhere to a more sustainable approach of teaching resources management. (shrink)

New concepts may prove necessary to profit from the avalanche of sequence data on the genome, transcriptome, proteome and interactome and to relate this information to cell physiology. Here, we focus on the concept of large activity-based structures, or hyperstructures, in which a variety of types of molecules are brought together to perform a function. We review the evidence for the existence of hyperstructures responsible for the initiation of DNA replication, the sequestration of newly replicated origins of replication, cell division (...) and for metabolism. The processes responsible for hyperstructure formation include changes in enzyme affinities due to metabolite-induction, lipid-protein affinities, elevated local concentrations of proteins and their binding sites on DNA and RNA, and transertion. Experimental techniques exist that can be used to study hyperstructures and we review some of the ones less familiar to biologists. Finally, we speculate on how a variety of in silico approaches involving cellular automata and multi-agent systems could be combined to develop new concepts in the form of an Integrated cell (I-cell) which would undergo selection for growth and survival in a world of artificial microbiology. (shrink)

François Nault | Résumé : Dans cet article, je vais aborder la question de l’identité du théologien : qui est théologien dans l’Église ? Je vais aborder les positions du dernier Concile, de Jean-Luc Marion, d’Yves Congar, de Karl Barth et enfin de René-Michel Roberge. |: In this paper, I will address the question of the identity of the theologian : who may pretend to be theologian in the Church ? I will present the positions of Vatican II, (...) Jean-Luc Marion, Yves Congar, Karl Barth and René-Michel Roberge. (shrink)

This article reports on a historical investigation carried out on the conical object MIN000-3519 preserved in the mineralogy collections of the Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle at Paris (France). The mineralogist René-Just Haüy (1743-1822) included this object, cut in a single pyrite (FeS2) crystal, in his working collection with the references ‘Sulphured iron, mirror of the Incas, of Peru, M. de Jussieu’. All of the research lines followed lead the author to Joseph de Jussieu (1704-1779) and his shipments of botanical (...) specimens and various other samples from South America. As a member of the Godin-La Condamine-Bouguer geodesic expedition on the equator (1735-1743), he returned to France only after 36 years (1771), ill, exhausted and dispossessed of the scientific product of his Andean collections. This pyrite mirror is important because, in addition to appearing to be the only archaeological object that can be linked to Joseph's peregrinations in America, it resembles other specimens found at sites of the Cañaris culture (500-1500 AD) in Ecuador. Preserved within the de Jussieu family, this object would presumably have been given to Haüy by Joseph's heirs, his nephews Antoine-Laurent (1748-1836) or Laurent-Pierre (1792-1866), with whom he had close ties. (shrink)

The rise of big digital data is changing the framework within which linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other researchers are working. Semiotics is not spared by this paradigm shift. A data-driven computational semiotics is the study with an intensive use of computational methods of patterns in human-created contents related to semiotic phenomena. One of the most promising frameworks in this research program is the Semantic Vector Space (SVS) models and their methods. The objective of this article is to contribute to the (...) exploration of the SVS for a computational semiotics by showing what types of semiotic analysis can be accomplished within this framework. The study is applied to a unique body of digitized artworks. We conducted three short experiments in which we explore three types of semiotic analysis: paradigmatic analysis, componential analysis, and topic modelling analysis. The results reported show that the SVS constitutes a powerful framework within which various types of semiotic analysis can be carried out. (shrink)

Summary At the beginning of the 1730s René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur published two long memoirs on a new type of thermometer equipped with a specially calibrated scale — known ever since as the Réaumur scale. It became one of the most common ‘standardized’ thermometers in Europe until the late nineteenth century. What made this thermometer so successful? What was it specifically? I will first argue that the real Réaumur thermometer as an instrument was a fiction, a ghost — (...) an idealized instrument. On paper, it was theoretically flawless. In reality, the standardized Réaumur thermometer was most likely never achieved. This article shows that its success was essentially due to a recontextualisation from theoretical natural philosophy — Réaumur's principle of uniformity — to: 1) the context of artisanal knowledge and practices and 2) the context of making and reporting in the Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences actual measurements done in the field (in Paris at the Observatory, in Provincial France, in the Colonies, and in the rest of Europe). Réaumur's thermometer was essentially a theoretical method to which was associated a particular scale. It was the instrument's reification for market consumption and fieldwork that gave this specific type of thermometer materiality and authority. Although most Réaumur thermometers ever made were strikingly different from one another, over time the thermomètre de Réaumur designation became a brand, a seal of approval born from customary artisanal practices and cultural habitudes. (shrink)

According to a broadly accepted interpretation, the doubt of the First Meditation gets stronger due to an increasing effectiveness of the reasons for said doubt. I defend a deflationary reading of the doubt of the Meditations insofar as the sceptical arguments used by René Descartes gradually lose power. This reading is obviously not without consequences, which will be mentioned in the conclusion, for the interpretation of the exercise of doubt and, more fundamentally, of the Cartesian doctrine of knowledge.

The article aims to understand the notion underlying the term “revolution” in René de Chateaubriand’s Essay on Revolutions, making particular reference not only to the substantial notes of the 1826 re-edition, provided by the author himself, but also to the conceptual constellation surrounding the nascent concept of revolution, in particular “history” and “revolutionary rupture”.

In the concluding pages of his first major book, Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, René Girard asserts that “Toutes les conclusions romanesques sont des conversions. Personne ne peut en douter” (All novelistic conclusions are conversions; it is impossible to doubt this).1 By this he means simply that there comes a moment when both the great novelists whom he studies and their characters recognize a fundamental truth that dramatically changes them: a life founded on human desire alone can end only (...) in misery and failure. Although not necessarily religious in nature, this novelistic conversion, as Robert Doran puts it in his recent edition of Girard’s uncollected writings on literature and literary theory .. (shrink)

Many contemporary social epistemologists take themselves to be combatting an individualist approach to knowledge typified by Descartes. Although I agree that Descartes presents an individualist picture of scientific knowledge, he does allow some practical roles for reliance on the testimony and beliefs of others. More importantly, however, his reasons for committing to individualism raise important issues for social epistemology, particularly about how reliance on mere testimony can propagate prejudices and inhibit genuine understanding. The implications of his views are worked out (...) more fully by some of his immediate successors; I examine how François Poulain de la Barre, and (briefly) Mary Astell analyze the social conditions for epistemic agency in a Cartesian vein. (shrink)

Le XIXe siècle fut la grande époque de l'Histoire. On y croyait avec une force et une foi sans faille, on s'est mis à la pratiquer méthodiquement avec pour ambition de la hisser au rang de science, le roman s'en est emparé... Véritable théologie des temps modernes, trait d'union entre passé, présent et futur, elle organisait le monde et lui donnait un sens. Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui, où « faire de l'histoire » se signifie plus, comme chez Chateaubriand, jouer un rôle (...) politique, être moteur des événements, mais simplement être historien, avoir fait des études et obtenu des diplômes justifiant ce titre? Peut-on encore croire en l'Histoire? Y croire implique-t-il de croire qu'elle a un sens? Qui fait l'Histoire et qu'est-ce que qu'écrire l'Histoire? Le concept moderne est-il définitivement dépassé? Poursuivant une réflexion entamée dans ses précédents ouvrages, notamment dans Évidence de l'histoire, dialoguant avec les artistes (trois commentaires d'image ponctuent le livre), les écrivains (de Balzac à McCarthy), les historiens (Spengler, Toynbee), François Hartog montre comment l'évolution du concept d'histoire est significatif du basculement progressif de notre rapport au temps : on assiste à une fermeture du futur et à l'essor d'un présent omniprésent, mais aussi à une montée de la « mémoire » (lois mémorielles, devoir de mémoire, droit à la mémoire...). L'avenir disparaît de nos horizons, devient imprévisible, « infigurable » ; ce n'est plus l'Histoire qui juge : elle est jugée. Grand objet de croyance de l'époque moderne (avec ses dévots, ses martyrs, ses hérétiques et ses traîtres), l'Histoire semble bien être entrée dans l'ère de doute. Quelle peut dès lors être encore la mission de l'historien? (shrink)

The standard view of logical form is that logical forms are synthetic structures which are the forms of sentences and of other linguistic entities. This is often associated with a more general linguistic view of logic which is articulated in different ways by various authors. This paper contains a critical discussion of such linguistic approaches to logical form, with special emphasis on Quine’s formulation of a logical grammar in Philosophy of Logic. An account of logical forms as higher-order properties, which (...) essentially builds on Frege’s analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, is suggested at the end. (shrink)

Ontology played a very large role in Quine’s philosophy and was one of his major preoccupations from the early 30’s to the end of his life. His work on ontology provided a basic framework for most of the discussions of ontology in analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. There are three main themes (and several sub-themes) that Quine developed in his work. The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential commitments of a theory? The second (...) is ontological reduction: How can an ontology be reduced to (or substituted by) another? And what is the most economical ontology that can be obtained for certain given purposes? The third is criteria of identity: When are entities of some kind (sets, properties, material objects, propositions, meanings, etc.) the same or different? In this paper I discuss Quine’s development of these three themes and some of the problems that were aised in connection with his work. (shrink)

Otávio Bueno gives a positive and accurate summary of my defense of Platonism, with special emphasis on the epistemological issues. He criticizes “skeptical nominalism”, and proposes instead an “agnostic nominalism”, which treats mathematical objects as “objects of thought”, and neither rejects nor accepts abstract entities. In my response I argue that the main problem for nominalism is to account for abstract properties and relations, and that treating mathematical objects as objects of thought does not provide a satisfactory solution to that (...) end.Otávio Bueno apresenta um resumo positivo e correto de minha defesa do Platonismo, com ênfase especial nos aspectos epistemológicos. Ele critica o “nominalismo cético” e propõe um “nominalismo agnóstico” que trata os objetos matemáticos como “objetos de pensamento”, sem rejeitar ou aceitar entes abstratos. Em minha réplica argumento que o problema principal para o nominalismo é dar conta das propriedades e relações abstratas, e que tratar os objetos matemáticos como objetos de pensamento não é uma solução satisfatória para esse fim. (shrink)

In §1 I examine Boole’s “principle of wholistic reference” in relation to Frege’s postulation of truth-values as referents for sentences. I also consider in this connection Frege’s interpretation of quantification and his view that functions and concepts must be defined for all objects. I then present my own contrasting views on the reference of sentences. In §2 I discuss Boole’s introduction of the notion of universe of discourse and consider whether one of the issues implicit in John’s paper is a (...) confrontation between absolute interpretations of logic and relativistic interpretations of logic. I conclude with a brief examination of Tarski’s views on this issue. (shrink)

Classical logic is often characterized through certain laws such as bi-valence and sharpness of concepts, among others. My view is that its most fundamental feature is a commitment to an objective conception of truth, which goes together with a realistic metaphysical view. Truth is objective in that it derives from the nature of reality, and is not dependent on beliefs, theories, practices, and the like. Classical logic is a theory of logical properties, logical truths, and logical states of affairs.

After some preliminary remarks in §1, I argue in §2 that Claudio’s considerations about my treatment of Quine’s Bizet-Verdi counterfactuals do not constitute a difficulty for the structural analysis of such counterfactuals. I discuss some of his other examples and argue that counterfactuals are ambiguous both structurally and contextually. I conclude with an examination of the principle of transitivity for counterfactuals.

Abel Lasalle Casanave’s comments on the rhetorical and dialectical aspects of the discussion of proof in chapters 19 to 21. I center most of my response on two issues raised in his concluding questions; the first being the hermeneutic aspect of the development of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge, and the second “the symbolic conception of mathematics” and the “algebraic mode of thought”.As considerações de Abel Lasalle Casanave dizem respeito aos aspectos retóricos e dialéticos da discussão da noção de prova (...) nos capítulos 19 à 21, e minha réplica está centrada em duas questões levantadas em suas observações finais. A primeira refere-se ao aspecto hermenêutico do desenvolvimento da matemática e do conhecimento matemático; e a segunda à “concepção simbólica da matemática” e ao “modo algébrico de pensar”. (shrink)

My disagreement with the deflationist treatment of truth affects my attitude to Paul Horwich’s approach to meaning and intentionality. In my response I summarize objections to the deflationist account of truth developed in some detail in chapters 2, 7, and 12, and argue that the notion of intentionality should be treated naturalistically in a broader context than the context of the referential import of the locution “means that”.Minha discordância com a visão deflacionista da verdade afeta minha atitude em relação às (...) propostas deflacionistas de Paul Horwich para a intencio-nalidade. Em minha réplica faço um resumo das objeções ao deflacionismo em relação à verdade, detalhadas nos capítulos 2, 7 e 12, e argumento que a noção de intencionalidade deveria ser tratada naturalisticamente em um contexto mais amplo que o contexto do alcance referencial da locução “significa que”. (shrink)

In §§1-2 I argue that Marco misidentifies my main objections to the Church and Gödel slingshot arguments and that his defense of these arguments does not overcome those objections. In §3 I discuss his criticisms of my theory of descriptions in relation to Church’s argument.

Guido Imaguire proposes an epistemological formulation of Ockham’s razor in terms of the notion of explanatory reduction. Although in my response I express reservations about some aspects of the specific formulations, I agree with the general epistemological idea.Guido Imaguire propõe uma formulação epistemológica da navalha de Occam em termos da noção de redução explicativa. Apesar de em minha réplica expressar reservas com respeito à alguns aspectos das formulações, concordo com a idéia geral epistemológica.

In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity and (...) negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions. (shrink)

O artigo de Goodman “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” teve um papel central no debate relativo a análise adequada dos condicionais contrafactuais. A seguir examinarei o artigo de Goodman em detalhe e discutirei algumas objeções e sugestões de Parry em seu artigo “A Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. Restringirei minha discussão ao “problema das condições relevantes”, assim denominado por Goodman, que é o tema principal das críticas de Parry e que considero ser o problema principal para a abordagem (...) de Goodman. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p383. (shrink)

Goodman’s paper “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” played a central role in the debate concerning the proper analysis of counterfactual conditionals. In what follows I examine Goodman’s paper in detail and discuss objections and suggestions by Parry in his “Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. I restrict my discussion to what Goodman termed “the problem of relevant conditions”, which is the main subject of Parry’s criticism, and which I also consider to be the central issue for Goodman’s approach.

The question that I discuss in this paper is whether Frege has a criterion of identity for the objects the True and the False that he introduces as denotation of sentences. My answer is that he does not, either in general or within the system of Basic Laws.

Walter Carnielli argues that my position about knowledge and justification emphasizes individual knowledge, is too demanding, and is anti-psychologistic. In my response I argue that this reflects a misunderstanding of the view of knowledge and justification sketched in my book, and that our views on these issues are much closer than he imagines.Walter Carnielli argumenta que minha posição com respeito ao conhecimento e à justificação enfatiza o conhecimento individual, é demasiadamente exigente e é anti-psicologista. Em minha réplica argumento que isto (...) reflete um mal entendido em relação ao ponto de vista sobre conhecimento e justificação esboçado em meu livro, e que nossas visões dessas questões são muito mais próximas do que ele imagina. (shrink)