This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the doctrine is defensible. I also argue that (...) Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not. (shrink)

In the Preface to his best known work on moral philosophy, Kant states his purpose very clearly and succinctly: “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already constitutes an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation” (Groundwork 4:392). This paper will deal with the outcome of the first part of this task, namely, Kant’s attempt to formulate the (...) supreme principle of morality, which is the intended outcome of the search. It will consider this formulation in light of Kant’s conception of the historical antecedents of his attempt. (shrink)

In June 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that there is a fundamental right to marriage that extends to same-sex couples. This Article analyzes the Obergefell decision in light of the Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby regarding religious protections that might by analogy be afforded under state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. In particular, the article considers whether a government official may claim the right to religious freedom to deny (...) issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Additionally, the article suggests that a new standard for the separation of church and state may be required. Although the 2015 decision prevents the government from denying marriage to same-sex couples, the decision does not directly affect private businesses that choose not to provide services for same-sex weddings. It may, however, have an important indirect effect if laws are already present that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Therefore, the article explores possible avenues for protection from private. (shrink)

The UK Supreme Court’s recent judgement inMcCulloch v Forth Valley Health Boardclarifies the standard for the identification of ‘reasonable’ alternative medical treatments. The required standard is that of a reasonable doctor: treatments that would be accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion. Accordingly, the assessment of consent involves a two-stage test: first, a ‘reasonable doctor’ test for identifying alternative treatments; followed by a ‘reasonable person in the patient’s position’ test for identifying the material risks of these (...) reasonable alternative treatments. The separation of consent into two stages is consistent with not only a certain conception of freedom but also a nuanced construct of respect for autonomy that has a normative base. Furthermore, reliance on a reasonable doctor in the first stage is in keeping with a sociological account of medical professionalism, which posits that only doctors, and none others, can determine what is a proper treatment. Yet, reliance on a reasonable doctor permits a plurality of standards for reasonableness, because differences in opinion among doctors are pervasive. The reasons for some differences might be acceptable as unavoidable imperfections in medical decision-making to a reasonable person. But reasons for other differences might be objectionable; and the resultant inequalities in medical treatments would be considered unfair. One solution is to make the plurality of reasonable alternatives available to the patient, but this would introduce practical uncertainty and it is rejected by the Court. The Court’s approach may be pragmatic; however, it seems to allow avoidable injustice in healthcare. (shrink)

A book of beauty and simple wisdom that all can relate to, The Three Supreme Gifts provides a clear path and an in depth understanding of the three supreme truths introduced in its companion book, Love is the Seed: Teachings from the Spirit World. Lisa Hromada eloquently illustrates that you have all you need to attain self-mastery and create a life of your choosing-one of much greater joy, ease and inner peace-and improve any aspect of your life moving (...) forward. The three supreme gifts help you to more consciously grow beyond negative karmic and thought patterns, which in turn not only changes the course of your life at the very moment you begin to apply these supreme gifts, but forevermore. In Lisa's words, "You are about to delve into a subject of love, thought and free will from a different perspective than you may have previously considered." If you have ever wanted to know the meaning or purpose of your life, how to master or navigate your life, and really any question you may have about your life, it all comes down to what you have at this very moment. What you have is love, thought and free will. (shrink)

The unexpected passing of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia left a vacancy on the Court in the midst of a presidential election year. As a result, the appointment process did not proceed in the same fashion as previous appointments. Instead, the Senate declared shortly after Justice Scalia’s death that it would not consider any candidate to fill the vacancy until the next president is elected. The Senate remained steadfast in this decision throughout the remainder of (...) President Obama’s term. -/- This Article analyzes the constitutional questions surrounding the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee and argues the Senate has a duty to advise and consent in a timely manner. Additionally, it demonstrates how a politically-motivated delay threatens the integrity of the constitutional process for selecting judges, violates separation of powers concerns by politicizing the Court, and contradicts the express intent of the Framers of the Constitution. (shrink)

This project explores the "contradiction" that critics contend lies at the heart of the Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence. The doctrine of "guided discretion," represents the Court's attempt to achieve both consistency and individuation in capital sentencing. Guided discretion rejects the unbridled sentencing discretion of an earlier era that resulted in sentencing decisions that were "arbitrary and capricious." At the same time, guided discretion requires juries to give individualized consideration to the facts and circumstances of individual defendants. Critics (...) contend that consistency and individuation are mutually exclusive, and that "guided discretion" is a contradiction in terms. ;The analysis first attempts to isolate the moral dimension of the capital punishment debate, arguing that such analytical clarity is essential to any defensible view of capital punishment. Second, it sets forth and defends the coherence approach to moral and legal justification, according to which the specific moral and legal principles relevant to capital sentencing are evaluated for their compatibility with the principles of the legal system more generally. Third, the analysis canvasses the traditional justifications for punishment, as well as the development of the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, and identifies retribution and deterrence as the most promising rationales for the death penalty. Fourth, the claim of contradiction is considered in the context of legal liberalism, which, contrary to critics, has ample resources to accommodate the doctrinal balancing act that guided discretion entails. Moreover, examination of a typical capital sentencing statute establishes that the doctrine of guided discretion is compatible with at least some forms of retributivism and with traditional principles of deterrence. Finally, the analysis recognizes the limits of philosophical consistency. The capital sentencing process presents daunting practical challenges that a theoretical defense of guided discretion cannot fully address. Substantial reforms are needed before the theoretical coherence of guided discretion can be translated into a constitutionally defensible capital sentencing process. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the mythic narratives of the Yoruba-derived tradition of Candomblé Nagô to discern the attributes of its Supreme Being. I introduce Candomblé, offering an overview of its central beliefs and practices, and then present theological perspectives on the Supreme Being in African Traditional Religion as a basis for comparison with the myths I will examine. I consider the primary creation myths of Candomblé, emphasizing references to the tradition's Supreme Being and, analysing (...) these myths, I argue that Candomblé's Supreme Being, as depicted in these narratives, amounts to a limited god. This portrayal accounts for the absence of a problem of evil within the tradition. It suggests the moral ambivalence of Candomblé's Supreme Being and other high deities, as well as the world itself. This exploration sheds light on a lesser-explored tradition and its unique approach to philosophical dilemmas, distinct from the predominantly theistic framework of most philosophy of religion, and evinces that philosophizing through immersion in myths should involve appreciating the complexities and richness inherent in these forms of life, free from the imposition of external assumptions or biases. (shrink)

This article discusses the issue of abortion in the context of the dispute between progressive and neoconservative political forces in Brazil. The article analyses ADPF 442, a legal instrument known as a Motion of Noncompliance with a Fundamental Precept, which was lodged with the Supreme Court as part of a feminist litigation strategy in the country. The motion calls for the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of the decriminalisation of abortion within the first 12 weeks (...) of gestation. Methodologically, the analysis combines a literature review with participant observation and corpus linguistics analysis. ADPF 442 is considered a key event in the use of judicialisation to voice demands for women’s rights in current-day Brazil, and this work examines the testimonies as representative of the discourse and strategies at play in the broader field of abortion and its major actors, both for and against its decriminalisation. (shrink)

The opening chapters of Anselm's Monologion contain a ‘proof’ of a perfect being, which has received far less attention than the more famous Proslogion proof, and the ontological arguments derived from it. I wish to rectify this by developing an argument in defence of a crucial premise of the Monologion proof. This premise states that ‘the Good’, i.e. that in virtue of which numerically distinct things may all be good, must itself be a supremely good thing. I motivate (...) the argument before considering objections to both premises, as well as putative ‘parodies’ of my argument. Part of the motivation of my argument will involve the claim that the Good, if it is good at all, must be a paradigm good thing. I conclude that theists have a second kind of ontological argument at their disposal. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAID) legislation in Canada followed much deliberation after the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling inCarterv.Canada. Included in this deliberation was the Special Joint Committee on Physician Assisted Dying’s recommendation to extend MAID legislation beyond the inclusion of adults to mature minors. Children's agency is a construct advanced within childhood studies literature which entails eliciting children’s voices in order to recognise children as active participants in constructing their own childhoods. Using this framework, we (...) class='Hi'>consider the possible extension of MAID legislation to most minors. We highlight important questions regarding how insights from children’s voices could be mobilised in the life or death context of MAID. We conclude that children’s voices have the potential to help determine their eligibility for MAID; however, incorporating children's voices in the context of MAID requires careful consideration due to the complexity of voice. (shrink)

If Spinoza is a thinker very present in the Faculties of Philosophy, on the other hand, he is presented as one of the great forgotten of the humanist programs of secondary education. Contrary to what happened with other philosophers, who had more chance of spreading in non-specialized contexts (we can cite Nietzsche, Pascal, Plato or Schopenhauer as obvious examples), Spinoza is generally considered a excessively systematic author, and complex, whose works would have been written for a small group of scholars. (...) Nothing could be further from the truth. Spinoza’s life was full of completely surprising events, from his estrangement from the Jewish community (which repudiated him in a strict and disagreeable way), through his dalliances with heterodox currents which gradually grew in power, until his meeting with Leibniz and his intrepid travels. from one part of his native Holland to another. In this article, we examine the concept of desire in Spinoza's philosophy and its connection to the philosopher's decision to find the greater good. Since the greatest good, in turn, is nothing but its own enjoyment, we conclude that ignoring its existence, seeking it, and living it are, respectively, the conditions of the vulgar, the philosopher, and the wise, as what happened in the Garden of Epicurus. (shrink)

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been petitioned to revisit legal issues pertaining to the lawfulness of imposing a vaccine mandate on individuals with proof of natural immunity during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the petition accepts that the protection of public health during COVID-19 was an important governmental interest, the petitioners maintain that the imposition of a vaccine mandate on individuals with natural immunity was not ‘substantially related’ to accomplishing that purpose. In this short report, (...) we outline how some of the petition’s general arguments interact with points we raised in a 2022 article in this journal defending natural immunity exemptions, in light of new evidence. In particular, we reflect on new evidence pertaining to differences between vaccine-induced immunity, natural immunity, and so-called ‘hybrid’ immunity. We suggest that the nuanced nature of this evidence highlights the importance of making fine-grained judgements about proportionality and necessity when considering vaccine mandates. We conclude by claiming that if future pandemics necessitate the imposition of vaccine mandates, then those seeking to justify them should clearly articulate the relevance (and the evidence) for the comparative protection of vaccine-induced, natural, and hybrid immunity. (shrink)

At the core of Kant's ethics lies the claim that if there is a supreme principle of morality then it cannot be a principle based on utilitarianism or Aristotelian perfectionism or the Ten Commandments. The only viable candidate for such a principle is the categorical imperative. This book is the most detailed investigation of this claim. It constructs a new, criterial reading of Kant's derivation of one version of the categorical imperative: the Formula of Universal Law. (...) class='Hi'>This reading shows this derivation to be far more compelling than contemporary philosophers tend to believe. It also reveals a novel approach to deriving another version of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity, a principle widely considered to be the most attractive Kantian candidate for the supreme principle of morality. This book will be important not just for Kant scholars but for a broad swathe of students of philosophy. (shrink)

According to Kant, the supreme principle of morality is: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). This principle has come to be known as the Formula of Universal Law (“FUL”). Few philosophers believe it succeeds. But, I argue, few philosophers have understood what FUL means. This dissertation offers a full defense of FUL. It is, in fact, the supreme principle of (...) morality—and it can successfully derive a viable theory of permissible action and virtuous willing. Kant was right. Chapter 1 considers FUL’s role in relation to Kant’s subsequent formulations of the Categorical Imperative and the broader architectonic of duty he sets up in the Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s formulations are equivalent insofar as they are each expressions of the very same moral principle. And I suggest that FUL’s two tests correspond to Kant’s later distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue. Thus, FUL’s contradiction-in-conception test can be used to derive duties governing permissible action, and FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can be used to derive duties governing virtuous willing. This sets up the framework for the remainder of the dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 together interpret and defend Kant’s account of permissible action. In Chapter 2, I argue that we should fundamentally reconceive of the nature and purpose of Kant’s permissibility criterion. Kant’s contemporary interpreters have adopted too psychologistic an account of the maxim. Kantian maxims have little to do with the motivating principles of actual agents. Relying on Kant’s historical context and his account of maxims in rational agency, I argue that FUL tests means-end principles which describe act-types. When its permissibility test is applied to such principles, it can viably derive general duties. Chapter 3 continues this positive account of Kant’s permissibility test and defends it from common objections. I argue that the contradiction-in-conception test rejects an act-type when it would be inconceivable for all rational agents to be directly governed by the type’s means-end imperative as a universal practical law. So understood, FUL condemns act-types because: (1) they are hypocritically self-serving, (2) they inflict agential harm on other agents, or (3) they inflict self-harm motivated by self-love. I defend FUL’s derivations against such act-types against common criticisms, such as that they are circular or overbroad. Turning to prominent objections against Kant’s account of permissible action, I then argue that FUL correctly rules out all and only impermissible actions. Moreover, its conclusions are both nuanced and normatively defensible. In Chapter 4, I turn to Kant’s virtue ethics. I begin by considering the demands of Kantian virtue. I argue that we should reject accounts on which duties of virtue are merely less restrictive duties governing permissible action. Instead, I argue, they represent genuinely virtue-ethical requirements to promote morally worthy ends, namely, the ends of our own perfection and others’ happiness. I show that all of Kant’s duties of virtue can ultimately be traced back to one of these required ends. Then, I argue that FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can successfully derive our positive obligation to set the ends of virtue. I conclude that FUL is successful not only as a standard of permissibility, but also as the supreme principle of virtue. (shrink)

The neutrality of the art and architecture of courtrooms and courthouses has dominated the public perception in the Indian context. The courtroom design and the visual artistic elements present within these judicial places have very often been considered to be insignificant to the notions of law and justice that they reflect. As art and architecture present certain historical narratives, reflect political allegories and have significant impact on the perceptions of their viewers, they have critical socio-political ramifications. This makes it (...) pertinent to explore them and investigate the paradox of their deployment and interpretation in today’s increasingly mediatized world. Through an ethnographic study of the Supreme Court of India, this paper interprets its art and architecture, and, the symbolism and semiotics reflected through them. Arguing against their neutrality and insignificance, the paper demonstrates how they reflect nationalism, certain ideologies and power-space dynamics. It further argues that they act as evidence of political metaphors related to justice, power and democracy. With a conversation between law, architecture and semiotics, the paper investigates the historical and spatial dimensions of its architecture and artistic elements. Mapping the Court’s architectural elements, I examine how the visual representation of ‘justice as virtue’ finds translation in its design through transfer of certain images, including the image of the ‘scales of justice’, into it, while absenting the notion of ‘justice as struggle’—to contemplate on how legal architecture gives evidence to the vexed relationship between law and justice and also of the break from the colonial past. (shrink)

The main purpose of the present paper is to introduce and explicate the position and services of the most brilliant character –Etemad-Al-doleh of the ruling era of Shah Abbass the first called Khajeh Mirza Hatam Beig Ordoobadi and his son-Talib Khan. Due to Shah's authority in this era, the paramount duty which can be assigned to the position of Etemad-Al-doleh was to control the geostrategy and military actions.After Shah Abbass, the first-and due to the fact that the kings were (...) brought up in seraglios and were far from gaining experience to manage the country, Etemad- Al-doleh developed his position so increasingly. According to the historical sources belonging to the Safavid era and itinerary of European, we can easily find out that Etemad-Al-doleh found his way into any governmental affairs. Based on the outstanding position of Hatam Beig and his son, it can be claimed that the social position is not considered just to promote the military officers ' ranks in Shah- Abbass era. Unlike the Safavi's point of view, the term of virtue- centered community was limited to recruiting the Georgian servants called "the establishment of the third military force". In the first decades, Etemad-Al-doleh enjoyed a valid social position and a proper background in tribunal. Studying the lives of supreme ministers shows us that the majority of them had court-based and military social origins. (shrink)

According to Hegel, art in its ‘supreme task’ is engaged in ‘bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit’. Raymond Geuss, in a highly illuminating paper, has connected Hegel’s conception of art’s supreme task with the project of theodicy. In this paper I explore Hegel’s aesthetics of comedy through this theodicy-based framework Geuss has proposed, and I consider what light this framework (...) can shed on comedy and, reciprocally, what light comedy can shed on it. In particular, invocation of a theodicy can give the impression of art as a kind of defense of the status quo. Yet Hegel’s brief, but pivotal remarks on comedy complicate this picture in an interesting way. The best comedy does reassure us about the basic rationality and goodness of the world. Yet Aristophanic comedy—the sort Hegel lauds as the best and the most truly comic—has a strongly social-critical streak that Hegel notes with great admiration. Hegel’s theory of comedy says as much about him as it does about the genre. But if we are attentive to Hegel’s remarks on comedy, they will offer us a point of resistance against overly Panglossian interpretations of the Hegelian supreme task of art and will help us better understand in what way active social criticism through art is compatible with that higher calling. (shrink)

Recently, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Tega Esabunor v Faweya & Ors (2019) LPELR 46961 (SC) dismissed an appeal seeking to quash the order of a magistrate court for the transfusion of blood to a baby. The appellants contended that the court had no jurisdiction to make theorder. The crux of the case was whether the parents’ right to consent to the child’s treatment based on religious beliefs supersedes the child’s right to live, thus reflecting the tension between (...) a parent’s right to give consent to the choice of treatment for their child, and the court’s power to override such rights through the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the state. The case also reflects the tension between the freedom of a parent to practise their religion and the right of a child to live, in the medical context. This article examines the findings of the Supreme Court in Tega Esabunor’s case, considering whether the court’s decision is in line with the generally accepted practice on when the state can intervene if persons with parental responsibility refuse medical treatment for an incompetent child because of religious beliefs.Cases from other jurisdictions are analysed to ascertain the position of foreign courts. It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s judgmentreflects accepted international practice regarding parental refusal of consent for medical treatment of a child. (shrink)

This landmark volume in the Teachings of the Buddha series translates the Suttanipata, a text that matches the Dhammapada in its concise power and its centrality to the Buddhist tradition. Celebrated translator Bhikkhu Bodhi illuminates this text and its classical commentaries with elegant renderings and authoritative annotations. The Suttanipata, or “Group of Discourses” is a collection of discourses ascribed to the Buddha that includes some of the most popular suttas of the Pali Canon, among them the Discourse on (...) Loving-Kindness Sutta. The suttas are primarily in verse, though several are in mixed prose and verse. The Suttanipata contains discourses that extol the figure of the muni, the illumined sage, who wanders homeless completely detached from the world. Other suttas, such as the Discourse on Downfall and the Discourse on Blessings, establish the foundations of Buddhist lay ethics. The last two chapters—the Atthakavagga (Chapter of Octads) and the Parayanavagga (The Way to the Beyond)—are considered to be among the most ancient parts of the Pali Canon. The Atthakavagga advocates a critical attitude toward views and doctrines. The Parayanavagga is a beautiful poem in which sixteen spiritual seekers travel across India to meet the Buddha and ask him profound questions pertaining to the highest goal. The commentary, the Paramatthajotika, relates the background story to each sutta and explains each verse in detail. The volume includes numerous excerpts from the Niddesa, an ancient commentary already included in the Pali Canon, which offers detailed expositions of each verse in the Atthakavagga, the Parayanavagga, and the Rhinoceros Horn Sutta. Translator Bhikkhu Bodhi provides an insightful, in-depth introduction, a guide to the individual suttas, extensive notes, a list of parallels to the discourses of the Suttanipata, and a list of the numerical sets mentioned in the commentaries. (shrink)

Politics is among the most important concepts of al-Fārābī’s philosophy. For him, real happiness can only be achieved in a virtuous society and a virtuous society appears only in a regime led by the first chief. The most important feature of the first chief is that he communicates with the Active Mind. Religion is considered by al-Fārābī as the regime and life style implemented by the first chief in a virtuous society. This study tries to present how al-Fārābī perceives (...) religion philosophically and what is the need for religion in terms of making the laws required in the social life. From this point of view, we tried to reach the aspects of the relationship between religion and law. Furthermore, metaphysical foundation of laws and the role of the philosopher and prophet at the point of law-making were the other issues addressed. The features of the laws which will lead to this supreme goal and by whom they should be made as well as how they can be implemented and changed within the historical process were addressed. The place of Islamic law (fiqh) in the virtuous society was another aspect of the subject that was investigated. (shrink)

I review the recent case of Edna Folz, a 73 year-old woman who was suffering through the end stages of very advanced Alzheimer's dementia when her case was adjudicated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I consider this case as an example of how courts are increasingly misinterpreting the ethical and legal decision-making standards known as substituted judgment and best interests and thereby threatening individuals' treatment decision-making rights as developed by other courts over the past two decades and (...) creating serious roadblocks to health-care providers' ability to render appropriate patient care. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Edna's legal guardian could not authorize withdrawal of Edna's treatment, ruling that as a matter of law, if an incompetent person is not in a persistent vegetative state, it is not in his or her best interests for life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn unless (s)he has executed an advance directive or other statement clearly indicating his or her desires. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Men with Muskets, Women with Lyres: Nationality, Citizenship, and Gender in the Writings of Germaine de StaëlSusanne HillmanOn 23 May 1812 Germaine de Staël (1766–1817), Europe’s best-known enemy of Napoleon Bonaparte, set out from her estate on Lake Geneva to escape to England. In her reminiscences, she reflected on the pivotal event as follows:[A]fter ten years of ever-increasing persecutions [...] I was obliged to leave two homelands as a (...) fugitive, Switzerland and France, by order of a man less French than I. For I was born on the banks of the Seine, where his only claim to citizenship is his tyranny. He saw the light of day on the island of Corsica, practically within Africa’s savage sway. His father did not, like mine, devote his fortune and his sleepless nights to defending France from bankruptcy and famine; the air of this beautiful country is not his native air; how can he understand the pain of being exiled from it, when he considers this fertile land only as the instrument of his victories. [End Page 231] Where is his patrie? It is any country that accepts his domination. His fellow-citizens? They are whatever slaves obey his orders.1In this passage, de Staël deliberately links nationality and citizenship. In her view, citizenship status was acquired simply by being born on French soil. Her family’s tireless labors on behalf of the nation added another irrefutable proof of Frenchness. In addition, growing up in France and breathing the country’s invigorating air had created an emotional attachment that a person raised elsewhere simply could not fathom. We thus have a triad of birth/service/sentiment that connects the deserving individual to his or her nation (in this case la grande nation).In this essay I explore de Staël’s understanding of the twin concepts of nationality and citizenship through the lens of gender. Nationality and citizenship were of perennial concern to her thought, partly because of the turbulent times she lived in, partly because of her personal experience in exile. Influenced by history and literature, she early on admired the gallant men with muskets who heroically sacrificed their lives for the glory of the nation. But it was the exceptional women with lyres who were destined to act as the nation’s unifying agents by recreating the gallants’ deeds in writing. By imagining the nation these women fulfilled the supreme task of citizenship. In what follows I will argue that de Staël conceived of the ideal citizen as a woman writer or artist who served her nation by inspiring its members with enthusiasm and virtue.2 In elaborating her view of the superior woman as citoyenne and national muse she made an important contribution to the debate on the nation and the citizen.The only daughter of Louis XVI’s finance minister Jacques Necker and the salonnière Suzanne Curchod-Necker, of Genevan and Vaudois citizenship respectively, de Staël gained fame and notoriety through her brilliant conversational talents, political intrigues, and unconventional relationships with famous men. Though she considered herself a “true Frenchwoman” (véritable française),3 she was a citizen of Geneva and a Swedish subject by marriage, at least until 1803 when she took advantage of the Code Civil [End Page 232] and officially claimed French citizenship.4 Considering this multiplicity of conflicting loyalties, it is not surprising that her major writings reveal a sustained preoccupation with these issues.Despite their undeniable significance for early nineteenth-century European intellectual history, historians have so far devoted scant attention to de Staël’s writings. In fact, in the US, Staëlien studies have largely been dominated by literary criticism and theory.5 This has had the effect of prioritizing her novels over her non-fiction, downplaying the historical context of her oeuvre and, most grievously, ignoring de Staël’s historical contribution to socio-political thought.6 As a result of the complex ways in which her personal experience informed her writing, her oeuvre is best examined as a unified, though certainly inconsistent, whole. Her writings were rarely “products of intense deliberation, but rather reflections... (shrink)

This approach focuses on a convergence point between father Stăniloae’s theology and Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology, as concerns Heidegger’s ontology. The German philosopher launches a challenge as to the role that the Embodiment of Logos actually plays in human existence. According to him, the Incarnation event is for man only a corrective to the ontic, while father Stăniloae and the French philosopher consider that we are facing a true ontological reconfiguration of human existence. This is because the One (...) who has stepped into the ontological field of the human being has the power to take man out of the being-toward-death paradigm and give him the opportunity to become being-toward-resurrection. Both father Stăniloae and Marion resort to areopagitic thinking, in which God is above the being, i.e. supra being, so He cannot be considered a being among others, even if He were considered a supreme being. At the same time, God is love because He is the Trinity of People and it is only through this reality that the human being gains more in terms of existence. (shrink)

Newman sought a via media—a middle ground—between “evidentialists,” who considered reason supreme and so disparaged faith, and “existentialists,” who wanted to create a fortress of faith impenetrable to reason. Examining the way people actually think, Newman identified three types of inference that lead people to make decisions. This inferential process, which is operative in the decisions of every day life, serves as a paradigm for understanding how the human mind—particularly the illative sense—operates in religious matters; accordingly, Newman presents (...) faith as a personal and reasonable inference. (shrink)

This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the (...) supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence, the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness. (shrink)

Analytical philosophers of religion widely assume that God is a person, albeit immaterial and of unique status, and the divine attributes are thus understood as attributes of this supreme personal being. Our main aim is to consider how traditional divine attributes may be understood on a non-personal conception of God. We propose that foundational theist claims make an all-of-Reality reference, yet retain God’s status as transcendent Creator. We flesh out this proposal by outlining a specific non-personal, (...) monist and ‘naturalist’ conception of God, which we call the ‘euteleological’ conception of God, and then considering euteleological interpretations of omnipotence, omniscience and divine goodness. (shrink)

Cruelty and morality seem like polar opposites – until they join forces. Beware those who persecute in the name of principle... -/- Following in the steps of Michel de Montaigne, the distinguished political philosopher Judith Shklar has argued that cruelty should be considered the supreme evil and that we should put it first among the vices. The essence of cruelty is to wilfully and needlessly inflict pain and suffering on another creature – be it an animal or a human (...) being. Closely related to this vice are malice and sadism, both of which involve taking pleasure or delight in the suffering of others. Although cruelty might not be peculiar to human beings, it is a familiar and pronounced feature of human nature and social life. One important feature of human cruelty is the way that it varies, both with respect to its instruments and when it is occasioned, depending on our particular cultural and social circumstances. With this in mind, we can ask: what is the relationship between cruelty and morality? -/- . (shrink)

Should people be assisted to die or be given euthanasia when they are suffering from terminal medical conditions? Should they be assisted to die when they are suffering but do not have a ‘diagnosable medical illness?’ What about assisted dying for psychiatric conditions? And is there a difference morally between assisted suicide, voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia?These are deep questions directly addressed or in the background of the productive discussion between Varelius and Young.1 ,2 Their focus is whether (...) doctors should assist people to die who are ‘tired of life’ and experiencing ‘existential suffering’. An example was Edward Brongersma, an 86-year-old man, who was tired of life but with no serious medical condition, who was assisted by Dr Philip Sutorius to commit suicide in 1998. In the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legal, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that this was wrong because "edical expertise, by its nature, does not extend to questions and complaints that do not have a sick- ness or ailment—mental or physical—as their source.3"Sutorius was convicted, but not punished.Robert Young, considering this case, concurs, concluding, "a physician may justifiably consider that an individual who is ‘tired of life’ should consult a non-medical, professional counsellor, and if that produces no change in outlook, choose suicide. Outside Switzerland, an individual who makes that choice has to then be determined enough to do so unassisted .2"I will argue that there is, within current medical ethics and human rights, a method of assisted suicide which could fall within the limits of the law. But first I will review some recent cases involving requests for dying. I will then discuss an alternative which some may argue addresses these cases, and those of …. (shrink)

Despite historic efforts to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, national health reform is threatened by multiple legal challenges grounded in constitutional law. Premier among these claims is the premise that PPACA’s “individual mandate” is constitutionally infirm. Attorneys General in Virginia and Florida allege that Congress’ interstate commerce powers do not authorize federal imposition of the individual mandate because Congress lacks the power to regulate commercial “inactivity.” Stated simply, Congress cannot regulate individuals who choose not to (...) obtain health insurance because they are not engaged in a commercial venture. Several courts initially considering this argument have rejected it, but two federal district courts in Virginia and Florida have concurred, leading to numerous appeals and the near promise of United States Supreme Court review. (shrink)

Ahmed Mâhir, who was born in Kastamonu in 1860-70, is one of the last period Ottoman scholars and is known by the penname "Ballıkızâde". He lived in the 19th century, during the Constitutional Monarchy period when the West progressed in many directions and the Ottoman Empire began to lose land alongside its reforms. After taking lessons from the scholar Ahmed Hicâbî, he also gave lectures and educated many students, and taught tafsir and theology for thirteen years at Daru'l-Fünûn Faculty of (...) Theology and Medresetü'l-Vâizîn. In addition to this, the scholar, who has served as a member of the Supreme Court, a judge, and a deputy, also appears as a political personality. Mâhir, who has four published works, is one of the important personalities that Kastamonu raised in religious, political, and literary fields. In this study, the Constitutional Era and the position of the science of tafsir in this period are discussed. Secondly, after transferring information about Ahmed Mâhir's life, his exegesis method on the works of "Mu'cizât-ı Kur'âniyye" and "al-Fâtiha fî Tefsîri'l-Fâtiha" was examined. The qualitative research method and document analysis technique wasused for this study. In addition, the data were analyzed with the help of description, sampling and association techniques. The fact that Ahmed Mâhir has both a political and religious personality and that we have four works about him today makes it important to research him. In this context, the study aims to reveal Ahmed Mâhir's exegesis based on his works. A doctoral thesis on him, in which his mystical aspect was emphasized, and an article by the same person, again, two master's theses were made about the work he wrote in the field of Sufism. Some sources provide concise information about his life and works, and brief information given in some biographical or literature studies. But his works named "Mu'cizât-ı Kur'âniyye" and "al-Fâtiha fî Tefsîri'l-Fâtiha" have not been studied academically. This situation made this study important. In addition, the existence of various interpretations on whether the author's interpretation of Surah Fâtiha is original or not has caused us to consider this issue as a problem. As a result of our analysis, Ahmed Mâhir has conveyed the negative political or religious situations of his period, especially in his work "Mu'cizât-ı Kur'âniyye". Based on the idea that the Qur'an is perfect and contains everything, he used the verses to correct these situations. His work "el-Fâtiha fî Tefsîri'l-Fâtiha" shows us both the traces of the Ottoman tafsir accumulation of that period and that this scholar has a scientific tradition on tafsir, hadith, and literature. (shrink)

This collection contains twenty-one thought-provoking essays on the controversies surrounding the moral and legal distinctions between euthanasia and "letting die." Since public awareness of this issue has increased this second edition includes nine entirely new essays which bring the treatment of the subject up-to-date. The urgency of this issue can be gauged in recent developments such as the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, "how-to" manuals topping the bestseller charts in the United States, and the (...) many headlines devoted to Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has assisted dozens of patients to die. The essays address the range of questions involved in this issue pertaining especially to the fields of medical ethics, public policymaking, and social philosophy. The discussions consider the decisions facing medical and public policymakers, how those decisions will affect the elderly and terminally ill, and the medical and legal ramifications for patients in a permanently vegetative state, as well as issues of parent/infant rights. The book is divided into two sections. The first, "Euthanasia and the Termination of Life-Prolonging Treatment" includes an examination of the 1976 Karen Quinlan Supreme Court decision and selections from the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Nancy Cruzan. Featured are articles by law professor George Fletcher and philosophers Michael Tooley, James Rachels, and Bonnie Steinbock, with new articles by Rachels, and Thomas Sullivan. The second section, "Philosophical Considerations," probes more deeply into the theoretical issues raised by the killing/letting die controversy, illustrating exceptionally well the dispute between two rival theories of ethics, consequentialism and deontology. It also includes a corpus of the standard thought on the debate by Jonathan Bennet, Daniel Dinello, Jeffrie Murphy, John Harris, Philipa Foot, Richard Trammell, and N. Ann Davis, and adds articles new to this edition by Bennett, Foot, Warren Quinn, Jeff McMahan, and Judith Lichtenberg. (shrink)

In what is quite possibly the most famous passage of the De revolutionibus, Copernicus implies that nobody could ever place this supreme flaming torch that is the Sun in another or better place than that from which it can illuminate everything simultaneously, namely the centre of this extremely beautiful temple that is our world. Considering the fact that he leaves an interrogatory twist to this argument of convenience, and since he makes this statement without any (...) justification as it seems entirely evident to him, certain Copernicans choose to illustrate this by means of an analogy: if indeed the Sun must be positioned thus, it is because the most appropriate place for the torch intended to illuminate the room is at its centre, and not in one of its corners. Despite the heliosophy of the Renaissance having been shared by both geocentrists and Copernicans alike, this "torch" argument does not appear to have achieved much success: rarely adopted by the Copernican camp, it was even contested by some of them; as for the geocentrists, it held no appeal for them whatsoever. Did this argument of convenience therefore not benefit from the self-evidence attributed to it by Copernicus, and from, in his wake, it's continued support by a good many commentators? As is often the case when it comes to the history of thought, the pseudo-obviousness of this argument is merely the fruit of a blatant anachronism: presenting heliocentrism as the cosmological system that finally grants the Sun its worthy centrality by placing it in the centre of the room and not in a corner, is to ignore the fact that this star of the day already enjoyed, in geocentrism, a centrality esteemed to be perfectly in keeping with both its dignity and its inherent illuminative function. Having lost their grasp on this worldview that no longer belonged to them, the Copernicans thus put forward an argument which, for the geocentrists, is worthless. Yet they could have argued the objective superiority of their centrality over that accorded to the Sun by geocentrism: while the latter is only numerical, on a purely planetary scale, and frankly fictitious, the former is thoroughly spatial, of cosmic proportions and, at least on first approximation, very real. In order to produce arguments of convenience that could carry their own weight, the protagonists of the new cosmology would have benefited from getting to know the world vision of their adversaries a little better instead of addressing them from their own point of view; similarly, instead of treating as an obvious fact that which is only evident to one of the two parties present, historians of scientific thought would also be well advised to have a better understanding of the world vision of those who history now considers as the losers! (shrink)

This Article considers the moral and legal status of practices that aim to modify traits in human offspring. As advancements in reproductive biotechnology give parents greater power to shape the genetic constitution of their children, an emerging school of legal scholars has ushered in a privatized paradigm of genetic control. Commentators defend a constitutionally protected right to prenatal engineering by appeal to the significance of procreative liberty and the promise of producing future generations who are more likely to have (...) their lives go well. This 'new eugenics,' however, confronts us with ethical challenges that neither liberal arguments about autonomy, fairness, and consent, nor utilitarian arguments about preferences, happiness, and equality, are able to capture. I begin by analyzing the Supreme Court's modern substantive due process jurisprudence, as it bears on recent advancements and controversies in genetic science. After developing a doctrinal framework that could support an asserted right to genetic engineering, I draw on empirical research in behavioral psychology to examine the influence of eugenic norms on egalitarian attitudes and institutions. I predict that if parents become accustomed to choosing the genes of their children, it would be radically more difficult to give an influential account for why the successful should adopt a charitable posture toward those who are less fortunate. I argue that by shifting control over offspring DNA from chance to choice, enhancement will inflate a sense of individual entitlement for social and economic outcomes. I conclude that increasing willingness to prevent the birth of abnormal children distracts attention from institutions that fail to accommodate the limitations of imperfect people. Some may reply that producing people who better fit the roles society chooses to reward need not deter us from providing for people whose abilities fail to meet the demands of modern society. However, this reply misses the way that changes in reproductive practices can bring about changes in the way that we understand our identities and relationships. Eugenic solutions to social problems such as poverty, crime, and unemployment reshape the challenge of genetic disadvantage so that it is no longer one we address through collective measures such as public education, social services, and income redistribution, and instead becomes one for individual parents to prevent through donor screening, embryo discard, or selective abortion. (shrink)

Can God be entirely and supremely just and also entirely merciful, without these two characteristics ending up in contradiction with each other? Anselm of Canterbury considers this question in several places in his works and provides rational resolutions demonstrating the compatibility of divine justice and mercy. This paper considers Anselm's treatment of the problem in the Cur Deus Homo, noting distinctive features of his account, highlighting the seeming incompatibilities between mercy and justice, and setting out his resolution of (...) the problem. (shrink)

The common periodisation in Ash‘ari kalām is Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the early and late periods over al-Ghazālī. Although some consider this as an artificial and unrealistic periodisation, we do not think so. For, it is not possible to understand and make sense of the logic and necessity of periodisation without knowing what exactly distinguishes these periods from each other and what kind of great differences and changes occurred in the latter period. The most important factor that distinguishes (...) the theological activities of the two periods is undoubtedly the Peripatetic philosophy that left its mark on the second period. The direct relationship established by the Ash‘ari theologians of the late period with philosophy has been the source of many changes in theology. These changes have manifested themselves in many areas from the understanding of method in theology to the theory of definition, from the use of evidence to the theories of nature, intellect and soul, most importantly from the notion of the Omnipotent God (al-Fā‘il al-Mukhtār) to the metaphysics of possibility-necessity, and from the cosmology of substance-accident to al-umūr al-‘āmma as the main subject-matter of metaphysics. Finally, the changes in the process that started with al-Ghazālī and evolved with Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī brought theology to the brink of philosophization, and at the end of the process, theology turned into a universal (metaphysical) discipline. This situation naturally led to a convergence between the metaphysical thought and theological thought. It is one thing to say that theology is the most honourable and supreme science, and it is another to reveal that it is universal. In this context, al-Ghazālī declared and substituted the Islamic theology as a religious universal discipline for the first time. Actually, this substitution has a hidden philosophical/metaphysical meaning and message. Al-Ghazālī 's characterisation of theology as a universal science can also be interpreted as a challenge to both the sciences of the field it belongs to and the sciences outside itself, with its disciplinary encompassing and priority for theology. It should not be forgotten that theology, while confronting and coming to terms with philosophy and metaphysics, integrating with the subjects it has taken into the field of study, on the other hand, it has to maintain and protect the religious character it belongs to and represents. (shrink)

The topic of abortion was in the limelight again in Dobbs v Jackson, where the US Supreme Court overturned the decision of Roe v Wade, ‘which guaranteed women and pregnant people a constitutional right to abortion’. While not bound by the judgment, this gives us an opportunity to reflect on the current law in South Africa which regulates the termination of pregnancy. The primary piece of legislation which governs abortion is the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act. Section (...) 2 of the Act lists the grounds under which one may lawfully terminate a pregnancy. One of those grounds relates to the period of the 13th up until the 20th week of the gestation period, and states that if a medical practitioner, after consultation with the pregnant woman, is of the opinion that the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman, then the pregnancy may be lawfully terminated. The question is: What exactly is meant by ‘social grounds’? This article considers this aspect from a legal perspective and attempts to provide clarity on the issue, in the hope that this will be of assistance to medical practitioners who are concerned about the outcome of their actions, when assisting persons in this position. (shrink)

This paper considers the maturation of the American Catholic tradition of social and economic thought in the seminal period between 1920 and 1940, particularly as encapsulated in the work of John A. Ryan. While different social ethical models emerged in the American Church during this time, the dominant school of thought was the liberal tradition associated with Ryan. This tradition, which Ryan described as "true economic liberalism," forged American political liberalism and papal critiques of secular modernity into (...) a new social ethical theory which became the capstone of prewar Catholic progressivism. True economic liberalism first manifested itself in critiques of the Supreme Court's description of "freedom" in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923). It took positive form during the 1920s in the widespread Catholic embrace of industrial democracy as a moral alternative to laissez-faire capitalism It was during the 1930s, however, when the Church confronted the economic crisis of the Great Depression, that true economic liberalism became a more totalizing system of social thought. It was also during the 1930s that this theory revealed the difficulties Catholic liberals have had in defining their relationship to a market economy and the state. On one hand, true economic liberalism provoked the creative maturation of Catholic thought and established the Church as a leading progressive critic of capitalism. At the same time, true economic liberalism circumscribed the possible depths of the Catholic moral critique. American Catholics liberals were so committed to constructing a social ethic that upheld "the priceless goods of liberty, opportunity, and democracy," that they accepted a reformed capitalism, guarded and chastened by religion, as the most desirable outcome for a modern economy. As John P. Carroll revealingly wrote, "The remedy, then, for the social evils. . . does not lie in the destruction of the present social system. The way to clean a house is not to dynamite it." By accommodating the Church's social ethic to the ideals of American democracy, liberal Catholics rejected radical reforms in favor of moderate legislative schemes which one writer described in Commonweal as "sniping at capitalism." It was for this reason that so many Catholics fawningly embraced the New Deal and, indeed, found in Franklin Roosevelt the supreme advocate for the principles set forth in Pius XI’s 1931 Quadragesimo Anno. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is no reason that there won’t be physical disabilities in the life of heaven. To argue for this conclusion, the chapter considers what bodies will be good for in the life of heaven. On the one hand, if the life of heaven is physically dynamic, that is, where our bodies change and we can do things with them, like play rugby and climb mountains, physical disabilities can be part of the limitations that allow (...) the physical things we do to be difficult, which, in turn, allows us to achieve physical things. Since the possibility of achievement is important for a life supremely worth living, as the life of heaven is, God has no reason to eliminate, unilaterally, that is, without the person’s consent, physical disabilities in the life of heaven. On the other hand, if the life of heaven is physically static, where our bodies don’t change and we can’t do things with them, physical disabilities are neither a help nor a harm to such a life, and so God has no reason to eliminate unilaterally physical disabilities in the life of heaven. This then leads to the conclusion that God gives a person the option to retain or have eliminated their physical disability in the life of heaven. (shrink)

This book discusses issues like the characteristics of Chinese cultural spirit, life wisdom of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, the management wisdom of traditional Chinese culture, features of Chinese philosophy, as well as the definition of guoxue, or Chinese studies. Referring to previous research, the author defines the characteristics of the traditional Chinese cultural spirit as creating harmony amid diversity and viewing the outside world with a broad mind; being vigorous and self-motivated with tenacious vitality; taking benevolence and righteousness as (...) supreme and being independent; considering people as the basis of the nation; thinking systematically and dialectically; and being pragmatic and thrifty. This book is beneficial to studies on cultural awareness, civilization comparison, as well as civilization exchange. (shrink)

In this thesis I consider two common, though directly opposed, interpretations of Kantian morality. According to what I call "the other-regarding interpretation," Kantian morality is primarily about the regulation of human interaction. According to what I call "the private and internal interpretation," Kantian morality is primarily self-regarding since what chiefly matters, on this view, is adopting moral motives. I argue that both interpretations rest on a failure to understand Kant's distinction between ethics and justice , a distinction (...) which he introduces in The Metaphysics of Morals, on which I primarily focus. As I interpret this distinction, ethics addresses the question about the supreme individual good , whereas justice addresses the question how to make possible the coexistence of the freedom of action of a plurality of agents who pursue their personal ends. I argue that the other-regarding interpretation tends to reduce morality to justice , whereas the internal and private interpretation reduces morality to ethics and cannot accommodate Kantian justice as part of morality. I focus most of my attention on the former view because it has been significantly more influential in recent debates. Against this view, I argue that ethics, on Kant's account, is about the pursuit of the supreme individual good , and not about the regulation of human interaction. The tendency to reduce morality to justice is manifest in the thesis that the justification of principles of personal morality rest upon an agreement as well as in a certain version of the thesis of the priority of the right over the good. Both theses are present in the work of Jurgen Habermas. The use of agreement is common among followers of John Rawls's who attempt to extend his Contractarian justification of principles of justice to the domain of personal morality. Such an extension, I argue, presupposes an understanding of personal morality by analogy with justice. Paradoxically, these two theses are regarded as "Kantian," though they have contributed to the distortion in recent debates of what I argue is central to Kant's ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Criminal Law, Pain Relief, and Physician Aid in DyingFaye Girsh, Ed.D., Executive DirectorMadam:The article by Cantor and Thomas on “Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law” (KIEJ, June 1996) was a tortured attempt to develop criteria for the humane and compassionate physician who tries to serve the needs of a patient in unremitting pain. There are three areas that merit comment.The authors dealt with pain medications that might (...) have the undesirable side effect of causing death. They did not mention tolerance, which usually occurs in a patient with chronic pain and which would require exceedingly high doses to be effective. They did not mention barbiturates, which are preferable to opiates in causing death and which are used increasingly by compassionate physicians to answer the pleas of their suffering patients, but for which there is no excuse about alleviating pain. Would the criminal law just call the prescription of a lethal dose of barbiturates a reckless act and require conviction? Fortunately, juries, as the authors point out, do not balance these formulas on the head of a pin. When they see the circumstances under which these doctors do help their patients, they choose to nullify the law and would ignore the suggestions made in this article.The authors refer to the “consent” of the patient. They do not mention that these doctors are operating with more than consent; they are administering these medications because suffering patients are begging them to put them out of their pain and the indignities of the dying process. The article discusses the process as though it were the same as consent to elective surgery. These patients—with AIDS, cancer, and hopeless neurological degeneration—are not simply agreeing to a procedure; they are desperately seeking a way out. If the criminal law were to develop criteria for physician aid in dying, certainly one of them should be the active, witnessed, repeated request of such a patient for a certain, quick, painless, gentle death.The third point is that physicians do not face prosecution when administering no treatment to a patient whose life could be saved with treatment but who chooses not to receive it. This has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court; no criteria for suffering, alternatives, terminality, justifiability, or unbearability are required. The doctor can stand by while the patient dies what may be a protracted, difficult death, but it is within the law. What matters in this situation is the decision of the patient to refuse treatment, and that is absolute. How ironic that the patient who cannot refuse treatment must, with his or her doctor, jump through all these hoops to achieve a peaceful death.One worries that the physician who must balance the risk of “risky pain relief” against the accusation of recklessness will err in the direction of allowing [End Page 103] the patient to bear the pain rather than help with a dose of analgesics that might be considered beyond the stipulated “risk.”Why don’t we just be honest about it? Allow dying or hopelessly ill patients to make the decision about what they want by passing a carefully defined law allowing euthanasia rather than balancing the risk and trying to determine the “purpose” of the physician’s ministrations. We protect some patients from themselves while allowing others almost complete autonomy to make the choice of ending their lives. The authors were right in saying that proponents of rational laws consider this sheer hypocrisy.Faye Girsh, Executive DirectorHemlock Society U.S.A. Denver, COFaye Girsh misconceives our article’s objective as an “attempt to develop criteria” for the humane physician. Our goal in writing the paper was to analyze the current criminal law framework in the hope of sharpening debate and engendering normative critiques. We readily acknowledge tensions in the current legal framework and would support changes in that framework.Copyright © 1997 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In this Article, I take up the thesis that international and comparative law sources are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution because the Constitution itself warrants respect only insofar as it is a means for achieving minimal protections for human dignity. I argue a narrow version of this thesis: Our domestic constitutional interpretations should be checked by looking to the minimal set of rights recognized in other systems that share certain contents. And I take up the problem that (...) what may appear as shared values at one level may reflect different understandings at a deeper, more reflective level. For example, the framers of our Constitution clearly sought to advance liberty. But the liberty they sought to advance may not have been the same liberty that became of concern during the Fourteenth Amendment's period of ratification, and in the subsequent history of Supreme Court constitutional cases following its adoption. In this article I propose to consider the set of rationally based aspirations that our system of constitutional rights and many other related systems seem to presuppose as a ground for developing a growing conception of liberty and dignity that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt. (shrink)

This article considers the topic of the prior parental right in the education of their children, unequivocally asserted in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. Discussion focuses upon the origins and nature of this right as it is described in Catholic Church teaching as well as the Supreme Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, both of which antedate and provide principled support for UDHR’s assertion. The purpose here is to use these principles to (...) identify the injustice arising when a State or its agents deny parental choice in education by limiting that choice to public schools. In the United States, this action imperils the foundation of UDHR’s goal that education be “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay explores how bioethics as a field, rather than as a collection of individual efforts by bioethicists working within it, can inform deliberation on matters of bioethical import that, for better or worse, are in the hands of civic processes. It is motivated by the repeal of a constitutional protection of abortion access in the Supreme Court Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision, which effectively returned abortion regulations to states rather than setting a baseline federal protection (...) of abortion access up to fetal viability. Given the outsized role of local legislators in shaping health-care policy through legislation, about abortion as well as other health topics, the author proposes foundational bioethical education for legislators and considers two potential models for such education: one that operates on a clinical ethics consultation model, and one that mirrors bioethical coursework taught in traditional academic settings but modified for a legislator audience. Although both models present notable challenges requiring further conceptualization and problem-solving, overcoming these hurdles would enable bioethics to provide a service to civic learning and placemaking that would complement advocacy or lobbying efforts by individual bioethicists. (shrink)

Controversial Supreme Court decisions have barred organized school prayer, but neither the Court nor public policy exclude religion from schools altogether. In this book, one of America's leading constitutional scholars asks what role religion ought to play in public schools. Kent Greenawalt explores many of the most divisive issues in educational debate, including teaching about the origins of life, sex education, and when--or whether--students can opt out of school activities for religious reasons. Using these and other case studies, (...) Greenawalt considers how to balance the country's constitutional commitment to personal freedoms and to the separation of church and state with the vital role that religion has always played in American society. Do we risk distorting students' understanding of America's past and present by ignoring religion in public-school curricula? When does teaching about religion cross the line into the promotion of religion? Tracing the historical development of religion within public schools and considering every major Supreme Court case, Greenawalt concludes that the bans on school prayer and the teaching of creationism are justified, and that the court should more closely examine such activities as the singing of religious songs and student papers on religious topics. He also argues that students ought to be taught more about religion--both its contributions and shortcomings--especially in courses in history. To do otherwise, he writes, is to present a seriously distorted picture of society and indirectly to be other than neutral in presenting secularism and religion. Written with exemplary clarity and even-handedness, this is a major book about some of the most pressing and contentious issues in educational policy and constitutional law today. (shrink)

This excellent book is about Western morality as it interacts with law. It is not contrasting the moral foundations of American law with other value systems. Rather the authors examine the history and great diversity of Western thought, the substance of moral ideas. They range from the ancients to the new old order of the New World. Hazard and Pinto see the various voices articulating moral, political and legal thought as "pregnant with future relevance" for practical decision-making. Thus their (...) approach is not relativistic, but mindful of alternatives and historical context. Hazard and Pinto have written a most thoughtful and stimulating study. -- Gerhard Casper, Professor of Law, Emeritus and President Emeritus, Stanford U. *** Beginning with the reality and challenge of modern Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Hazard and Pinto demonstrate the relationships and differences among law, morals, and politics. Hazard, a legal ethicist and scholar, and Pinto, a biblical historian, are a unique team. Their succinct and vital work draws from the wisdom of the ancients and the evolution of modern thought. Anyone concerned with the living law must understand its moral roots to sense when the old growth should be pruned and the new nurtured in light of evolving principles of liberty, equality, and morality. -- Michael Traynor, President Emeritus, American Law Institute *** In this concise meditation on the relationship between law and morality, one of our leading thinkers on law and the legal profession, himself the embodiment of Aristotelian "practical wisdom", takes us on a most engaging tour of our intellectual and moral heritage, helping us to understand the moral foundations of our modern legal system and the language of the law. I commend this book to any interested reader and particularly to non-lawyers who may not have considered how deeply and mysteriously intertwined our legal rules are with religious belief and historical origins. -- David F. Levi, Dean and Professor of Law, Duke U. School of Law *** This is an unstuffy and lively account of fundamental values in American, and indeed Western, public and civic life. The whole historical background is presented both clearly and comprehensively. This attractively succinct book deserves to be read by all who are interested in our public life. The writing is so incisive and compelling that I read this book in a single sitting. -- Neil H. Andrews, Professor of Civil Justice and Private Law, U. of Cambridge. (shrink)

This short essay explores the importance of fear and violence in the genesis and life of constitutions, with a particular focus on the case of secession. Secession has been seen as a taboo and until recently constitutions tried to avoid mentioning it, considering such a phenomenon as an extra legal fact. A turning point has been represented by the famous Reference of the Canadian Supreme Court on Québec. Finally, in the last part of this work I shall (...) try to present some arguments in favour of the explicit constitutionalization of a secession clause in multi-national federalisms. (shrink)

This article maintains that it is the constitutional responsibility of the courts, here the courts of the State of Michigan, to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules. The article is written in response to the views expressed by some Justices of the Michigan Supreme Court that separation of powers concerns should impose significant limits on the power of the courts to establish and develop the common law of Michigan. Specifically, the contention is (...) that policymaking is exclusively the province of the legislature, so that the courts cannot properly formulate common law rules that may have significant social and economic effects. The article strongly disagrees with the proposition that there is any kind of constitutional constraint, either prudential or structural, on the power, and indeed, the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan courts (or the courts of any state) to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules.The judicial power given to the Michigan courts by the Michigan Constitution includes the power to do what courts have always done in the Anglo-American legal system. The judicial power gives the courts the responsibility to adjudicate controversies between private persons and in the process to develop a common law through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. In so doing, the courts may properly take into account considerations of social and economic policy just as the legislature does when it engages in the process of enacting legislation. The difference between what the courts do and what the legislature does is a difference in process, not a difference in substance. Judicial policymaking takes place within the judicial process, that is, in the adjudication of controversies between persons in which the courts promulgate common law rules. The common law develops in a line of growth through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis, and to the extent that there are limitations on the development of the common law, these are limitations that inhere in the judicial process itself. When the courts, for example, consider whether a new claim or a new defense should be recognized by the common law, they must consider whether that new claim or defense properly follows in the line of growth from existing doctrine and precedent. But if the courts conclude that it does, that is, if the claim or defense is consistent with the line of growth of existing doctrine and precedent, the courts are not constrained from recognizing the claim or defense on the ground that the substance of the claim or defense is a matter for the legislature rather than for the courts or that the resulting common law rule may have significant social and economic effects. The legislature, in contrast, enacts legislation through the legislative process. That process is a freewheeling one, often dependent on political compromise and completely unrestrained by the kind of limitations that inhere the judicial process. There is no legislative concept of line of growth, and the legislature can and often does enact legislation that brings about fundamental societal change or reverses the course of public policy. In our constitutional system, the most important questions of public policy are, of course, determined by the Legislature. Where the legislature disagrees with the policy choices reflected in a common law rule, the legislature has the power to enact legislation changing the common law rule. But there are many areas of private law where the legislature has not acted. In our constitutional system, where the matter in issue is not covered or preempted by legislation, the courts may formulate a common law rule to cover that matter, and in so doing may engage in judicial policymaking. Judicial policymaking is a part of the development of the common law, and the courts cannot avoid their responsibility to engage in judicial policymaking to the extent that it is necessary in the process of formulating the common law. As a constitutional matter, there are no separation of powers considerations that prohibit the courts from engaging in judicial policymaking. This part of the article traces judicial policymaking and the common law back to the seminal writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo.The article then discusses at length judicial policymaking and the development of the common law in Michigan. It shows that the clearest history of judicial policymaking in development of the common law is the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century that were promulgated in the wake of the Industrial Revolution to protect the newly-emerging industries. During that time the courts in Michigan and elsewhere grafted on to the general principles of negligence law liability rules such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine, all of which had the effect of denying recovery to workers and other victims of industrial accidents. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Michigan Supreme Court began excising its constitutional power to make changes in the common law, expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan. Emphasizing that "rules created by the court could be altered by the court," and that the court had a "corrective responsibility when dealing with judge-made law," the Court, in approximately a 30 year period: eliminated the imputed negligence doctrine, under which the driver's negligence was imputed to the passenger in the passenger's suit against a third party; eliminated charitable immunity as a defense to a tort action; held that a wife could maintain at tort action for loss of her husband's consortium; abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, which had been applied outside of the employment area, held that there could be recovery for pre-natal injuries and finally abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in favor of a comparative negligence approach. In these cases the Court discussed the relevant policy considerations influencing their decisions with respect to the common law rule at issue. In the last quarter century, the Court continued to take into account policy considerations in developing the common law, but not infrequently there was disagreement on the Court as to where policy considerations should lead, with some Justices arguing that policy considerations supported the imposition of tort liability, while other Justices argued that they did not.The article concludes that it has been demonstrated that in the development of the common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court has at all times engaged in judicial policymaking. From the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century designed to protect the newly-emerging industries in this state, to the Court's exercise of its power to change the common law in Michigan over a 30 year period by expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan, to its recognition of new claims, such as a child's right to recover for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a negligent injury, to its imposition of limits on tort recovery, such as the open and obvious doctrine, the Court has invoked considerations of policy in support of its decisions. In these cases, the Court's invocation of policy considerations was sometimes accompanied by substantial disagreement among members of the Court over where policy should lead, but at no time did the Court ever suggest that separation of powers considerations should somehow operate as a kind of restraint on the Court's use of policy in the development of the common law. It is the power and responsibility of the Michigan Courts under the Michigan Constitution to make policy choices in formulating the common law. (shrink)