In this Article, we explore the practices of extensive data collection among sharing economy platforms, highlighting how the unknown future value of big data creates an ethical problem for a fair exchange relationship between companies and users. Specifically, we present a typology with four scenarios related to the future value of data. In the remainder of the Article, we first describe the status quo of data collection practices in the sharing economy, followed by a discussion of the value-generating affordances of (...) big data. We then introduce the typology of four scenarios for the future value of data. Finally, the paper concludes with a short discussion on the implications of information asymmetries for a fair exchange process. (shrink)

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even (...) if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where 'U' stands for the 'usual' fairness notion, and S-fairness, where 'S' stands for the 'sequential' aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an 'eclipse' of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors' choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness. (shrink)

We agree with MacNeilage's claim that speech stems from a volitional vocalization pathway between the cingulate and the supplementary motor area (SMA). We add the vocal self- monitoring system as the first recruitment of the Broca-Wernicke circuit. SMA control for “frames” is supported by wrong consonant-vowel recurring utterance aphasia and an imaging study of quasi-reiterant speech. The role of Broca's area is questioned in the emergence of “content,” because a primary motor mapping, embodying peripheral constraints, seems sufficient. Finally, we reject (...) a uniquely peripheral account of speech emergence. (shrink)

One challenge of societies in the 21st century is the conflict of norms between different cultures. In Ancient Greece, too, such conflicts arose, and great thinkers offered great solutions. In this contribution we will argue for the following: - Ancient ethical theories were not only individual ethical theories but also social ethical theories (II). - The ancient methods of scientific examinations are useful not only in classical sciences but also in ethics (III). - Accepting the result of (III) yields highly (...) interesting theoretical results about conflicts of norms between different cultures (IV). (shrink)

Martin Heidegger hat die klassisch-metaphysische Ontologie als eine Ontologie der Vorhandenheit gelesen und einer scharfen Kritik unterzogen. Emmanuel Levinas und Heinrich Barth versuchen beide, in expliziter Absetzung von Heidegger, noch einen Schritt darüber hinaus zu tun und den ontologischen Horizont als solchen aufzubrechen. Der vorliegende Beitrag fragt danach, von welchen Bedingungen die Glaubwürdigkeit einer solchen Intention abhängt, und sieht diese Bedingungen in der am Leitfaden der Stichworte der ,,Vertikalität" und einer ,,Integration des Nicht-Intergrierbaren" interpretierten Philosophie Heinrich Barths in exemplarischer Weise (...) erfüllt. (shrink)

This paper presents two approaches to creativity needed to solve problems.: the Brainstorming from Osborn and the Synectics from Gordon. By a comparison between these two disconnection processes, we try to appreciate the contributions and limits of creativity methods to practical problem solving.

A poset is well‐partially ordered (WPO) if all its linear extensions are well orders; the supremum of ordered types of these linear extensions is the length, of p. We prove that if the vertex set X is infinite, of cardinality κ, and the ordering ⩽ is the intersection of finitely many well partial orderings of X,, then, letting, with, denote the euclidian division by κ (seen as an initial ordinal) of the length of each corresponding poset: where denotes the least (...) initial ordinal greater than the ordinal. This inequality is optimal. This result answers questions of Forster. (shrink)

Starting from the fundamental role which is assigned to solidarity in politics and society, the essay tries to answer the question of whether or not solidarity still functions accordingly. Observations showing that there are deficits in the actual ways expression is given to solidarity cause the search for the reasons. In this context attention is drawn to a close interrelationship between a highly developed welfare - state and its administering corporate solidarity on the one band and an almost hypertrophied individualism (...) which feels itself widely released from acting in solidarity on the other band. Both has led to lessen sensitivity for the need of cultivating a personal sense of solidarity. To meet individual needs as weil as social requirements, it seems necessary to find an new balance. (shrink)

Societal decisions regarding the possible granting of permission for industrial and power plants, waste disposals, traffic routes and other facilities implementing modern science and technology (here simply called technology-decisions) often provoke debates regarding the risks involved. A main theme in these debates concerns the magnitudes of these risks and whether or not they are worth taking to reach some aim. This is also a main theme in traditional risk-analysis and critical discussions of risk-management. However, sometimes the fact that some people (...) do not want to be exposed to the risks in question has been suggested as an independent argument, i.e. regardless of the magnitudes of these risks. A well known phenomenon in this respect on the local and national level is what has been labelled "not in my backyard" (NIMBY), but the argument also has been used on an international level. In accordance, the view that unwanted risks are less acceptable than wanted or indifferent ones (regardless of their magnitudes) has been proposed as being highly relevant for technology-decisions. The paper explores to what extent there are good reasons for accepting such a proposal. The main part of the paper is devoted to an examination of the extent to which the view that unwanted risks are less acceptable than wanted ones can be supported by, on the one hand, welfare-based ethical theories underlying standard models for risk-analysis, such as utilitarianism, and, on the other, a moral requirement to respect the autonomy of individual persons. Also, the very concept of an unwanted risk is explored and some peculiarities are noted. It is argued that no categorical impermissibility of exposing people to unwanted risks can be supported. However, there are still good reasons for policy-makers to consider the degree to which risks are unwanted as a factor in technology-decisions that is relevant independently of the welfare-gains at stake. In particular, policy-makers should avoid paternalism in risk-management, i.e.. (shrink)

In der als wissenschaftliche Disziplin noch recht jungen WirtschaftsethikWirtschaftsethik geht es um das Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Moral. Jemand kann – so die Grundannahme – wirtschaftlich handeln, ohne moralisch zu handeln und jemand kann moralisch handeln, ohne wirtschaftlich zu handeln. In den meisten wirtschaftsethischen Ansätzen wird der Moral ein normativer Vorrang vor der Wirtschaft eingeräumt.

The philosophical parting of the ways between Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology and the Philosophical anthropology of Plessner is well known. Today, however, after the publication of the »Schwarze Hefte«, new aspects of their differences come to light. Accordingly, this article focusses on the purpose of death discussed in »Die Stufen des Organischen« as a genuine thought Plessner inscribed into 20th century philosophy. It argues that the most peculiar difference is to be found in Plessner’s view on death not as a simple (...) element of life but as an external phe- nomenon. In contrast to Plessner, Heidegger’s »Schwarze Hefte« seem to present more of an eschatology than a systematical approach to human self and world. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 29-46.

Ciceros Dialog De re publica endet mit der Schilderung des berühmten Traums des Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, eine der Hauptpersonen des Dialogs, in dem er detailliert die Erfahrung einer Vision des fast unermesslich großen Weltgebäudes – mit der kleinen Erdkugel in der Mitte – beschreibt. Dieser Text, der paradoxerweise gerade dadurch Anspruch auf objektive Wahrheit erhebt, dass er sich als subjektive Traumerfahrung präsentiert, ist außerordentlich einflussreich gewesen und bestimmte für Jahrhunderte die Weltvorstellung des westlichen Mittelalters. Unbestritten ist, dass Scipios Traumvision (...) eines geozentrischen Universums das Produkt einer langen, bis weit in die Antike reichenden Tradition kosmologischer Spekulation ist, welche maßgeblich von Platon, Aristoteles und Ptolemaios geprägt worden war. (shrink)