In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Breaking the Revolutionary Deadlock?Volney's Leçons and the Debate on the Value of HistoryNiccolò ValmoriThis article explores the crucial contribution of Constantin-François de Chasseboeuf, better known by his pen name, Volney, to the eighteenth-century debate on the nature of history as a discipline.1 My claim is that Volney's Leçons d'histoire is the result of a complex dynamic between two forces: on the one hand, (...) a century-long debate on how history should be both written and taught; on the other, the revolutionary calls for a thoroughgoing revision of the past amid concurrent references to the virtuous moral examples of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Volney had a very narrow gap to "save" history from deadlock between these opposite perspectives. His history course at the École normale supérieure showed how the eventful years of the French Revolution had changed his own understanding of the discipline of history.I argue that Volney's supposed distrust toward the importance of the study of history was not an attempt to devalue history itself.2 On the contrary, the French author approached history as a discipline based on the principle [End Page 773] of investigative doubt and on dialogue with other scientific domains such as geography, geology, and meteorology. As Jean Gaulmier puts it: "The true heirs of Volney's dream of a total history were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch."3 However, if Volney's proposal for a new historiography is set within the eighteenth-century debate on how to write and teach history, it appears neither original nor new. Nonetheless, I argue, Volney attempted a synthesis between divergent positions on the role of history, as they emerged and were debated during the eighteenth century in the light of the first years of the French Revolution. The context of the French Revolution left Volney with more doubts than certainty on the value of the discipline, given the manifold and controversial uses of historical examples proposed in those years. As Minchul Kim has pointed out, Volney's Leçons are a "work in history rather than a work on history."4 While Kim is right to point out the importance of the revolutionary context for understanding Volney's skepticism toward the value of history, I argue that while Volney's personal understanding of how history should be written matured through the revolutionary experience, it was also the fruit of a dialogue with Enlightenment historiography.In the first part of the article, I present the main features of the eighteenth-century debate on the limits and meaning of writing history, with a particular focus on its relationship with ancient history and on the stature of history among the other disciplines. In the second part, I analyze how Volney dealt with this debate in some of his works that preceded his appointment to the chair of history at the École normale. Three of Volney's pre-1795 works are considered here: Voyages en Syrie et en Égypte (1787), Considérations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs (1788), and Les Ruines (which was published during the Revolution). In the last section of the article I delve into the Leçons to highlight how this work represented Volney's provisional resolution of the long debate over the role of history as a scientific endeavor as well as a subject that could be taught. [End Page 774]ENLIGHTENMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE TEACHING OF HISTORY: THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY QUESTIn this section I review the main contributors to the Enlightenment historiographical debate on the status of history as a discipline and on its relationship with antiquity. I do not claim to cover all aspects of Enlightenment historiography; rather I aim to set Volney's contribution to these two aspects of the debate in a broader context. His open skepticism toward the heuristic value of history cannot be reduced simply to a reaction to the political uses and misuses of history during the French Revolution. Volney's Leçons addressed a larger audience than the select group of French teachers attending his class. The philosopher-traveler, as his contemporaries called him, joined a conversation about history that had started at... (shrink)

The French writer, explorer, and historian Constantin-François de Volney (1757–1820) has been interpreted as embracing a Eurocentric Orientalism and a typically Enlightenment progressivist historical understanding. In this article, however, I argue that, far from simply offering yet another rationalistic or teleological historical narrative, Volney set out to refound the historical discipline by erecting historiography on a firmly empirical basis in order to repudiate the idea of historical design altogether. In this respect, his best-known work, The Ruins, (...) or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires (1791), seems to occupy a special status in his oeuvre in that it did not confine its analyses to the epistemological realm and historiographical practice, but explicitly linked historical narratives and practice to historical developments themselves, ascribing civilizational decline and devastation predominantly to ignorance and blind faith in religion or myths of the past. According to this reasoning, a new, more critical historical practice – akin to social anthropology – would, by making people conscious of their historical agency, liberate historical development itself and ideally bring an end to seemingly unending cycles of political tyranny and social destruction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article treats the universal history Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires (Les ruines ou Méditations sur les révolutions des empires) of the French cultural philosopher Constantin-François Volney (1757–1820). Using a textual, interdisciplinary study, which focuses upon Volney’s complex cultural and historical philosophical contexts, I demonstrate that his primary concern was a nearly 2500 years coherent Europe of tradition and reception: this Europe did not represent a western corner of a larger Asian landmass (...) but, in the late eighteenth century, rather offered the opportunity for a complex and harmonious unity of European peoples under French circumstances. Volney chose the ruins of the desert town of Palmyra as the starting point of his historical and philosophical reflections. As a cultural philosopher of the late Enlightenment, he looks past the divine workings of the course of history in order to take instead the finite, man-made world as his focal interest. The following pages emphasize these reflections on human history that – in the face of a melancholic mode – highlighted the cultural anthropological characteristics and committed them to the promotion of a self-creating future. (shrink)

The French Revolution had a complex relationship with historical thought. In a significant sense, the politics of 1789 was built upon a rejection of the authority of the past. As old institutions and practices were swept away, many champions of the Revolution attacked conventional historical modes for legitimating authority, seeking to replace them with a politics anchored in notions of reason, natural law and natural rights. Yet history was not so easily purged from politics. In practice, symbols and images borrowed (...) from the past saturated Revolutionary culture. The factional disputes of the 1790s, too, invoked history in a range of ways. The politics of nature itself often relied on a range of historical propositions and, as the Revolution developed, a new battle between “ancients” and ‘moderns’ gradually emerged amongst those seeking to direct the future of France. This article explores these issues by focusing on a series of lectures delivered at the École Normale in the Year III (1795), in the wake of Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre. The lectures, commissioned by the Ministry of Education, were designed to lay out a program for historical pedagogy in the French Republic. Their author, Constantin-Francois Volney (1757–1820), was one of a group of figures who sought, during these years, to stabilise French politics by tying it to the development of a new form of social science—a science that would eventually be labelled “idéologie.” With this in mind, Volney sought to promote historical study as an antidote to the political appropriation of the past, with particular reference to its recent uses in France. In doing so, he also sought to appropriate the past for political purposes. These lectures illustrate a series of tensions in the wider Revolutionary relationship with history, particularly during the Thermidorian moment. They also, however, reflect ongoing ambiguities in the social role of the discipline and the self-understanding of its practitioners. (shrink)

This article analyses the complex and contested geo-politics associated with the concept of a universal human society during the era of the French Revolution. It focuses on the figure of Constantin-François Volney (1757?1820), a neglected philosopher who played a significant role in the history of both French anti-imperialist thought and French imperial practice in North Africa and the Levant. It uses that focus to explore the relationship between visions of human emancipation and the exercise of global power (...) during the 1790s and beyond. (shrink)

This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language.

This article is a plea for the idea of society in sociological theory. Even though the industrial national societies no longer exist, the successive crises that we have encountered show that we need a general concept to account for social life. Thus sociology should be enabled to remain a moral and political philosophy.

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...) problem is generated by the finite nature of the standard calculi and one direction in which it can be solved is to strengthen the deductive systems by adding infinitary rules (such as the ω-rule), i.e., to construct a full formalization. Another main direction is to provide a natural semantics for the standard rules of inference, i.e., a semantics for which these rules are categorical. My aim in this paper is to analyze some recent approaches for solving the categoricity problem and to argue that a logical inferentialist should accept the infinitary rules of inference for the first order quantifiers, since our use of the expressions “all” and “there is” leads us beyond the concrete and finite reasoning, and human beings do sometimes employ infinitary rules of inference in their reasoning. (shrink)

There are two antithetical classes of Paradoxes, The Runner and the Stadium, impregnated with infinite divisibility, which show that motion conflicts with the world, and which I call Static. And the Arrow, impregnated with nothing, which shows that motion conflicts with itself, and which I call Dynamic. The Arrow is stationary, because it cannot move at a point; or move, and be at more points than one at the same time, so being where it is not. Despite their contrast, however, (...) both groups can be evaded, if motion is conducted over discrete points: (a) If no two points touch, there will be a step ahead, for there will now be nextness. And (b) if they do not touch, “here” and “there” (=not–here) will no longer be sufficiently proximal to have the body be where it is not. They will be separate. So the body is only where it is. Hence, both groups, despite their contrast, presuppose, each in its own way, the infinite proximity of any point with anynext. But the Dynamic group cannot survive what it needs. Suppose that “here” and “not–here” (i.e., “there”), are not discrete but infinitely proximal. Then Rest also would be self-contradictory. And it gets worse. For it takes two to make a contradiction, in this case, “here,” “not–here,” and their proximity. But, with regard to conditions of infinite proximity, “in the end there can be only one” (point), and hence no contradiction in the first place. The Dynamic paradoxes rest on a premise with which they are inconsistent. They need two of this, of which, in a different but just as equally vital connection, there can be only one. On the force of this remark, the Dynamic paradoxes, initially the stronger of the lot, actually turn out to be the weaker. (shrink)

With Jean-Clet Martin's book, Une intrigue criminelle de la philosophie: lire la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel, the latter emerges as a philosopher of (negative) difference and (infinite) repetition, one of the first to inject Being with becoming, in other words, as the brother-enemy that Deleuze had been waiting for and with whom he did establish complex relationships that cannot be conveniently summarized in his Nietzschean moment. In view of his novel and striking reading of Hegel, Martin is invited by (...) the interviewer to defend his suggestions that the negative and the dialectic need not turn into spoilers of the joys of Spinoza and the affirmations of Nietzsche; that Hegel's anti-humanism can be counted as a variation on Deleuze's own; that Hegel did anticipate Deleuze in the distinction between becoming and history and in the separation of the virtual event from the actual state of affairs; that Hegel's death of God ushers in, ahead of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the death of man in the ‘overman’; and that, despite their infinite proximity, Hegel and Deleuze are separated by two incompatible images of thought that make the difference between them a difference of nature and not only a difference of degree. (shrink)

RésuméOn montre d'abord que la technique de révision des probabilités appelée « imagerie », qui a été introduite par Lewis pour la logique des conditionnels de Stalnaker, peut être généralisée à la sémantique des systèmes de sphères de Lewis si l'on permet aux énoncés conditionnels d'avoir des valeurs de vérité fractionnaires. Un système est proposé.

Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction brings together eighteen essays written by an internationally acclaimed team of scholars to provide a comprehensive overview of the work of Gilles Deleuze, one of the most important and influential European thinkers of the twentieth century. Each essay addresses a central issue in Deleuzeʹs philosophy (and that of his regular co-author, Félix Guattari) that remains to this day controversial and unsettled. Since Deleuzeʹs death in 1994, the technical aspects of his philosophy have been largely neglected. (...) These essays address that gap in the existing scholarship by focusing on his contribution to philosophy. Each contributor advances the discussion of a contested point in the philosophy of Deleuze to shed new light on as yet poorly-understood problems and to stimulate new and vigorous exchanges regarding his relationship to philosophy, schizoanlysis, his aesthetic, ethical and political thought. (shrink)

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models’ characteristics. The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models’ psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue, copy the engineer, and copy the friend. We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss (...) the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant. We also assessed participants’ theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants’ attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy or friendliness. These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture. (shrink)

Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...) problem is generated by the finite nature of the standard calculi and one direction in which it can be solved is to strengthen the deductive systems by adding infinitary rules (such as the ω-rule), i.e., to construct a full formalization. Another main direction is to provide a natural semantics for the standard rules of inference, i.e., a semantics for which these rules are categorical. My aim in this paper is to analyze some recent approaches for solving the categoricity problem and to argue that a logical inferentialist should accept the infinitary rules of inference for the first order quantifiers, since our use of the expressions “all” and “there is” leads us beyond the concrete and finite reasoning, and human beings do sometimes employ infinitary rules of inference in their reasoning. (shrink)

Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...) I show that this assumption does not hold for the class of models of classical propositional logic. In particular, I show that the existence of non-normal models for negation undermines McGee’s argument. (shrink)

At last available in paperback, this book anticipates and explains the post-structuralist turn to empiricism. Presenting a challenging reading of David Hume's philosophy, the work is invaluable for understanding the progress of Deleuze's thought.

La naissance de la philosophie s'accompagne d'un refus énigmatique, celui de l'exil. Persécuté par Athènes, Socrate choisira de se donner la mort plutôt que de vivre les dernières années de sa vie à errer hors de ses murs. Par ce refus qui résonne par-delà les siècles jusqu'à nous, Socrate nous oblige à réfléchir à ce lien intime entre l'individu et sa communauté d'origine. Dans l'histoire de la vie de l'esprit, tous ne feront pas le même choix. Plusieurs, écrivains, poètes, philosophes, (...) préféreront la vie ailleurs à la persécution ou à la mort certaine. Comment l'exil ou les longues périodes d'errance ont-ils influencé ceux qui en ont fait l'expérience? Leur témoignage nous permet-il de penser les défis particuliers de notre époque? De manière plus précise, est-ce que la pensée des auteurs qui ont vécu l'exil est de nature à nous inciter à célébrer davantage les vertus de l'enracinement ou au contraire nous convie-t-elle à souhaiter qu'advienne encore plus rapidement un monde cosmopolite? À l'heure où les enjeux migratoires deviennent de plus en plus pressants et où est remise en question de multiples manières la pertinence des frontières, la pensée de ceux qui ont connu l'exil doit éclairer notre réflexion. (shrink)

Comment écrire sur Bataille sans s’épargner et se mettre soi-même hors jeu sinon en entrant dans le jeu de ce qu’on appellera, en un sens majeur, la parodie ? Dans ce retour, dans cet éternel retour des pensées et des mots – dans cette déconstruction créatrice qu’est la réécriture – Bataille n’y entra-t-il pas lui même en écrivant sur Nietzsche ?

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...) the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry. (shrink)

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

Le dégagement de cinq fosses dépotoirs au comblement homogène sur le site de l’Archipiskopi à Nicosie fouillé par F. Hadjichristofi (Département des Antiquités de Chypre) de 2009 à 2011 a livré un bel échantillonnage de productions chypriotes déjà connues et d’importations byzantines et proche-orientales. Cependant, l’intérêt majeur de ces assemblages réside dans la mise en évidence d’une production locale de poterie à pâte calcaire, glaçurée ou non. Cette activité potière à Nicosie a débuté à la fin du xiie‑xiiie siècle et (...) s’est poursuivie presque inchangée au xive siècle. Les productions de la capitale des Lusignan sont diversifiées et, pour une partie d’entre elles, témoignent d’apports proche-orientaux – émail, bases à disque, cruche à filtre. L’artisanat de la terre dans l’île ainsi que les liens entretenus avec les territoires croisé et musulman du Proche‑Orient sont donc réexaminés au regard de ces nouvelles données. (shrink)

Given sets and a regular cardinal μ, let be the statement that for any function, there are functions and such that for all,. In, the statement is false. However, we show the theory (which is implied by + “” + “ω1 is measurable”) implies that for every there is a such that in some inner model, κ is measurable with Mitchell order.

We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.