The present disarray of psychoanalytic criticism is no doubt a cause for satisfaction among people who never cared for "deep" interpretation and who now feel confirmed in their resolution to allow literature to speak for itself. The only way to do that, however, is to remain silent—a sacrifice beyond the saintliest critic's power. To be a critic is precisely to take a stance different from the author's and to pursue a thesis of one's own. Among the arguments it is possible (...) to make, reductive ones are without a doubt the trickiest, promising Faustian knowledge but often misrepresenting the object of inquiry and deluding the critic into thinking he has cracked the author's code. To forswear all reductions, however, is not the answer: that is the path of phobia. A critic can avoid reductionism, yet still give his intellect free rein, only by keeping his skepticism in working order. If psychoanalysis, originally the most distrustful of psychologies, has by its worldly success and conceptual elaboration become a positive impediment to skepticism, we need be no more surprised than Freud himself would have been at such all-too-human backsliding. A critic's sense of limits, like Freud's own, must come not from the fixed verities of a doctrine but from his awe at how little he can explain. And that awe in turn must derive from his openness to literature—from his sense that the reader in him, happily, will never be fully satisfied by what the critic in him has to say. Frederick Crews has written books on James, Forster, Hawthorne, and Christopher Robin. He is professor of English at the University of California at Berkeley. The present essay is a chapter from a new book, Out of My System: Psychoanalysis, Ideology, and Critical Method. (shrink)

Erdelyi's “unified theory of repression” attempts to rehabilitate psychoanalytic doctrine by exaggerating its compatibility with the findings of cognitive science. In addition, Erdelyi treats Freud's writings as holy writ, any portion of which can be quoted to prove a point. He also relies on a long-discredited account of Freud's “seduction theory” and ignores important links between Freudian assumptions and our recent recovered memory movement.

Legal decisions and theories are frequently condemned as formalistic, yet little discussion has occurred regarding exactly what the term "'formalism" means. In this Article, Professor Schauer examines divergent uses of the term to elucidate its descriptive content. Conceptions offormalism, he argues, involve the notion that rules constrict the choice of the decisionmaker. Our aversion to formalism stems from denial that the language of rules either can or should constrict choice in this way. Yet Professor Schauer argues that this aversion to (...) formalism should be rethought: At times language both can and should restrict decisionmakers. Consequently, the term "'formalistic" should not be used as a blanket condemnation of a decisionmaking process; instead the debate regarding decision according to rules should be confronted on its own terms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Grand Theory on Trial:Kafka, Derrida, and the Will to PowerNina Pelikan StrausIn summa: so that man may respect himself he must be capable of doing evil.(Nietzsche, The Will to Power)1IThe following pages offer evidence that in The Trial Kafka invents characters who deploy a Nietzschean-sourced language of deconstruction related to what we now call theory; that in "Before the Law" Kafka's priest deconstructs The Law to which K. is (...) subjected, and that Kafka exposes the discursive devices by which laws can be deconstructed. Kafka's text then opens the way to another kind of deconstruction of that-which-is-already-deconstructed as performed by Jacques Derrida in his 1987 essay, "Before the Law."2 Although this claim may seem self-evident or rhetorically circular to some readers of Kafka and his commentators, it is the result of years of puzzlement concerning the impact of Grand Theory in American criticism.This puzzlement, often accompanied by antagonism, is shared by critics whose essays comprise Patia's and Corral's Theory's Empire: An Anthology of Dissent. The 2005 volume includes major reassessments of poststructuralist theory, notably Derrida's, by Tzetan Todorov, Thomas Nagel, M. H. Abrams, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Frederick Crews, René Welleck, David Bromwich, and others. While the deconstructionist idea of the arbitrariness of the signifier appears to be a central target of these critics' analysis, it is precisely the arbitrariness of the signifier called the Law that Kafka explores in The Trial.Kafka's intended relation to what he exposes has been much debated. [End Page 378] Stanley Corngold refers to the "undecidability" of Kafka's work and its "narrative mood of neutrality."3 The emphasis on "undecidability" in Kafka can be viewed as symptomatic of the influence of French Theory embraced by the American literary academy in the 1970s and 1980s. This latter view of Kafka's writing contrasts sharply with an earlier view, such as Hannah Arendt's, that The Trial, for all its ambiguity and multivalence, carries precise political meanings and warnings that Kafka fully intended. The deconstructionist moment did not bury convictions such as Adorno's or Canetti's that "from the beginning, Kafka sided with the humiliated,"4 or that for "a generation of early readers Joseph K.'s arrest was... a prophetic anticipation of the fate awaiting Hitler's victims."5 But deconstruction's skeptical effect undermined the certitude that Kafka was a politically important novelist. For its detractors, the deconstructionist view that there is "nothing outside of the text" ignores that texts like Kafka's have shaped human lives and human history. Wellek, who helped to introduce French theory to American literature departments, now asserts that theory has destroyed literary studies, while Frederick Crews argues that "Derrida's judgment that 'there is nothing outside the text' automatically precludes recourse to evidence." In Crews's view, "both Derrida and his myriad followers think nothing of appropriating and denaturing propositions from systems of thought whose premises they have already rejected." Thomas Nagel goes further in condemning "post-modern relativism" as a "quick fix" which puts reason to sleep. In Theory's Empire, Derrida's language is described as a "maze," a "prison house of language," a "limbo of combined attention and nonassertion."6The arguments against deconstruction theory can scarcely be summarized here, but a sampling of the commentaries in Theory's Empire on Derrida can lead us through and eventually back to what is or isn't at political stake in reading The Trial. Two questions are of concern: How much of Kafka's political acumen does Derrida ignore or misread in his commentary on "Before the Law"? And: to what degree do Derrida's rhetorical devices and ingenious language games resemble the language of the Courtiers who torture Joseph K.? What might such an analogy imply? Other questions follow, such as David Bromwich's very important ones. "About the status of Derrida's procedures there was always a puzzle," he writes. "Was deconstruction a technique proper to the commentator, and necessary as a tactic against the naïve constructionism of the author? Or was it something the author's writing practiced for itself, in... (shrink)

In this article, we argue that John Henry Newman was right to think that our passional nature can play a legitimate epistemic role. First, we unpack the standard objection to Newman’s understanding of the relationship between our passional nature and the evidential basis of faith. Second, we argue that the standard objection to Newman operates with a narrow definition of evidence. After challenging this notion, we then offer a broader and more humane understanding of evidence. Third, we survey recent scholarship (...) arguing that emotions, a key aspect of our passional nature, are cognitive. In this light, they plausibly have a proper epistemic role. Fourth, we defend Newman’s reliance on the passional nature in epistemic matters by showing how reasonable it is in light of this recent work on evidence and the nature of emotions. Newman’s insistence that the formation of a right state of heart and mind is crucial for epistemic success is far from untenable. (shrink)

For the first time in Ukrainian historiography the Battle of Legnano 29 May1176 inthe context of European origin and formation of the professional army has been analyzed in this study. In this battle the first European professional military formation, equipped and trained by the city and commune of Milan, defeated the mighty army, formed with well-armed and prepared German knights. This army was headed by the Emperor Frederick I Barbaros, who was an experienced commander. Particular attention is paid to (...) the reasons of emergence of the first professional formations and infantry evolution, which allowed to resist armored knightly cavalry. The lack of necessary resources and the inability to advance sufficient number of mighty men forced the Italian cities-communes, among which Milan was one of the largest centers of arms crafts at the end of the twelfth century, to form the army, which could be manned with the free segments of the population of not noble origin and resist knightly cavalry. In practice, this led to formation of the armored infantry, which returned to modernized ancient hoplites tactics. Readiness of such infantry which demonstrated its feasibility in the Battle of Legnano required resources and professionalism. The problems of maintaining and training of professional formations led to the search for reduction of their strength due to the efficiency of technical innovations, one of which was the use of chariots bound round with metal and manned with crew armed with fighting scythes - hizarmams. But this experiment did not justify itself or may have been devised by the later Milan chronicler Galvani Fiamma. The battle of Legnano initiated hired professional contingent of condottieres, which were widely used in Italian cities-states in the XIII-XV centuries. (shrink)

The analysis of function-ascribing statements, such as “the function of x is y”, is proving to be a difficult matter. It is difficult because we are only beginning to see the complexity which is involved in ascribing functions. The process of discovery has been slow and tedious, with each newly constructed analysis of the meaning of functional ascriptions yielding insights into the structure of functional analysis and functional explanation. However, as each analysis is, in turn, dismantled, we seem to see (...) our insights slip away. In the wake of each exchange, a new member is added to the list of desiderata for an analysis of function-ascribing statements. Thus, the matter of finding a proper analysis of function attributions becomes more and more complex. (shrink)

Feminist scholars have been critical of the expectations placed upon mothers to accomplish a perfect version of motherhood, but have often failed to interrogate the values about normalcy and disability imbedded in modern mothering ideologies. Mothers with disabilities are well positioned to expose the underlying beliefs about normalcy with which all mothers must contend. Drawing from interviews and focus groups conducted with mothers who have physical and sensory disabilities, I explore Deaf/disabled women’s experiences negotiating the scientific motherhood regime. Illuminating a (...) paradox, I argue these women are labeled “risky mothers” under scientific motherhood, which prizes the management of risk and the prevention of disability. Yet, these mothers are simultaneously rendered invisible by inaccessible and inflexible medical practices, and by a consumer market of expert advice which prescribes that mothers inhabit a typical body. These women’s experiences illuminate the normalcy project as a central tenet of scientific motherhood. (shrink)

Unger’s interests encompass both criticisms of the existing, dominant "liberal" order and constructive suggestions about nascent possibilities of postliberal alternatives. The richness and erudition of several hundred pages cannot possibly be suggested in the few paragraphs comprising this section of a review article; therefore, I shall sketch the main lines of the argument baldly, without attempting to reproduce the subtle expository network woven by Unger himself.

The authors explore how technique via propaganda has replaced the word with images creating a mass society and limiting the ability of people to act as individuals. They begin by looking at how words affect human society and how they have changed over time. They explore how technology has altered the meaning of words in order to create a more efficient world. Words become disconnected from time and space through the use of timeless images. The institutions of society support the (...) humiliation of the word to create a world where technique can flourish. Ellul provides a way of reconciling the loss of power for words via a Christian living as cross-bearers. Only individuals and not the institution are capable of changing society. Ellul believes that the salvation of the word and restoration of a more humane society depends on individuals living the faith. (shrink)

Everywhere I go, I'm asked if I think the universities stifle writers. My opinion is that they don't stifle enough of them. ---Flannery O'Connor, Mystery and Manners, p. 84, as quoted by Frederick Crews, The Critics Bear it Away, pp. 143--144..

Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..

I distinguish arguments and arguing and I explain some important logical features of arguments. I then explain how philosophers have been misled, apparently by Euclid, into giving seriously mistaken accounts of arguing. I give a few examples. I then offer a seven-step guide on how to argue. After that, I conclude.

Jacobi’s importance in the history of German philosophy has long been recognized. Yet his writings have been little studied in the English-speaking world, mainly because very few of them have been translated. George di Giovanni’s translation and edition of some of Jacobi’s main philosophical writings now fills this serious gap. This is the first major scholarly edition in English of Jacobi’s writings. The quality of the translation and the editing set a high standard for future work. Giovanni’s translations capture the (...) freshness and fluency of the German original, and his scholarly notes leave nothing to be desired in thoroughness and erudition. But it is not only students who will appreciate this volume. The long introduction, and the many notes, will be useful even for specialists. It is among the very best scholarship on Jacobi in any language. (shrink)

Law’s ‘normativity’, its capacity to impose obligations, is among the great mysteries of jurisprudence; or so the bulk of the literature dedicated to the topic strongly suggests. As mysteries typically do, the mystery of law’s ‘normativity’ derives from various sources. One of them is the question as to the interrelation of facts and norms.

There is a dilemma facing mainstream environmental ethicists. One of our leading spokesmen, Holmes Rolston, III, offers a rich ethical position, but one that lacks internal connections between principles relevant to the environment and principles relevant to human society. These principles are just different; thus no higher-order guidance is available to cope with cases of conflict between them. A second major spokesman, Baird Callicott, recommends a "land ethics" that is internally coherent but sadly inadequate for addressing many distinctly human ethical (...) concerns. To escape this dilemma I advocate an alternative worldview, "Personalistic Organicism." On this view, inspired by Alfred North Whitehead, a continuum of values, pervading the universe, can undergird a unified ethics in which human persons are recognized as especially valuable without rupturing the continuities that bind humanity to the rest of the living (and nonliving) environment. (shrink)

Many environmental thinkers are torn in two opposing directions at once. For good reasons we are appalled by the damage that has been done to the earth by the ethos of heedless anthropocentric individualism, which has achieved its colossal feats of exploitation, encouraged to selfishness by its world view—of relation-free atoms—while chanting ‘reduction’ as its mantra. But also for good reasons we are repelled, at the other extreme, by environmentally correct images of mindless biocentric collectivisms in which precious personal values (...) are overridden for the good of some healthy beehive ‘whole’. (shrink)

This article explores the interrelationships and tensions between public engagement in higher education and media discourse. It tracks the mediated trajectory of an attempt by a group of academics to connect with audiences beyond academia, comparing a magazine article in which their opinions first became public, to its recontextualisation across various UK newspapers and their Internet spin-offs. A mediated stylistic analysis reveals the discursive, rhetorical and performative techniques via which a sociologically imaginative attempt to transform a seemingly-personal-trouble into a definitively-public-issue (...) got recontextualised as if merely the public projection of personal angst. The article concludes by noting that in an era where public engagement increasingly means mediated public engagement, to take seriously the interactive, intertextual and rhetorical affordances of media discourse is to understand that and how sociologically imaginative work can – but does not always – end up circulating within public debate. (shrink)

Over the past 2,000 years, the concept of charity has moved from the personal care of the poor mandated by religious conviction to a multibillion dollar business. The culture of technological efficiency helped create this transformation. The authors explore the origins of charity and show how technology has drastically altered its form and function.

This is a collection of nineteen essays in the tradition of critical rationalism (as advocated by Karl Popper). All but one of the essays is previously unpublished and the one previously published paper has undergone significant revisions. The first four essays tackle topics in the philosophy of science, the first being an exposition of Popper's views, the others discussing falsifiability, truth, the aim of science, and ceteris-paribus law-statements. Five essays follow concerned with Reason, reasoning and reasons, in which faulty conceptions (...) of theoretical and practical reason are criticised, the nature and uses of argument are discussed, and the rationality of debate, agreement and disagreement are explained. Next, there are two papers on economics, one of which is a substantial critique of the so-called subjective theory of value, the other a brief discussion of entrepreneurial insight. The last section of the book contains a miscellany of eight critical essays in which some errors of contemporary philosophers are exposed regarding issues including the interpretation of Popper’s work, the Gettier problem, no-platforming, open-mindedness, homosexual equality, tolerance, philosophical heuristics and the conduct of debate. (shrink)