The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware (...) of linguistic trick can be the master of referential language. Another important question is that how could Quine’s radical translation thesis reduce into semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his confirmation method. I think that the notion and the analysis of meaning became hopelessly vague in Quine’s later work. I further argue on Quine’s position of meaning that I call, following Hilary Putnam, ‘meaning nihilism’. It seems to me that Quine had no belief like ‘meaning consists in’, or ‘meaning depends on’ something. Through this argument, I would like to challenge the confirmation holism that was foisted by Fodor on Quine’s thesis. My attempt would be to scrutinize Putnam’s point of view that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a meaning holist. I think that both Putnam and Quine denied the concept of constitutive connection of meaning as a second grade notion not only from the realm of semantic, but also from the perspective of epistemology. So, linguistic meaning cannot be formed by any sample of its uses. For Quine, the concept of meaning in metaphysics is heuristic and need not be taken seriously in any ‘science worthy’ literature. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware (...) of linguistic trick can be the master of referential language. Another important question is that how could Quine’s radical translation thesis reduce into semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his confirmation methord. Even I think that the notion and the analysis of meaning became hopelessly vague in Quine’s later work. I further argue on Quine’s position of meaning that I call, following Hilary Putnam, ‘meaning nihilism’. It seems to me that Quine had no belief like ‘meaning consists in’, or ‘meaning depends on’ something. Through this argument, I would like to challenge the confirmation holism that was foisted by Fodor on Quine’s thesis. My attempt would be to scrutinize Putnam’s point of view that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a meaning holist. I think that both Putnam and Quine denied the concept of constitutive connection of meaning as a second grade notion not only from the realm of semantic, but also from the perspective of epistemology. So, linguistic meaning cannot be formed by any sample of its uses. For Quine, the concept of meaning in metaphysics is heuristic and need not be taken seriously in any ‘science worthy’ literature. (shrink)

In this bold work of broad scope and rich erudition, Richard W. Miller sets out to reorient the philosophy of science.

Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. Instead, they use alternative statistical (...) tests that can measure the risk or the reliability in decision making, circumventing some of the theoretical problems in practice. Therefore, the theory is not very popular in hypothesis testing among scientists at present. However, there are some proponents of Bayesian hypothesis testing, and software packages are made available to accelerate utilization by scientists. Time will tell whether Bayesian confirmation theory can become both a leading theory and a widely practiced method. In addition, this theory can be used to model the belief of scientists when testing hypotheses. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to make a simple observation regarding the Johnson -Carnap continuum of inductive methods. From the outset, a common criticism of this continuum was its failure to permit the confirmation of universal generalizations: that is, if an event has unfailingly occurred in the past, the failure of the continuum to give some weight to the possibility that the event will continue to occur without fail in the future. The Johnson -Carnap continuum is the mathematical (...) consequence of an axiom termed Johnson 's sufficientness postulate, the thesis of this paper is that, properly viewed, the failure of the Johnson -Carnap continuum to confirm universal generalizations is not a deep fact, but rather an immediate consequence of the sufficientness postulate; and that if this postulate is modified in the minimal manner necessary to eliminate such an entailment, then the result is a new continuum that differs from the old one in precisely one respect: it enjoys the desideratum of confirming universal generalizations. (shrink)

This volume, the second in the Springer series Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, contains selected papers from the workshops organised by the ESF Research Networking Programme PSE (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective) in 2009. Five general topics are addressed: 1. Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science; 2. Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences; 3. Philosophy of the Cultural and Social Sciences; 4. Philosophy of the Physical Sciences; 5. History of the Philosophy of Science. (...) This volume is accordingly divided in five sections, each section containing papers coming from the meetings focussing on one of these five themes. However, these sections are not completely independent and detached from each other. For example, an important connecting thread running through a substantial number of papers in this volume is the concept of probability: probability plays a central role in present-day discussions in formal epistemology, in the philosophy of the physical sciences, and in general methodological debates---it is central in discussions concerning explanation, prediction and confirmation. The volume thus also attempts to represent the intellectual exchange between the various fields in the philosophy of science that was central in the ESF workshops. (shrink)

This study examines the methods students use to cheat on class examinations and suggests ways of deterring using an international sample from Australia, China, Ireland, and the United States. We also examine the level of cheating and reasons for cheating that prior research has highlighted as a method of demonstrating that our sample is equivalent to those in prior studies. Our results confirm the results of prior research that primarily employs students from the United States. The data indicate that (...) actions such as having multiple versions of the examination and scrambling the questions on these versions would deter cheating. In addition, given the increased level of cheating and students' increased perception of the social acceptability of cheating in college, the data provided by our international sample also suggest that some relatively simple precautions by instructors could dramatically reduce the level of cheating on in-class examinations. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to statistically verify the links of income and education with information and communication technology diffusion across 191 countries of the world taking into account a total of 9 indicators best representing the socio-economic variables. Design/methodology/approach Multivariate regression analysis was used as a prime method to rigorously test the relationships of income and education with ICT diffusion across 191 countries. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to analyze and predict patterns in the data. Findings (...) The results support the hypotheses that income and education are positively related to ICT diffusion. The findings statistically confirm that poverty is a leading cause of digital divide worldwide. Research limitations/implications Academic, policy and practice groups should work in collaboration to fight against digital divide. Present results also imply that digital divide shall never end but rather it can be controlled to an extent with multiple collaborative efforts. Originality/value Prior research assignments on the digital divide concentrate on exploring the links between few socio-economic and ICT variables in select few regions theoretically. The present work addresses this literature gap by developing and testing two hypotheses to statistically investigate the relationships between a broad set of socio-economic and ICT indicators. (shrink)

Legal reasoning on the requirements and application of law has been studied for centuries, but in this subject area the legal profession maintains predominantly the same stance it did in the time of the Ancient Greeks. There is a gap between the standards of proof, one which has been always demonstrated by percentages and in terms of the evaluation of these standards by percentages by mathematical or statistical methods. One method to fill the gap is Bayes theorem that describes (...) an event’s probability based on conditions that might be related to an event. Bayes theorem can help to establish or confirm a relation between facts and rules if there is sufficient other evidence that connect a party in a procedure with a considered legal action. (shrink)

Explication usually plays the role of the method of language revision. The paper sticks to the Carnapian project of explication and develops some of the formal requirements imposed on the explicatum. However, it departs from Carnap’s view when it comes to how to construe the simplicity condition. It is suggested that in some cases the simplicity condition, which in the Carnapian project plays the derived role with respect to the other three conditions—the similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness conditions—may be substantive (...) for the overall evaluation of explications. Based on a case study of three different explications of the H-D concept of confirmation :391–437, 1991; Erkenntnis 41:183–188, 1994; Gemes in Philos Sci 60:477–487, 1993; Erkenntnis 49:1–20, 1998; Sprenger in Philos Compass 6:497–508, 2011), we show that there are cases where competing explicata of a common explicandum satisfy the first three conditions equally well. In those cases, then, the simplicity condition is supposed to make the difference. However, instead of using Carnap’s construal of simplicity, we suggest a Principle of instrumental simplicity according to which, ceteris paribus, the simpler the explicatum is, the more likely is its ‘survival’ in competition with other explicata. Moreover, it is suggested that whereas the similarity, exactness and fruitfulness conditions are, in some sense, formal criteria, the simplicity condition is rather tested empirically. (shrink)

The argument from analogy is examined from the standpoint of Carnap's confirmation theory. Carnap's own discussion of analogy in relation to his c*— function is restricted to cases where the analogues are known to be similar, but not known to be different in any respect. It has been argued by the author in a previous work,, and by P. Achinstein, that typical analogy arguments involve known differences between the analogues as well as similarities. Achinstein shows that for such arguments (...) none of Carnap's Δ— system of conflrmation functions gives satisfactory values, and it is further shown in the present paper that for these arguments the confirmation never rises above its initial value, irrespective of evidence drown from an analogue. it is argued that even if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must in principle be capable of taking into account known differences between the instances of an inductive generalization. Hence Carnap's Δ— system is inadequate as an explication of both induction and analogy.Three conditions are stated as necessary for any confirmation theory which gives a satisfactory explication of analogical inference:I. If two individuals a and b are known to agree in certain properties and differ in others, and if in addition a has a further property, then the confirmation of the hypothesis that b also has this property is greater than its initial confirmation, at least if the weight of the similarities is sufficiently great compared with the weight of the differences.II. The confirmation‐value increases or decreases with the weight of the similarities between the analogues compared with the weight of their differences.III. The confirmation that b has a certain property is greater if a has that property than if a does not have it.The Δ— system sastisfles none of these conditions. Carnap and Stegmüller have now, however, presented a new anxiom system for confirmation functions. the — system, Which is introduced primarily to deal with languages whose primitive predicates fall into families such that each individual can only be qualified by one predicate of each family. They construct a c‐ function which, as well as dealing with a language having two families of such predicates, also depends, unlike the functions in the Δ— system, on similarities between otherwise different individuals. The system is not developed far enough in this Appendix to enable the authors to discuss the confirmation in analogy arguments satisfying conditions I — III above, but it is shown in the present paper that, with a simple generalization of the measure‐function defined by Carnap and Stegmüller, and in the simplest non‐trivial case, condition I — III are all satisfied, indeed a stronger form of condition I is satisfied, in which no known similarity of the analogues is postulated.Finally it is remarked that Carnap and Stegmüller's method of introducing their Δ— system is extremely arbitrary and ad hoc, and an alternative method of introducing is suggested. Bearing in mind the fundamental nature of the argument from analogy in all application of induction to the real world, it is suggesetd that the fundamental inductive inference needing explication is not the inference of‘P1b, from ‘P,1a, but the analogical infeence of‘P2b, from‘P1P2a.P1b,. It is posinitial confirmation of‘P2b, and the confirmation of‘P2b, given‘P2a” and that the later two confirmation‐values are equivalent to those in the Δ— system. It is then shown that Carnap and Stegmüller's new measure‐function follows from their axiom system together with these postulates. Thus some of the arbitrariness of the — system is removed by general considérations regarding inductive and analogical inference. (shrink)

. — The scientific method can be understood as a sequence of stages of types of activity undertaken to construct explanatory hypotheses which are verifiable. These stages, origination, deduction, experimentation, and confirmation, are each subdivided into several phases. The stages and phases are related by an order of precedence in which any given phase has to be preceded by the one before it but does not necessarily lead to the one after it. Such a dynamic outline of the (...) growth of a scientific idea is a general scheme for rendering an explanation of it. As a consequence, the general historical development of a scientific idea is traced at the same time that its logical structure and operational significance is indicated. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. The article is devoted to the study of confirmatory distortion as a cognitive bias within the framework of the modern theory of argumentation. In the context of this study, the effectiveness of the critical questioning technique as an argumentation strategy aimed at reducing the negative impact of confirmatory bias is considered. M e t h o d s. To achieve the goals of the research, the method of critical questions (...) is used, which is based on the traditional principles of logic, dialectics and rhetoric. Specific lists of critical questions are developed for each argumentative scheme. R e s u l t s. The article demonstrates that standard critical questions for schemes of practical reasoning, developed by eminent specialists, are able to minimize the negative impact of confirmation bias. This is achieved by taking into account information that may conflict with the agent's action plan. C o n c l u s i o n s. The study highlights the importance of using critical questions as a tool to minimize confirmation bias. Such an approach not only contributes to the substantiation of arguments, but also stimulates self-control and the search for information that may cause doubts about one's own views. The final part of the article examines propaganda as the deliberate use of confirmatory distortion and points to the need for attention to language patterns where it occurs rather unintentionally. In connection with the specificity of the studied phenomenon, the term "confirmation bias" is proposed as a translation of the English "confirmation bias". (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework (e.g., Newtonian mechanics en bloc, as opposed, say, to Newton’s theory of gravitation) either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be (...) the kind of thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. (In particular, Newtonian abduction is not inference to the best explanation, but rather is closer to Peirce’s original idea of abduction.) I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell (Proc Camb Philos Soc II:292–294, 1876): “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument, (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H (here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmation argument’), (...) is inductively strong. Yet this argument looks nothing like an inductive generalization, i.e., it does not seem inductive in the term’s traditional, enumerative sense. If anything, it has the form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This paper aims to solve this puzzle. True, in recent decades, ‘induction’ has been sometimes used more broadly to encompass any non-deductive, i.e., ampliative, argument. Applying Bayesian confirmation theory has famously demonstrated that hypothetico-deductive confirmation is indeed inductive in this broader, ampliative sense. Nonetheless, it will be argued here that, despite appearance, hypothetico-deductive confirmation can also be recast as enumerative induction. Hence, by being enumeratively inductive, the scientific method of hypothetico-deductive confirmation is justified through this traditional, more restrictive type of induction rather than merely by ampliative induction. (shrink)

1. Overview and organizing themes 2. Historical Review: Aristotle to Mill 3. Logic of method and critical responses 3.1 Logical constructionism and Operationalism 3.2. H-D as a logic of confirmation 3.3. Popper and falsificationism 3.4 Meta-methodology and the end of method 4. Statistical methods for hypothesis testing 5. Method in Practice 5.1 Creative and exploratory practices 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘third way’ of doing science 6. Discourse on scientific method 6.1 “The scientific method” (...) in science education and as seen by scientists 6.2 Privileged methods and ‘gold standards’ 6.3 Scientific method in the court room 6.4 Deviating practices 7. Conclusion Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries . (shrink)

SummaryScientists regard their inductive hypotheses as confirmed when consistence exists between two or more results obtained by differing methods. Three hierarchical levels of confirmation are applied. Certainty is obtained by the deductive element of the third level. The question of uniformity o i nature is less decisive than the question whether or not the complexity of the processes observed or the limited scope of our senses and instruments permits to see through the causal connections involved.

The Socratic method has a long history in teaching philosophy and mathematics, marked by such names as Karl Weierstra, Leonard Nelson and Gustav Heckmann. Its basic idea is to encourage the participants of a learning group (of pupils, students, or practitioners) to work on a conceptual, ethical or psychological problem by their own collective intellectual effort, without a textual basis and without substantial help from the teacher whose part it is mainly to enforce the rigid procedural rules designed to (...) ensure a fruitful, diversified, open and consensus-oriented thought process. Several features of the Socratic procedure, especially in the canonical form given to it by Heckmann, are highly attractive for the teaching of medical ethics in small groups: the strategy of starting from relevant singular individual experiences, interpreting and cautiously generalizing them in a process of inter-subjective confrontation and confirmation, the duty of non-directivity on the part of the teacher in regard to the contents of the discussion, the necessity, on the part of the participants, to make explicit both their own thinking and the way they understand the thought of others, the strict separation of content level and meta level discussion and, not least, the wise use made of the emotional and motivational resources developing in the group process. Experience shows, however, that the canonical form of the Socratic group suffers from a number of drawbacks which may be overcome by loosening the rigidity of some of the rules. These concern mainly the injunction against substantial interventions on the part of the teacher and the insistence on consensus formation rooted in Leonard Nelson's Neo-Kantian Apriorism. (shrink)

Franz Huber’s (2008a) attempt to unify inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist intuitions on confirmation by means of a single measure are examined and compared with previous work on the theory of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. The idea of connecting ‘the logic of confirmation’ with ‘the logic of acceptability’ is also critically discussed, and it is argued that ‘acceptability’ takes necessarily into account some pragmatic criteria, and that at least two normative senses of ‘acceptability’ must be distinguished: ‘acceptable’ in the sense of (...) ‘being allowed to accept’, and ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being obliged to accept’. Lastly, some connections of confirmation theory with naturalism, intertheoretic reduction, and explanation vs. understanding are explored. (shrink)

Exact measurements are a central practice of modern physics. In certain cases, they are essential for determining values of coefficients, for confirming theories, and for detecting the existence of effects. The history of piezoelectricity at the end of the nineteenth century reveals two different methods of exact measurement: a mathematical versus an “artisanal” approach. In the former, a scientist first carried out the experiment and later employed mathematical methods to reduce error. In the latter, a scientist physically manipulated the experimental (...) apparatus to bypass possible sources of error before its performance. These two approaches were related to German theoreticians and to French experimentalists, respectively. However, affiliation with a particular school rather than nationality was the decisive factor in the differences between the two approaches. Despite differences, adherents of both approaches sought to attain high precision and to eliminate even small experimental errors. This history exhibits the complexity and flexibility of experiments and their analysis. It supports the claim of the “New Experimentalism” that theory does not supply complete directions for practical experimental decisions. An example for this is found in the way an experimental error was discovered only by a comparison to an earlier experiment rather than to a theory. (shrink)

The use of idealized models in science is by now well-documented. Such models are typically constructed in a “top-down” fashion: starting with an intractable theory or law and working down toward the phenomenon. This view of model-building has motivated a family of confirmation schemes based on the convergence of prediction and observation. This paper considers how chaotic dynamics blocks the convergence view of confirmation and has forced experimentalists to take a different approach to model-building. A method known (...) as “phase space reconstruction” not only reveals a lacuna in the philosophical literature on models, it also fails to conform to conventional views about how models are used to confirm a theory. (shrink)

Recently, Rueger and Sharp (1996) and Koperski (1998) have been concerned to show that certain procedural accounts of model confirmation are compromised by non‐linear dynamics. We suggest that the issues raised are better approached by considering whether chaotic data analysis methods allow for reliable inference from data. We provide a framework and an example of this approach.

In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for (...) instance, is found to be defective in that it treats evidence as a formal entity and this creates the problem of relevance of evidence to the hypothesis at issue, in addition to the difficulties arising from the subjective interpretation of probabilities. This essay purports to satisfy the need for a successful account of hypothesis confirmation by offering an original formulation based on the notion of instantiation of the relation urged by an hypothesis. (shrink)

A recent development in the philosophy of religion has been the attempt to justify belief in God using Bayesian confirmation theory. My dissertation critically discusses two prominent spokesmen for this approach--Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie. Using probabilistic confirmation theory, these philosophers come to wildly divergent conclusions with respect to the hypothesis of theism; Swinburne contends that the evidence raises the overall probability of the hypothesis of theism, whereas Mackie argues that the evidence disconfirms the existence of God. (...) After a careful analysis of the individual authors, this dissertation critically examines the assumptions of the project. The authors consider arguments for the existence of God separately--the cosmological argument, the argument from design, apparent miracles, the problem of evil, and arguments from religious experience--and then conjoin them to assess the cumulative effect of the arguments. The assumptions are that the probability calculus may be interpreted for a successful inductive argument for or against the existence of God, that inference to best explanation is applicable to the justification of religious belief, that the justification of belief in God is analogous to the justification of a scientific theory, and that a classical foundationalist conception of rationality is correct. It is the contention of this dissertation that all of these assumptions are incorrect. All of the major interpretations of the probability calculus are examined and it is argued that there are either no interpretations for the probability assignments or no interpretations which will advance an argument for or against the existence of God. It is also argued that the usual methods for interpreting the explanatory power of theism will not determine any non-zero probabilities; however, density measuring will provide a non-zero interpretation. In the final chapter it is argued that a subjective Bayesian conception of rationality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of rationality and that classical foundationalism is self-referentially inconsistent. An alternative approach to the rationality of religious belief is offered that proceeds along Reidian and Plantingan lines, belief in God is properly basic. (shrink)

Do the methods of science lead to atheism? This is different from asking whether the results of science (e.g., well‐confirmed theories in evolutionary biology or cosmology) have that consequence. In this chapter, I consider several philosophical theories about scientific reasoning and trace out their implications for atheism, theism, and agnosticism. These theories include different versions of empiricism, logical positivism, inference to the best explanation, Bayesianism, hypothetico‐deductivism, and the principle of parsimony (Ockham's razor).

Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at (...) a sounder and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of hypothetico-deductive confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the hypothetico-deductive method is also highly relevant for scientific practice. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, our theories of fundamental physics have become increasingly detached from empirical data. Recently, Richard Dawid has argued that the progressive separation of theory from experiment is concomitant with a number of changes in the methodology of the discipline. More precisely, Dawid has argued that the new methods of fundamental physics amount to a form of non-empirical confirmation, and that physical theories may therefore be confirmed even in the absence of empirical data. In this paper, (...) I critically engage with Dawid's views on non-empirical physics. My main target is the excessively central role that, in my view, the notion of non-empirical confirmation plays on Dawid's analysis. I will therefore argue that, while non-empirical methods may legitimately be employed in physics, those are not always deployed with the purpose of confirming scientific theories. Non-empirical arguments may also be used in order to ground pragmatic choices regarding what theories deserve to be further developed—and this is an aspect of the work that non-empirical methods perform that cannot be solely understood in terms of Dawid's notion of non-empirical confirmation. I support these claims by making use of a case-study from the early history of particle physics. The case-study concerns a theory of the strong force that J. J. Sakurai introduced in 1960. As we shall see, both the genesis of Sakurai's theory as well as the arguments that he used to defend it provide direct support for my own views on the role that non-empirical methods play in physics. Finally, I conclude the paper by introducing a notion that I believe is useful in making sense of the manner in which the pragmatic and the epistemic dimensions of non-empirical reasoning relate to each other, namely the notion of a cognitive attitude. -/- . (shrink)

(This is for the Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Marcus Rossberg) In this handbook entry, I survey the different ways in which formal mathematical methods have been applied to philosophical questions throughout the history of analytic philosophy. I consider: formalization in symbolic logic, with examples such as Aquinas’ third way and Anselm’s ontological argument; Bayesian confirmation theory, with examples such as the fine-tuning argument for God and the paradox of the ravens; foundations of mathematics, with examples such (...) as Hilbert’s programme and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems; social choice theory, with examples such as Condorcet’s paradox and Arrow’s theorem; ‘how possibly’ results, with examples such as Condorcet’s jury theorem and recent work on intersectionality theory; and the application of advanced mathematics in philosophy, with examples such as accuracy-first epistemology. (shrink)

This paper concerns the Aristotelian inquiry on φαντασία’ in De Anima iii 3. I argue for a systematic interpretation of the chapter, according to which iii 3 neatly instantiates what David Charles has called the Three Stage View on scientific inquiry. The first stage establishes the meaning of the term φαντασία so it provides a nominal definition of the object, the second stage dialectically confirms the existence of φαντασία as something different from other already known cognitive powers (perception, thought), the (...) third stage posits a hypothetical essence (real definition), then it tests its power of enabling us to derive from such an essence those manifest and apparent features of φαντασία, that had been previously individuated. On the basis of such reading, some general suggestions on the status and role of φαντασία are also proposed, on the basis of which we can take the definition of iii 3 to be consistent with any other explanatory uses of φαντασία in the corpus. (shrink)

The defining insight of evolutionary psychology consists of bringing considerations drawn from evolutionary biology to bear on the study of human psychology. So characterized, evolutionary psychology encompasses a large range of views about the nature and evolution of human psychology as well as diverging opinions about the proper method for studying them.¹ In this article, I propose to clarify and evaluate various aspects of evolutionary psychologists’ methodology, with a special focus on their heuristics of discovery—i.e., their methods for developing (...) plausible hypotheses—and their strategies of confirmation—i.e., their methods for providing empirical support for these hypotheses.² I will also evaluate several well-known objections raised against evolutionary psychology. Note that because views about psychology and evolution differ among evolutionary psychologists, I do not pretend to cover every method used in evolutionary psychology.³. (shrink)

Background To allow patients to reflect about a decision to participate in a clinical trial, guidelines suggest a 24-h delay from when they are informed about the trial to when they give consent. In certain clinical settings, this is likely to hamper recruitment. Method After oral and written information about the trial has been given in person, the patient signs the declaration of consent knowing that they will be asked again after 24 h whether they confirm or regret the (...) decision. This procedure can be done by SMS. The investigators must document the response. The procedure was tried in a study in which the doctors were randomly assigned to receive a clinical communication skills course, and encounters with patients were videotaped before and after the course. Results 553 patients were approached, 530 (95.8%) gave initial consent, eight of these later regretted their consent. Discussion The low level of regrets suggests this is an acceptable procedure for patients. Trial registration The RCT was registered before initiation – registration # ISRCTN22153332. (shrink)

The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe (...) attempts to resolve the paradox within a Bayesian framework, and show how to improve upon them. This part begins with a discussion of how probabilistic methods can help to clarify the statement of the paradox itself. And it describes some of the early responses to probabilistic explications. We then inspect the assumptions employed by traditional (canonical) Bayesian approaches to the paradox. These assumptions may appear to be overly strong. So, drawing on weaker assumptions, we formulate a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the Paradox of the Ravens. (shrink)

This methodological article provides a Mixed Method approach to analyze how the Teaching Personal and Social Responsibility (TPSR) Model is feasible to enhance student’s autonomy. The objective is to detect how teachers’ behavior-oriented patterns shift in response to continuing professional development to reinforce TPSR strategies. We compared the application of TPSR by three teachers who had previously attended a training course for this model, with that of an expert in the model. A total of 44 sessions of primary and (...) secondary school semesters in various subjects, taught by all four teachers and comprising 120 students. A mixed-method approach followed in the study involved: a) the Observational System of Teaching Oriented Responsibility (OSTOR), which revealed how the teachers’ behavior patterns shifted over their interventions, and b) the Tool for Assessing Responsibility-Based Education (TARE 2.0.), which focused on perceived behaviors by teachers and student behaviors. Data analysis was conducted for a) the T-pattern detection technique, b) polar coordinate analysis to obtain detailed sequences of instruction, and c) descriptive and correlational analysis from the TARE. The mixed-method analysis of data confirms how the TPSR improved the teaching behaviors of the three teachers in training compared with the expert teacher. (shrink)

The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe (...) attempts to resolve the paradox within a Bayesian framework, and show how to improve upon them. This part begins with a discussion of how probabilistic methods can help to clarify the statement of the paradox itself. And it describes some of the early responses to probabilistic explications. We then inspect the assumptions employed by traditional (canonical) Bayesian approaches to the paradox. These assumptions may appear to be overly strong. So, drawing on weaker assumptions, we formulate a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the Paradox of the Ravens. (shrink)

RésuméĽauteur propose ?illustrer et ?expliquer le concept de comprehension en reprenant le probleme de I'asymetrie des sujets et des predicats tel que P. F. Strawson ľa posé et partiellement résolu. II s'agit de comprendre, en un sens fort, le phénomene de ľasymétrie. Un rapprochement entre philosophie logique et sémantique linguistique permet de généraliser la solution strawsonienne: ?une part, on peut traiter simultanément le cas de la predication monadique et celui des relations dyadiques; ?autre part et surtout, la cause profonde de (...) ľasymetrie ainsi généralisée semble se trouver dans une autre asymétrie que ľauteur identifie sous le nom ? asymétrie quantitative ≪. Ce résultat confirme que, tant en philosophie logique qu'en linguistique, une methode informelle est féconde, et en même temps aussi rigoureuse que la méthode formelle.SummaryBy way of illustrating and clarifying the concept of understanding in the theoretical sense in which to understand something is tantamount to being able to explain it, the author takes up the problem of the asymmetry of subjects and predicates with regard to negation in philosophical logic. How much explanation can we hope achieve in such a field? If we bring to bear on the problem of the asymmetry recent results in linguistic semantics, we get a generalization of P. F. Strawson's proposed solution: an abstract structure is shown to be common to monadic predication and dyadic relations, and the cause of the asymmetry which is characteristic of that structure is identified as a new, probably “quantitative” asymmetry between subjects and predicates. These results contribute to substantiate the case for an informal method, both in philosophical logic and in general linguistics. (shrink)

BackgroundFamily consent is a prerequisite for the organ donation of the deceased in China. However, a large number of donors are individuals who died due to accidental injuries or unanticipated diseases, which means that most of the families of such donors have just experienced the sudden death of their loved one and have to make a donation decision in a short time. This decision may cause psychological stress and some psychological damage to the minds of relatives of the donors. In (...) addition, cultural sensitivity also has largely caused the relatives of donors inner conflicts and contradictions. And sometimes organ donation may still be stigmatized. However, have they received any emotional support and what is their emotional support needs are some questions that need to be answered. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the emotional support, influencing factors, and needs of the family members of organ donors in Hunan Province, China.Materials and methodsThis is mixed-methods research that combines quantitative and qualitative research methods. A cross-sectional survey was conducted among 102 donor families using a questionnaire to investigate their emotional support status. To further understand their emotional support needs, 12 donor families participated in the semi-structured interview.ResultsThe results confirmed that: A total of 67.7% of the 102 respondents received emotional support or psychological comfort. Thus, only a small number of respondents felt respected by the public. Emotional support came mainly from immediate family members, and official organizations such as the Red Cross. Marital status, health status, occupation, and coping style can affect the emotional support of the donor families. Interview showed that the families of donors need emotional support and psychological aid from psychological professionals mostly. And they also wish to receive the understanding and respect of the public.ConclusionMost families of organ donors received emotional support from family, Red Cross, and friends, but only a minority of families of donors reported receiving respect from the public after the donation. And families of donor showed a strong need for emotional support and professional psychological aid from institutions. (shrink)

It is customary to distinguish experimental from purely observational sciences. The former include physics and molecular biology, the latter astronomy and palaeontology. Experiments involve actively intervening in the course of nature, as opposed to observing events that would have happened anyway. When a molecular biologist inserts viral DNA into a bacterium in his laboratory, this is an experiment; but when an astronomer points his telescope at the heavens, this is an observation. Without the biologist’s handiwork the bacterium would never have (...) contained foreign DNA; but the planets would have continued orbiting the sun whether or not the astronomer had directed his telescope skyward. The observational/experimental distinction would probably be difficult to make precise 1, as the notion of an ‘intervention’ is not easily defined, but it is intuitively fairly clear, and is frequently invoked by scientists and historians of science. Experimentation, or ‘putting questions to nature’, is often cited as a hallmark of the modern scientific method, something that permitted the enormous advances of the last 350 years. And it is sometimes said that the social sciences lag behind the natural because controlled experiments cannot be done so readily in the former. Moreover in certain sciences, e.g. epidemiology, students are explicitly taught that experimental data is preferable to observational data, particularly for doing causal inference. So the distinction between observational and experimental science has quite wide currency, and is often regarded as methodologically significant. Surprisingly, mainstream philosophy of science has had rather little to say about the observational/experimental distinction. 2 For example, discussions of confirmation usually invoke a notion of ‘evidence’, to be contrasted with ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’; the aim is to understand how the evidence bears on the hypothesis. But whether this ‘evidence’ comes from observation or experiment generally plays no role in the discussion; this is true …. (shrink)

Prospect theory emerged as one of the leading descriptive decision theories that can rationalize a large body of behavioral regularities. The methods for eliciting prospect theory parameters, such as its value function and probability weighting, are invaluable tools in decision analysis. This paper presents a new simple method for eliciting prospect theory’s value function without any auxiliary/simplifying parametric assumptions. The method is applicable both to choice under ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) and risk (when events are characterized by objective probabilities). (...) Our new elicitation method is implemented in a simple paper-and-pencil experiment (via an iterative multiple price list format). This is one of the first experiments that elicits non-parametric prospect theory’s value function with salient rewards. The collected data generally confirm findings in the existing literature: the value function is S-shaped (concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain) though there is a weaker loss aversion on the aggregate level and a substantial heterogeneity in loss aversion on the individual level (41% loss averse, 6% loss neutral and 53% gain seeking). (shrink)

The aim of this study was to obtain in-depth knowledge about caring confirmation of patients with cancer, from the patients’ point of view. The research topic was: what is the significance for patients of their being confirmed by nursing personnel? Fifteen men and women between 43 and 80 years of age participated in this study. The method of data collection used was qualitative research interviewing. A hermeneutic approach was used to interpret the data, in which Kvale’s self-perception, the (...) ‘common sense’ level, and theoretical levels were applied. The results are summarized in three areas: an outer confirmation, an inner confirmation, and a lack of the latter. Outer confirmation meant being understood and taken seriously; the maintenance of human dignity and worth indicated inner confirmation. A lack of inner confirmation is primarily manifest in terms of patients’ mental, spiritual and existential concerns. In relation to the theory of Eriksson, these patients were confirmed at the level of having and being, but seldom at the level of becoming. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Quantitative Methods undertakes a philosophical examination of a number of important quantitative research methods within the behavioral sciences in order to overcome the non-critical approaches typically provided by textbooks. These research methods are exploratory data analysis, statistical significance testing, Bayesian confirmation theory and statistics, meta-analysis, and exploratory factor analysis. Further readings are provided to extend the reader's overall understanding of these methods.

The author discusses some difficulties involved in the application of "degree of confirmation" to the confirmation of lawlike-statements. An alternative analysis is proposed, which is based on interval estimation. It is argued that this analysis is superior to the criticized method, in that it is better able to show how instantial confirmations are inductively relevant to a law, and in that it requires fewer undesirable extra-logical assumptions.

Previous research (Kielbasa, Pomerantz, Krohn, & Sullivan, 2004; Pomerantz & Segrist, 2006) indicates that when psychologists consider a client with symptoms of depression or anxiety, payment method significantly influences diagnostic decisions. This study extends the scope of the previous research to consider clients with symptoms of social phobia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Psychologists in independent practice responded to vignettes of clients whose descriptions deliberately included subclinical impairment. Half of the participants were told that the clients would pay (...) via managed care; the other half were told that the clients would pay out-of-pocket. Confirming previous studies, payment method had a highly significant impact on diagnosis such that compared to out-of-pocket clients, managed care clients were much more likely to be assigned Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. [DSM-IV]; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagnoses. Ethical implications relate to informed consent, accuracy and truthfulness in diagnosis, and psychologists' integrity. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is increasing evidence that research misbehaviour is common, especially the minor forms. Previous studies on research misbehaviour primarily focused on biomedical and social sciences, and evidence from natural sciences and humanities is scarce. We investigated what academic researchers in Amsterdam perceived to be detrimental research misbehaviours in their respective disciplinary fields.MethodsWe used an explanatory sequential mixed methods design. First, survey participants from four disciplinary fields rated perceived frequency and impact of research misbehaviours from a list of 60. We then (...) combined these into a top five ranking of most detrimental research misbehaviours at the aggregate level, stratified by disciplinary field. Second, in focus group interviews, participants from each academic rank and disciplinary field were asked to reflect on the most relevant research misbehaviours for their disciplinary field. We used participative ranking methodology inducing participants to obtain consensus on which research misbehaviours are most detrimental.ResultsIn total, 1080 researchers completed the survey (response rate: 15%) and 61 participated in the focus groups (3 three to 8 eight researchers per group). Insufficient supervision consistently ranked highest in the survey regardless of disciplinary field and the focus groups confirmed this. Important themes in the focus groups were insufficient supervision, sloppy science, and sloppy peer review. Biomedical researchers and social science researchers were primarily concerned with sloppy science and insufficient supervision. Natural sciences and humanities researchers discussed sloppy reviewing and theft of ideas by reviewers, a form of plagiarism. Focus group participants further provided examples of particular research misbehaviours they were confronted with and how these impacted their work as a researcher.ConclusionWe found insufficient supervision and various forms of sloppy science to score highly on aggregate detrimental impact throughout all disciplinary fields. Researchers from the natural sciences and humanities also perceived nepotism to be of major impact on the aggregate level. The natural sciences regarded fabrication of data of major impact as well. The focus group interviews helped to understand how researchers interpreted ‘insufficient supervision’. Besides, the focus group participants added insight into sloppy science in practice. Researchers from the natural sciences and humanities added new research misbehaviours concerning their disciplinary fields to the list, such as the stealing of ideas before publication. This improves our understanding of research misbehaviour beyond the social and biomedical fields. (shrink)

Many modern societies are committed to harmonizing their laws and public policies with their deeply felt moral values. To succeed in this accomplishment is to employ methods that move rationally from fundamental values to the policy incarnations that the society installs and maintains. This paper is an examination into what this method ought to be if policies are to instantiate agreed-upon fundamental moral commitments rather than the arbitrary whims of tyranny and anarchism or the political expedience of compromise.

This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.

Using student self-reported cheating admissions and answers from a hypothetical cheating scenario, this paper analyzes the effects of individual and situational factors on potential cheating behavior. Results confirm several conclusions about student factors that are related to cheating. The probability of cheating is associated with younger students, lower GPAs, alcohol consumption, fraternity/sorority membership, and having cheated in high school. Student perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment appear to have a negative and significant impact on the probability of cheating (...) on in-class assignments. Students who report a belief that cheating is never acceptable appear to be significantly less likely to cheat in any circumstance. This study illustrates the context-dependent nature of academic dishonesty, and the associated difficulty in understanding the relationships between measurable factors and cheating behavior. (shrink)