Results for 'Condorcet paradox'

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  1.  35
    The paradoxical perfection of perfectibilité: from Rousseau to Condorcet.John T. Scott - 2024 - History of European Ideas 50 (2):211-227.
    Rousseau coined the term perfectibilité to name what he claimed was the faculty that distinguished human beings from other animals. Although Rousseau himself largely associated perfectibility with the tendency of the human race to become corrupt, later thinkers adopted his term but then transformed it into a concept denoting the human capacity for progress. This article has two goals. The first goal is to analyse Rousseau’s discussion of perfectibilité in order to identify a specifically Rousseauean of perfectibilité. I identify three (...)
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  2. Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences.William V. Gehrlein - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
    Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by (...)
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  3.  33
    Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes.Conal Duddy - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):275-285.
    We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded by a lower-ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may (...)
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  4.  88
    Condorcet's paradox.William V. Gehrlein - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (2):161-197.
  5.  34
    Condorcet-Style Paradoxes for Majority Rule with Infinite Candidates.Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (3):123-140.
    This paper presents two possibility results and one impossibility result about a situation with three voters under a pairwise majoritarian aggregation function voting on a countably infi nite number of candidates. First, from individual orders with no maximal or minimal element, it is possible to generate an aggregate order with a maximal or minimal element. Second, from dense individual orders, it is possible to generate a discrete aggregate order. Finally, I show that, from discrete orders with a particular property, namely (...)
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  6. Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as (...)
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  7.  20
    Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers.Wesley Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2023 - Public Choice 197:1-62.
    We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both (...)
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  8.  18
    The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk.David Butler & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of (...)
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  9.  92
    Paradoxes of Rationality.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling, The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen provides a panoramic view of paradoxes of theoretical and practical rationality. These puzzles are organized as apparent counterexamples to attractive principles such as the principle of charity, the transitivity of preferences, and the principle that we should maximize expected utility. The following paradoxes are discussed: fearing fictions, the surprise test paradox, Pascal’s Wager, Pollock’s Ever Better wine, Newcomb’s problem, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Kavka’s paradoxes of deterrence, backward inductions, the bottle imp, the preface paradox, Moore’s problem, Buridan’s (...)
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  10.  58
    De doctrinale paradox.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 97 (1):XX.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  11.  22
    Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain: An Examination of the (in)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes.Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the (...)
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  12. Rational aggregation.Bruce Chapman - 2002 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):337-354.
    In two recent papers, Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the aggregation of reasoned judgements that is akin to the aggregation of the preference problem in social choice theory. 1 Indeed, List and Pettit prove a new general impossibility theorem for the aggregation of judgements, and provide a propositional interpretation of the social choice problem that suggests it is a special case of their impossibility result. 2 Specifically, they show that no judgement aggregation (...)
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  13. A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions.Christian Elsholtz & Christian List - 2005 - Elemente der Mathematik 60:45-56.
    Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, Sen identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen’s result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen’s condition. We discuss how Sen’s condition is logically related to a number of (...)
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  14. Aggregating sets of judgments: Two impossibility results compared.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
    The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, (...)
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  15.  95
    Three Unique Virtues of Approval Voting.Walter Horn - 2024 - Qeios (doi:10.32388/ZETKEQ.):1-10.
    Approval Voting offers advantages over other voting systems for single-winner elections. This manuscript analyzes three unique virtues of Approval Voting. First, the procedure does not violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion for rational choice. Second, it prevents manipulation of outcomes through agenda setting. Third, it avoids intransitive majority preference cycles like Condorcet paradoxes and so escapes Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem constraints. As a result of these virtues, which are generally not shared by its best known competitors, Approval voting emerges (...)
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  16. Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    (This is for the Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Marcus Rossberg) In this handbook entry, I survey the different ways in which formal mathematical methods have been applied to philosophical questions throughout the history of analytic philosophy. I consider: formalization in symbolic logic, with examples such as Aquinas’ third way and Anselm’s ontological argument; Bayesian confirmation theory, with examples such as the fine-tuning argument for God and the paradox of the ravens; foundations of mathematics, with examples such (...)
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  17. Optimizing Political Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic Competence and Dependence.Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, formally, an ambiguity in the exercise of political influence. To wit: A voter might exert influence with an eye toward maximizing the probability that the political system (1) obtains the correct (e.g. just) outcome, or (2) obtains the outcome that he judges to be correct (just). And these are two very different things. A variant of Condorcet's Jury Theorem which incorporates the effect of influence on group competence and interdependence is developed. (...)
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  18. (1 other version)Four Structures of Intransitive Preferences.Luc Bovens - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Routledge.
    I taxonomize a half-century of examples of intransitive preferences into four structures: (i) Cycles of Negligible-Value-Differences and Missing-Values; (ii) Condorcet-Voting-Paradox Style Cycles (iii) Sen’s-Libertarian-Paradox Style Cycles; and (iv) Sorites Cycles.
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  19.  95
    The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions.Christian List - 2005 - Social Choice and Welfare 24 (1):3-32.
    Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the (...) converges to 1, and when it converges to 0, as the number of individuals increases. Drawing on the Condorcet jury theorem and work by Bovens and Rabinowicz , I use the model to assess the “truth-tracking” performance of two decision procedures, the premise- and conclusion-based procedures. I compare the present results with existing results on the probability of Condorcet’s paradox. I suggest that the doctrinal paradox is likely to occur under plausible conditions. (shrink)
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  20. The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; (...)
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  21.  21
    Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg.Matthew Ryan - 2021 - Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):543-577.
    The Condorcet Jury Theorem formalises the “wisdom of crowds”: binary decisions made by majority vote are asymptotically correct as the number of voters tends to infinity. This classical result assumes like-minded, expected utility maximising voters who all share a common prior belief about the right decision. Ellis : 865–895, 2016) shows that when voters have ambiguous prior beliefs—a set of priors—and follow maxmin expected utility, such wisdom requires that voters’ beliefs satisfy a “disjoint posteriors” condition: different private signals lead (...)
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  22.  39
    Traductions et retraductions françaises de la Théorie des sentiments moraux d’Adam Smith. L’insoutenable légèreté de traduire.Michaël Biziou - 2013 - Noesis 21:229-263.
    La Théorie des sentiments moraux d’Adam Smith, publiée pour la première fois en anglais en 1759, a été traduite en français quatre fois dans la seconde moitié du xviiie siècle. Puis, après deux siècles de simples rééditions, durant le xixe siècle et jusqu’à la toute fin du xxe siècle, une nouvelle traduction française a paru en 1999. Le présent article commence par des considérations méthodologiques portant sur le statut de la traduction comme retraduction, montrant en quoi l’acte de retraduire peut (...)
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  23.  33
    Conditions on social-preference cycles.Susumu Cato - 2015 - Theory and Decision 79 (1):1-13.
    Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we (...)
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  24.  18
    An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting.Wesley H. Holliday - 2024 - Economics Letters 236:111589.
    In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, (...)
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  25. The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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  26. Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice: A Review.Christian List - 2018 - In André Bächtiger, Jane Mansbridge, John Dryzek & Mark Warren, Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford University Press.
    In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In (...)
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  27. Deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls.Christian List, Robert Luskin, James Fishkin & Iain McLean - 2013 - Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95.
    Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have (...)
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  28.  91
    Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion.Alan Hájek & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):897-919.
    Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximation to better, worse, and equally good, which we (...)
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  29.  43
    Sports Tournaments and Social Choice Theory.Rory Smead - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (2):28.
    Sports tournaments provide a procedure for producing a champion and ranking the contestants based on game results. As such, tournaments mirror aggregation methods in social choice theory, where diverse individual preferences are put together to form an overall social preference. This connection allows us a novel way of conceptualizing sports tournaments, their results, and significance. I argue that there are genuine intransitive dominance relationships in sports, that social choice theory provides a framework for understanding rankings in such situations and that (...)
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  30.  13
    An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - manuscript
    May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May's axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives. In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and avoid the so-called strong no show paradox. We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting method (...)
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  31.  57
    Complex collective decisions: an epistemic perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Associations: Journal for Social and Legal Theory 7 (X).
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  32.  16
    Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate.Dan S. Felsenthal - 2017 - Cham: Imprint: Springer. Edited by Hannu Nurmi.
    This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a (...)
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  33.  42
    Are good leaders truly good?Susumu Cato & Akira Inoue - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):437-446.
    This paper offers a new insight on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) in the theory of epistemic democracy. This theorem states that democratic decision-making leads us to correct outcomes under certain assumptions. One key assumption is the ‘independence condition’, which requires that voters form their beliefs independently when they vote. This paper examines the role of an opinion leader as an informational source, which potentially violates independence. We demonstrate that voters’ beliefs may be correlated in the presence of the (...)
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  34.  39
    Shapes of philosophical history.Stanley M. Daugert - 1968 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (2):171-172.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews,Shapes oS Philosophical History. By Frank E. Manuel. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.Pp. 166.$1.95.) Based upon his seven Camp Lectures of 1962 at Stanford, Professor Manuel has issued this taut and recondite volume describing the forms philosophical history has taken in the West. He has performed a difficult task well, giving much scholarly substance to his theme that two archetypal shapes of speculative history-writing have dominated Western thought, (...)
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  35.  27
    Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities.Saul Levmore - 2002 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 3 (1).
    This article takes on the puzzle of why many appellate courts insist on an outright majority decision as to the immediate outcome or disposition of a case, while tolerating a plurality decision as to the precedential message, or reasoning, attached to a case. Somewhat similarly, pluralities are respected in many political settings but then not, for example, in legislative assemblies. The argument builds both on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and on the problem of dealing with voting paradoxes, or cycles. (...)
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  36.  13
    La fortune de Pascal en France au dix-huitième siècle.Arnoux Straudo - 1997 - Oxford: Voltaire Foundation.
    Avant la parution des Lettres philosophiques de Voltaire, chaque grande famille intellectuelle examine la production pascalienne selon une perspective traditionelle. Après la XXV Lettre, où s'affrontent deux morales, deux épistémologies, deux conceptions de Dieu, le regard sur Pascal perd de son unité. Certes, parmi les écrivains des Lumières, l'anthropologie pascalienne est condamnée: la valorisation de l'amour propre, la croyance en l'idée de nature, le souci, le souci de bienfaisance, l'esprit de tolérance, le concept d'utilité, la foi dans le progrès et (...)
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  37.  73
    Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods.Dan S. Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (1):59-77.
    In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. (...)
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  38. Condorcet: selected writings.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet - 1976 - Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     
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  39.  29
    Condorcet: political writings.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet (ed.) - 2012 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794), the innovating founder of mathematical thinking in politics, was the last great philosophe of the French Enlightenment and a central figure in the early years of the French Revolution. His political writings give a compelling vision of human progress across world history and express the hopes of that time in the future perfectibility of man. This volume contains a revised translation of 'The Sketch', written while in hiding from the Jacobin Terror, together with lesser-known writings (...)
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  40. Democracy and argument: tracking truth in complex social decisions.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - In Anne van Aaken, Christian List & Christoph Luetge, Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Ashgate. pp. 143-157.
    Suppose a committee has to take a stand on a complex issue, where the decision presupposes answering a number of sub-questions. There is an agreement within the committee which sub-questions should be posed. All questions are of the ”yes or no?”-type and the main question is to be given the yes-answer if and only if each sub-question is answered with “yes”. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting (...)
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  41. Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  42. Sources of transitivity.Daniel Muñoz - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):285-306.
    Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.
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  43. (1 other version)The Political Theory of Condorcet.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, Fiona Sommerlad & Iain Mclean - 1989 - University of Oxford, Faculty of Social Studies.
     
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  44. (1 other version)There Are Preferences and Then There Are Preferences.Chrisoula Andreou - 2007 - In Barbara Montero and Mark D. White, Economics and the Mind.
    This paper draws a distinction between two closely related conceptions of 'preference' that is of great significance relative to a set of interrelated debates in rational choice theory. The distinction is particularly illuminating in relation to the idea that there is a rational defect inherent in individuals with intransitive preferences and, relatedly, in democratic collectives. I use the distinction to show that things are more complicated than they seem.
     
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  45. Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.Condorcet, O. H. Prior & Y. Belaval - 1974 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 164 (4):462-463.
     
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  46. Sketch for a historical picture of the progress of the human mind.Marquis de Condorcet - unknown
     
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  47.  25
    Freiheit, Revolution, Verfassung. Kleine Politische Schriften: Herausgegeben von Daniel Schulz.Marquis de Condorcet - 2010 - Akademie Verlag.
    Während Condorcets Schriften bislang nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Geschichtsphilosophie und mathematischen Entscheidungstheorie rezipiert wurden, präsentiert dieser Band Condorcet als einen zentralen politischen Ordnungsdenker der Französischen Revolution, als einen liberal-republikanischen Autor. Die in der Edition versammelten Quellentexte zeigen, dass er die menschenrechtlichen und demokratischen Leitideen am Ende des 18. Jh.s nachdrücklich artikulierte. Condorcets zentrales Anliegen besteht in der Suche nach einer institutionellen Form demokratischer Ordnung, die ein hohes Maß an bürgerschaftlicher Partizipation mit den liberalen Forderungen individueller Rechte verbindet. Die (...)
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  48.  12
    (1 other version)...Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, P. Daunou & Marie-Louise-Sophie de Grouchy Condorcet - 1933 - Paris,: Boivin et cie. Edited by Oliver H. Prior.
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  49. Sketch for a historical picture of the progress of the human mind.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet - 1955 - London,: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
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  50. Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet - 1966 - Paris: Editions sociales.
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