Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to (...) its rivals, in that it stems naturally from a systematic picture of the physical world. (shrink)

Evan's influential argument against vague objects (_Analysis<D>, 1978) has a parallel directed against contingent identity. I argue that Noonan failed in his attempt to accept Evans's argument but save contingent identity by establishing a disanalogy between the two arguments (in The Philosophical Quarterly 1991). Instead, I suggest an alternative way to block the argument against contingent identity and argue that its analogue provides a satisfactory response to Evans's original argument.

A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.

This paper argues that the principle of necessary identity (f)(g)(f=g then necessarily f=g) cannot be maintained, At least in second order form. A paradox based upon scientific definitional practice is introduced to demonstrate this. A non-Fregean reading of standard contingent identity semantics is provided to explain how such 'definition breaking' works.

The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.

It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is (...) wrong with the argument from Leibniz's Law. (shrink)

Since its inception, roughly sixteen years ago, the theory of the contingent identity of mental-states and brain-states has been argued on many fronts. I want here to examine and to try to meet one in particular of the objections raised in connection with this theory. The objection has been stated with especial force by Peter Herbst.Let us then investigate a proposition that there is a particular mental entity which is contingently identical with a particular brain state. In order (...) to be able to test it, we must know which mental entity is supposed to be identical with what brain state. Therefore we need at least two clear and independent identifying references to serve as the basis of our proposition of identity. They must each be sufficient to individuate an entity, or else we cannot say what is identical with what, and they must be independent of each other, or else the identity proposition expressed in terms of them becomes tautologous. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrgang: 13 Heft: 2 Seiten: 116-127.

In his article "rigid designation" ("journal of philosophy", Volume lxxii, Pages 363-9) hugh s chandler presents an alleged counterexample to the principles that proper names are rigid designators and that identity statements using proper names as designators are non-Contingent. In the present paper this counterexample is shown to rest on a tacit assumption which the principles' proponents need not accept. Chandler's example is redescribed in a way which is both plausible and compatible with the two principles.

Stephen Yablo has attempted recently to revive the notion of contingent identity, identifying this with a relation of L coincidence between objects that are "distinct by nature but the same in the circumstances" (296). Yablo argues convincingly for the need of essentialist metaphysics to recognize some relation of this sort, a relation of "intimate identity-like connections between things" (296) if it is to acknowledge properly the intuitive difference between (i) the nonidentity of a bust B and a (...) hunk of wax H of which it is composed, and (ii) the nonidentity of the hunk H and the Treaty of Versailles. (i) and (ii) are clearly not on the same level. Even though B, like the Treaty of Versailles, fails to be strictly identical to H, it is very closely, and quite specially, related to it. What this relation is is certainly worth a general inquiry. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s modal essentialist argument against materialism remains an obstacle to any prospective Identity Theorist. This paper is an attempt to make room for an Identity Theory without dismissing Kripke’s analytic tools or essentialist intuitions. I propose an explanatory model that can make room for the Identity Theory within the constraints of Kripke’s view; the model is based on ideas from Alan Sidelle’s, “Identity and Identity-like” . My model explains the apparent contingency of some scientific (...) identities by appealing to our epistemic access to the conditions of identity for sensations and brain processes. Pace Kripke, the Identity Theorist can thus explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identity claims. (shrink)

Leibniz’s famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) states that no two things are exactly alike. The PII is commonly thought to be metaphysically necessary for Leibniz: the coexistence of two indiscernibles is metaphysically impossible. This paper argues, against the standard interpretation, that Leibniz’s PII is metaphysically contingent. In other words, while the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a contradiction, the PII is true in the actual world because the Principle of Sufficient Reason rules out violations (...) of the PII. God could have created indiscernibles but he did not because he is wise and does nothing without a sufficient reason. Because it is plausible that all Leibnizian possible worlds are unified by a wise plan, this means that the PII is true in all possible worlds. God could create indiscernibles, but the resulting creation would not be a world. To argue for this conclusion, the paper carefully examines Leibniz’s mature account of metaphysical contingency. It shows that for Leibniz, only states of affairs that imply logical contradictions are metaphysically impossible. Next, it argues that the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a logical contradiction; it would merely imply what Leibniz calls a “moral absurdity,” that is, a violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This means that the PII is true contingently and—since God can do whatever is metaphysically possible—that God can create two things that are exactly alike. (shrink)

When the necessity of identity (NI) is combined with composition as identity (CAI), the contingency of composition (CC) is at risk. In the extant literature, either NI is seen as the basis for a refutation of CAI or CAI is associated with a theory of modality, such that: either NI is renounced (if counterpart theory is adopted); or CC is renounced (if the theory of modal parts is adopted). In this paper, we investigate the prospects of a new (...) variety of CAI, which aims to preserve both NI and CC. This new variety of CAI (CCAI, contingent composition as identity) is the quite natural product of the attempt to make sense of CAI on the background of a broadly Kripkean view of modality, such that one and the same entity is allowed to exist at more than one possible world. CCAI introduces a world-relative kind of identity, which is different from standard identity, and claims that composition is this kind of world-relative identity. CCAI manages to preserve NI and CC. We compare CCAI with Gibbard’s and Gallois’ doctrines of contingent identity and we show that CCAI can be sensibly interpreted as a form of Weak CAI, that is of the thesis that composition is not standard identity, yet is significantly similar to it. (shrink)

Thomas Polger has argued in favor of the mind-brain type-identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type-identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type-materialist must respond to Kripke's modal anti-materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke's argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non-identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. (...) Replace x and y with 'brain states' and 'sensations' and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non-identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But, according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brains states and sensations are non-identical after all. But Polger's account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger's skepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type-materialist. But more importantly, Polger's skepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger. (shrink)

This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.

I show that intuitive and logical considerations do not justify introducing Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals in more than a limited form, as applying to atomic formulas. Once this is accepted, it follows that Leibniz’s Law generalises to all formulas of the first-order Predicate Calculus but not to modal formulas. Among other things, identity turns out to be logically contingent.

abstract: Leibniz holds that there are no two perfectly similar things, a doctrine he calls the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (the PII). What is his attitude toward its modal status? Most commentators hold that the principle is best understood as a necessary truth because it is allegedly entailed by doctrines such as the conceptual containment theory of truth, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), and the denial of purely extrinsic denominations, which are arguably regarded by Leibniz (...) as necessary truths. In this paper, I argue against this consensus and show that (1) neither the conceptual containment theory of truth, nor the PSR, nor the denial of purely extrinsic denominations give Leibniz a good reason to hold that the PII is necessary; (2) Leibniz says that the PII is contingent in the correspondence with Clarke and not for dialectical reasons; and (3) the argument that Leibniz gives for the PII in §21 of his Fifth Letter to Clarke has been misunderstood; properly interpreted, it gives Leibniz a cogent argument rooted in some of his most important doctrines for the conclusion that the PII is a contingent truth. (shrink)

America has become a spiritual wasteland. Three aspects of the human condition are crucial for human beings to recognize if they are to develop a proper identity and agency within the world: these aspects are finitude, contingency, and the spiritual . The notion of the spiritual can be filled out with an understanding of faith. American culture is antithetical to faith, as is demonstrated through a discussion of the basic human practice of conversation. In America, conversation works against faith (...) because conversation has become brutal. Contemporary debate literally works against faith because conversation has become brutal. Contemporary debate literally works to annihilate the reality of others. These reflections support the conclusion that brutality is the antithesis of faithfulness. (shrink)

A new theory of identity statements is put forward which appeals to a basic distinction between two notions of identity, i.e. strict and loose identity. The former is the traditional necessary relation of an object with the object itself, whereas the latter is a contingent relation of reduction of some (at least two) possible unactual objects to a possible actual object. By appealing to strict identity, one can maintain that some tokenings of identity sentences (...) express a semantic content which is both knowable apriori only and a necessary proposition. By appealing to loose identity instead, one can maintain that other tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is both knowable a posteriori only and a contingent proposition. (shrink)

Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and (...) Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press) and indirectly by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. New York: Oxford University Press). Korsgaard understands Humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, Humanity as self-legislation faces what I call ‘Existential dilemma’: either Humanity has specific content, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings; or Humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived of as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., Humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary natural fact that human beings are social creatures, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call ‘Nature/nurture dilemma’, which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford University Press). In conclusion, I address the worry that without the necessary practical identity of Humanity we might not be able to extend our practical and moral concerns to distant fellow human beings by sketching an alternative path to extend such concerns. (shrink)

I present a novel argument against the non-contingency of identity. I first argue that the necessity of distinctness is intimately connected with numerous paradoxes of recombination. In particular, I argue that those who reject the necessity of distinctness have natural solutions to various paradoxes of recombination which have plagued the metaphysics of modality. Moreover, I argue that adding the necessity of distinctness to modest, paradox-free assumptions is sufficient to reinstate the paradoxes. Given that identity is non-contingent only (...) if distinctness is necessary, I suggest this constitutes new evidence against the non-contingency of identity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT An apparent objection against my theory of instantiation as partial identity is that identity is necessary, yet instantiation is often contingent. To rebut the objection, I show how it can make sense that identity is contingent. I begin by showing how it can make sense that identity is temporary. I rely heavily on Andre Gallois’s formal theory of occasional identity, but argue that there is a gap in his explanation of how his (...) formalisms make sense that needs to be filled by appeal to my theory of Aspects. (shrink)

How should an acknowledgement of contingency affect our understanding of moral identity? The book considers various ways of thinking about this question in contemporary moral and political theory. Drawing on the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur, Taylor and others, it defends a realist but pluralist 'strong hermeneutic' view.

Book Information Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity. By Nicholas H. Smith. Routledge. London. 1997. Pp. x + 197. Paperback, £14.99.

Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz''sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply (...) wrong. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles —the principle that no two numerically distinct things are perfectly similar—features prominently in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Despite its centrality to his philosophical system, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what modal status Leibniz ascribes to the PII. On many occasions Leibniz appears to endorse the necessity of the PII. There are a number of passages,however, where Leibniz seems to imply that numerically distinct indiscernibles are possible, which suggests that he subscribes to a merely (...) contingent version of the PII. In this paper I attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency. I argue that Leibniz consistently takes the PII to be necessary and that this view of his shines through even in his correspondence with Clarke. I also show that competing interpretations, on which Leibniz’s PII is contingent, misread a number of crucial passages from this correspondence. (shrink)

"This volume is concerned with how we ought to evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend - discussed here as the "problem of contingent future persons." For it seems that those future persons who are brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by them in any conventional sense. This is a relatively novel problem in ethics and as yet there is simply no consensus on (...) how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. However, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. Intended for professional ethicists, policy researchers, and graduate students, this volume explores the theological implications of the problem and advances the investigation of it both philosophical and in theological terms." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity (...) over time, and, in particular, the disagreement between advocates of perdurance and advocates of endurance as analyses of identity over time; the notion of identity across possible worlds and the question of its relevance to the correct analysis of de re modal discourse; the notion of contingent identity; the question of whether the identity relation is, or is similar to, the composition relation; and the notion of vague identity. A radical position, advocated by Peter Geach, is that these debates, as usually conducted, are void for lack of a subject matter: the notion of absolute identity they presuppose has no application; there is only relative identity. Another increasingly popular view is the one advocated by Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no philosophical problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion. What there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the language of identity. But since these can be restated without the language of identity they are not problems about identity. (For example, it is a puzzle, an aspect of the so-called “problem of personal identity”, whether the same person can have different bodies at different times. But this is just the puzzle whether a person can have different bodies at different times. So since it can be stated without the language of personal “identity”, it is not a problem about identity, but about personhood.) This article provides an overview of the topics indicated above, some assessment of the debates and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

In the paper we introduce a wide range of Anderson-like variants of Gödel's theory and prove for each of them strong completeness theorem wrt. corresponding class of modal structures.These theories — all formulated in the 2nd order modal language with a 2nd order unary predicate of positiveness — differ among themselves with respect of: properties of the necessity operator and of the predicate of positiveness, axioms characterizing identity between 1st sort terms, definitions of identity between 2nd sort terms, (...) the treatment of Godlikeness as a term of the 2nd order, the treatment of necessary existence as a term of the 2nd order if there exists the necessity of its presence, the treatment of Ix (Ix(y) is read: terms x, y are identical), for every 1st sort term x, as a term of the 2nd order if there exists the necessity of its presence.Concerning to semantical commitments, the following are essential: (i) 1st order terms order receive only rigid extensions in the constant objectual 1st order domain; (ii) 2nd order terms receive non-rigid extensions in the constant objectual domain of 2nd order and rigid intensions in the constant conceptual 2nd order domain; (iii) The behavior of the identity between 1st sort terms shifts from possible worlds to possible worlds. (shrink)