Fitch´s problem and the "knowability paradox" involve a couple of argumentations that are to each other in the same relation as Cantor´s uncollected multitudes theorem and Russell´s paradox. The authors exhibit the logical nature of the theorem and of the paradox and show their philosophical import, both from an anti-realist and from a realist perspective. In particular, the authors discuss an anti-realist solution to Fitch´s problem and provide an anti-realist interpretation of the problematic statement "It is knowable that r is (...) known and yet unknown". Then, it is argued that the knowability paradox has a solution even if one adopts a realist point of view. The authors provide a solution that takes into account the ambiguity of the term 'knowability' by deploying a temporal possible world semantics for epistemic modalities. (shrink)

Temas actuales de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica 143 John Corcoran Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic: Aristotle, Boole, and Tarski 177 Ignacio ...